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QUERIES AND ANSWERS.*
1 Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.]
QUERIES. 31. If the jury believe from the evidence that Mrs.
for the purpose of influencing said testator in making bis will, raised prejudices in his mind against those who would otherwise have been the natural objects of his bounty, and by contrivance kept him from intercourse with such persons to the end, that those prejudices or impressions which she knew he had thus formed to the disadvantage of such persons (if the jury so believe) might be removed, then the jury are entitled to consider these facts in connection with other facts in the case, in deciding the issue relative to undue influence. But such facts would not of themselves amount to such proof as the law requires of undue influence sufficient to invalidate the will.
The above instruction was given to the jury in a will case, and was objected to by the contestants. The verdict sustained the will. The Mrs. was distantly related to testator, and testimony proved the testator to be blind, over 80 years of age and confined to his bed-room at time of making will, by which, relatives more nearly related than the Mrs. were excluded. Is the instruction correct? Cite authorities.
law, applicable to those questions with which the emergencies of the profession are most likely to confront the practitioner, will be of service in the administration of justice."
From this statement, it is manifest that Mr. Malone has not attempted the impossible task of condensing into the compass of a single volume of less than five hundred pages the great body of the criminal law; but has made a judicious selection of those questions which are most likely to "confront the practitioner," and has treated them as concisely as possible with due regard to their importance.
Mr. Malone's divisions of his subject are good. He pretermits all criminal process prior to the action of the grand jury, and after treating the jury system, generally and briefly, in a preliminary chapter, or “brief,” as for some occult reason he calls his subdivisions, he enters upon the subject of his work with the procedure of the grand jury, indictment, presentment and information. The next four briefs treat re. spectively of "trial and its incidents,” "evidence in criminal cases,” “insanity as an excuse for crime," and "rules for the interpretation of criminal stat. utes." As these subjects are disposed of in one hundred and sixty-six pages, it is manifest that no degree of condensation could render the treatment exhaustive; nor, indeed, as we have already said, does it profess to be, but there are many important principles well and succinctly stated within those narrow limits. Following these six briefs are fourteen others, treating specifically a large number of offenses, and to these succeed three briefs, on verdicts and subsequent proceedings, the work concluding with two briefs on extradition and habeas corpus respectively.
The briefs are sub-divided into sections, indicated by italics, but not numbered, as they should have been. The typographical execution of the book is good, and the work, although not as full as could be desired, will prove very useful to the practitioner.
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.
Query 27. [23 Cent. L. J. 408.]-A contracts to build a house for B, and in the contract there is a clause that A “will deliver the building free of me. chanics' or other liens.” What effect would such a clause have on material men, sub-contractors and day laborers? If B paid A in full, according to contract, and it turns out that A has not paid for all the material, and still owes sub-contractors and day laborers, could they, under above claim, file a lien on said building?
Answer. The party inquiring does not state where, and under what law the question is to be answered. Under the Iowa law, it is clear that they would not be entitled to a lien. As the case of Steward & Hayden v. Wright et al., 62 Iowa, 335, holds that sub-contractors who furnish labor or materials for the erection of a building, are required to take notice of the terms of the principal contract, and the owner is protected in making payments to the principal contractor in accordance with the terms of his contract, unless notified of claims for material or labor furnished before such payments are due. And 54 Iowa, 338, contra in Nebraska.
J. R. C.
THERE has lately died at Helston, in Cornwall, an example of a practitioner in the law whose experience of it for length of time and permanence in one place is probably unparallelled. A legal practice once established, especially in a country town, very often lasts for many generations; but no man ever practiced as a solicitor in one firm for eighty years. The nearest ap. proach to this distinction has been attained by a rep. resentative of that well-deserving class, which for want of a better name, is called lawyers' clerks. In the year 1806, the late Mr. Treloar entered the service of a firm of solicitors in Helston, at the age of fifteen, not earlier than most of his class begin, and remained with the same firm until he died last week. Partners came and went, but the clerk continued, managing the estates of the clients of the firm, and acting as their deputy at boards of guardians, bighway boards, and elsewhere. So valuable a servant was of course well paid, and Mr. Treloar became a man of substance, besides acquiring posts like that of registrar of marriages and manager of the gas company. He also took a leading part in the religious body to which he belonged; but he remained a lawyer's clerk to the end. Probably it was not worth his while, or he could not afford the time, to become a solicitor. Mr. Treloar has at length fallen a victim to the principle that nature, like the law, objects to perpetuities; but he has left a reputation which does credit to the profession of the law, although he was not a formally authorized practitioner of it.-London Law Journal.
