« AnteriorContinuar »
presumed that the co-tenant has such knowledge. Knowles v. Brown, S. C. Iowa. June 9, 1886, N. W. Rep., Vol. 28, 409.
prosecution against R. Held, that the judgment of the justice is only prima facie evidence of prob. able cause for the prosecution. Womack v. Circle, 32 Gratt. 324, overruled. Blanks v. Robinson, Sup. Ct. App. Va., April 8, 1886, Va. Law Jour., Vol. 10, 398.
16. JURY.- Question of Fact-Attorney-Employ
ment--Interest-Mortgage.- Where an attorney received payment of interest on a mortgage, evi. dence of his employment by the mortgagee, to whom he never accounted, in a prior transaction, and of the fact of his acting as such at the time, was sufficient to put to the jury. McMahon v. Bardinger, S. C. Penn., March 8, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 379.
19. MASTER AND SERVANT.-Liability of Employer
for Acts of Agent or Contractor- Trespass--Lia. bility of Employer for Tort of Employee-Intent with which Act Done.-The defendants were authorized by the land agent to guard certain lots, reserved for public uses, against trespassers, but had no right or authority to grant permits to parties to take timber therefrom. The defendants, nevertheless, supposing they had such authority, gave permits to certain parties to take off the hemlock bark and timber upon those lots, and these contracts were assigned to other parties, who snbsequently peeled the bark, and cut down and car. ried away a portion of the timber. In an action of trespass against the defendants, held that, having authorized the commission of the trespasses, they were liable for the damages caused thereby. An employer is responsible for the wrong done by a contractor or his servants in the execution of a wrongful or illegal act, though not of a legal act. The intent of the defendants was entirely immaterial. State v. Smith, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., May 25, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 412.
20. MORTGAGE ABSOLUTE.- Deed – Defeasance
Evidence.-To convert a deed absolute on its face into a mortgage, by parol testimony, such testimony must be clear and specific, of a character such as will leave in the mind of a chancellor no hesitation or doubt; and, failing this, the effort to impeach the legal character of the deed must be regarded as abortive. Lance's Appeal, s. C. Penn., May 24, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 375.
17. LIEN.-Landlord and Tenant-Devise-Infant
Laches Guardian Ward – Insolvency Equity.--The lien given by statute to a landlord or his assignee, on the crops grown on the rented premises, for the rent of the current year (Code, s 3467), only attaches when the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties; and although this relation may be either created by ex. press contract, or implied from the conduct of the parties towards each other, it will not be inferred from occupation merely, when the relative position of the parties to each other can, under the circumstances of the case, be referred to any other distinct cause. Where lands are devised to infant children, their father being appointed executor and trustee, with power to manage and control the property for them; whatever may be his liability to them, in a proper proceeding, for rents and profits, the relation of landlord and tenant does not exist between them, and they have no statutory lien on the crops raised by him, received and sold by his administrator. As a general rule, laches will not be imputed to an infant, and his rights are not waived by a failure to assert them promptly. But there are cases in which his rights may be lost by the failure of his guardian to assert them, leaving him only the personal liability of his guardian for indemnity. Although the statute contemplates that all personal property,not specifically exempted, shall be included in the administrator's inventory, and that a selection of exemptions may be made from the property so inventoried; yet a selection may be made from property not included in the inventory, and even before an inventory is returned. Where an infant's guardian selected for him, as exempt, all the personal property included in the inventory, which was appraised at $400; and the administrator afterwards received and sold other personal property, and, the estate being afterwards declared insolvent, accounted for the proceeds on settlement of his accounts as the administrator of the insolvent estate; on which settlement the infant was represented by a guardian ad litem, and no additional claim of exemption was made; the surety on the administrator's official bond is not liable to the infant for the loss of any additional exemptions to which he might have been entitled. To justify the removal of the settlement of an insolvent estate into equity, requires a clear and strong case-a case requiring relief which the probate court, on account of its want of equitable jurisdiction, cannot grant. Hardin v. Pulley, S. C. Ala., May 9, 1886.
21. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.- Taking Land for
Sever Purposes-Nuisance--Consequential Damages.-Commissioners appointed by the court to appraise the damages for the taking of land for sewer purposes by an incorporated village have power to award damages only for the actual tak. ing of land, and not consequential damages resulting from a nuisance created by the discharge of sewage, when the village charter prescribes no rule for the assessment, and does not determine what shall constitute elements of damage. Steuart v. Rutland, S. C. Vt., June 10, 1886, Atl. Rep. Vol. 4, 420.
22. NEGLIGENCE.-Defective Highway — Necessary
Elements to Sustain Action for Injuries, Facts must Warrant Instructions-Punitive Damages, when Recoverable -- Opinion of Witnesses as to Condition of Highway Inadmissible-Condition is Fact for the Jury.-1. To maintain an action for injuries caused by a defect in a highway it must appear affirmatively, and the burden of proof upon plaintiff to show that the road was a high. way; that the defect actually existed; that defendant was in fault for not repairing, and that plaintiffs' injuries was caused by such defect. Shearm. & Red. on Neg., $ 321 (3d ed). 2. It is error to give an instruction, that plaintiff can recover, and for the jury to award punitive or exemplary dam. ages, where the facts in evidence do not warrant it. 62 Mo. 326; 51 Id. 316; 59 Id. 27. 3. Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that defendant's
18. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.- Probable Cause
Case at Bar.–Upon complaint of R., B. is taken before a justice and adjudged guilty of petit larceny, and sentenced; upon appeal, this judgment is reversed and B. is adjudged not guilty, and is discharged. B. then brings an action for malicious
failure to remove certain obstructions on the highway which contributed to the cause of the injury, was either wanton or malicious, it is improper to award punitive damages. 4. Witnesses cannot give their opinion as to whether a roadway was in such condition as to afford a safe and convenient track for the passage of wagons and travelers, as that is not matter of expert testimony, and the jury must find this fact. Brown 0. Cape Girardeau Plank Road Co., S. C. Mo., June 7, 1886.
price, and that he acted upon the dispatch in making his purchases. Where a telegram is written upon a form provided by the telegraph company, which contains a printed condition to the effect that the company “shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any unrepeated message, whether happening by negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount received for sending the same," the plaintiff, to recover from the company, must show that the mistake was caused by the fault of the defendant, and that it might have been avoided, if the defendant's instruments had been good ones, and if the defendant's agents had possessed the requisite skill, and exercised the proper care and diligence in respect to the transmission and receipt of the message in question. Akin v. Western, etc. Cw., S. C. Iowa, June 10, 1886, N. W. Rep., Vol. 28, 419.
23. PRACTICE-Continuance-Absence of Witness
Materiality-Erceptions- Skeleton Bill — Insertion of Eridence.-Held, in an action upon a fire insurance policy to recover loss, that admissions by the plaintiff that the property was of much less value than the damages claimed, were material, and that in the circumstances of the case the court erred in refusing a continuance on the ground of the absence of a witness. In a skeleton bill of exceptions, directions given to the clerk in regard to the insertion of the evidence in these terms, “Clerk, here insert the evidence,” is not sufficient, and the evidence inserted must be stricken from the abstract. Parks v. Council Bluffs. etc. Co., S. C. Iowa, June 10, 1886, N. W. Rep., Vol. 28, 424.
Motion to Quash Execution, Must be Made in County Where Judgment was Rendered. - Where a judgment is obtained in S. county and an alias execution is issued thereon, directed to the sheriff of county,B.,returnable to the Circuit Court of the former county, and the sheriff of County B. levied the execution upon lands in that county and advertised the same for sale, and where the defendant files a motion in the Circuit Court of County B., to quash the levy, the Circuit Court of County B. has no jurisdiction to hear such motion, the proper forum being County S., where the judgment was obtained. 17 Mo., 603; 23 Mo., 19; 11 Mo., 411; 44 Mo., 415; 65 Mo., 446. Mellier v. Bartlett, S.C. MO., June 7, 1886.
