friendly relations among the members of our Federal Union; and it is now a subject of congratulation, that, rebuked and circumscribed as these proceedings have been, and I trust will continue to be, by the vigorous and healthful tone of public opinion, there is no longer any cause for disquietude on this account.

It is eight years since the public judgment of the country was emphatically pronounced in favor of a change in the administration of the General Government. A large majority of the nation, dissatisfied with their political condition, concurred in selecting for their Chief Magistrate the eminent citizen who now occupies that station; confidently believing that he possessed the rare endowments so indispensably necessary to effect a favorable change in the adverse current of our national affairs. The extent to which this expectation has been realized, and the various ways in which public opinion has expressed its approval of his conduct, have amply vindicated the wisdom of the selection. It must be conceded that he has managed our national concerns during an eventful period. Questions of the highest importance to the well-being of the country, have been violently agitated; principles that lay at the foundation of the government, have been assailed; sectional interests have been arrayed on the side of false and dangerous theories; a great moneyed monopoly, having vast means at its command, with an unscrupulous disposition to use them in operating upon the hopes and fears of those whose fortunes could be affected by any sudden change. in our pecuniary affairs, espoused the cause of the assailants of the administration, and gave a powerful impulse to their measures of annoyance; our affairs at home and abroad assumed at times a most gloomy aspect; but, amid difficulties the most embarrassing, and obstacles the most formidable, he has pursued his undeviating course, and has finally accomplished all the great purposes rendered necessary to re-establish correct principles, and to give a new and better direction to the policy of the government.

He is now about to retire from public life, and it is not at all probable that any thing will occur to change the aspect in which his character must present itself to the scrutiny, and abide the judgment of future ages. When the passions engendered in our late and severe political conflicts shall have subsided; when personal and local interests shall cease to employ their fallacies to pervert public opinion; when measures shall be appreciated by their remote as well as their immediate consequences, justice will then pronounce an impartial sentence on the merits of his public conduct. With the ample means we now possess of anticipating this decision, we should distrust our own udgments too much,

and weaken the just influence of a virtuous and powerful incentive to noble actions, if we could hesitate to believe that his name will stand high on the list of our distinguished patriots and statesmen, and that the record of his public services will constitute one of the most admired and instructive portions of the history of our country.

The recent Presidential Election has produced less excitement than usually attends such a contest, especially when it involves, as in the present instance, a change of the persons to fill the offices of President and Vice-President. This unusual degree of repose in the public mind, is to be ascribed rather to the peculiar attitude in which the adverse parties were placed, than to any want of a proper solicitude in the mass of the people, as to the character and principles of their political agents. The present administration had been so decidedly approved and firmly sustained by the people, that those who engaged in the election with a view to secure to the country the continuance of its wise and enlightened policy, reasonably anticipated a favorable result; while those who designed to effect a political revolution, foresaw inevitable defeat, should the contest be so con. ducted as to involve a direct expression of public opinion, upon a system of measures varying essentially from that upon which our political affairs had been heretofore conducted. Abandoning all hope of success by the votes of the electoral colleges, they resorted to devices, openly avowed in some quarters, and but poorly disguised any where, to prevent a choice by the electors, and bring it to the House of Representatives, where the relative power of the States would be lost, and the largest reduced to an equality with the smallest. This expedient has been signally defeated, and the public voice, expressed in the most direct and democratic mode provided by the Constitution, has designated as successor to the present Executive, the candidate who was supported by the people, on account of his peculiar fitness to sustain the principles, and carry forward the leading measures of the present administration.

The attention of the Legislature has been repeatedly called to the condition of our judiciary system. Such has been the increase of business in our higher courts that they cannot, as now constituted, prevent considerable delay in the administration of justice. Although this evil is more immediately felt by those who are compelled to resort to our judicial tribunals for the redress of wrongs, all classes in the community are interested in providing an adequate remedy. The well-being of society, and the success of all our institutions, depend, to a considerable extent, upon the prompt administration of the laws. This end can be fully attained, only by so enlarging the judiciary system as to make it conmensurate with the increase of business resulting from our progress in wealth and population.

It is generally conceded that something must be done on this subject but hitherto all attempts to accomplish it have failed, as I apprehend, by reason of a diversity of views as to the kind of modification that will, in the best manner, accommodate this branch of the Government to the present and future exigencies of the State. Of the several improvements in the organization of the supreme court which have been proposed, that of increasing the number of judges best commends itself to my judgment. The addition of two judges to the present number, would relieve the court from the burden of business that now oppresses it, secure a more speedy decision of causes, and, for many years to come, render it adequate to the public exigencies. If it shall be deemed expedient to make such a change in the court of chancery as will withdraw from the circuit judges the equity business which they now discharge as vice-chancellors, a less number would be enabled to execute the duties which would then be required of them. Five or six would be sufficient, now and for some time hereafter, to despatch all the business that would devolve on them as circuit judges.

