was August, 1888. At that term the defendant | for removal came after the term of the court at had permission to file an additional plea. Aft- which by the state law and rule of the court er this was done, and on the last day of the the defendant was required to answer or plead term, plaintiff, by permission of the court, in- to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff. creased his claim for damages to $10,000, and Up to the close of the term at which the cause continued the cause to the next term. Before could first have been tried, the defendant had the next term of the court the defendant filed no right or power to remove the cause for diits petition for the removal of the cause to this verse citizenship, because the plaintiff did not. court, and presented it for action to the state claim more than $2,000. court, at its next session, December, 1888. This petition asked for removal upon two grounds: (1) the adverse citizenship of the par ties; (2) upon the existence of local prejudice and influence. The state court ordered the removal upon the first ground, and has made no reference to the second ground. The defendant, upon the first day of the present term of this court, presented its petition, and along with it an affidavit in its support, both averring in positive terms that "From prejudice or local influence defendant will not be able to obtain justice in the state court, or in any other state court to which the defendant might remove the cause under the laws of the State, because of prejudice or local influence." Defendant asks the court to remove the cause from the state court to this court, under the provisions of the fourth clause, section 2, of the Act of March 3, 1887. Plaintiff has filed an answer to this petition, denying the truth of its allegations and averments as to local prejudice, and has accompanied this answer with a considerable number of affidavits of intelligent and respectable persons strongly sustaining this answer. Plaintiff moves to remand the suit to the state court: first, because the application for removal upon the ground of diverse citizenship came too late; and second, because it is shown that the local prejudice or influence on account of which a removal is asked does not exist. There is no question but that the application The question is, Can a plaintiff prevent, under the law, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States, by commencing his suit, claiming $2,000 or less, joining issue at the return term with his adversary, and at the trial term, or some later period, amend his writ by increasing his claim to a sum within the jurisdiction of the federal court? The plaintiff is a citizen of this State; the defendant, of Ohio. The language of the Act of 1887 is clear in regard to the time when the removal must be made for this character of citizenship. "He may make and file a petition in such suit in such state court at the time or any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the State or the rule of the state court in which such suit is brought to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff." All There is no room for construction here. is clear and unambiguous. But what was the suit in this case? The damages-the money plaintiff seeks to recover-is the gravamen, the heart, the soul of his suit. The suit he began was a suit for $2,000, and such a suit it remained until the closing hour of the first term at which it could have been tried, when the plaintiff went into court and converted his suit for $2,000 into a suit for $10,000. The $2,000 suit disappeared. It merged into and was swallowed up by a suit for $10,000. The life of the new suit began at the moment the first suit expired. Plaintiff's complaint was no longer for $2,000, but it became a complaint for five times that sum. The affidavit must be in substantial accordance with the words of the statute. Baltimore, P. & C. R. Co. v. New Albany & S. R. Co. 53 Ind. 597. See Bowen v. Chase, 7 Blatchf. 255; Desty, Rem. Causes, 101. within the category of removable causes. Ex parte | udice or local influence exists must be shown to Anderson, 3 Woods, 124; McMurdy v. Conn. Gen. L. | the circuit court by oral testimony or by affidavit. Ins. Co. 4 W. N. C. 18; Tunstall v. Madison Parish, Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 114. 