27. VENDOR AND VENDEE-Carrier-Instructions,
Delivery. -Where goods, ordered and contracted for, are not delivered directly to the purchaser, but are delivered by the vendor to a carrier, with proper instructions, for transportation as directed by the purchaser, the goods when delivered to the carrier are at the risk of the purchaser and the property is vested in him, subject to the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu. An instruction by a purchaser to the vendor to ship goods to care of certain shipping merchants, who were agents and managers of a certain well known steamship line, “for their next steamer," means that the goods are to be transported by a ship of their line, and not by any ship which would accept freight from them. A change in direction to the carrier by the vendor relates back to and qualifies the original delivery of goods to the carrier by the vendor; and when such a change in direction is a departure from the instructions given by the purchaser, and the goods are lost in transitu, the vendor cannot recover their value from the purchaser. Wheelhouse v. Parr, S. J. Ct. Mass., May 8, 1886, N. Eng. Rep., Vol. 2, 150.
35. SALES – Conditional Sale — “Satisfactory”'
Obligations · Imposed by the Word-Warranty, Conditions - Must be Observed Before it may be Availed of.-If an article is delivered to a purchaser, to be retained and paid for by him if satisfactory, the purchaser may repudiate the sale if such article prove bona fide and in fact unsatisfactory. If, accompanying a sale, there is a warranty that the article, if set up in a certain manner and location, and operated a certain way, will prove satisfactory, and if such warranty is accepted as part of the contract of sale before advantage can be taken of it, the purchaser must bave tested it after it has been set up in such manner and location and tested in that way. Exhaust. etc. Co. v. Chicago, etc. Co., S. C. Wis., May 15, 1886, N. W. Rep., Vol. 28, 343.
Warranty-Description-Mistake – Deceit.-When there is no bad faith, or willful misrepresentation or imposition by a vendor, and no warranty of the quantity of land conveyed, the delivery and acceptance of the deed, payment of part consideration and delivery of bond for the balance, close the transaction, and the vendee is precluded from setting up a deficiency in the quantity of land as against his bond. In this case it is held that a deficiency of 1.67 foot in a line of 20 feet is not so gross as to be evidence of deceit. It is a mere mutual mistake, with equal opportunity to both.parties to have had corrected, which will not be relieved against. In an action for purchase money of land the defendant cannot resist on the ground of failure of title to part of the land sold, if he has disabled himself from placing his vendor in statu quo by conveying the title to a third party. Rodgers v. Olshoffsky, S. C. Penn., May 1886, Pitts. L. J. (N. S.), Vol. 16, 455.
26. TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES
Principal and Agent- Error in TransmissionEvidence--Purchase on Faith of Telegram-Condition Against Liability-- Burden of Proof.—The principal may maintain an action against a telegraph company for an error in transmitting a telegram from his broker. Evidence by the plaintiff that a telegram, as received, directed him to purchase at a certain price, is competent as tending to show his good faith in making the purchase at the
held the property as his own. Can the county court, where the administration is pending, declare the trust and vest the title in the heirs in a proceeding for par. tition of the estate?
3. Husband and wife living together, wife gives hus. band money (not for household expenses), there being no contract to repay; under laws of Michigan can wife maintain action against husband as for money had and received.
SUBSCRIBER. Milwaukee, Wis.
4. A. and P., lumber and material men, contract with D. to furnish material to fence a certain lot in town (owned by D.); the material was furnished, as per contract, and the fence erected, but before paying for the material, and within ten days after the improve. ments are finished, D., (who is insolvent,) secretly conveyed the property to E., who is an innocent pur. chaser for value. Will the fact that E. is an innocent purchaser, defeat the right of A. and B. to a lien as material men in Missouri, under $ 3172, R. S. Mo? See also $$ 3174, 3178, R. S. Mo.
C. B. A.
5. In Iowa, at a sale of school land, A. purchased 80 acres, and on paying one third in cash, received from the county auditor a contract for a deed. A. assigns his contract to B., but A.'s wife does not sign the contract of assignment. The land was never occupied by A. as a homestead. Can A.'s wife claim and have as. signed to her dower on the death of A., or will the mere assignment of the school land contract by A. cut off her dower interest? Cite authorities. R. F. M.
6. A. B. C. and others, sign a petition for dramshop license under the provisions of $ 5442, R. S. 1879, amended 1883, petition is filed in advance of time required by law. A. B. and C. desire afterwards to have their names erased from, or held for naught, in said petition. Will the filing of a counter-petition or writ. ten order to the court by them for this purpose before action had in original petition, effect this? No strict rule of pleading required in county courts.
QUERIES ANSWERED. Query No. 48. [22 Cent. L. J., 551.] A. sues B. for work and labor alleging an indebtedness of $45.75, af. ter all payments and set-offs. B. makes general denial thereto, then produces account book and offers to prove full payment. Query: Is such evidence admis. sible under the Kansas code which requires set-off to be especially pleaded.
J. M. Answer.-When the action is not based on the origi. nal agreement, but is brought for balance after de. ducting payments and off-sets, the truth of plaintiff's averment is put in issue by denial and proof of pay. ment allowed, it not being new matter. Bliss on Code Pleading, $ 357. But in a suit on original agreement, proof of payment is treated as new matter, and evi. dence of it cannot be allowed under a denial. Bliss on Code Pleading, $ 358; Stevens v. Thompson, 5 Kans. 305; Clark v. Spencer, 14 Kans. 398. I can not see how the question of set-off enters into the matter.
dence may be adduced. Wallace v. Dubois, Md. Ct. App., March 10, 1886, Atl. Rep., Vol. 4, 402.
30. Will.- Testamentary Capacity – Evidence
Undue Influence-Insanity.-On the question of undue influence the proponent of the will may show that nominal legacies to heirs other than children were inserted at the suggestion of the person who wrote the will, because he erroneously supposed it necessary to the validity of the will. When portions of a deposition are read by one party for the purpose of contradicting the witness who gave it, the other party may read from the same deposition so much as pertains to the same subject- and tends to explain, qualify or limit what is so read. The practice of requiring an executor, upon the issues of insanity and undue influence, to call all the subscribing witnesses to the will, if alive, sane and within the jurisdiction, should not be departed from without good cause. Whether a party shall be allowed to put leading questions to his own witness is determined by the presiding justice while the examination of the witness is going on before him, and is not matter of exception. The common-law rule forbidding a party to discredit his witness has no application when the party, by legal intendment, has no choice, as in the case of an attesting witness. Upon the issues of insanity and undue influence, declaration of the testator tending to show the state of his feeling toward relatives, to whom he gave only a nominal sum, may be received. A request for instructions to the jury, which, in effect, assume as matter of law what should be left to the jury as matter of fact, is properly denied. A request for instructions, which in effect require the proponent of a will to explain why the testator made it as he did, is properly denied. Whit man v. Morey, S. C. N. H., March 12, 1886, East. Rep., Vol. 5, 187.
Life-Estate-Power of Disposition-Remainder.- The testator left the following will: “After my lawful debts are paid and discharged, 1 give, bequeath, and dispose of as follows, to-wit: To my beloved wife, Margaret Jones, all that is in my possession at the time of my decease; and also my wife have right to sell the estate, if that will be her choice. And after my wife's decease, the property to be parted to my dear children in equal shares.” Held, that Margaret took, under the will, only an estate for life in the property of the testator, with power to sell such life-estate, if she chose to do so, and her children took, in equal shares, a vested remainder in fee in such property. Quere. See Jones v. Bacon, 68 Me. 34; Howard v. Carusi, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575; McClellan v. Turner, 15 Me. 436; VanHorn v. Campbell (N. Y.), 3 N. E. Rep. 316. Jones v. Jones, S. C. Wis., May 15, 1886, N. W. Rep., Vol. 28, 177.
