QUERIES AND ANSWERS.*

[Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.]

QUERIES.

31. If the jury believe from the evidence that Mrs. for the purpose of influencing said testator in making his will, raised prejudices in his mind against those who would otherwise have been the natural objects of his bounty, and by contrivance kept him from intercourse with such persons to the end, that those prejudices or impressions which she knew he had thus formed to the disadvantage of such persons (if the jury so believe) might be removed, then the jury are entitled to consider these facts in connection with other facts in the case, in deciding the issue relative to undue influence. But such facts would not of themselves amount to such proof as the law requires of undue influence sufficient to invalidate the will.

The above instruction was given to the jury in a will case, and was objected to by the contestants. The verdict sustained the will. The Mrs. was dis

tantly related to testator, and testimony proved the testator to be blind, over 80 years of age and confined to his bed-room at time of making will, by which, relatives more nearly related than the Mrs. were excluded. Is the instruction correct? Cite authorities.

QUERIES ANSWERED.

J.

Query 27. [23 Cent. L. J. 408.]-A contracts to build a house for B, and in the contract there is a clause that A "will deliver the building free of mechanics' or other liens." What effect would such a clause have on material men, sub-contractors and day laborers? If B paid A in full, according to contract, and it turns out that A has not paid for all the material, and still owes sub-contractors and day laborers, could they, under above claim, file a lien on said building?

Answer. The party inquiring does not state where, and under what law the question is to be answered. Under the Iowa law, it is clear that they would not be entitled to a lien. As the case of Steward & Hayden v. Wright et al., 62 Iowa, 335, holds that sub-contractors who furnish labor or materials for the erection of a building, are required to take notice of the terms of the principal contract, and the owner is protected in making payments to the principal contractor in accordance with the terms of his contract, unless notified of claims for material or labor furnished before such payments are due. And 54 Iowa, 338, contra in Nebraska. J. R. C.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

CRIMINAL BRIEFS.-By Wm. Henry Malone, of Ashville, North Carolina, author of "Real Property Trials." Baltimore: M. Curlander, Law Bookseller, Publisher and Importer. 1886.

This is a work on criminal law and procedure, which we regard as well worthy of commendation. The author says, that the object of his book is "to state concisely, and at the same time clearly and accurately, all principles of law generally arising in criminal cases," and concludes his preface by saying: "It is hoped that such a condensed presentation of the

law, applicable to those questions with which the emergencies of the profession are most likely to confront the practitioner, will be of service in the administration of justice."

From this statement, it is manifest that Mr. Malone has not attempted the impossible task of condensing into the compass of a single volume of less than five hundred pages the great body of the criminal law; but has made a judicious selection of those questions which are most likely to "confront the practitioner," and has treated them as concisely as possible with due regard to their importance.

Mr. Malone's divisions of his subject are good. He pretermits all criminal process prior to the action of the grand jury, and after treating the jury system, generally and briefly, in a preliminary chapter, or "brief," as for some occult reason he calls his subdivisions, he enters upon the subject of his work with the procedure of the grand jury, indictment, presentment and information. The next four briefs treat respectively of "trial and its incidents," "evidence in criminal cases," "insanity as an excuse for crime," and "rules for the interpretation of criminal statutes." As these subjects are disposed of in one hundred and sixty-six pages, it is manifest that no degree of condensation could render the treatment exhaustive; nor, indeed, as we have already said, does it profess to be, but there are many important principles well and succinctly stated within those narrow limits. Following these six briefs are fourteen others, treating specifically a large number of offenses, and to these succeed three briefs, on verdicts and subsequent proceedings, the work concluding with two briefs on extradition and habeas corpus respectively.

