be defeated. It can hardly be supposed that this right would have been openly declared by members of Congress, or that the probability of the event would have been thus urged on Washington, had it been regarded by public opinion as an illegal or treasonable act. It seems rather to be inferred that there existed in the minds of those, who with the facts so recent were most competent to judge, a conviction that the right existed and might be exercised-that able and just government would avoid it-but still that it was there.

The doctrine, indeed, has been maintained and loudly declared, both in the North and South, at frequent periods in the history of the Union. Jefferson, in his Ana, refers to that occasion of its being first raised in Congress, and observes that it was the Eastern, that is, the Northern States, who especially threatened to secede. He describes a walk with Hamilton, in which the latter painted pathetically the danger of the secession of their members, and the separation of the States. And the Northern States were the first to raise it tically. The war of 1813 was highly unpopular in that district, and when called upon by the President to supply their quotas of militia, they absolutely declined. In the words of Jefferson to Lafayette: "During that war four of the Eastern States were only attached to the Union, like so many inanimate bodies to living men." But they went far beyond inaction. They called a Convention at Hartford, of which the proceedings

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were suppressed, but the object is well known; a flag appeared with five stripes, secession was threatened in the loudest terms, nor can there be a doubt in the mind of any one who studies the events of that period, that the New England States would have seceded from the Union had the war continued.

The State of Massachusetts has threatened, indeed, on four separate occasions to secede from the Union. First, in the debates referred to on the adjustment of the State debts; secondly, on the purchase of Louisiana and its admission into the Union; thirdly, during the war of 1813; and fourthly, on the annexation of Texas, when, we believe, one chamber of her legislature actually passed a vote of secession. On these occasions it was no mere act of excited individuals, but the general voice of the community. Yet this State is now the loudest in denouncing it, when inconvenient to herself; and a bastile is now said to be preparing in the vicinity of Boston, for the incarceration of those as political prisoners, who simply utter the opinions which, when it suited, this very State has so often and so vehemently expressed.

It has been a popular illustration with the advocates of the Union, that if a State may secede, so may a county from a State, or a town from a county, until society break up into chaos. The fallacy of this is very obvious. A State claims to secede in virtue of her right as a sovereignty.

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When a county becomes a sovereignty it may prefer an equal claim, but then it cannot be a county. The comparison fails in other respects. The secession of a State from others is the case of men who separate; the secession of a county would be that of a limb torn from the body. There is also no such practical danger as that which has been described. The secession of a single State would be suicidal; it would be surrounded with customhouses, cramped with restrictions, and crushed under the expenses involved. North Carolina and Rhode Island, after refusing to join the Union, and holding out for more than two years, were at last constrained to accede, by the same causes which will always prevent any State from attempting to stand alone. Practically the right could not be exercised, even if conceded, except by a number of States together, sufficient in resources to enable them to maintain their position, and to endure the heavy cost of a separate government. Indeed, if justly governed, it is by no means clear why there should be any desire to secede.

A much more subtle argument was used by Jefferson, since often repeated. He observed that if one State claimed the right to secede from the rest, the others would have equal right to secede from one State, which would amount to turning it out of the Union. The argument is based on the assumption that a State, claiming the one, and objecting to the other, would exhibit a conflict of principles. But a State would protest against

ejection because it involves compulsion; and she claims a right to retire, because if compelled to remain, that is equally a compulsory restraint. Both really involve the same principle; ejection and imprisonment are equally acts of compulsion: and this principle is alike objected to in both

cases.

It has been argued that a State would thus claim the right to exercise her will against the others, whilst denying them the right to use their will as against herself. But the case is not one of will within the limit of individual action, but of compulsion extending to, and exercised over, another. A State compelled to go or to remain has a forcible restraint imposed on its will; but in seceding it imposes no restraint on the will of others they remain free to follow, or continue as before.

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Another illustration frequently used reminds us that the United Kingdom is a Union. It is asked how we should like Ireland to secede. reply would be, that if Ireland were a slaveowning country, we should not only approve of her seceding, but insist upon it. We might first strive to prevail upon her to alter the system; but if that proved impossible, or she refused to comply, there is assuredly no thought of profit or advantage, that would induce this country to maintain such a partnership. If the argument be seriously brought forward, it would appear singular it should not be known that our system differs

from that of the United States, and that rights may exist under the one that are unknown to the other. We have not yet proclaimed the sovereignty of the people in Ireland, or taught that governments rest in the "consent of the governed," and may be abolished when no longer promoting the pursuit of happiness. The systems spring from different roots; and to impute to them similar results is to argue that different trees might bear the same fruit.

Another case has been urged, that of Florida, a district which has proved costly to the Union, from local wars with the Indians, lighthouses, and even the first cost of the soil; on which grounds an appeal is made to a sense of justice. Those who address themselves to a sense of justice are not fortunate in taking Florida as their ground, and seem to have forgotten how the Union abstracted it from Spain. Apart from this, these matters are altogether beside the question of constitutional right. Secession, if lawful, gives no right to lighthouses without paying for them, and the fact of having built lighthouses is no answer to the right of secession. To leave a partnership is one thing; another, to settle accounts with the firm. The impression exists, that the people of the South proposed, from the first, to pay for all Federal property, and sent commissioners to Washington to arrange this. If against the share to be paid to the North, there were placed the amount abstracted by it through its tariffs during