QUERIES AND ANSWERS.*
| Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.)
QUERIES. 2. In Texas an administrator bought land with funds belonging to the estate he then represented, and caused the deed to be made to him personally, and
Query No. 46. A. owned a mill property in his own name and right worth $6,000 and upon which there was an outstanding mortgage of $2,000 held by C. A. and his wife, B., in March, 1882, conveyed to D., by war. ranty deed, the undivided one-half thereof for $3,000, and received the purchase money. In October, 1882,
A. and his wife, B., conveyed the other undivided half to H., subject to one-half of the outstanding mortgage. Shortly afterwards he, A., paid one-half the amount of mortgage (in order to make his title good to D.), but the payment was indorsed by C. as a general credit of that amount. Afterwards C. foreclosed, and the whole mortgage premises were bid in by B., the wife of A. Can she hold the title thus acquired as against D., the purchaser of the undivided one-half under a warranty deed, made by her and husband? The husband being insolvent since the conveyance. Cite authorities.
Ansier.-The decisions upon the proposition as to whether a seme covert is bound by the covenants in a Warranty deed given by her husband in which she joins to convey or release her dower are conflicting; most of the cases examined hold, that while the covenants (under the circumstances stated above) estop a woman from setting up any claim of title she had at the time she signed the deed, she is not, however, estopped from setting up an after acquired title. This is the law in New York, as shown in Jackson v. Vanderheyden, where it was held that “a covenant of warranty does not estop the wife from setting up a subsequently acquired interest in the lands in the conveyance of which she had joined. This same doctrine is followed in New Hampshire and is the settled rule there, 6, N. H., 117.
“Although competent to join with her husband in executing a conveyance of her land, a wife's covenant's of warranty and of litle though in the same deed are not binding upon her." 3 Washburn on Real Property, 260.
When a wife joined with her husband in a deed by relinquishing her rights of dower in the granted premises, though it estops her from claiming dower, it would not prevent her from claiming a subsequent by acquired title. 3 Washburn on R. P., 114, also 50 Illinois 37 Dean v. Shelby 57 Pa. St. 426, 6 Iowa 137 and 20 Iowa 431, opposed to this doctrine are Hill v. West 8 Ohio 222 and Nash v. Spofford, 10 Met. 192.
S. L. LAX.
THE ADJUDGED CASES ON DEFENCES TO CRIME. Vol. V., including special defenses to crimes against the property and persons of individuals, viz.: Forgery; Fraud and False Pretenses; Larceny; Receivîng Stolen Property; Robbery; Abduction; Seduction; Assault; Assault and Battery; Assault with Intent; False Imprisonment; Rape and Homicide. With notes. By John D. Lawson. San Francisco: Sumner Whitney & Co., Law Publishers and Law Booksellers. 1886. This is the concluding volume of the series which Mr. Lawson has prepared with so much labor, and such thorough knowledge and diligent investigation of the subject in hand. We reviewed the fourth volume of this series in a former number of the JOURNAL (vol. 22, p. 479), and we can only add our conviction of the value of the work, and repeat what we have already said, that it "will doubtless prove of great value to the counsel for the defense."
two volumes. Jersey City, N. J.: F. D. Linn & Company. 1886.