In the court of chancery the accumulation of business greatly exceeds that in the supreme court. The delays are here more protracted, and the consequences to suitors more serious. Here too, the difficulties of devising an adequate mode of relief seem to be more formidable. It is, I believe, the general opinion of those who best understand the nature and course of business in this court, that the multiplication of officers subordinate to the Chancellor, will not effectually overcome the present defect in the constitution of the court. To lay any considerable restraint on the right of appeal from a subordinate jurisdiction, might also be but little better than a denial of justice, and would be scarcely more tolerable than a refusal of it, by neglecting to provide tribunals for its prompt administration. If the course of appeal is kept open, we have already abundant evidence that the amount of business, in this way, thrown upon the Chancellor, will be more than any inan, whatever may be his capacity of mind, his professional acquirements, or physical abilities, can possibly discharge.

If such would probably be the result of the modification suggested, then there appears to me to be only one other mode of improvement that will be likely to accomplish the desired end; and that is, to provide for the appointment of an additional number of equity judges, to be located in different parts of the State, possessing concurrent jurisdiction with the Chancellor and to allow appeals to be made directly from each judge to a court of review, without subjecting the new officers to the appellate jurisdiction of the Chancellor. The State might then be divided into

convenient districts, with a Chancellor in each who should have exclusive jurisdiction therein; or, parties might have the liberty of selecting such court as, at the time, should be least burdened with business. The Chancellor and his associates might be organized as a court of appeals, of which he should be the presiding officer. Into this court all equity causes should be brought before being carried to the court for the correction of errors. The right of appeal to this latter tribunal might then be limited to cases of great importance, either in principle or a mount, or appeals might be discouraged by imposing heavy damages and costs upon those who should litigate in the court of the last resort, matters of trifling moment.

I submit these suggestions with some degree of diffidence, knowing that they are open to objections, but in my view of the subject, to fewer in number and less weighty in character than those which present themselves to the other modes of reorganizing the courts of chancery which have been brought under my consideration. The subject is one of great importance. It calls for deliberate reflection, but the public interest also calls for final action upon it. I apprehend that nothing ef fectual for the purpose of substantial relief can be done without an amendment to the Constitution, and this will necessarily defer for two years at least the completion of any measure you may approve. I commend it to your early attention, in the hope that you will be able to unite on some plan for improving our judiciary system before the close of the present session.

Although I have gone somewhat into detail in these suggestions, I deem it important that any amendments of the Constitution in regard to this subject that you may propose, should be general in their character, laying down only the outlines of the system, and leaving them to be filled up by the Legislature. This is the only certain mode of securing the concurrence of your successors and the people, who must also pass upon the plan which you may recommend; and in this way only can the details be left open to such modifications as time and experience may suggest, without the necessity of again amending the Constitution.

The enterprise and energies of the people of this State, are powerfully directed to the acquisition of individual wealth; and the course of legislation, naturally controlled by public opinion, has been turned to objects subsidiary to this absorbing pursuit. This is not to be regretted, if other great interests, intimately connected with the public welfare, have, at the same time, been properly cherished.

Public virtue and intelligence are better than national wealth, for they are essential to its security and rightful enjoyment. Education in all its branches, but particularly in that which includes the common schools, is the highest object of public concern; and the duty of promoting and extending it, is in all respects, the most important that can engage your attention. The subject assumes at this time a new interest, because more ample means than the State has hitherto possessed, are placed within your control, and may be devoted to extend the blessings of popular education. By the deposite law of the last session of .Congress, more than five millions of the surplus revenue of the United States, are to be entrusted to the safe keeping of this State until it shall be required by the General Government. Unless some unexpected change shall take place in our public affairs, it is not probable that any considerable part of this deposite will be soon withdrawn. The benefit which the State will receive, if it shall accept of the trust, as I think it should, will be the interest to be derived from the investment of the money deposited. According to the plan of investing it, which I shall hereafter suggest, an annual income during the time the deposite remains, of about $300,000, may be added to the funds already devoted to the cause of education. I respectfully recommend that an amount of this income about equal to the sum now annually distributed to the common schools, should be applied as this sum now is, to their support; thus making the annual distribution to them from the Treasury $220,000. I also recommend that a liberal portion of this income should be appropriated to the academies in such a manner as will not only increase the amount annually distributed to them, but also improve the Literature Fund; having in view principally the design of rendering them more efficient as seminaries for educating common school teachers. And I further recommend, that the remainder of the income from the deposite money be added to the capital of the Common School Fund.

The propriety of the last branch of this recommendation, may perhaps be less obvious than the two former, and may therefore require some explanation. It should not be forgotten that this deposite is only temporary, and that in the course of a few years, perhaps sooner than is now anticipated, it may be withdrawn. By such an event, the State will of course be deprived of this source of income. Should the whole of it be annually expended in the support of common schools, it would require some time to place them in a condition to avail themselves, to the best advantage, of this great increase of means; and when brought into such a condition, they would decline, should these means be wholly