CRIMINAL BRIEFS.-By Wm. Henry Malone, of Ashville, North Carolina, author of “Real Property Trials.” Baltimore: M. Curlander, Law Bookseller, Publisher and Importer. 1886.
This is a work on criminal law and procedure, which we regard as well worthy of commendation. The author says, that the object of his book is “to state concisely, and at the same time clearly and accurately, all principles of law generally arising in criminal cases," and concludes his preface by saying: “It is hoped that such a condensed presentation of the
he Central Law Journal. be continued? Is it in accord with our scru
pulous abstention from all religious tests that ST. LOUIS, NOVEMBER 26, 1886.
we should continue this remnant of an effete
system? We think not. The time is within CURRENT EVENTS.
living memory, when it was considered a
reckless experiment to abrogate the disqualiCOMPETENCY OF WITNESSES DEFECT OF
fication of witnesses on account of interest. RELIGIOUS BELIEF.-It appears from a news- And yet the law and the country survived the paper report (Knoxville Journal) that a cir- total extinction of that rule. And so with cuit court in Tennessee was recently con- the testimony of parties to a civil action, and fronted with the legal-religious question. it has now become well settled that the tribuWhat constitutes such a defect of religious nal which is to decide upon the weight and belief as will render a person incompetent to effect of testimony may well be trusted with testify in a court of justice? The case has its credibility. The practical rule now is, gone to the supreme court, and in the course “ let everything go to the jury for what it is of time we will hear from that body on the worth, and we do not see why the crotchets subject. Meanwhile we have abuudant leisure of the agnostic should exclude him from the for speculation.
witness-box any more than those of the MorIt is well settled in England, that one who
or Spiritualist, Chinaman or Budhist, does not believe in a God, “the rewarder of do, the people who hold those extraordinary truth and avenger of falsehood," 1 is not
creeds. competent witness in a court of justice. The Whether the punishment denounced by the rule is sometimes otherwise stated; in some law against perjury is sufficient to exclude of the States it has been materially modified, false testimony without the aid of a religious and in five or six, including Missouri, abol- sanction is not a question now to be taken ished altogether. Formerly, in England, only
into account. If it is not sufficiently severe Christians were permitted to testify-Jews,
or sufficiently certain it should be made so by Mohammedans, Pagans, all manner of " mis- proper legislation. It is not proposed to believers," as well as unbelievers, were
absolve the agnostic from compliance with rigidly excluded. But there, as well as here,
the forms exacted from other witnesses. He this severity of the rule has been relaxed,
should be required to swear or affirm llke and the only question which remains now is,
other people, and if in his eyes, the performwhether public policy requires that it should ance is a mere folly that is his affair, the law be longer continued, even in its modified
holds him all the same to tell the truth, form, and whether the perfect liberty guar
under the penalties prescribed for perjury. anteed by free institutions does not require It is noteworthy that on this subject Tenthat it should be abrogated altogether.
nessee is somewhat less progressive than It is not a question of degree or amount of
some other States. In its constitution of privation, loss or inconvenience, but of right.
1870, art. IX., $ 2, it is provided that: "No Those under the ban of this rule, whom we person who denies the being of a God or a will call agnostics, that being the appellation
future state of rewards and punishments shall usually adopted by them, may pass through a hold any office in the civil department of this long life without suffering the least inconven
State." ience from this quasi disfranchisement. The
There has been no judicial exposition of question is, whether it is consistent with the this clause, and it is a little remarkable that spirit of our institutions, which guarantee per
the advanced thinkers on theological and fect freedom and absolute equality before the
philosophical subjects in Tennessee, to say law to all manner of men, that one class should nothing of sticklers for personal liberty have for opinion's sake be singled out and de
not been heard from on the subject. It is barred from a right, or exempted from a
evidently on the cards, that in a partisan duty, incumbent upon all others. Does pub-political crisis, the Bradlaugh question, which lic policy require that this distinction should so long agitated the British Parliament, might
well chance to be reproduced on the banks of i Lord Hardwicke in Ormchund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 48. the Cumberlaud river. Vol. 23-No. 22.
NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. company in conflict with that clause? If the
city had no greater power than a private corFEDERAL JURISDICTION_IMPAIRING OBLIGA- poration, its action would only have been, at TION OF CONTRACT—MUNICIPAL CORPORATION the utmost, a breach of contract, for which - MONOPOLY. — There was recently before the
the party aggrieved would have an ample United States Circuit Court, for the Eastern remedy in the State courts. The question District of Michigan, a casel involving the
was whether the latter contract was really power of a municipal corporation to grant an the act of the State through the instruexclusive franchise to a corporation for a
mentality of the city, for it is only a law of a long term of years, and in connection there- State that cau conflict with the clause under with a question of federal jurisdiction. The consideration.3 After an examination of the facts were, that in 1868 the city of Saginaw general law of the State, the charter of the made a contract with the gas-light company
city, enacted in 1867, the amendment of the by which that company should, upon terms
charter in 1871, and the city ordinance in the unnecessary to state here, have the exclusive same year re-affirming the contract of 1867, right to light the streets, etc., for a term of the court concludes that the State by its acts thirty years. In 1886, the city contracted conferred upon the city the right to "cause with an electric light company for city and
its streets to be lighted,” but adds: * It is commercial lighting. The gas-light company
clear, however, that there is no authority exfiled a bill in the United States Circuit Court, pressly given to confer upon any corporation and the case was heard on a motion for a an exclusive right to occupy its streets for a preliminary injunction.
number of years.” Now if this means, as These were two questions before the court:
may fairly be inferred from the language em1. Whether a federal court had jurisdiction ployed, that the acts of the State, i. e., the of the question; and 2. Whether the contract
charter of 1867, and the amendment to it of between the city and the company was valid
1871, did not confer upon the city the right and binding upon the city.
to grant the exclusive privilege for thirty Upon the first point, the court held that it years, the act of the city so granting that had no jurisdiction by reason of the fact privilege was ultra vires and void. It would that one of the parties defendant, the electric seem, therefore, to be unnecessary to demonlight company, was a citizen of a different strate, as the court does very fully, that the State from the plaintiff, upon the well estab
contract between the city and the gas-light lished principle, that to give jurisdiction to a company is the grant by the former to the federal court on the ground of citizenship
latter of a monopoly, and for that reason alone, all the parties properly plaintiffs must
void, so far as its exclusive feature is conbe citizens of a different State from that of
cerned. It is sufficient to show that the city which the parties properly defendants are
has done a thing which by the law of the citizens. The court, however, finds juris
State it had no power to do, and by a well diction over the question, in the fact that the
settled rule of law its act in so doing is void. case involves the well known clause of the
The contract of 1886 with the Electric Constitution of the United States : “No Light Company was fully within the powers State shall pass any law impairing the obli- granted to the city by its charter ; by it the gation of contracts.' That federal courts city conferred no exclusive right and exerhave jurisdiction of all cases involving a vio- cised no doubtful powers. The contract was lation of this constitutional provision is too beyond all question the act of the State, well settled to need the citation of authori
through the instrumentality of the city, and ties. Was the action of the defendant city
if the antecedent contract of the city with the in 1886 in contracting with the electric light gas-light company was valid, it undoubted
ly impaired the obligation of that contract. 1 Saginaw Gas-Light Company v. City of Saginaw
Therefore, it was certainly within the proper (Sept. 17, 1886), The Reporter, vol. 22, p. 378.
2 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch, 267; Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ketch. 3 Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177, 181; Knox v* am, 101 U. S. 289, 297; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Exchange Bank, 12 Wall. 379; Tarver v. Keach, 15 Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336; Shainwald v. Lewis, Wall. 67; Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 462; 108 U. S. 158; Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U, S. 407:
Wright v. Nagle, 101 U, S. 791.
jurisdiction of the federal court to entertain the action and decide whether or not the last contract made by the city impaired the obligation of the former.
THE PRESENT LAW OF RENT.