The briefs are sub-divided into sections, indicated by italics, but not numbered, as they should have been. The typographical execution of the book is good, and the work, although not as full as could be desired, will prove very useful to the practitioner.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

THERE has lately died at Helston, in Cornwall, an example of a practitioner in the law whose experience of it for length of time and permanence in one place is probably unparallelled. A legal practice once established, especially in a country town, very often lasts for many generations; but no man ever practiced as a solicitor in one firm for eighty years. The nearest approach to this distinction has been attained by a representative of that well-deserving class, which for want of a better name, is called lawyers' clerks. In the year 1806, the late Mr. Treloar entered the service of a firm of solicitors in Helston, at the age of fifteen, not earlier than most of his class begin, and remained with the same firm until he died last week. Partners came and went, but the clerk continued, managing the estates of the clients of the firm, and acting as their deputy at boards of guardians, highway boards, and elsewhere. So valuable a servant was of course well paid, and Mr. Treloar became a man of substance, besides acquiring posts like that of registrar of marriages and manager of the gas company. He also took a leading part in the religious body to which he belonged; but he remained a lawyer's clerk to the end. Probably it was not worth his while, or he could not afford the time, to become a solicitor. Mr. Treloar has at length fallen a victim to the principle that nature, like the law, objects to perpetuities; but he has left a reputation which does credit to the profession of the law, although he was not a formally authorized practitioner of it.-London Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, NOVEMBER 26, 1886.

CURRENT EVENTS.

COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES - DEFECT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.-It appears from a newspaper report (Knoxville Journal) that a circuit court in Tennessee was recently confronted with the legal-religious question. What constitutes such a defect of religious belief as will render a person incompetent to testify in a court of justice? The case has gone to the supreme court, and in the course of time we will hear from that body on the subject. Meanwhile we have abuudant leisure for speculation.

It is well settled in England, that one who does not believe in a God, "the rewarder of truth and avenger of falsehood,"1 is not competent witness in a court of justice. The rule is sometimes otherwise stated; in some of the States it has been materially modified, and in five or six, including Missouri, abolished altogether. Formerly, in England, only Christians were permitted to testify-Jews, Mohammedans, Pagans, all manner of "misbelievers," as well as unbelievers, were rigidly excluded. But there, as well as here, this severity of the rule has been relaxed, and the only question which remains now is, whether public policy requires that it should be longer continued, even in its modified form, and whether the perfect liberty guaranteed by free institutions does not require that it should be abrogated altogether.

The

It is not a question of degree or amount of privation, loss or inconvenience, but of right. Those under the ban of this rule, whom we will call agnostics, that being the appellation usually adopted by them, may pass through a long life without suffering the least inconvenience from this quasi disfranchisement. question is, whether it is consistent with the spirit of our institutions, which guarantee perfect freedom and absolute equality before the law to all manner of men, that one class should for opinion's sake be singled out and debarred from a right, or exempted from a duty, incumbent upon all others. Does pubDoes public policy require that this distinction should

1 Lord Hardwicke in Ormchund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 48. Vol. 23-No. 22.

pulous abstention from all religious tests that we should continue this remnant of an effete system? We think not. The time is within living memory, when it was considered a reckless experiment to abrogate the disqualification of witnesses on account of interest. And yet the law and the country survived the total extinction of that rule. And so with the testimony of parties to a civil action, and it has now become well settled that the tribunal which is to decide upon the weight and effect of testimony may well be trusted with its credibility. The practical rule now is, "let everything go to the jury for what it is worth," and we do not see why the crotchets of the agnostic should exclude him from the witness-box any more than those of the Mormon or Spiritualist, Chinaman or Budhist, do, the people who hold those extraordinary creeds.

Whether the punishment denounced by the law against perjury is sufficient to exclude false testimony without the aid of a religious sanction is not a question now to be taken into account. If it is not sufficiently severe or sufficiently certain it should be made so by proper legislation. It is not proposed to absolve the agnostic from compliance with the forms exacted from other witnesses. should be required to swear or affirm llke other people, and if in his eyes, the performance is a mere folly that is his affair, the law holds him all the same to tell the truth, under the penalties prescribed for perjury.

He

It is noteworthy that on this subject Tennessee is somewhat less progressive than some other States. In its constitution of 1870, art. IX., § 2, it is provided that: "No person who denies the being of a God or a future state of rewards and punishments shall hold any office in the civil department of this State."

