connection and relation to the matter in issue have been traced, and their weight and force considered. In such cases the inference cannot be made without the intervention of a jury, although all the witnesses agree in their statement, or there be but one statement, which is consistent throughout." 16 Courts, however, have adopted the rule that if one fails to look for the train at a railroad crossing before he enters upon the track, and which he would have seen if he had looked, or would have heard if he had listened, in time to have avoided injury, he is guilty of such contributory negligence as precludes a recovery. And the neglect of the engineer of the train, to give proper signals, does not excuse the person injured.18 In such instances, where the facts are undisputed, the court may direct a verdict for the company.19 Crawfordsville, Ind. W. W. THORNTON. 16 Ireland v. Plank-road Co. 13 N. Y. 533; See Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. St. 263; T. & R. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 46 Tex. 366; Wilson v. Southern Pacific R. R Co., 9 Am & Eng. R. R. Cas. 161; 8. c. 7 Id. 400; Dolfinger v. Fishback, 12 Bush. 478; Paducah Elizabethtown R. R. Co. v. Letcher, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 61; Patterson v. Wallace, 1 McQueen, H. L. Cas. 748; Mangam v. Brooklyn R. R. 38 N. Y. 455; Quimby v. Vermont Central R. R. 23 Vt. 387; Pfau v. Reynolds, 53 Ill. 212; Catawissa R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. St. 282; Treat v. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. 131 Mass. 371; Wohlfahrt v. Beckert, 27 Hun. 74; Cotton v. Wood, 98 E. C. L 566. 17 Wilds v. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 430; Salter v. Utica, etc. R. R. Co. 88 N. Y. 42; Chicago, etc. R. R, Co. v. Adler, 56 Ill. 344; Sweeney v. Old Colony R. R. Co. 10 Allen, 368; Poole v. North Carolina R. R. Co. 8 Jones (N. C.) 340; Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co. v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570; Central R. R. Co. v. Dixon, 42 Ga. 327; Dodge v. R. R. Co. 34 Iowa, 279; Ormsbee v. Providence R. R. Co. 14 R. I. If the eye-ight or hearing of the person injured is defective, the greater care is required of him. Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102. 18 Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Houston, 97 U. S. 542; (cited 19 Blatcht. 537; 2 McCrary, 273; 30 N. J. Eq. 241, 243, 609; 67 Mo. 676; 71 Mo. 489; 69 Ala. 109; 44 Am. Rep. 506;) Gorton v. Erie R. R. Co. 45 N. Y. 660; Hevins v. Erie R. R. Co. 41 N. Y. 296; Hill v. Louisville, etc. R. R. o. 9 Heisk. 823; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Triplett, 38 III. 482; Peoria, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stiltman, 88 Ill. 529; Memphis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Copland, 61 Ala. 376; St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Mathias, 50 Ind. 65; Karle v. Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. 55 Mo. 476; Com. v. Fitchburg R. R. Co. 10 Allen, 189; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Penn. St. 504; Wilcox v. Railroad Co. 79 N. Y. 358; Railroad Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 631; Dacomb v. Buffalo, etc. R. R. Co. 27 Barb. 221; Cook v. Central R. R. etc. Co. 67 Ala. 533; Murray v. Pontchartrain R. R. Co. 31 La. Ann. 490; Indianapolis, etc. R. R. Co. v. McLin, 82 Ind. 435; Bunting v. Central Pacific R. R. Co. 16 Nev. 277; Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Richardson, 25 Kan. 391. 19 Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Van Patten, 64 Ill. 510; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Damerell, 81 Ill. 450; Allyn v. B. & A. R. R. Co. 105 Allen, 77; Morse v. Erie R. R. Co. 69 Barb. 490; C. C. C. & I. R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St. 340; Lake Shore, etc. R, R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274. to my wife, Elizabeth, to use or dispose of in any manner that she may think proper during her lifetime, and at her death may by will dispose of the same between my children and grandchildren as she may think proper." Held, that her interest in the property so given was a life estate, with a discretionary power of testamentary disposition among testator's children and grandchildren, but without power to entirely exclude any of them. Bill for construction of will, etc. The question presented for decision is whether the complainants, who are executors of the will of Elizabeth Richards, deceased, can lawfully execute the power to sell land given to them by the will. The land was owned by William Richards, the husband of the testatrix. He predeceased her and died seized of it. By his will he disposed of his estate as follows: "I give and bequeath all my property, both real and personal, that I die possessed of, both in the State of New Jersey and the city of New York (after my funeral expenses and debts shall be paid), to my wife, Elizabeth Richards, to use or dispose of in any manner that she may think proper during her life-time, and at her death may by will dispose of the same between my children and grandchildren as she may think proper." By her will she ordered her executors to sell all her estate, both real and personal, within one year from the date of her decease; she charged her estate with the payment of her debts, and a sum sufficient for the erection of a suitable tombstone over her grave, and directed that out of the remainder of the property a legacy of $100 be paid to her daughter-in-law, the widow of Thomas Richards. She then directed that the residue of the property