At

plemental answer not having been denied by plaintiff, the court gave judgment, discharging the garnishee, with $5 costs for filing answer. a subsequent term the court, on motion of plaintiff, entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the garnishee for all costs in the case, held the judgment against the garnishee for costs was void, that the judgment discharging the garnishee was a final and complete disposition of the cause. 53 Mo., 217; 69 Mo., 174; 70 Mo., 370. A court may at a subsequent term re-tax costs under a judgment made before, (28 Mo., 583) but that is a different thing from rendering a judgment for costs. Jackson v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., S. C. Mo., June 7, 1886.

21. PROMISSORY NOTES. - Consideration-Compounding Felony.-Plaintiff seeks to recover the amount of a promissory note, given upon the settlement of a claim by defendant that plaintiff's son, while in the employ of defendants, had stolen his money, and alleged that the note was given to compound a felony, and was extorted from plaintiff by threats. The judge refused to charge, as requested by defendant, "that if the compounding of a felony entered into, and formed a part of the consideration of the note, the plaintiff could not recover;" and also, "that if the motive of the plaintiff in giving the note was in part for the purpose of compounding a felony, he could not be entitled to recover." Held, error, and that if the consideration of the note was in any way affected by the compounding of a felony, or it entered into the same, or such a motive actuated the plaintiff in any respect, then the contract was illegal, and should not be upheld. Haynes v. Rudd, N. Y. Ct. App., June 1, 1886, N. East Rep., Vol. 7, 288.

22. REPLEVIN.-When Lies-Animals.-The gist of the action of replevin is the detention, not the taking. Thus, the defendant carried on a farm on shares, and his father, while assisting him at haying, seized the cattle in contention damage feasant; but, instead of driving them to the public pound, yarded them on the premises. The cattle broke through the defendant's defective fence. Both the defendant and his father refused to deliver them up on demand, Held, that defendant was a wrong-doer, and liable in an action of replevin. Rowe v. Hicks, S. C. Vt., June 16, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 563.

23. RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE.-When in Force in Alabama Rights Thereunder. - The "Rule in Shelley's Case," as at common law, prevailed in this State until the 17th January, 1853, when the Code of 1852 became operative; and the deeds and wills which took effect before that date, are governed by it; and a deed executed in 1841, by which lands were conveyed to a trustee, "for the purpose of providing a permanent domicile and home for the said Jane C. M., "a married woman," "and such family as she may have for their use and benefit during her natural life, and at her death to descend to and be equally divided among and between her heirs," under the operation of the rule in Shelley's case, vested the entire estate in Mrs. M.; and if her children took any present interest, as members of her "family," their right to sue for it was not postponed until her death. McQueen v. Logan, S. C. Ala., Dec. Term, 1885-86.

24. SET-OFF-Of Damages - Measure of Damages. -In an action to recover the price of guano sold and delivered by plaintiffs to defendant, the latter

may set off or recoup the damages sustained by him on account of the plaintiff's failure and refusal to deliver the full quantity stipulated for, when it was too late to procure it elsewhere. Plaintiffs having notice that the guano was intended for use by defendant in raising a cotton crop on his plantation in the county, the measure of the defendant's damages for the breach is the difference between the cotton crop raised on the land on which the guano was used, and that raised on the adjoining land, of the same quality and cultivated in the same manner, on which no guano was used. When an agent makes a contract for the benefit of his principal, but without disclosing his name, the principal may sue on it in his own name. Bell v. Reynolds, S. C. Ala., July 2, 1886.

25. TAXATION. ·Law Creating Classes of Property for Taxation Constitutional-Railroad and Canal Property Constitute Such a Class-Franchises Taxable.-A law which taxes a class of property separately is not unconstitutional, if it embraces all property of that class, and applies to it uniform rules, and taxes it according to its true value. The property of railroad and canal companies constitute a legitimate class of property for the purposes of taxation,-a class which, in order to deal with it fairly in the matter of taxation, must be treated separately. Franchises are property, and, as such, are taxable. State Board of Assessors v. State, Ct. Err. & App., N. J., May 29, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 578.

26. VENDOR AND VENDEE.-Deed- Delivery-Extension-Time-Equity-Adverse Title.-Where a deed for land was delivered to a third person, to be delivered to the purchaser of the land on condition that a note for part consideration should be paid within ten days, and the vendor extended the time from May 23d until Saturday, May 26th, and on May 28th made a further extension, but when, on June 2d, the purchaser tendered the money to the third person, he was informed that the vendor had given notice neither to receive the money nor deliver the deed, held, that vendor's conduct was calculated to throw vendee off his guard, and, under the circumstances, the condition was well performed within five days after the last postponement; that it was error to hold that the parties had done no more than make propositions to each other, which either were at liberty to withdraw at the expiration of the ten days; that the promise of May 28th, viewed in the light of preceding circumstances, was not void; that the proceeding was not premature; and that it was not a case where the plaintiff claims to recover possession of land under adverse title, distinct from defendant's grant. Baum's Appeal, S. C. Penn., May 28, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 461.

27. WATERS AND WATER-COURSES.-Artificial Flow -Prescriptive Right- Exceptions-Statement of Evidence by Court.-A right to the artificial flow of water through a water-course can be acquired by prescription. Exceptions do not lie because the presiding judge in his charge to the jury called attention to certain testimony, but made no mention of other testimony on the same point. The attention of the court should be called to the matter before the jury retire. Murchie v. Gates, S. C. Me., June 17, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 698.

28. WAYS.-Estoppel - Report of Committee Affected by Relationship to Parties.-One member of a committee appointed by the court, upon an appeal from the doings of county commissioners,

was a brother of one of the original petitioners, and a distant relative of another; but was appointed with the consent of the petitioners, and presumably with their knowledge of the relationship. Held, that the petitioners, having knowingly taken their chances for a favorable report, were estopped from raising the objection that the committee were not disinterested. Robinson v. County Commrs., S. J. C. Me., June 5, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 556.

29. WAYS-Railroads in Streets-If Used by Individual for Private Purpose Exclusively, a Nuiance.-Defendants, under a contract with a street railroad corporation, took a branch road abandoned by it, having flat rails, and reconstructed it with T rails, and used it exclusively for carrying their machines, etc., to their factory. Held, that the construction and maintenance by an individual of a railroad upon the highway for private purposes constitutes a nuisance for which any person sustaining special injury may bring action, and the contract with the railroad furnished no defense to such suit, as it was an attempt by the railroad to transfer its franchise to an individual for the purpose of enabling him to operate the road exclusively for the purpose of his private business. Fanning v. Osborne, N. Y. Ct. App. June 1 1886, N. East. Rep. Vol. 7, 307.

30. WILL-Legacy-Interest-Accord and Satisfaction-Principal and Agent-Ratification-Payment of Legacy.-Legacies, unless otherwise controlled by the will, draw interest after one year from the probate of the will; and the rule is not affected by the fact that the executor is unable to gather in the assets and pay the legacy within the year. When there is a dispute between an exeutor and a legatee as to the amount of interest due on a legacy, on account of the expense and delay caused by a long litigation carried on for the protection of the property of the estate, an acceptance by the legatee of a sum less than the one due on the legacy is an accord and satisfaction, if the payment is made upon the express condition that it shall be in full for the balance due, and the money accepted without protest against snch condition. The Baptist State Convention was a legatee, and the money was paid to its treasurer. Held, that the convention, by accepting and using the money, with knowledge of all the facts, ratified the acts of the treasurer in receiving it, if there were doubt as to his authority. Vermont etc. Convention v. Ladd, S. C. Vt. June 19, 1886. Atl. Rep. Vol. 4, 634.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.*

[Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.]

QUERIES.

7. A. executes a quit claim deed to B., conveying a certain tract of land, the deed bearing date of December 21, 1884. B. conveys the same land by quit claim deed to C., this deed bearing date of December 23, 1884, but the certificate of acknowledgment bears date of December 16, 1884, seven days prior to the date of the deed itself. Did C. derive any title from B., the

deed being acknowledged prior to the date of the deed from A. to B., i. e., under the circumstances should the date of the deed or the date of the acknowledgment be presumed to be the date of delivery? Please cite authorities. X. Y. Z.

