Their leaders are also well read in the history of the early days of the Constitution, a subject which the Northern people prefer to ignore, and they could not anticipate that recourse would be had to "coercion," which Hamilton, the idol of the Northern Unionists, had stigmatised as "madness." They knew that one of the chief objects for which the Constitution was framed, was to avert the impending danger of civil war; possessed of this knowledge, they could hardly anticipate that civil war would be invoked to maintain it. Indeed, on turning to peruse it they would find announced as one of its objects, "to insure domestic tranquillity." Strange indeed it were to expect that such an object would be sought with fire and sword. They knew also that no military force existed at the command of the Government, with which such an undertaking could be attempted. Not easily would any mind be brought to believe that the sister States would volunteer on such a service, least of all of them the people of the metropolis, New York-a city grown great upon their trade, and long united in bonds of the warmest alliance. It was the member for that State, who, as one of the founders of the Republic, had discarded with repugnance the idea that any State would ever be sunk so low as to be employed in coercing a sister State. But although the people of the South, thoroughly convinced of their constitutional right to secede, had also these reasons to expect that the separation might be peacefully effected-still more than this was required. No assertion of inde pendence can be a reasonable act, unless those who announce it be prepared to maintain it, by surer means than reliance on the calm judgment or fraternal feeling of others. The measure has some of the features of a challenge, which none should offer unless prepared for any consequence. It was the plain duty of the leaders, whatever the belief or the incitements to action, still in spite of them to abstain from so dangerous a movement, unless well assured that their resources would suffice to insure that which the world requires to justify movements of this nature,-success. It may appear beyond the scope of an inquiry directed to the American Union, to examine the relative resources of the two sections. Were it wholly of an abstract nature this would be the case; connected as it is with the question of the maintenance or restoration of that Union, it is necessary, in order to embrace the subject as a whole, that this investigation should not be omitted. Indeed, after the first question whether the Union be really itself a good, or an evil, the inquiry naturally follows, whether it can be maintained. There exists a popular impression, that the great superiority of the North in number gives to it an overwhelming preponderance of strength. This seems to have worked so strongly on the minds of some, as to preclude all doubt concerning the issue of the contest. Mr. Cassius M. Clay raises the question, "Can we subdue the South?" and replies to it at once- "Of course we can." When Napoleon invaded Russia at the head of half a million of men, he was probably not less confident. The only apparent ground for this reliance is superiority in population. But in India we hold 180 millions under our rule, with a force of 80,000 men; and though in that case superiority of race is the real power, the simple fact seems to afford reason for distrusting the mere evidence of numbers. Modern history is replete with instances where no appreciable superiority of race has existed, and yet victory has remained with the smaller number. Frederick the Great would never have maintained himself against the three great empires that surrounded him, had success depended upon numbers. Portugal would not be independent of Spain, nor Switzerland of Austria, nor Greece of Turkey, by that rule; the history of our own wars gives it a very emphatic contradiction. If, indeed, it were possible that the belligerents should enlist to the full capacity of the respective populations, and these forces were likely to meet on an equidistant plain-then this mode of calculation would hold good. Or if one country could invade another as a people, each man accounting for a foe, in that case the more numerous would remain with a balance triumphant on the field. warfare nothing of the kind occurs. force is not a people, but an army. its progress must encounter obstacles fatal to far greater numbers than fall by the sword. The But in modern That army in question is not really what numbers there will be to resist the invasion, but what the sum of the obstacles the invader must overcome to attain his object. So delusive is any estimate based on numbers, when applied to a war of this character, that it be doubted whether the superior population of the North be not really a source of weakness instead of strength. may In ordinary warfare the combat is a duel between the two armies, which the inhabitants of the country behold as spectators; if both armies be inefficient, they fight on equal terms. But here the invading force has two enemies, the opposing army and the people. There is the foe in front, others are on the flanks, there are more in the rear. The efficiency of an army so placed is exposed to the severest test; for every march is in the nature of a flank march, and every important movement is a change of front in presence of the enemy. And when the country to be invaded is ill supplied with roads or forage, without stores that may be seized, and of enormous extent, the difficulties of the transport and commissariat services become so intense, that an invading army, when fairly advanced into the country and fully exposed to these influences, must find itself employed in the pursuit of its own destruction, unless thoroughly efficient. Hence the question is by no means confined to the number of recruits the population of the North could supply, but is rather the extent of the really efficient force it can bring into the field. To deserve that character an army requires officers, cavalry, guns, and munitions of war in due proportion. The scale on which these existed in the United States was that of 16,000 men. Upon such a nucleus to build up within a year an efficient army of 100,000 men would be a remarkable achievement. The great armies of Europe have been the growth, not of months, but of centuries. There is no American art of war different from our own; the same rules apply, and if it be considered what difficulty we experienced in the Crimean war, in placing 50,000 men suddenly in the field, notwithstanding our greater population, resources, and experience, it will be seen that a strenuous effort will be required, to convert within a few months a force of 16,000, disorganized by the loss of its best officers, into an efficient army of 100,000 men. Apart from those local forces that cannot decisively influence the result, this would appear to be the maximum number the principal army will reach. If so, a population of ten millions will readily supply recruits for that number. The truth is, the North possesses a numerical power beyond its military strength, and this excess is mere superfluity. An army is a complex machine, in which the efficiency of the whole depends on the efficiency of each separate part; like a watch that is valueless unless every wheel and pinion be in order. With one set of movements, one watch can be |