30 La. Ann. 471; Lalor v. Dunning, 56 How. Pr. 209. The facts upon which the petitioner bases his right must be made to appear, but no particular mode is prescribed. It may be by admission of parties, by affidavit, or by the testimony of witnesses (People v. Chicago Superior Ct. 34 Ill. 356); and such as are positive and express the facts on which it depends and not argumentative. Brown v. Keene, 33 U. S. 8 Pet. 112 (8 L. ed. 885)-citing Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 19, 382 (1 L. ed. 491, 646); Abercrombie v. Dupuis, 5 U. S. 1 Cranch, 343 (2 L. ed. 129); Wood v. Wagnon, 6 U. S. 2 Cranch, 9 (2 L. ed. 191): Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U. S. 2 Cranch, 128 (2 L. ed. 229). It should point out what the question is, and how and where it will arise. Trafton v. Nougues, 4 Sawy. 178. If a petition be defective, it may be amended, as a matter of right; and if not verified, a verified petition may be filed. Delaware R. Constr. Co. v. Davenport & St. P. R. Co. 46 Iowa, 496; Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 273. When filed it cannot be contradicted or controverted. Stewart v. Mordecai, 40 Ga. 1. Affidavit for removal. Under section 2, Act of 1887, a mere formal affidavit by the defendant that he believes that he cannot obtain justice because of prejudice or local influence is not sufficient; but the fact that such prej But it is not generally necessary to state the reasons or facts showing the local prejudice or influence. Sands v. Smith, 1 Dill. 298, note; Meadow Valley Min. Co. v. Dodds, 7 Nev. 143; Quigley v. Cent. Pac. R. Co. 11 Nev. 350. An affidavit "to the best of his knowledge and belief” is sufficient. Stoker v. Leavenworth, 7 La. 390; De Camp v. N. J. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 2 Sweeney, 481. That he had reason to believe, and did believe, that by reason of prejudice and local influence he would not be able to obtain justice in that forum is sufficient. Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. supra. It is sufficient that defendants have made oath that they so believe, without setting forth the facts or circumstances on which such belief is founded. Meadow Valley Min. Co. v. Dodds, supra. See also Bowen v. Chase, supra; Fisk v. Henarie, 32 Fed. Rep. 421. But if made on his belief alone, it is insufficient. Cooper v. Condon, 15 Kan. 572; Tunstall v. Madison Parish, 30 La. Ann. 471; Baltimore, P. & C. R. Co. v. New Albany & S. R. Co. 53 Ind. 597. The reason why the party applying does not make Under the laws of Tennessee process issued upon a suit instituted must be executed at least five days before the time for the meeting of the court, so as to be issuable at that term. If such process be executed at a later day it is not issuable until the next succeeding term. The suit for $10,000 did not begin until the last day of the August Term, 1888, of the court; and the suit, according to the letter and spirit of the Act of 1887, would not be returnable at the shortest before the next term of the court, and defendant's petition was filed before that time. In general phrase, and in most respects, the amendment increasing the damages did not create a new suit; but so far as the jurisdiction of this court is concerned it was new, and a liberal interpretation will be allowed to prevent the flagrant and intentional defeat of its jurisdiction. "If the defendant have a right to the removal, he cannot be deprived of it by the allowance by the state court of an amendment reducing the sum claimed after the right of removal is complete." Speer, Rem. Causes, 81; Kanouse v. Martin, 56 U. S. 15 How. 198 [14 L. ed. 660]. This being true, is not the converse of the proposition true; that is, that a person not entitled to a removal, who becomes entitled to it, so far as the jurisdictional amount is concerned, by reason of an amendment allowed by the state court after the time had elapsed within which his removal of the suit might have been made, shall not be deprived of his right to remove the suit? The reasons why the removal of the cause should not be defeated in one case apply with equal cogency to the other. Had the defendant filed its petition and bond for removal the moment after the amendment was made increasing the damages claimed, his attitude in the affidavit should be given. Cooper v. Condon, | 15 Kan. 572. But that "Plaintiff had reason to and does believe that from prejudice he will not be able to obtain Justice in the state court," is not sufficient without facts showing the reasonableness of his belief. Sands v. Smith, 1 Dill. 298, note; Goodrich v. Hunton, 29 La. Ann. 372. The omission of the words "and does believe" is fatal. Baltimore, P. & C. R. Co. v. New Albany & S. R. Co. 53 Ind. 597. By whom to be made. Under the prejudice and local influence clause, the affidavit in the case of a petition for removal by a natural person must be made by the party in question. A removal cannot be had upon an affidavit made by his attorney, agent or any other person on his behalf. Duff v. Duff, 31 Fed. Rep. 772. The want of an affidavit appearing on the face of the record, the mere filing of a petition and affidavit of some person, other than the party, does not work a removal under the statute. Ibid. the case would have been in no wise changed from that which it occupies. But suppose the position taken in regard to the removal ordered by the state court be wrong, how stands the case with regard to the application made to this court for removal on account of local prejudice or influence? In Lookout Mountain Railroad Company v. Houston, 32 Fed. Rep. 711, in which there was an application for removal because of local prejudice or influence, it was held that an