8. Suit on note. Answer of payment; to sustain which the defendant testifies to the fact of the payment, with the attendant circumstances, and, over the objection of the plaintiff, testifies that he knows the payment was made, because he sold a horse on the same day to A., and thus got the money with which the payment was made. He then offers to prove by A., as an independent fact, the sale of the horse, and the payment to him of a certain sum of money for the horse by A. Can such evidence be received over the objection of the plaintiff? "W."

9. A farmer having a large quantity of stock, advertised them for sale at public auction. Nothing was said in the advertisement about how the stock would be sold, other than that they would be sold at public auction, on the day named, and upon a credit of nine months. At the sale a fine mare, which had been recently bred to a fine horse, upon the insurance plan, was offered for sale. The owner of the horse was present, and it was agreed between him and the farmer that the mare might be put up for sale with the understanding that, if she proved to be with foal, and had a colt, that the purchaser should pay for the season of the mare to the horse. This agreement was publicly proclaimed by the auctioneer when the mare was put up for sale, and it was stated by him that she was to be sold upon the condition that the purchaser should pay the owner of the horse for the season if the mare should have a colt. The mare was sold, and the purchaser executed his note to the farmer for the amount of his bill. The mare proved to be with foal, add had a fine colt. The owner of the horse then went to the purchaser of the mare, and demanded his pay for the season of the mare io the horse. The purchaser refused to pay the same, claiming that he was not close to the auctioneer when the mare was put up for sale, and didn't hear the statement made by him, and never knew such a statement was made. Upon this state of facts can the owner of the horse recover? Please cite authorities. SUBSCRIBER.

10 A. loses his house, which was insured, by fire. The Insurance Company believed that A. either did or procured the burning thereof, refuses payment of loss. A. sues to recover the amount claimed under the policy. The company answers, setting up as their defense A's guilt in regard to the fire. What is the quantity of proof required at the company's hands to release it from liability? Must it establish A's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt," as would be required of the State in a criminal prosecution for the crime, or must it simply show it by "the preponderance of testimoney," only, as is the rule in other civil cases?

Answer.-The dictionaries define an occupant as one in possession. It is not a technical legal word, and the courts have adopted the same definition, regardless of the question of evidence, unless the context of the law necessitated a different construction. People v. Sup. of Alleganey Co., 36 How. Pr. 544; Abbott v. Upham, 13 Metc. 172; Carpenter v. Vail, 36 Mich. 226; Leehler v. Chapin, 12 Nev. 65; Hussey v. Smith, 1 Utah, 331; Shelby v. Houston, 38 Cal. 410; Cofield v. McClelland, 83 U. S. 331; Comstock v. Beardsley, 15 Wend. 318. In the case stated the law does not require the occupant to lodge on the premises. S. S. U.

Query 49. [22 Cent. L. J., 574.] A., implement dealer, contracted with a manufacturer of implements that the company should furnish A. goods. The agreement was that A. was to sell goods, and when cash was paid the amount, less commissions, was to be remitted to the manufacturer of implements, and when goods were sold on time (which right A. had), the notes were to be sent to manufacturing company with A.'s personal guaranty written on the back of notes, which in each instance A. did, but it turns out that some of the notes are not good. Now, at the time of making the contract, A. gave security for the faithful performance. Now, as the principal has sent in all money and notes, as per contract, can the fact that some of the notes are not paid make the surety of A. liable when there is nothing in the contract that all notes should be paid, it only stipulating that all money received and notes taken should, "less commission," be sent into the house-the notes with A.'s personal guaranty on notes, which was done in all cases? Please answer and cite authorities, etc.

C. P. JOHNSON.

Answer. If case is fully and correctly stated in the query, the surety cannot be liable. The law cannot be better stated than it was by Chief Justice Kent, as long ago as 1805, in Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Caines Cases in Error, 57. He says: "It is a well-settled rule, both at law and in equity, that a surety is not to be held beyond the precise terms of his contract, and except in certain cases of accident, mistake or fraud, a court of equity will never lend its aid to fix a surety beyond what he is fairly bound to at law." See also Chase v. McDonald, 7 Harris & Johnson, 193; People v. Chalmers, 60 N. Y., 154; Kingsbury v. Westfall, 61 N. Y., 360. It is unnecessary to multiply authorities. An intelligent use in any moderately good law library of the time expended in writing the "query," would have given all the necessary information.