This is not a new edition of the author's former work on this subject, nor yet a reproduction of it in an improved form. It is more properly, as he ex. plains in his preface, a new work on the same subject, . the production of which he conceives is justified by the immense growth of case law on the topics treated, which has taken place within the fifteen years that have elapsed since the publication of his first work. The book is manifestly the result of great labor, the author having cited no less than sixteen thousand cases, the treatment is thorougb and conscientious, and the arrangement very good. It is divided into three books, the first devoted to Estoppel by Judgment, or other matter of record; the second to Estoppel by deed or other written matter; the third to estoppel in pais and equitable estoppel. The matter contained under these topics are judiciously subdivided into twenty chapters, of which the first treats of the general principles of law controlling the subject; the second of Estoppel by record; the third of personal judgments as between parties; the fourth of judgments in personam; the fifth of judgments in rem;; the sixth of judgments of courts of limited jurisdiction; the seventh of foreign judgments. The eighth, which opens the second book, treats of Estoppel by deed or other writing; the ninth is devoted to the subject of recitals; the tenth to title by Estoppel; and the eleventh to leases by Estoppel. The third book opens with the twelfth chapter, which treats of Estoppels in pais and Equitable Estoppels; in the thirteenth are considered Equitable Estoppels in their relations to landlord and tenant, vendor and vendee, bailor and bailee; the fourteenth specially applies the doctrine of Estoppel to mortgages; and the fifteenth to the title to land. The sixteenth chapter treats of the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as applied to written instruments; and the seventeenth to the doctrine as affecting or applied to election, ratification, acquiescence, as well as to certain personal relations as principal and agent, etc. The eighteenth chapter treats of the application of the doctrine to the matters of boundaries, easements, possession, partition, etc.; and the nineteenth to the doctrine as affecting corporations. Finally, the twentieth chapter shows how Estoppel can be made available, when it must be pleaded specially and when it can be given in evidence under the general issue.
The work is well worthy of Mr. Herman's high reputation, and we heartily commend it to the profession.
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.
WOMEN'S RETORTS.--Lawyers not unfrequently receive the most provoking retorts from women whom they are trying to confound. A counsel defending a prisoner on trial, before an English court, for stealing money, began his cross-examination of the principal witness, a woman, by saying:
“Tell me, my good woman, what sort of money had
“I had eight shillings in silver, and a sovereign in gold.”
“Tell me, my good woman," continued the lawyer, with a sneer, intended to confuse the witness, "did you ever see a sovereign in any thing else than gold ?”
“O, yes, sir,” answered the woman, with a calm smile; “I saw Queen Victoria, God bless her!”
“Madam,” said a course lawyer, baffled in his attempt to make a cool witness contradict ber statements, "you have brass enough to make a saucepan."
“And you have sauce enough to fill it,” she retorted.
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA. By Henry M. Herman, Counsellorat-Law, author of the “Law of Executions," "Chattel Mortgages,” etc. “Omne jus qno utimur vel ad personam pertinet, vel ad res, vel actiones." In
JUDGE AND PARSON.-Lord Chancellor Kenyon was furnished the straws without extra cost, and amid a so noted for his penuriousness that a wit said: “In his breathless silence, the Mexicans drew lots. lordship's kitchen the fire is always dull, but the spits The die was cast, and the case decided, but when the are always bright.” “Spits!” rejoined a witty friend, winner went proudly forth to claim his quadruped, it “in the name of common-sense don't talk of Kenyon's was discovered that a more subtile “Greaser" bad stospits, for nothing turns upon them!”
len the mule. An Irish Chief-Justice, St. George Caulfield, was also
UNPRINCIPLED.-Lord Chancellor Thurlow was noted notorious for his parsimony. Though a gentleman of
for rough mental vigor, coarse manners, shocking pro. fortune, he was never known to give a dinner party
fanity, and hard drinking. He had little principle, and but once. A gentleman, holding an important govern
considered politics as a game by which clever men adment office, happened to pass near the chief-justice's
vanced themselves. The tricky nature of the man, residence, and the penurious judge was obliged to in
and his shrewdness, also, are shown by the manner in vite him to become his guest.
which he procured a horse, when he began the pracThe official accepted, and the neighboring gentlemen
tice of the law. He was so poor that he was perplexed were invited to meet him at dinner. Among them was the witty rector of the parish, who, being asked to re
as to how he should secure one on which to ride the
rounds of the courts. turn thanks, when dinner was over, did so in words as impertinent as irreverent.