Nature and Time of Payment.--Rent, which is an important incident of an estate for years and a lease, is defined to be a periodical return made by the tenant, either in labor, money or provisions, in retribution for the land that passes ;' or it is in effect the price or purchase money to be paid for the ownership of the premises during the term, which must be certain or capable of being reduced to a certainty by either party;" and at common law it must issue out of the thing granted, and not be a part of the land itself,4 though it is frequently reserved in a certain portion of the products, and may also be reserved in labor, as well as produce.?
When the time for payment of rent is not fixed by custom or by express stipulation, it is not due until the end of the term ;8 but if payable in produce, payment should be made in a reasonable time after the crops are gathered, and payments made by the tenant on account of rent generally without any
direction or agreement as to its application, will be applied by the law on the rent due at the timelo, and not on the rent then accruing." Rent may be made payable in advance, 12 but a custom to pay in advance cannot be imported into an express covenant to pay quarterly, 18 though a lessor's verbal agreement with the tenant to change, for a new consideration, the time of paying the rent from the beginning to the end of the month has been held valid; and under a lease for years from a specific day, rent conditioned to be payable quarterly on certain days is not due until after midnight of such days ;15 but where a lease, conditioned to be forfeited for nonpayment of rent, provides no place for payment, payment should be demanded by the landlord of the tenant on the premises just before sunset on the specified day. 16
Actions and Defenses.-In most cases an action of debt will lie for rent, under the common law practice, and an action of as
1 2 Greenl, Cruise Real Prop. 72; Coke on Littleton, 142 a; McGee v. Gibson, 1 B. Monroe, Ky., 105.
2 Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 67; Stone v. Patterson, 19 Pick. 476. Rent is a certain profit, either in money, provisions, chattels or labor issuing yearly out of lands and tenements in return for their use. Green v. Eales, Z. Q. B. 224 Tayb. hand & Terr. 369.
3 2 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 72; Smith v. Tyler, 2 Hill 648; Cross v. Tome, 14 Md. 247; Bowzer v. Scott, 8 Black Ind. 36; Smith v. Colson, 10 Johns, N. Y. 9; Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn., 548.
4 2 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 72; Coke on Littleton 47; and coni pare Buszard v. Capel, 8 Barn and C. 141; Mickle v. Miles, 31 Pa. St. 20.
3 See Ream v. Hamish, 45 Pa. St. 376; Butterfield v. Biker, Pick. 522; Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. St. 357; Smalley v. Corliss, 37 Vt. 486; Buskirk v. Cleveland, 41 Birb. 610; Dockham v. Parker, 9 Me. 137; 23 Am. Dec. ti; Johnson v. Smith, 3 Pen. & W. 496; $. C. 24 Am. Dec. 339; Lilley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Masz. 432.
6 McGee v. Gibson, 1 B. Monroe 105; Boone Real Prop. 106.
i McGee v. Gibson, 1 B. Monroe 105. Three kinds of rent, rent service, rent charge and rent seck, Taylor on Land
570; Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 72, 1475; 3 Kent's Com. 368; Coke 65; Cuthbert v. Kuhn, 3 Whart, 357; S. C. 31 Am. Dec. 513; Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68; Hurst v. Lithgrow, 2 Yeates 24; S. C. 1 Am. Dec. 326; Distress for rent, 2 Washb. Real Prop. 11; 3 Kent's Com. 473; 2 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 88; 4 Dane's Abr. 126; Youngleload v. Lowry, 2 McCord s. C. 39; S. C. 13 Am. Dec. 698; Diller v. Roberts, 13 Serg. & R. Pa. 60; S.C. 15 Am. Dec. 578; Lichtenthaler v. Thompson, 13 Serg. & R. 157; S. C. 15 Am. Dec. 581; Nosnins v. Paul, 4 Halst. N. J. 110; S. C. 17 Am. Dec. 455; McCreery v. Clafilin, 37 Md. 435; 11 Am. Rep. 542; Hadden v. Knickerbocker, 70 11). 677; 2. Am. Rep. 80; Howe Sewing Machine Co. v. Sloan 87 Pa. St.
438; 30 Am. Rep. 376; Survival of remedy (as in Waring v. Slingluff 63 Mo. 53) criticised 21 Cent. L. J. 107, entering through a window to distrain, 21 Cent. L. J. 300.
8 Garvey v. Dobyns, S Mo. 213; Ridgley v. Stillwell, 27 Mo. 128; Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343; Gibbons v. Thompson, 21 Minn. 398; Boyd v. McCombs, 4 Pa. St. 146; Hopkins v. Helmore 8 Ad. & E. 463.
