Sutton Publishing, 1997 - 232 páginas
John Peddie questions the role of the war-elephant, Hannibal's choice of route over the Alps, re-examines the purpose of the campaign and suggests the purpose of the campaign was not so much the destruction of Rome but the re-conquest of Sicily. Exploring the Carthaginian's generalship he concludes that Hannibal's war was lost at sea, not on land.
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Adriatic African allies Alps already ancient animals Apennines Appian Apulia arrival assault attack battle battlefield Bomilcar Brundisium Bruttium camp campaign Campanian Cannae Canusium captured Capua Carthage Carthaginian cavalry Cisalpine Gaul citadel coast Coin showing command consul contingent crossing defeat defence despatched Ebro elephants encamped enemy envoys Epicydes Fabius fighting Flaminius flank fleet force garrison Gnaeus Hamilcar hand Hannibal Hannibal's harbour Hasdrubal Barca Hasdrubal's Hiero Himilco horse ibid infantry island Italian Italy killed Laevinus Lake Trasimene land later legions Lilybaeum Livy Mago manpower Marcellus Masinissa miles military Minucius Nola northern Numidian once operations Paullus peninsula Polybius Publius Punic recognised reinforcements Rhone river Roman army Rome Rome's Saguntum sail Sardinia Scipio seaport Senate Servilius ships Sicily siege situation soldiers southern Italy Spain Spanish strategically success supplies Syracuse tactical Tarentum territory town Trebbia tribes troops valley victory Volturnus walls whilst winter xxii