Query 51 [22 Cent. L. J. 599.]—A. rides a bicycle on a public road, in the county, at a rapid rate of speed, up to within twenty-five feet of the face of a team of horses traveling towards him, does not turn out, and by this act, frightens the team; and in the fright the harness, which is sound and good, breaks, making it impossible for the driver to control them. A. jumps from his bicycle, seizes the horse next to him, calls to the driver to jump out and seize the other horse. Driver jumps out, but before he can get the other horse's head, A. lets go his hold, voluntarily, the team runs away, B., riding in the carriage, is threwn out and seriously injured. Has B. a cause of action against A? Cite autharities. Has any correspondent a reference to a case of injury caused by a bicycle?

A. L. B. Answer.-A bicycle is a carriage, 28 Eng. R. Moak, 748. See also People v. Greenfield, 138 Mass. 1. There is little question that a bicycle rider on the street is entitled to the same rights that any driver of a vehicle

is, no greater, no less. The horse is not a sacred animal. If A. L. B. will apply to Mr. Charles Pratt, Boston, Mass., he will undoubtedly receive a copy of brief containing all the bicycle cases. Mr. Pratt is counsel for the League of American Wheelmen, and very willing to help all cyclists. C. T. C.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

TAE AMERICAN PROBATE REPORTS,-Containing recent cases of general value decided in the courts of the several States on points of Probate Law. With notes and references by Wm. W. Ladd Jr. Vol. IV. New York: Baker Voorhis & Co., Law Publishers, 66 Nassau Street. 1886.

This is the fourth volume of a collection of cases which cannot fail to be of great value not only to the specialist whose practice lies chiefly, or altogether in courts of Ordinary, to whom they would seem absolutely indispensable, but also to the general practitioner who must frequently appear in those courts. Upon such occasions it would assuredly be of great assistance to have at hand a collection of this character of cases, bearing upon almost every question that can be presented to a Probate Court. The cases, seventy seven in number, are evidently selected with great care, and many of them carefully annotated. We commend this series to the profession, as well worthy of a place in the library of every practitioner.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

A GOOD FIELD for Bad LAWERS.-"Yes," said the old fellow who had been beaten for Superior Court Judge at the last electian. "Yes, bad lawers always make good judges. Most bad lawers are given to conscience and honesty."

"Well-Judge-."

"That's all right. I'm a bad lawyer. That's why I wanted to be a judge. It saves you a lot of trouble and teaches you your business when other lawers fill you up with the facts and figures of the law. A good lawyer can never be trusted on the bench. He's always liable to give a decision against the cleverest lawyer in the case, just to show his smartness. A bad lawyer on the bench doesn't take law so much as justice into consideration, and no defendant or plaintiff ever yet was injured by a common sense decision. It is a fallacy of our great republican form of government that the voice of the people spoken through the ballot-box purifies the men elected, and that the election of a lawyer to the bench destroys all the weakness of human nature he may have had before. In the divine government purification precedes election. In human government election precedes purification. I don't believe a lawer's any more honest when they make him a judge than he was before. They call him a lawyer until he becomes a judge, then he is spoken of as a distinguished jurist."

WOMEN AS LAWYERS.-The following facts were furnished by Ellen S. Martin, an attorney at law, of Chicago, to a member of the Philadelphia bar in search of statistics:

"My investigation last year resulted in finding fortyeight women who had been admitted to the bar and engaged in practice or some line of lawyers' work (editing law reports or periodicals) in the United States.

I have heard of others since, but, as it was too late for my purpose, I have not followed them up. Many other women have studied and been admitted, but have not practiced.

"The forty-eight in actual practice are distributed as follows: I give the place of first admission-some have changed location-and give the States in order in which they first admitted women: Iowa, 3; Missouri, 2; Michigan, 6; Utah Territory, 1; District of Columbia, 3; Maine, 1: Ohio, 4; Illinois, 7; Wisconsin, 5; Indiana, 2; Kansas, 3; Minnesota, (from Iowa); California, 3; Connecticut, 1; Massachusetts, 1; Nebraska, 1; Washington Territory, 1; Pennsylvania, 1. Total 48.