9 Brown v. Adams, 35 Tex. 447; Toler v. Seabrook, 39 Ga. 11; Lamberton v. Stouffer, 55 Pár. St. 276; and Şee Dockham v. Parker, 9 Me. 127; 8. C. 23 Am. Dec. 547.
10 Hunter v. Osterhoudt, 11 Barb. 33.
11 Hunter v. Osterhoudt, 11 Barb. 33 Boone Real Prop. 108.
12 Rent payable in advance on a certain day may be paid at any time during that day; Smith v. Shepard, 15 Pick, 147; s. C. Am. Dec. 547.
13 Mitchell v. Weller, 1 Jur. 622.*
14 Wilgus v. Whitehead, 89 Pa. St. 131. If the tenant has paid the rent of the term in advance he will not be liable to pay the same again to an assignee of the reversion; Stone v. Patterson, 19 Pick. 477.
15 Ordway v. Remington, 12 R. I. 319; s. C. 34 Am. Rep. 646; Compare Sherlock v. Thayer, 4 Mich. 355.
16 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 63 Ind. 416; 8. C. 30 Am. Rep. 229; Boone Real Prop. 108; and see Hartwell v. Kelly, 117 Mass. 235: Chapman v. Harney, 100 Mass. 353.
17 Duppa v. Mayo, 1 Sound 281; and see DeLancey v. Ga. Min, 12 Barb. 120; 9 N. Y. 9; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb. 504; Allen v. Bryan 5 Barn & C. 512; Trabue v. McAdams 8 Bush. Ky., 74. In England an action of
sumpsit for the use and occupation of land a part of the demised premises are ocby permission of the plaintiff lies on an im- cupied for an immoral purpose, with the plied, 18 as well as on an express, promise to knowledge and consent of the landlords : 47 pay rent;19 but an action for use and occupa- but at common law the abandonment of the tion will lie only where the relation of land- premises by the tenant because untenantalord and tenant exists between the parties, 20 ble would have been no defense to an action and the defendant must have actually taken against him for the stipulated rent.? And possession of the premises, either by himself, where a landlord leases premises to a tenant his agent or his under-tenant,21 though if the for the carrying on of a certain business and lease contains a covenant on the part of the covenants that he will not, during the term lessee to pay the rent an action of covenant of the lease, lease other adjacent premises may be brought thereon.22
to other parties for the carrying on of a simAmong the defenses to actions for rent23 ilar business, the tenant injured by the are, an eviction from the whole or a material breach of such a covenant is not entitled to part of the premises by the landlord, 24
set off his damages in replevin upon a disment or tender of the rent as provided in the tress for rent. 29 agreements--a surrender in fact--and deliv- Lien for.-In some of the States, and in ery of possession to and its acceptance by the England, statutes have been enacted giving landlord ;26 and it is also a good defense that landlords a lien upon the tenant's goods, or
upon the crops growing or grown upon the debt wlil now lie for the recovery of a rent charge in
demised premises, to secure the payment of fee; Thomas v. Sylvester, Law R. 8 0. B. 368; 6. Eng. rent, so the lien in such cases attaching at the Rep. 103.
commencement of the tenancy,31 and the 18 Guns v. Scovil, 4 Day Conn 228; s. C. 4 Am. Dec. 208; Howard v. Runsen 2 Aiken, Vt., 252; Crouch v.
landlord may maintain a special action against Briles, 7 J. J. Marshall, Ky., 255; s. c. 23 Am. Dec.
a stranger, who, with notice of a lien upon 404. 19 Sutton v. Mandeville, 1 Munf. 407; s. c. 4 Am.
the crop, destroys, removes or so converts Dec. 549; Eppes v. Cole, 4 Har. 4 Mc.H. Md., 161; the crop or changes its character that the Swaseyr Little 7 Pick. 296; Warner v. Hale, 65 III. 395; landlord cannot enforce his lien. S2 And the Howard v. Shaw, 8 Mees. & W. 118, where there is a lease under seal, no action for use and occupation can
acceptance of a collateral promise by a purbe maintained against the lessee or his assignee; Keir- chaser of goods from a tenant does not rested v. Railroad Co. 69 N. Y. 343; 25 Am. Rep. 199. lease the landlord's lien; nor, where goods
20 Smith v. Stuart, 6 Johns, 49; s. c. 5 Am. Dec. 186; Bancroft v. Wardell, 13 Johns. 489; s. C. 7 Am. Dec.
are levied on, can a third person after failing 396; Edmonson v. Hite, 43 Mo. 178; McCloskey v. Miller, 72 Pa. St. 154; Espy v. Penton, 5 Overy, 423; Lank.