be divided into six equal shares, and gave one of them to each of her three daughters "or to their respective" descendants; another to her grand-daughter, Frances, danghter of William Richards, "or her descendants;" a half share to each of her grand-children, Abby Ann and Ira L., children of Thomas Richards, or "to the descendants of each" of them, and a half share to each of her grand-children, Frances and Peter, children of Mary Garrison, "or to the descendants of each of them. The testatrix had no real estate upon which the will could operate. Her estate in the real property devised to her by her husband's will was a life estate only. The property was given to her to use or dispose of in any manner she might think proper during her lifetime, with provision that she might dispose of it between [among] the testator's children and grand-children as he might think proper. The gift is not of an unlimited interest with a superadded power to dispose of the property by deed or will, but it is for life merely, with a power of appointment by will. In Bradley v. Westcott, 13 Ves, 445, where there was a personal estate to the sole use of the testator's wife for life, to be at her full, free, and absolute disposal during her life, without liability to account, and after her decease certain specified articles and £500 were to go according to her appointment by will, and in default of appointment they were to fall into the residue, which was disposed of, it was held that the widow took an interest for life only, with a limited power of appointment. It was also held that the power given to her to dispose of the property was merely such power of disposition as a tenant for life might exercise. So, also, in Scott v. Josselyn, 26 Beav. 174, where the bequest was of the residue in trust to permit the testator's wife to receive the annual produce of the property for life, and also to apply to her own use such parts of the capital as she should think proper, and after her death to stand possessed thereof in trust for such persons as she should by will appoint, and in default of appointment, in trust to pay certain legacies-it was held that the widow took a life estate only, with power of disposition of the capital during her life and of appointment by will. And in Pennock v. Pennock, L. R. (13 Eq.) 144, where the gift was to the testatrix's husband in trust to stand possessed thereof and to enjoy the rents, profits and income for his own absolute use and benefit for life, with power to take and apply the whole or any part of the capital (the will gave him full power of sale) to and for his own benefit, and from and after his decease the property was to go over-it was held that the husband took a life estate only, with power of appointment, and that on his death without having exercised the power, the gift over took effect. In the case under consideration the gift was of the property to use and dispose of it as the donee might think proper during her life, and at her death she was to dispose of it among the testator's children and grand-children as she might think proper. The devise is expressly for life. Where the devise is expressly for life, with power of disposition annexed, an estate for life only passes. Bradley v. Westcott, ubi supra; Downey v. Borden, 7 Vr. 460. Inasmuch as the testatrix had no real estate upon which her devise of real property could operate, it is to be presumed that she intended to execute the power by the devise. But she has not made the appointment according to the requirements of the power. She was to appoint the property among the donor's children and grandchildren as she might deem proper. Under such a provision both the children and grandchildren take. Barnaby v. Tassell, L. R. (11 Eq.) 363; Law v. Thorp, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 447; Fox's Will, 35 Beav. 163. She has appointed a share to each of her daughters "or their descendants." At least one of them, Sarah Jordan (or Jardine), had a child living at the death of the testatrix. He is named as one of the executors, and is one of the complainants. Under the terms of her husband's will,the testatrix was not at liberty to exclude any of the children or grandchildren; the power was not an exclusive one. While she had a discretion as to the shares to be given to them, she was bound to give each child and each grandchild a portion. Lippincott v. Ridgway, 2 Stock. 164. The word "grandchildren" is not used in a substitutionary sense, but as a word of purchase. The direction is "to dispose of the same between 'the testator's children and grandchildren as she may think proper." The words must, in the absence of anything in the context to lead to a diffrent construction, be construed according to their natural import. There is nothing in the context in this case to control the meaning. The gift to the wife and the appointment of executors are all the provisions contained in the will. Nor is the case of Lippincott v. Ridgway, above cited, in anywise opposed to this view. There the power was to dispose of the trust funds by will among the donee's brothers and sisters and their children, in such proportions as the donee might think fit. The court, indeed, did not recognize the right of the children to participate, except in substitution for deceased parents, but it will be seen, by reference to the will by which the power was conferred (and which will be found in Lippencott v. Stokes, 2 Hal. Ch. 122), that it appeared from the context that the gift to the children was merely substitutionary. The appointment being invalid, it follows of course that the executors have no power