As his perplexity did not include the slightest scru.
ple as to the morality of the means, he went to a “We thank the Lord, for this nothing less
horse-dealer, and, in the tone of a man who could buy Than the fall of Manna in the wilderness;
every horse in the stable, said: “Show me, sir, a borse In the house of famine we have found relief,
that you can recommend for riding, and if I like him And known the comforts of a round of beef;
after trial, I'll take him at your own price." Chimneys have smoked that never smoked before, The young barrister was immediately mounted on And we have dined where we shall dine no more." the best saddle-horse in the stable. He rode away,
and the trial, which the dealer thought might extend The chief-justice pretended to enjoy the joke, and on
until night, lasted for several weeks. When the dealer a subsequent day, asked the parson to take a frugal | again looked upon his property, the horse had carried dinner with him. When the covers were taken off,
Thurlow to every town in the circuit. With the anithere was nothing in the dishes.
mal, the owner received this note: “The horse, thouth “May I ask you, reverend sir, to say grace?” asked
he has some good points, does not altogether suit me." the chief-justice, with a malicious smile. The parson,
Once, while Thurlow was Lord Chancellor, an atrising to the occasion said:
torney appeared before him to make proof of a death. “May He who blessed the loaves and fishes “Sir, that is no proof," answered the Chancellor 10 Look down upon these enıpty dishes;
every statement made by the lawyer. For if they do our stomachs fill,
“My lord,” at last exclaimed the vexed attorney, “it 'Twill surely be a miracle.”
is very hard that you will not believe me. I knew the
man well. I saw him dead and in his coffin. He was In the preface to “Fortescue's Reports," which con
my client.” sists of thirty-one folio pages, it is said that “the grand “Good heavens, sir!" sneered the rude, brutal Chandivisions of law is into divine law and the law of na cellor. “Why did you not tell me that before? I ture; so that the study of law in general is the busi should not have doubted the fact one moment, for I ness of men and angels. Angels as well as men may think nothing would be more likely to kill a man than desire to look into both the one and the other, but
to have you for an attorney." they will never be able to fathom the depths of either.”
Yet this rough, tricky, immoral man was for years This classification of law students it will be observed
the despot of the House of Lords, and the personal leaves out the third estate'-devils. The omission is
confident of George the Third, the most religious of probably correct, as those personages are generally
all the Georges. He secured the sovereign's favor by supposed to know from experience much more of the penalties of the law than is entirely agreeable to them.
his uncompromising advocacy of the royal preroga.
tive, and his strong denunciations of the rebellious LEGAL-A legal adjustment of differences was
Americans. sometimes very difficult for a man to obtain in the In public, he shed tears at the approach of the early days of California, as it is elsewhere at times, king's insanity, but in the royal cabinet, he treated his owing to local peculiarities.
feeble-minded master as if he was a boy. Two Mexicans who had been lucky in digging, dis Once, when Thurlow had brought to the king a puted the possession of an aged mule, not worth her number of acts of parliament for him to read and keeping. The case was brought before a learned mag sign, the sovereign showed some dullness of percep. istrate named Muggins, who, before listening to the
tion. trial, demanded that each claimant should pay three
“Your majesty," said the coarse chancellor, "it's all ounces of gold dust for “cost of court."
nonsense trying to make you understand these acts, Each party was then allowed to state his side of the and you had better consent at once to all of them." case in his native language, of which Judge Muggins The world moves. The English would not now en. did not understand a word. This done, bis Honor in dure a George III., much less a George IV., nor would formed them, through an interpreter, that the case they tolerate for a single parliament the insolence and must be decided by a jury.
immorality of a Thurlow. Within a few weeks, the Two ounces more having been paid to meet the “ex career of a popular leader, a man of wealth and positra expense,” twelve good men and true were sum tion, has been terminated, because he stood morally, moned. These persons decided that the evidence was though not legally, convicted of one gross immorality. so conflicting that neither man owned the mule, but that, in strict justice, the plaintiff and defendant should draw straws for the bony beast. The foreman