27 Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cowen, 727; Townsend y. ford v. Greene, 52 Ala. 103; Hathaway v. Ryan 35 Cal.
Gilsey, 1 Sweeny, 155; 7 Abb. N. S. 159, and compare 194; and compare Woodbury v. Woodbury 47 N. H.20. 21 Bordman v. Osborn, 23 Pick. 295; Waring v. King.
Dewitt v. Pierson, 112 Mass. 8; 17 Am. Rep. 58. Ten8 Mees & W. 571; and see Mayor, etc. v. Saunders, 3
ant holding after knowledge of bad repute of house
liable for rent. Carhart v. Ruder, 11 Daly, 101. Barn & Adal 421; Edmonson v. Kite, 43 Mo. 176; Bed
28 Graves v. Cameron, 58 How. Pr. 75; Boone Real ford v. Terhune, 30 N. Y. 453.
Prop. 110. False representations that premises ten22 2 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 94; Vyvyan v. Arthur
antable. Jackson v. Odell, 14 Abb. N. C. 42, and see 1 Barn, etc. 418; Boone Real Prop. 110.
Bradley v. De Goicuria, 14 Id. 53. 23 See Farris v. Houston, 74 Ala. 162, destruction of
29 Alleguert v. Smart, 14 Cent. L. J. 159. lime kiln; Warren v. Wagner, 175 Ala. 188; s. c. 51
30 See Doam v. Garretson, 24 Iowa, 351; Givens v. Am. Rep. 446.
Easley, 17 Ala. 385; Brighton v. Powell, 52 Ala. 123: 24 Hayner v. Smith, 63 Ill. 430; s. C. 14 Am. Rep.
Taliafero v. Pry, 41 Ga. 622; Washington v. William124; McClewg v. Price, 59 Pa. St. 1420; Tunis v.
son, 23 Md. 244; Woodside v. Adams, 40 N. J. L. 417; Grandy, 22 Gratt, Va., 109; Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Vt. Reed v. Thoyts, 6 Mees. & W. 410; Valid agreement 109; 24 Am. Rep. 117; Holmes v. Guion, 44 Mo. 164; for lien; See Wisner v. Ocinnpaugh, 71 N. Y. 113. Colburn v. Morrill, 117 Mass., 262; 19 Am. Rep. 415; 31 Smith v. Meyer, 25 Ark. 609; Powell v. Hadden, 21 Shumway v. Collins, 6 Gray 227; Edgerton v. Page, 1 Ala. 748; Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall. 328. Compare Hilt. N. Y. 328; Morrison v. Chadwick, 7 Com. B. 383. Harris v. Dowmann, 3 Mackey, (D. C.), 90. If after eviction the lessee returns and occupies again, 32 Hussey v. Peebles, 53 Ala. 432; Boone Real Prop. the rent revives; Morrison v. Chadwick, 7 Com. B. 111; purchases from tenant of property other than 383; Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 378; and compare Hunter crops takes it freed from lien, in Illinois; Hadden v. v. Reiley, 43 N. J. L. 480.
Knickerbocker, 70 Ul. 677; s. C. 22 Am. Rep. 80; and 25 Carter v. Carter, 5 Bing. 406; Sandford v. Fetcher, compare O'Hara v. Jones, 46 Ill. 288; Martin v. Black, 4 Term Rep. 511.
9 Paige, 641; Bach v. Meats, 5 Maule & S. 200; lessor's 26 Page v. Ellsworth, 44 Barb. 636; Elliott v. Aiken, right when postponed to that of a bona fide mortgage 45 N. H. 30; Fuller v. Ruby, 10 Gray 290; Fisher v. without notice; Thomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun. 88. Millikins, 8 Pa. St. 111.
39 Block v. Latham, 639, ex. 419.