There has been no judicial exposition of this clause, and it is a little remarkable that the advanced thinkers on theological and philosophical subjects in Tennessee, to say nothing of sticklers for personal liberty have not been heard from on the subject. It is evidently on the cards, that in a partisan political crisis, the Bradlaugh question, which so long agitated the British Parliament, might well chance to be reproduced on the banks of the Cumberlaud river.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT-MUNICIPAL CORPORATION -MONOPOLY.-There was recently before the United States Circuit Court, for the Eastern District of Michigan, a case involving the power of a municipal corporation to grant an exclusive franchise to a corporation for a long term of years, and in connection therewith a question of federal jurisdiction. The facts were, that in 1868 the city of Saginaw made a contract with the gas-light company by which that company should, upon terms annecessary to state here, have the exclusive right to light the streets, etc., for a term of thirty years. In 1886, the city contracted with an electric light company for city and commercial lighting. The gas-light company filed a bill in the United States Circuit Court, and the case was heard on a motion for a preliminary injunction.

These were two questions before the court: 1. Whether a federal court had jurisdiction of the question; and 2. Whether the contract between the city and the company was valid and binding upon the city.

Upon the first point, the court held that it had no jurisdiction by reason of the fact that one of the parties defendant, the electric light company, was a citizen of a different State from the plaintiff, upon the well established principle, that to give jurisdiction to a federal court on the ground of citizenship alone, all the parties properly plaintiffs must be citizens of a different State from that of which the parties properly defendants are citizens. The court, however, finds jurisdiction over the question, in the fact that the case involves the well known clause of the Constitution of the United States: "No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." That federal courts have jurisdiction of all cases involving a violation of this constitutional provision is too well settled to need the citation of authorities. Was the action of the defendant city in 1886 in contracting with the electric light

1 Saginaw Gas-Light Company v. City of Saginaw (Sept. 17, 1886), The Reporter, vol. 22, p. 378.

2 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch, 267; Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ketcham, 101 U. S. 289, 297; Removal Cases,' 100 U. S. 457; Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336; Shainwald v. Lewis, 108 U. S. 158; Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 407:

"It is

general law of the State, the charter of the city, enacted in 1867, the amendment of the charter in 1871, and the city ordinance in the same year re-affirming the contract of 1867, the court concludes that the State by its acts conferred upon the city the right to "cause its streets to be lighted," but adds: clear, however, that there is no authority expressly given to confer upon any corporation an exclusive right to occupy its streets for a number of years." Now if this means, as may fairly be inferred from the language emthe ployed, that the acts of the State, i. e., charter of 1867, and the amendment to it of 1871, did not confer upon the city the right to grant the exclusive privilege for thirty years, the act of the city so granting that privilege was ultra vires and void. It would seem, therefore, to be unnecessary to demonstrate, as the court does very fully, that the contract between the city and the gas-light company is the grant by the former to the latter of a monopoly, and for that reason void, so far as its exclusive feature is concerned. It is sufficient to show that the city has done a thing which by the law of the State it had no power to do, and by a well settled rule of law its act in so doing is void.

The contract of 1886 with the Electric Light Company was fully within the powers granted to the city by its charter; by it the city conferred no exclusive right and exercised no doubtful powers. The contract was beyond all question the act of the State, through the instrumentality of the city, and if the antecedent contract of the city with the gas-light company was valid, it undoubtedly impaired the obligation of that contract. Therefore, it was certainly within the proper

3 Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177, 181; Knox v Exchange Bank, 12 Wall. 379; Tarver v. Keach, 15 Wall. 67; Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 462; Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791.

jurisdiction of the federal court to entertain the action and decide whether or not the last contract made by the city impaired the obligation of the former.

THE PRESENT LAW OF RENT.

Nature and Time of Payment.-Rent, which is an important incident of an estate for years and a lease, is defined to be a periodical return made by the tenant, either in labor, money or provisions, in retribution for the land that passes; or it is in effect the price or purchase money to be paid for the ownership of the premises during the term,2 which must be certain or capable of being reduced to a certainty by either party; and at common law it must issue out of the thing granted, and not be a part of the land itself, though it is frequently reserved in a certain portion of the products," and may also be reserved in labor, as well as produce.7

1 2 Greenl, Cruise Real Prop. 72; Coke on Littleton, 142 a; McGee v. Gibson, 1 B. Monroe, Ky., 105.