"The admission in all these States is to the highest courts, except in the case of Pennsylvania. Women have also appeared as attorneys in several of the local courts of Maryland, and have been admitted to the United States courts in Texas and Oregon-though not to the State courts.

"Women were admitted on their first application, without any change in the law, in Iowa, Missouri, Michigan, Utah, District of Columbia, Maine, Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana, Kansas, Connecticut, Nebraska, and Washington Territory. In Wisconsin and Ohio, after some women had been admitted, others were refused by other judges, and the legislatures at once passed laws forbidding the exclusion. In Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and California courts would not admit woman until laws were passed, and the legislature promptly passed them.

"The first admission of a woman occured in Iowa in 1869, when the statute provided only for for the admission of 'white male persons over the age of 21 years.' Both the words 'white' and 'male' soon after droopped out of the statute. In the other States where women were admitted on first application,there existed either the common law on the subject (whatever that may be) or the word 'male,' 'citizen,' or 'voter' was in the statute relating to admission of attorneys."

PAT'S "IVIDINCE."-A man's honest opinion of himself is generally a pretty fair estimate of his powers. As a rule, it is only the most ignorant persons who esteem themselves too highly. The man in the following story unconsciously gave his own opinion of himself. An Irishman accused of horse-stealing was brought before his Honor for a series of questions, whereupon the following conversation ensued: "What are you here for?"

"For bearglary, I belave they call it." "What is the testimony against you?" "An' jist noothing, yer Honor, 'xcipt that I told the Justice of the Pace mesilf that I did it."

"Well, if you've confessed it, I don't see but your chances are good for a verdict against you."

"Sure, yer Honor, no dacent court wouid condimn a man on sich ividince as that!"

But that evidence was taken, and the poor Irishman was sent to prison.

ECCENTRIC.-There once lived "down East" a peculiar and original old gentleman named Adams, who was known to all the 'neighborhood for miles around by his harmless and amusing eccentricities. A lawyer named Somerby, riding out of town early one summer morning, discovered Mr. Adams making his way afield, with the necessary haying tools-a jug and a scythe-and stopped to have a chat with him.

The soil in that part of the country is very thin and sandy, and the hay crop always light, and the goodhumored lawyer took occasion to remark upon the fact, and to pity the farmers who were obliged to wring a scanty living from sucn barren acres.

The old gentleman heard him patiently for a time, but at length broke out:

"Look here, Squire, you're wasting your sympathy. I ain't so poor as you think I am. I don't own this farm."-Boston Record.

SMITH'S BITTERNESS.-"Say, pa," said Johnny, this paper says that Mr. Smith is a second Ananias. What does that mean?"

Pa (bitterly)-"It means he is a lawyer, my son." FELT HAPPY.-Lawyer (joyfully)-"How do you feel now?"

Condemned murderer (who has just been reprieved) -"As playful as a child, my boy."

Lawyer (slapping him on the back)-"Ah, I see you have just skipped a rope."-The Judge.

PRACTICING BY EAR.-Among the friends of Grover Cleveland when he was practicing law in this city was another attorney, but one of rather different stamp than the man of destiny. The friend was a bright fellow, but with the bump of laziness abnormally developed. He was not a well-read lawyer, and whenever it was necessary for him to use a decision bearing on any point, it was his habit to lounge into Cleveland's office and casually worm the desired information out of his friend's mental storehouse. "Grover" was not so dull as not to appreciate the fact, and to resent the sponging-not so much because the process was worthy of that name, as because he wished to spur his friend on to more energetic work. One day the friend came in on his usual errand, and when Cleveland had heard the preliminaries usual to the pumping process, the latter told his questioner that he had given him all the information on law matters that he was going to. "There are my books," said Cleveland, "and you're quite welcome to use them. You can read up your own cases." "See here, Grover Cleveland," said the friend, "I want you to understand that I don't read law. I practice entirely by ear, and you and your books can go to thunder."