ap plication in such a case must be filed at the return term of the cause, or before. If that be correct, the application in this suit would be in time, if the positions assumed upon the first ground of removal be tenable. The weight of opinion, however, so far as cases have been adjudged, is that such removal may be made at any time before the final bearing of the case. Judge Deady, an excellent authority, so holds in Fisk v. Henarie, 32 Fed. Rep. 417. And so does that eminent jurist, Judge Jackson, of this circuit, in Whelan v. New York Railroad Company, 35 Fed. Rep. 849-866. A very able, clear and well considered opinion has been rendered by him in this case; and the case decided by Judge Jackson is identical with the case in hand in most of the points of contention raised for determination. The opinion of the Circuit Judge will be accepted as the law of this case, not only because of the authority of the decision as a judicial exposition, but also for the sake of the harmony and agreement that should prevail, if practicable, in the administration of the law by different judges presiding over the same court. In passing, it may be observed that the words "local prejudice or influence" are used. They are connected disjunctively. If there be local How taken and certified. The affidavit must be taken and certified in accordance with the laws of the State, and must be authenticated according to such laws. Bowen v. Chase, 7 Blatchf. 255; Florance v. Butler, 9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 63. And if out of the State by a commissioner, it must be certified to by the Secretary of the State. Florance v. Butler, supra. The affidavit may be filed in the state court, and a certified copy thereof sent up to the circuit court. Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 114. Practice and procedure in circuit court. The Act of 1867 invests the circuit court with ju risdiction to determine the suit, although that court could not have taken original cognizance of the case. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (23 L. ed. 524). The provision of the Act of 1887, authorizing the court to examine under the truth of an affidavit for removal of a case from a state court, applies only to cases removed before the passage of said Act on the application of the plaintiff; otherwise, such affidavit being only a condition imposed on the party seeking the removal, it cannot be questioned or contradicted; nor is it necessary that the affiant should state the grounds of his belief. Fisk v. Hen It may be made by an agent or attorney. Dennis v. Alachua Co. 3 Woods, 683; Kain v. Texas Pac. R. Co. 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 46, 3 Cent. L. J. 12; contra, Mil-arie, 32 Fed. Rep. 417. ler v. Finn, 1 Neb. 254. When the petitioner is a corporation, the petition may be signed, and the affidavit be made by some person authorized to represent the corporation. But the authority of any person assuming to represent it must appear. Mahone v. Manchester & L. R. Corp. 111 Mass. 75; Duff v. Duff, supra. The Act of 1887 does not change the practice as it formerly existed, so far as concerns defendants seeking to remove from state to federal courts on the ground of prejudice or local influence. It is the duty of the circuit court, on the application of the other party, to examine into the truth of the affidavit. Hills v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 81. 1889. MONROE V. HANNON. prejudice, the cause may be removed, or if no local prejudice exists, and there be local influence so powerful and operative as to prevent the defendant from obtaining justice, he may remove. If there be prejudice against the defendant, or if the influence and power of the plaintiff or any other local influence dominate the public mind at the place where the suit is instituted, so that he cannot have justice, the cause may be removed. Judge Jackson "In conferring upon the Circuit Court of the United States the authority to act upon the application for removal of suits from state courts, Congress certainly never intended to make the question as to the existence or nonexistence of prejudice or local influence, which would prevent a nonresident citizen defendant from obtaining justice in the local courts, a jurisdictional fact, such as would entitle the side opposing the removal to dispute its truth and put the matter in issue for formal trial." 