2 Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 67; Stone v. Patterson, 19 Pick. 476. Rent is a certain profit, either in money, provisions, chattels or labor issuing yearly out of lands and tenements in return for their use. Green v. Eales, Z. Q. B. 224 Tayb. hand & Terr. 369.

32 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 72; Smith v. Tyler, 2 Hill 648; Cross v. Tome, 14 Md. 247; Bowzer v. Scott, S Black Ind. 36; Smith v. Colson, 10 Johns, N. Y. 9; Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn., 548.

42 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 72; Coke on Littleton 47; and compare Buszard v. Capel, 8 Barn and C. 141; Mickle v. Miles, 31 Pa. St. 20.

5 See Ream v. Hamish, 45 Pa. St. 376; Butterfield v. Baker, 5 Pick. 522; Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. St. 357; Smalley v. Corliss, 37 Vt. 486; Buskirk v. Cleveland, 41 Birb. 610; Dockham v. Parker, 9 Me. 137; 23 Am. Dec. 547; Johnson v. Smith, 3 Pen. & W. 496; S. C. 24 Am. Dec. 339; Lilley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 432.

6 McGee v. Gibson, 1 B. Monroe 105; Boone Real Prop. 106.

7 McGee v. Gibson, 1 B. Monroe 105. Three kinds of rent, rent service, rent charge and rent seck, Taylor on Land and Tenant, 870; 2 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 72, 1475; 3 Kent's Com. 368; Coke 65; Cuthbert v. Kuhn, 3 Whart, 357; S. C. 31 Am. Dec. 513; Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68; Hurst v. Lithgrow, 2 Yeates 24; S. C. 1 Am. Dec. 326; Distress for rent, Washb. Real Prop. 11; 3 Kent's Com. 473; 2 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 88; 4 Dane's Abr. 126; Youngleload v. Lowry, 2 McCord S. C. 39; S. C. 13 Am. Dec. 698; Diller v. Roberts, 13 Serg. & R. Pa. 60; S. C. 15 Am. Dec. 578; Lichtenthaler v. Thompson, 13 Serg. & R. 157: S. C. 15 Am. Dec. 581; Nosnins v. Paul, 4 Halst. N. J. I10; S. C. 17 Am. Dec. 455; McCreery v. Claflin, 37 Md. 435; 11 Am. Rep. 542; Hadden v. Knickerbocker, 70 Ill. 677; 22 Am. Rep. 80; Howe Sewing Machine Co. v. Sloan 87 Pa. St.

9

When the time for payment of rent is not fixed by custom or by express stipulation, it is not due until the end of the term:8 but if payable in produce, payment should be made in a reasonable time after the crops are gathered, and payments made by the tenant on account of rent generally without any direction or agreement as to its application, will be applied by the law on the rent due at the time1o, and not on the rent then accruing." Rent may be made payable in advance, 12 but a custom to pay in advance cannot be imported into an express covenant to pay quarterly, 13 though a lessor's verbal agreement with the tenant to change, for a new consideration, the time of paying the rent from the beginning to the end of the month has been held valid11; and under a lease for years from a specific day, rent conditioned to be payable quarterly on certain days is not due until after midnight of such days; 15 but where a lease, conditioned to be forfeited for nonpayment of rent, provides no place for payment, payment should be demanded by the landlord of the tenant on the premises just before sunset on the specified day. 16

Actions and Defenses.-In most cases an action of debt will lie for rent, under the common law practice," and an action of as

438; 30 Am. Rep. 376; Survival of remedy (as in Waring v. Slingluff 63 Mo. 53) criticised 21 Cent. L. J. 107, entering through a window to distrain, 21 Cent. L. J. 300.

s Garvey v. Dobyns, S Mo. 213; Ridgley v. Stillwell, 27 Mo. 128; Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343; Gibbons v. Thompson, 21 Minn. 398; Boyd v. McCombs, 4 Pa. St. 146; Hopkins v. Helmore 8 Ad. & E. 463.

