message. Indeed, he seems to me to catch up triumphantly the words of Christ: "In the world ye shall have tribulation; but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world." 16

"Still doth the soul, from its lone fastness high,

Upon our life a ruling effluence send.

And when it fails, fight as we will, we die;

And while it lasts, we cannot wholly end." 17

Or again, as he puts it in Thyrsis, speaking of the spiritual quest of the legendary Gipsy-Scholar:

"A fugitive and gracious light he seeks,

Shy to illumine; and I seek it too.

This does not come with houses or with gold,
With place, with honor, with a flattering crew;
'Tis not in the world's market bought and sold-
But the smooth-slipping weeks

Drop by, and leave its seeker still untired;
Out of the heed of mortals he is gone,
He wends unfollow'd, he must house alone;
Yet on he fares by his own heart inspired."

Or still more explicitly:

"O human soul! as long as thou canst so

Set up a mark of everlasting light,

Above the howling senses' ebb and flow,

To cheer thee, and to right thee if thou roam—

Not with lost toil thou laborest through the night!

Thou mak'st the heaven thou hop'st indeed thy home." 18

Perhaps the most complete and artistic picture of man's life that Arnold ever pend is containd in the beautiful allegory of the river, which closes Sohrab and Rustum. Here we catch a vision of the hopes of youth, the disappointments and limitations that beset middle life, and the peace that crowns the close.

"But the majestic river floated on,

Out of the mist and hum of that low land,
Into the frosty star-light, and there moved,
Rejoicing, through the hush'd Chorasmian waste,
Under the solitary moon;-he flow'd
Right for the polar star, past Orgunjè,

Brimming, and bright, and large; then sands begin
To hem his watery march, and dam his streams,
And split his currents; that for many a league
The shorn and parcell'd Oxus strains along
Through beds of sand and matted rushy isles-
Oxus, forgetting the bright speed he had
In his high mountain-cradle in Pamere,
A foiled circuitous wanderer-till at last

The long'd-for dash of waves is heard, and wide
His luminous home of waters opens, bright

And tranquil, from whose floor the new-bathed stars
Emerge and shine upon the Aral Sea."

This has indeed the classic finish of the Greek; but there is no "moral and intellectual scepticism;" nor is it merely the voice of "a poet of transition" that we hear, as we read the lines. It is rather the voice of one who has livd, who has gaind salvation thru struggle, and who has learnd to combine in his work "truth and seriousness of substance and matter, felicity and perfection of diction and manner" 19 as these are found in the great classics.

19. Essay on Byron.

An Examination of Hume's Theory

OF

of Causation

LOUIS GRANT WHITEHEAD

F all relations, causation is considerd by Hume to be of predominant importance. It is, indeed, the back-bone of his scepticism. "All reasoning concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man why be believes any matter of fact which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country or in France, he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact, as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been a man in that island. All our reasoning concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connection between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of the articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark, assures us of the presence of some person: why? because these are the effect of the human make and fabric and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other." (Essays, P. 322)

Briefly defined, causation is, or should be, a power of production in cause or a connection between cause and effect. That the assumption of a power or connection is necessary to a rational explanation of the appearance and disappearance of objects. Hume apparently never douted. Unless the present impression can be traced to a power which produced it, or unless it, itself, is a connection, there is no rational evidence of natural law. Objectiv validity can be predicated of nothing; all ideas of cause and effect are mere fictions; all matters of fact are the result of chance; all predications of the future are idle dreams, and one event is as likely to happen as another.

Considering, therefore, the importance of the relation of causation, it is worth while, says Hume, to enquire what is the nature of

that evidence which assures us of its reality. "I shall venture to affirm as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. ...This proposition, that causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience, will readily be admitted with regard to such objects as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; since we must be conscious of the utter inability which we then lay under of foretelling what would arise from them." (Essays, P. 323)

Since the assumption of causation is founded, not on reason, but on experience, Hume now asks what foundation experience has to offer for this inference beyond the senses. And he answers: "I say then, that even after we have had experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or on any process of the understanding." (Essays, P. 326)

"It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their regular and constant conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature. As to past experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which, for ought we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread which I formerly ate nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers; but it does not follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with the like secret powers. The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged, that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist, that the inference is made by a chain

of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connection between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it who assert, that it exists, and is the original of all our conclusions concerning matters of fact." (Essays, P. 327)

"Should it be said, that, from a number of uniform experiments, we infer a connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers: this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. The question still occurs, on what process of argument is the inference founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread, appear not of themselves to have any connection with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without the aid of experience, contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this to be remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects resulting from certain objects, and teaches us, that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a body of like color and consistence with bread, we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind which wants to be explained. When a man says, I have found in all past instances such sensible qualities, conjoined with such secret powers; and when he says, similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other; but you must confess that the inference is not intuitive neither is it demonstrative. Of what nature is it then? To say it is experimental is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore,