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that of the Supreme Court. And the Northern party-those who are now fighting to maintain the Constitution-how do they deal with this decision? They denounce it in their manifesto, or declaration of political principles-the Chicago platform—as a "dangerous political heresy." The avowed object of the party is to act in opposition to this solemn decision of their own Federal and supreme tribunal.

It arises from this, inevitably, that the Southerner foresees, in the accession of the North to power, not only the reversal of the former political condition, but also, that when the decision of the highest Court of Equity may be in favour of his Constitutional rights, such decision will be denounced, and, as soon as readily practicable, will be set aside. What protection is there for him in the future? He has none in power, for the superior political strength of the North is beyond dispute. He has none in public opinion, for he well knows that in America opinion is but the slave of the majority. He has none in courts of justice, for he sees the decision of its highest Court denounced. That shelter is broken, and he knows that it will soon be removed. The appointments to the bench of the Supreme Court are political. He knows that judges will soon be selected for the express purpose of reversing former decisions. He knows that just as the sovereignty of the people in America is a despotic power, so the government of the majority there is a despotic

rule. With all these facts before him, what is he to do? Mr. Seward, the leader of the Northern party, had already announced that the conflict is "irrepressible." And so it is. Is he then to wait until all the preparations of the opposing power in this inevitable conflict be completed? or will common judgment direct him, if a conflict there is to be, to accept it boldly and at once?

There is, indeed, one means of escape. It is possible for the Southerner to surrender all power to the North, to abandon all defence of what he holds to be his rights, to emancipate his slaves, not at the instigation of his own conscience, but in obedience to the conscience of other men. If that emancipation be gradual, he may place himself under the direction of Northern men, who will regulate his affairs; if sudden, he can risk his life, and those of his children; and should his property be destroyed he may emigrate. All this he can. do. But it hardly seems that this can be expected from a people numbering eight millions, the sons of those who thought it right to revolt against this country, because tea was subjected to a duty of threepence per pound. True, that was the pretext only, there was an abstract principle, and the real object was independence. But if the Virginians of that day had so irrepressible a desire to obtain their independence, they may have an equally strong desire to retain it. Subjection is still subjection, whether it be to one body or to another-the bitterness lies in the thing itself;

and the repugnance to it may be as great when it has to be endured at the hands of brothers, as when it was rejected at the hands of a parent.

It has been observed that the North had a clear right to act unanimously, and to win the election if it could. But there was more than this. They selected as a candidate one whose well-known opinions were those, not of one impartial, as between North and South, and prepared to rule with even hand both great divisions of the country, --but of an earnest and zealous partizan, a believer in opinions which, whether right or wrong, were held by one-half the country to imperil its existence. It is plain that no one can be qualified to act as President of the whole Union who is identified with opinions attacking the framework of half of it. A ruler is assumed to be above party, -it is essential to his functions to belong to no section. To elect one, unknown as a statesman, but known as a partizan, was to declare war against the other side We are not now considering this election in the aspect of the Slavery question-that wil: follow-but as evidence of the determination of the North to assume the power afforded by its numbers. Why not? The South had held it long enough, why not now the North? There is this difference. Power in the hands of the South threatens nothing in the North, seeks nothing from it, desires to disturb nothing in it. It is to the other side simply a negation, an absence from office. But power in

the hands of the North, when acting, not as a party, but as a people, is then by no means a negative evil or disappointment, but a source of instant anxiety and dread. It is known it will be aggressive, and that its immediate object will be to attack the interests or institutions of the South. Oliphant remarks: "Power in the hands of the South affects the patronage of a political party in the North; but power in the hands of the North affects the happiness of almost every individual in the South. The stakes are not equal. The North are playing for the triumph of a party, the South for all they hold dearest to them."

Let it not be assumed that we hold the North to be blameable for taking into its own hands the power that belongs to its numbers. The evil lies in the surrounding facts. The present circumstances of the Union, and the opinions of the age, conflict with a Constitution which was framed under conditions widely different. Both parties are now in a false position. The one maintaining and lauding a system that has become repugnant to the civilized world; the other seeking, some few of them, to carry out sincere convictions by means opposed to the Constitution,-most of them, to make use of a sentiment they do not share, to work with as a lever in the struggle for political supremacy.

Holland and Belgium were united on the same grounds as the United States,-to obtain that defensive strength in union, which they had not separately; and the union was greatly to the

But, as already

material advantage of both. observed, in a union of two powers, one must be supreme, and, sooner or later, the other finds this unendurable. There existed between the Belgians and the Dutch no conflicting social systems, no wide difference of temperament, no feeling of permanent dislike. True, there was a difference of race; but so there is between England and Wales. Different races may dwell together in perfect harmony so long as they are not rival powers. But rival powers, although of the same race, cannot coexist under the same government, unless the one be subservient to the other. far the Northerners have been subservient to the South-little indeed to their credit. They now, very properly, desire to escape from this thraldom. Escape from it they can, but they also wish to reverse it, and that cannot be done.

So

Under all these circumstances it does not appear surprising that the people of the South should desire to govern themselves, and " to be let alone." This is all they have asked. We have seen how strong, how irresistible an impulse is the desire of independence when once thoroughly aroused; we have seen what bonds it broke through, when this same people revolted from the parent State. There were all those ties to restrain, there was no antagonism to repel; here there are not the obligations, and there is the repugnance. Unquestionably, the Southern States have much more ground to demand the position of an independent

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