9 Brown v. Adams, 35 Tex. 447; Toler v. Seabrook, 39 Ga. 14; Lamberton v. Stouffer, 55 Pa. St. 276; and See Dockham v. Parker, 9 Me. 127; s. c. 23 Am. Dec. 547.

10 Hunter v. Osterhoudt, 11 Barb. 33.

11 Hunter v. Osterhoudt, 11 Barb. 33 Boone Real Prop. 108.

12 Rent payable in advance on a certain day may be paid at any time during that day; Smith v. Shepard, 15 Pick. 147; s. c. Am. Dec. 547.

13 Mitchell v. Weller, 1 Jur. 622.*

14 Wilgus v. Whitehead, 89 Pa. St. 131. If the tenant has paid the rent of the term in advance he will not be liable to pay the same again to an assignee of the reversion; Stone v. Patterson, 19 Pick. 477.

15 Ordway v. Remington, 12 R. I. 319; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 646; Compare Sherlock v. Thayer, 4 Mich. 355. 16 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 63 Ind. 416; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 229; Boone Real Prop. 108; and see Hartwell v. Kelly, 117 Mass. 235: Chapman v. Harney, 100 Mass. 353.

17 Duppa v. Mayo, 1 Sound 281; and see De Lancey v. Ga. Min, 12 Barb. 120; 9 N. Y. 9; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb. 504; Allen v. Bryan 5 Barn & C. 512; Trabue v. McAdams 8 Bush. Ky., 74. In England an action of

sumpsit for the use and occupation of land by permission of the plaintiff lies on an implied,18 as well as on an express, promise to pay rent;19 but an action for use and occupation will lie only where the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, 20 and the defendant must have actually taken possession of the premises, either by himself, his agent or his under-tenant, 21 though if the lease contains a covenant on the part of the lessee to pay the rent an action of covenant may be brought thereon.22

Among the defenses to actions for rent23 are, an eviction from the whole or a material part of the premises by the landlord,24 payment or tender of the rent as provided in the agreement—a surrender in fact-and delivery of possession to, and its acceptance by,the landlord;26 and it is also a good defense that

debt wlil now lie for the recovery of a rent charge in fee; Thomas v. Sylvester, Law R. 8 O. B. 368; 6. Eng. Rep. 103.

18 Guns v. Scovil, 4 Day Conn 228; s. c. 4 Am. Dec. 208; Howard v. Runsen 2 Aiken, Vt., 252; Crouch v. Briles, 7 J. J. Marshall, Ky., 255; s. c. 23 Am. Dec. 404.

19 Sutton v. Mandeville, 1 Munf. 407; s. c. 4 Am. Dec. 549; Eppes v. Cole, 4 Har. 4 Mc.H. Md., 161; Swaseyr Little 7 Pick. 296; Warner v. Hale, 65 Ill. 395; Howard v. Shaw, 8 Mees. & W. 118, where there is a lease under seal, no action for use and occupation can be maintained against the lessee or his assignee; Keirsted v. Railroad Co. 69 N. Y. 343; 25 Am. Rep. 199.

20 Smith v. Stuart, 6 Johns, 49; s. c. 5 Am. Dec. 186; Bancroft v. Wardell, 13 Johns. 489; s. c. 7 Am. Dec. 396; Edmonson v. Hite, 43 Mo. 178; McCloskey v. Miller, 72 Pa. St. 154; Espy v. Penton, 5 Overy, 423; Lank ford v. Greene, 52 Ala. 103; Hathaway v. Ryan 35 Cal. 194; and compare Woodbury v. Woodbury 47 N. H. 20. 21 Bordman v. Osborn, 23 Pick. 295; Waring v. King. 8 Mees & W. 571; and see Mayor, etc. v. Saunders, 3 Barn & Adal 421; Edmonson v. Kite, 43 Mo. 176; Bedford v. Terhune, 30 N. Y. 453.

22 2 Greenl. Cruise Real Prop. 94; Vyvyan v. Arthur 1 Barn, etc. 418; Boone Real Prop. 110.

23 See Farris v. Houston, 74 Ala. 162, destruction of lime kiln; Warren v. Wagner, 175 Ala. 188; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 446.

24 Hayner v. Smith, 63 Ill. 430; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 124; McClewg v. Price, 59 Pa. St. 1420; Tunis v. Grandy, 22 Gratt, Va., 109; Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Vt. 109; 24 Am. Rep. 117; Holmes v. Guion, 44 Mo. 164; Colburn v. Morrill, 117 Mass., 262; 19 Am. Rep. 415; Shumway v. Collins, 6 Gray 227; Edgerton v. Page, 11 Hilt. N. Y. 328; Morrison v. Chadwick, 7 Com. B. 383. If after eviction the lessee returns and occupies again, the rent revives; Morrison v. Chadwick, 7 Com. B. 383; Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 378; and compare Hunter v. Reiley, 43 N. J. L. 480.

25 Carter v. Carter, 5 Bing. 406; Sandford v. Fetcher, 4 Term Rep. 511.

26 Page v. Ellsworth, 44 Barb. 636; Elliott v. Aiken, 45 N. H. 30; Fuller v. Ruby, 10 Gray 290; Fisher v. Millikins, 8 Pa. St. 111.

a part of the demised premises are occupied for an immoral purpose, with the knowledge and consent of the landlords:" but at common law the abandonment of the premises by the tenant because untenantable would have been no defense to an action against him for the stipulated rent.25 And where a landlord leases premises to a tenant for the carrying on of a certain business and covenants that he will not, during the term of the lease, lease other adjacent premises to other parties for the carrying on of a similar business, the tenant injured by the breach of such a covenant is not entitled to set off his damages in replevin upon a distress for rent.29

Lien for.-In some of the States, and in England, statutes have been enacted giving landlords a lien upon the tenant's goods, or upon the crops growing or grown upon the demised premises, to secure the payment of rent, the lien in such cases attaching at the commencement of the tenancy, and the landlord may maintain a special action against a stranger, who, with notice of a lien upon the crop, destroys, removes or so converts the crop or changes its character that the landlord cannot enforce his lien.32 And the acceptance of a collateral promise by a purchaser of goods from a tenant does not release the landlord's lien; 33 nor, where goods are levied on, can a third person after failing

27 Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cowen, 727; Townsend v. Gilsey, 1 Sweeny, 155; 7 Abb. N. S. 159, and compare Dewitt v. Pierson, 112 Mass. 8; 17 Am. Rep. 58. Tenant holding after knowledge of bad repute of house liable for rent. Carhart v. Ruder, 11 Daly, 101.

28 Graves v. Cameron, 58 How. Pr. 75; Boone Real Prop. 110. False representations that premises tenantable. Jackson v. Odell, 14 Abb. N. C. 42, and see Bradley v. De Goicuria, 14 Id. 53.

29 Alleguert v. Smart, 14 Cent. L. J. 159.

30 See Doam v. Garretson, 24 Iowa, 351; Givens v. Easley, 17 Ala. 385; Brighton v. Powell, 52 Ala. 123; Taliafero v. Pry, 41 Ga. 622; Washington v. Williamson, 23 Md. 244; Woodside v. Adams, 40 N. J. L. 417; Reed v. Thoyts, 6 Mees. & W. 410; Valid agreement for lien; See Wisner v. Ocinnpaugh, 71 N. Y. 113.

31 Smith v. Meyer, 25 Ark. 609; Powell v. Hadden, 21 Ala. 748; Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall. 328. Compare Harris v. Dowmann, 3 Mackey, (D. C.), 90.

32 Hussey v. Peebles, 53 Ala. 432; Boone Real Prop. 111; purchases from tenant of property other than crops takes it freed from lien, in Illinois; Hadden v. Knickerbocker, 70 Ill. 677; s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 80; and compare O'Hara v. Jones, 46 Ill. 288; Martin v. Black, 9 Paige, 641; Bach v. Meats, 5 Maule & S. 200; lessor's right when postponed to that of a bona fide mortgage without notice; Thomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun. 88. 39 Block v. Latham, 639, ex. 419.