i

and when the task was regarded, and proved to be, all but impossible, without this further and strong element of repugnance?

In the next place, the framers of the Constitution perceived, that should they forbid the retirement of a State, they must provide means to prevent it; otherwise it would be an idle precept, a mere solicitation to remain. Other questions might be referred to the Supreme Court, but a retiring State withdrew from its jurisdiction. Other forms of delinquency could be visited on individuals, but here was the action of a whole community. Goodwill must have died out before it could occur; argument would be vain; there could be no appeal except to force. But no force was to be created, adequate to an undertaking of this nature. The first act under the Constitution for regulating the military establishment, provided for a standing force of only 1,216 rank and file. True, in case of need this might be increased; but a cardinal principle with the people was to distrust standing armies; a subject on which their feeling was jealous in the extreme. It was impracticable to run counter to this, even so far as to provide the framework of an army equal to such an object. The only possible force would be that of the remaining States, to be employed in coercing those that desired to secede. On such a proposition the views of the two chief framers of the Constitution are on record. In the Convention, on the 31st May, 1787, Madison declared that "the use of

force against a State would be more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked, as a dissolution of all previous compacts: a union of States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction." Again, on the 8th June, he observed: "Any government formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress."

Hamilton, in that great authority the "Federalist," after showing the futility of employing force against a State, concludes thus: "When the sword is once drawn the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of resentment, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extreme to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminatè in a dissolution of the Union." In one of the debates in the New York State Convention, Hamilton made use of these words: "To coerce a State would be one of the maddest projects ever devised. No State would ever suffer itself to be used as the instrument of coercing another." His far-seeing description in the "Federalist" is but too applicable to the events of the present day; and remarkable it is that he, the master spirit of the Unionists, should have de

nounced as "madness" that coercion which is adopted by his followers at the present day.

But there was a consideration of still higher import. The Constitution was a voluntary act, framed on the principles of free, mutual assent, and common belief in its advantages. To introduce force as a means of maintaining it, would be repugnant to these principles. It would be a commencement on the voluntary system, to be continued under compulsion. Force is an attribute of monarchy; the throne represents and wields the strength of the nation. Each part is subservient to the whole, and none can revolt without foreknowledge of this force to encounter and overthrow. But the basis of a Federal Republic is the reverse of all this. It stands upon consent, which is the abnegation of force. In place of the submission of part to the whole, the parties are co-equal. Compulsion is not only inapplicable, but opposed to the principle of the system. And the men of that day were too logical to be unaware of this; they declined to incorporate with the structure they were rearing a principle directly antagonistic to it.

Of

One effect of this omission of any clause forbidding secession is to compel those who deny the right to proceed on a system of inferences. these the most prominent is this: From a portion of a phrase in the preamble to the Constitution they infer, and would have others to infer, that the United States exist under it in the condition

of a single, consolidated State. We have already seen that unity does exist in a popular, in a commercial, and also in a political sense, so far as external relations are concerned. Does it exist in the domestic politics of the Union, the sole point in question? There is an unsatisfactory feature common to those who argue against the right of secession. They endeavour to convey impressions of a fact which they refrain from stating in plain terms. It is clear that the phrase, "We, the people," can have no bearing on the question, unless it indicate a single community, a consolidated State. This is the belief to be conveyed, the theory on which the whole argument is built; yet no one of those using it has the courage to state it plainly as a fact, and say the Constitution created a single, consolidated State. Either it did so, or it did not. The question is far too large to be solved by part of a sentence, so interpreted as to contradict the rest of it. We must search into the facts, and weigh the tenor of the Constitution itself; and this is the more important, as we may find in the end that the question of secession as a right may turn upon this point in one view to be

taken of it.

We have seen that the present is not the first Constitution of the Union. The Convention appointed to revise the "Articles of Confederation" had no general authority. It was summoned by an act of Congress, which strictly defined its object and powers in these words:

It

"For the purpose of revising the Articles of Con-
federation, and for reporting to the several legis-
latures such alterations and provisions therein as
should, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed
by the States, render the Federal compact ade-
quate to the exigencies of Government, and the
preservation of the Union." There is clearly no
authority here to frame a new system, or effect
organic change, but simply to make "alterations
and provisions,"—to effect a vigorous reform.
will be observed, too, there is no mention of the
people, but invariably of the States. The limits
of their powers were not overlooked by the mem-
bers of the Convention; they are continually
referred to in their debates. They could not desire
to exceed their authority, seeing that the next step
was to refer the instrument to Congress for its
approval to the very source of their authority,
whose sanction was essential to the success of their
labours.

Now the "Articles of Confederation" expressly declare that "each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence." They mutually acknowledge each other as distinct, sovereign communities; and in this capacity they send delegates to a Convention for the purpose of reforming the Government-their agent-and effecting such improvements in its machinery and details as would render it efficient. Curtis remarks: "We must observe the position of the States, when thus assembled in Convention. Their meeting was

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