35 Fed. Rep. 862. The fourth clause of section 2, Act of March 3, 1887, is wide reaching in its changes of the law previously existing. It enlarges its scope It does not in almost every direction but one. allow a plaintiff to remove his suit. It emIn the same connection it is held that a petibraces all controversies between citizens of difIt tion and affidavit such as have been made in ferent States without regard to amount. permits or authorizes removal, though some of this case made it appear that the cause should the defendants may be residents, or citizens be removed. This decision on this point conrather, of the State in which the plaintiff re-curs with that of Judge Deady in Fisk v. Hensides. Any defendant, being a nonresident, may remove the suit. "It extends to all controversies, without regard to amount; to all suits, whether they can be estimated in dollars and cents." Speer, Rem. Causes, 62; Fales v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 32 Fed. Rep. 673; Whelan v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. supra. The Act under consideration provides for the removal of the cause by this court, instead of by the state court. It must be made to appear to this court that the cause is removable, and it removes it. How it shall be made to appear that it is removable is, to some extent, an unsettled question. In Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Company, 33 Fed. Rep. 114, Judge Brewer held that a petition and affidavit such as have been filed by the defendant in this case are not such steps as will authorize a removal; that it must appear to the court in some method that may enable it to determine the fact as to whether there is prejudice. If this be a correct decision of the law, this case should not be removed. The decision of Judge Jackson, in the Whelan Case, supra, however, makes a different determination; and his conclusions have been reached after a wide range of examination, and after deliberate and careful consideration, and it has arie, 32 Fed. Rep. 417-421, and is sustained in Speer on Removal of Causes, 63. Judge Speer in his work on Removals under the Act of March 3, 1887, page 62, says: "It is quite possible that in this far reaching statute Congress intended to correct the mischief pointed out in Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 498 [29 L. ed. 460]. There it was held that before the suit could be removed it must have the money value fixed by the statute. Now, if local prejudice is a ground of removal from the local court in any controversy between citizens of different States, there is no reason why it should not have the same effect in all controversies. Undeniably there is often much local excitement and prejudice on the trial of proceedings for divorce, habeas corpus, or other suits where the matter in dispute cannot be estimated and ascertained in money. The federal courts are not courts where nonresidents have an undue advantage, and it is no injustice to residents to require them to litigate therein their controversies with citizens of other States." If this suit has not already been removed to this court by the order made by the state court, it should be removed under the application to this court, The order for removal is made, and plaintiff's motion to remand is overruled. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUPREME COURT. Charles R. MONROE & Co. v. Edward J. HANNAN et al., Appts. (....Mackey....) A lien in favor of "the contractor, subcontractor, material man, etc.," under the Act of Congress of 1884, chapter 143,* relating to the Dis*The section of the Act giving a mechanics' lien in the District of Columbia which designates the parties entitled thereto is as follows: trict of Columbia, does not extend to a subcontractor under a subcontractor. (April 8, 1889.) APPEAL by defendants, from an order of Be it enacted, By the Senate and House of Repre-engine, machinery or other thing placed in said sentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That every building hereafter erected or repaired by the owner or his agent in the District of Columbia, and the lot or lots of ground of the owner upon which the same is being erected or repaired, shall be subject to a lien in favor of the contractor, subcontractor, material a decree for plaintiffs in a suit in equity to enforce a mechanics' lien. Bill dismissed. The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Before Hagner, James and Bradley, JJ. Mr. Samuel Maddox, for defendants, appellants: The Law of Illinois, 1869, provides that every subcontractor, mechanic, workman, or other person who shall, in conformity with the terms of the contract between the owner of the land and the original contractor, perform any labor or furnish any material in building the house, etc., shall have a lien for the value of the work or material. The laborer employed under a subcontractor is not protected by this statute. Rothgerber v. Dupuy, 64 Ill. 452. This law does not extend the lien of mechanics and material men beyond the first subcontractor. Ahern v. Evans, 66 Ill. 125. The party furnishing materials to a subcontractor is not entitled to a lien. Newhall v. Kastens, 70 Ill. 156; Smith Bridge Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & St. L. R. Co. 72 Ill. 506. In Wisconsin, where the law is very similar, a like construction was given to it. Kirby v. McGarry, 16 Wis 63. Under the law of Pennsylvania it has been uniformly held that there must be privity between the owner and the subcontractor to enable the latter to charge the building with the lien for the lumber he purchases of others in order to fill his own contract. Duff v. Hoffman, 63 Pa. 191. Materials furnished a subcontractor will not give a lien. Harlan v. Rand, 27 Pa. 511; Smith v. Stokes, 10 W. N. C. 6. A late law of that State, intended to extend the provisions of the Laws of 1836 and 1845 so as to give a right of lien to the contractors and employés under a subcontractor has recently been declared unconstitutional and void. Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co. 122 Pa. 627, 1 L. R. A. 361, 22 W. N. C. 435. Messrs. James Hoban and Woodbury Wheeler, for C. R. Monroe & Co., appellees: The Lien Law gave Monroe & Company a right to furnish the bricks and to be paid for them the amount as ascertained by the court. Spalding v. Dodge (D. C.), 16 Washington Law Rep. 11 Cent. Rep. 715. The law is liberally construed in favor of the lienor. Flagstaff S. Min. Co. v. Cullins, 104 U. S. 176 (26 L. ed. 704). The defendants having filed a bond under the statute and obtained a release of their property are estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the law. Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 (26 L. ed. 187); U. S. v. Hudson, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 395 (19 L. ed. 937); Phila., W. & B. R. Co. v. Howard, 54 U. S. 13 How. 307 (14 L. ed. 157). Monroe's liability is to be strictly construed. McMicken v. Webb, 47 U. S. 6 How. 292 (12 L. ed. 443); Miller v. Stewart, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 680 (6 L. ed. 189); Sprigg v. Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 201 (10 L. ed. 419). Even if liable beyond the terms of the bond, the change in the contract released him. Martin v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689); Reese v. U. S. 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 13 (19 L. ed. 541); 39 Minn. 439. In no event could Monroe be liable beyond the penalty of the bond, viz., $500. McGill v. Bank of U. S. 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 511 (6 L. ed. 711); Humphreys v. Leggett, 50 U. S. 9 How. 297 (13 L. ed. 145). Hagner, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This bill was filed by C. R. Monroe & Co. to enforce a mechanics' lien against Edward J. Hannan. Hannan, the proprietor of sundry lots, in February, 1888, entered into a contract with Goodwin under which the latter undertook to build eleven houses on these lots for $13,683. In the same month Ward & Mockabee made an offer to Goodwin to do the brick work under his contract on the buildings, in these words: "Mr. Goodwin: We will agree to furnish material and to build and complete the brick work on eleven houses on the corner of Tenth and G. Streets, southeast, according to plans and specifications, for $4,481. Ward & Mockabee.' Goodwin, not being acquainted with these parties, required them to execute a bond to secure the owner; and on the 15th of February Ward & Mockabee entered into a bond with Monroe, one of the plaintiffs, as their surety, with this condition: "Whereas, the said Ward & Mockabee on the 15th day of February, 1888, have agreed to build all the brick work on eleven houses on the corner of Tenth and G Streets, southeast, in Washington, D. C., for the sum of $4,481 in a complete and workmanlike manner; Now, if the said Ward & Mockabee shall well and truly keep and perform all and each of the covenants herein contained, then this obligation to be null and void; otherwise, to be and remain in full force, effect and virtue in law." The buildings were commenced, and the work proceeded until early in April, when some differences about payment occurring between Hannan and Ward & Mockabee, the latter, according to Hannan's statement, declared they had abandoned the job and proceeded to tear down the scaffolding and throw down the ladders. Hannan appeared on the ground and asked for an explanation of their conduct; whereupon Ward declared they did not intend to do another particle of work there; and he was actually engaged in throwing down the poles, etc., when Hannan interfered and Ward was then put off the buildings. Hannan further testified that he went at once and informed Monroe that Ward & Mockabee had thrown up the contract, and called upon him as surety in the bond to complete the buildings; and declared that in default he would hold him on the bond. Monroe & Co. had previously made a subcontract with Ward & Mockabee to supply all the brick which were to be placed in the buildings, and had furnished a considerable amount up to that time. After Hannan's visit Monroe 1889. MONROE V. HANNAN. went to the buildings and assumed charge of them, and placed O'Neal, who had been the foreman of Ward & Mockabee, in control of the work. The houses were finished in due course of time; payments for bricks being made to Monroe during the progress of the work, of considerable amounts by Goodwin, and also by Hannan. Many of these allegations of Hannan are controverted by the plaintiffs. They deny that they voluntarily abandoned the work, but insist that Hannan wrongfully discharged them. They