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measures, and coin were ordained; strangers were admitted to citizenship on equal terms; and the effective nature of the Union may be seen in the fact, that when Sparta joined it she had to alter the laws of Lycurgus for the purpose. In spite of all this, both these Federations failed to endure; and it may be held that they proved of fatal injury to Greece, by sustaining the small States in a separate yet ineffective existence; whilst but for this they might have been incorporated with the larger, and so have prevented the civil wars that proved so fatal to the country.

If it be held that the mercurial character of the Greek rendered his government unstable, we have another instance in modern times amongst a people, of all in Europe, the least open to that charge. The united provinces of Holland formed a Federal Republic, under a president, bearing the title of Stadtholder. The confederation had an assembly or congress for general affairs, each province or State having its own legislature for provincial purposes, and enjoying a theoretical sovereignty. The history of this Republic presents on some points a striking analogy to that of the United States. The Dutch not only made a similar commercial progress, but displayed an energy, both in commerce and war, without any parallel in modern history, if the small dimensions of the country, and its many disadvantages, be considered. The same features are found in all these cases-great activity in the people, constant intestine commo

tions, and the eventual extinction of the system of government.

But there are instances much nearer at hand. Mexico, Central America, Columbia, and the Argentine Republic all copied the example of the United States. It has been argued that the system has failed in these cases, not from demerit in itself, but from the faults of race. But if any government succeed with one race, and fail with all others, it would appear that the whole merit of the success must lie in the race, and not with the system. Certainly, in every other instance on record, federal republicanism, when the component States have had the dimensions of powers, and not of provinces, has proved a signal failure. If its merits are to be tested by experience, it would appear that results have invariably disproved it, not only in remote times, but in the present age, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Union, and under the most favourable auspices. In the case of Mexico, it is capable of very clear demonstration, that the political ruin of that unhappy country has mainly resulted from evils arising in a Federal system, copied from that of the United States. In their war of independence, the Mexicans proved themselves to be men equal to the Brazilians; and yet now that time has developed the effects of political institutions, how inferior is their condition! On one side of the Andes the Federal system exists in the Argentine Republic, a scene of incessant strife, oscillating

between anarchy and despotism, with intermittent fits of civil war; whilst on the other side of that range, there is a Republic-that of Chili-free from the Federal principle; a people of the same race, much less favourably situated, yet steadily prosperous to the present day. Thus the general experience of the New World, as well as of the Old, teaches us that the peace and welfare of any people, under a Federal system or Union, would seem to be only a temporary exception to an invariable rule.

We say temporary, for the present disruption of the American Union is clearly another proof of the rule. It has long been predicted on theoretical grounds. Whenever a Federal Republic is formed of States large enough to exist as independent powers, or which, as in this case, have already existed as independent communities, two opposite forces come at once into action. There is the original attraction, or the compression, that brought them, and holds them together, and there is a disruptive force in the jealousy, ambition, and conflicting interests that come into existence. So long as the former exceed the latter they continue united, but whenever the disruptive power overcomes that of cohesion, they fall asunder, unless restrained by force; and to apply force is to abandon the principle of the system. It will be seen that time tells upon these influences with a twofold effect. The States originally unite because they are weak, because their population is small,

and they have a sense of insecurity in standing alone in the world. Time removes all this, whilst, on the other hand, it strengthens all the influences that tend to disruption; for with the growth of riches come the means of political corruption,with the accumulation of masses of indigent population arise the elements of discontent,-with the development of special branches of industry conflicting interests come into play,-with the increase of grandeur there will grow too the spirit of ambition. There is but one thing that can counteract all this. When the original union of States has, in the progress of its development, become homogeneous, so that time has obliterated the first lines of distinction, and the whole has fused into a united people,-in that case the Federal principle has disappeared, and given place to a consolidated State. In the United States, although this has occurred in some respects, in others, and those of far the greatest force, time has wrought the opposite effect. The original elements continue, and permit the action of the laws under which time and growth, are fatal to this form of government. In truth, no Federal Union has ever been formed, on a large scale, of States which had approached a mature condition; it has always been the resource of communities still young and feeble. It arises, indeed, out of their youth; but in time they cease to be young, they become mature and powerful, and when this point is reached, it becomes as natural for those which may now differ from the rest to

desire independence and free action, as for grown men to desire a termination of the conditions which were necessary and fitting in their early days.

All the writers who have commented on the subject appear to have entertained these opinions. To Lord Macaulay's letter no one has attempted a reply, for it was unanswerable. Confining himself to one element, he pointed out, with a force carrying irresistible conviction, how that single element of dense urban population would eventually overthrow the Union. The framers of the Constitution entertained misgivings upon the subject. Curtis, in his History of the Constitution, observes: "Many of the wisest of the statesmen of that period, as we now know, entertained doubts whether the country embraced by the thirteen original States would not be too large for the successful operation of a republican government." Washington expressed his fears more than once. It was a serious question in his mind whether that extent-insignificant as it was when compared with the present dominion-was not too large to abide permanently under one rule. He foresaw the effects of time, but wisely avoided unsettling discussions on the subject. In one of his letters he observes: "Let experience solve the question; to listen to speculation in such a case were criminal." Jefferson wrote thus forty years ago: "I have been amongst the most sanguine in believing that our Union would be of long duration.

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