THE Court of Chancery in New Jersey has given an opinion, holding that a witness in that State who swears on the Bible is not bound to kiss the book. A female witness when sworn had laid her hand on the Bible, but refused to kiss it, saying that she had "never kissed the book." She was allowed by the Master to testify, but a motion was subsequently made to to strike out her testimony. The law was thus laid down by Vice-Chancellor Bird: "Almighty God, or the Ever Living God, or the like, is called upon by the witness to witness that he will speak the truth. The rest is form. The solemn invocation, affirmation or declaration is the substance. All else is shadow. The witness in this case was sworn with her hand upon the book. There can be no doubt but that if she made a false statement wilfully she is liable to an indictment for perjury. But it is said that this may be true and yet the consience of the witness not be bound, which is the object of the oath. There is great force in this. How did the witness herself regard it? She is presumably a witness, for nothing to the contrary appears. She accepted the form of the oath as usually administered, without objections, except kissing the Bible. By this act on her part the court is justified in presuming, without further inquiry, that the witness intended that her conscience should be bound. Speaking from the forum of her conscience, she declared that it was not essential to kiss the book in order to impose upon herself all the obligations of an oath."-Ex.

ST. LOUIS, JULY 23, 1886.

CURRENT EVENTS.

THE QUEEN'S JUBILEE YEAR.-On the 19th

of June the Benchers of the Inner Temple celebrated the beginning of Queen Victoria's Jubilee year, her accession to the throne having taken place on the 20th of June,

1837.

The festivities, as accorded well with the antiquity of the venerable society under whose auspices they were conducted, were of an antique cast, the music was chiefly by the older composers, the songs were strictly "Old English," several of them Shakesperian, and the

whole entertainment was in Tony Lumpkin's phrase, "in a concatenation accordingly."

The learned gentlemen have done well and honored themselves in thus honoring their Queen, for very few sovereigns, ancient or modern, have borne as staunchly, as the present Queen of England, "the fierce light that beats upon a throne."

REFORMED PLEADING.-Every now and then there comes up a question whether an innovation in the law is really an improvement, and whether reformation in legal matters, really reforms. Some weeks ago we called attention to the doubt beginning to be entertained whether the "exemption" laws of the several States were really and truly such blessings to the industrious poor as they are generally held to be; and now comes a question whether the reformation of the forms of pleading which has been so general in all the States, has not done more mischief and injury to the due administration of the law than it has prevented. A contemporary says:

"The jury who, in the effort to squelch the defendant's counterclaim, the other day, extinguished the plaintiff himself by their blundering verdict of "no cause of action," afforded an amusing illustration of one of the inconveniences of the free pleading and commonly complex issues which the present procedure invites."

The old common law system of pleading was very faulty in many points of view, enVol. 23.-No. 4.

less forms, and subjected the unwary to the peril of many snares and pitfalls. It needed, and could well bear, very thorough pruning and many alterations, but it had the root of the matter in it. A case well pleaded on both sides under the old system never failed to present the precise point in issue between the parties.

The case mentioned by our contemporary would indicate that the systems which have supplanted it in most of the States, have introduced an element of uncertainty arising from the fault opposite to that of the older system, that the craving for simplicity and brevity has carried our legislators and courts too far, and produced evils, different but hardly less serious than those which attended the desciples of Chitty. In arguing or deciding any question, the first, last, indispensable matter is to know precisely what that question is, and any system of pleading that does not always disclose it even to the unprofessional juror is faulty, and stands in need of further improvement and reformation.

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS-CHARITABLE AND BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATIONS.-In a case recently decided in Massachusetts, we find the first judicial exposition, which we have seen, of the precise legal status of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals. These very praiseworthy organizations are to be found in most of our States and larger cities, but heretofore there seems to have been no occasion for their position to be judicially defined. It seems that the society in question had paid taxes to the amount of $205,60, and brought suit to recover it back upon the ground that its property was exempt from taxation, under the statute of Massachusetts which exempted from taxation the property of "literary, benevolent, charitable, and scientific institutions."

The court held that the society was both benevolent and charitable, and adds that it "comes within the definition of a charity. There is no profit or pecuniary benefit in it for any of its members. Its work, in the education of a mankind in the proper treatment

1 Massachusetts Society for the prevention of cruelty to animals v. City of Boston, Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass., May 1886.