also insist that Monroe completed the work under a special employment by Hannan, after Ward & Mockabee left the buildings, and not in his character as surety on the bond. There is a considerable mass of testimony on these points, but we have no hesitation in saying that the weight of the evidence is decidedly in support of the statement of Hannan upon each of the controverted points. After the work was completed the complainants made out their bill for $1,184.66 as the balance due them, after giving the proper credits; with the heading "Ward & Mockabee to C. R. Monroe & Co., Dr.," and Monroe & Co. brought suit upon the account and recovered a judgment against Ward & Mockabee for this amount. Hannan alleged in his answer that he had paid all of the $4,481, stipulated to be paid for all the brick work, excepting the sum of $200. Afterwards he said that on a recast of the account it appeared he owed but $83, and that amount he then deposited in court. At a later period, after he and Goodwin had re-examined the accounts, it was testified that only $53 was due. owner, by bricklayers, carpenters, joiners or In 1833 Congress passed a law which was al- The Act enumerated the classes of persons Then came the Act of 1857, which constituted the whole of chapter 20 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, Under neither of these excepting the last two sections, which are taken from the Act of 1870. Acts had the subcontractor any lien. By the Act of 1870 the word subcontractor was introduced for the first time into our law; but that Act only gave to the subcontractor the right to claim from the owner after due notice the value of services rendered; but gave no lien against the property. The Act of 1884, chapter 143, for the first time gave a lien to the subcontractor. The first section of this Act declares "That every building hereafter erected or repaired by the owner, or his agent in the District of Columbia, and the lot or lots of ground of the owner upon which the same is being erected or repaired, shall be subject to a lien in favor of the But it is plainly proved that Hannan has paid all of the $4,481 except a small sum, and that no such amount as $1,184 remains unpaid by him on the contract with Ward & Mockabee. If Hannan were decreed to pay the complain-contractor, subcontractor, material man, jourants' claim, it would not be because he has not paid all he contracted to pay, and the full value of the work, but because the claimants have secured a legal advantage by force of the statute, that would compel him to pay again a part of what he has once paid. neyman and laborer respectively; for the payment for work or materials contracted for or about the erection, construction or repairing of such building, and also for any engine, machinery or other thing placed in said building or connected therewith, so as to be a fixture, etc.; Provided, The person claiming the lien shall file the notice prescribed by the second section of the Act; and Provided, further, That the lien shall not exceed or be enforced for a greater sum than the amount of the original contract for the erection or repair of said build The bill presents the important question whether the subcontractors under subcontractors have the right to invoke the provisions of the Act of 1884, which gives a lien upon the property of the house owner to the contractor, subcontractors, material man, journeymen and laborers, for work done and materials fur-ing or buildings." nished. It is one that concerns a large class of people in this community, and its proper decision is a matter of general interest. No such claim could have been entertained in this District, prior to the passage of the Act of 1884, although laws to secure mechanics' liens have been in operation here for a longer time perhaps than in any other jurisdiction. Mr. Sergeant in his work on Mechanics' Liens, claims that the earliest legislation in this country or in England, securing a lien to mechanics, was the Pennsylvania Law of 1806. But the Maryland Act of 1791, chapter 45, designed to apply to the future federal city, in the Territory of Columbia, as it was then called, allowed a lien for work on houses in Washington to be performed under a written contract with the The 12th section declares "That any person who shall furnish, at the request of the owner or his agent, materials to do any work on, or labor in, filling up any lot or in erecting or constructing any wharf thereon, etc., shall be entitled to enforce a lien therefor upon the lots or wharves." And the 13th section provides that any mechanic or artisan who shall make, alter or repair any article of personal property, at the request of the owner, shall have a lien thereon for his just and reasonable charges, for his work done and materials furnished, etc. The only persons protected by the last two sections are such as deal directly with the owner or his agent; of course no subcontractor not directly in privity with the owner could claim any benefit of their provisions. |