to sell the property. As a gift to one or more of the children then living, in such manner as testator's executrix should think fit.2 "To such of my children as she [testator's wife] shall think fit.3 "Amongst all or such of his children as by their conduct should deserve it. "To be at her disposal, provided it be to any of his children.5 "For the use of her younger children as she should appoint." "To be by her disposed of to and amongst his three daughters, in such proportion, and payable in such manner as she shall think fit to give it in her life." "To and for the use of such child and children of the said J. G. as the said J. G. should at 1 Gibson v. Kniven, 1 Vern. 66; Alexander v. Alexan. der, 2 Ves. Sr. 640; Vanderzee v. Aclom, 4 Ves. 772; Kemp v. Kemp, 5 Ves. 849; Butcher v. Butcher, 9 Ves. 382, 1 V. & B. 79; Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594; Melvin v. Melvin, 6 Md. 541, 550; Michau v. Crawford, 3 Hal. 90, (109); Russell v. Kennedy, 66 Pa. St. 248; Little v. Bennett, 5 Jones Eq. 156; Stuyvesant v. Neil, 67 How. Pr. 16; See Pocklington v. Bayne, 1 Bro. C. C. 450; Harley v. Mitford, 21 Beav. 280; Booth v. Alington, 39 Eng. L. & Eq. 250; Brook v. Brook, 3 Sm. & Giff. 280; Howorth v. Dewell, 29 Beav. 18; Hawlew v. James, 5 Paige, 322; Haynesworth v. Cox, Harp. Eq. 1:7; Fronty v. Fronty, Bail. Eq. 517; Wickersham v. Savage, 58 Pa. St. 365; Loring v. Blake, 98 Mass. 253; Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head, 1; Gilbert v. Chapin, 19 Conn. 342. 2 Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Vern. 513. 3 Leafe v. Saltingstone, 1 Mod. 189, 2 Lev. 104. 4 Macey v. Shurmer, 1 Atk. 389. 5 Tomlinson v. Dighton, 1 P. Wms. 149. 6 Coleman v. Seymour, 1 Ves. Sr. 209. 7 Maddison v. Andrew, 1 Ves. Sr. 57. any time limit, direct or appoint."8 The residue to E. for her life, "and after her decease the same unto his children, to be parted among them as she should think proper." "In such shares and proportions as she should by her will direct, limit or appoint." 10 "To any one of my own family she may think proper."1 "To such of his mother's poor relations as W., his heirs, executors and adminstrators for the time being should think objects of charity." 12 "Unto and amongst of her relations, at such times and in such manner and proportions as he is his discretion should judge most proper." 13 "Unto and amongst all such child or children of S., in such parts, shares and proportions, manner and form, as J., should appoint." 14 "To divide among A.'s children, in such proportions as A. should appoint by will." 15 "To and amongst my other children or their issue, in such parts, shares and proportions, manner and form as my said daughter shall by deed or will appoint." 16 "For such child or children" of the marriage, and if more than one, in such shares as the survivor should appoint." 17 To testators's wife, that she might, "give her children such fortunes as she should think proper, or they deserve." 18 "To the heirs of his body,in such manner and shares as he may see fit to divide it among them, which he shall have full power to do as he pleases."19 "With full power to devise and bequeath the same, or any part thereof, to my relations of the H. family, as she shall in her discretion select." 20 Among the children of the testator's two brothers, "in such manner and proportion as he shall think proper." 21 "To pay and distribute the principal among such of M.'s children as the said M. by her last will should appoint." 22 "At their death to have the privileges to will to my daughter S.'s children or my son T.'s children, just as they see proper." 23 For the benefit of the testatrix's brothers and sisters, as the trustee might from time to time judge the testatrix would have done if she could have foreseen the circumstances.24 The cases of Garthwaite v. Robinson,25 which held that under this trust, viz, "to dispose of the same, in such manner as she thinks fit, amongst all or one or more of her children, if she should have any, and if she hath none, then amongst my present or future grandchildren, or their respective issue, as she like best," the tenant for life could not, wanting issue of her own, exclude the children of a deceased grandchild, who were living at testator's death; and Stolworthy v. Sancroft,26 "to dispose of his said estate in such manner and amongst 8 Swift v. Greyson, 1 T. R. 432. 9 Morgan v. Surman, 1 Taunt. 289. 10 Mocatta v. Lousada, 12 Ves. 123. 11 Grant v. Lynam, 4 Russ. 292; Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469. 12 Brunsden v. Woolredge Amb. 508; Atty. Gen. v. Price, 17 Ves. 371. See Bennettt v. Honywood, Amb. 708. 13 Supple v. Lawson, Amb. 729. 14 Wollen v. Tanner, 5 Ves. 218. 15 Abbott v. McGibbon, Low. Can. (Q. B. Div.) (1884), 18 Cent. L. J. 408. 16 Veale's Trusts, L. R. (4 Ch. Div.) 61, 36 L. T. (N. S.) 634, (5 Ch. Div.) 622. 17 Chamberlain v. Napier, L. R. (15 Ch. Div.) 614. 18 Buller v. Buller, Amb. 660. 19 Graeff v. De Turk, 44 Pa. St. 527. 20 Huling v. Fenner, 9 R. I. 410. 21 Cowles v. Brown, 4 Call. 477; Hudson v. Hudson, 6 Munf. 352. 22 Ingraham v. Meade, 3 Wall. Jr. 32. 23 Kerr v. Verner, 66 Pa. St. 326. 24 Portsmouth v. Shackford, 46 N. H. 423. 25 2 Slm. 43. 26 10 Jur. (N. S.) 762. Bill in equity for an account and an injunction. On exceptions to the answer. The charter of the respondent corporation granted at the May session of the general assembly, A. D. 1844, contains the following provisions: § 15. The said Providence and Worcestsr Railroad Company are hereby authorized to unite with a railroad company which may be empowered by the legislature of the State of Massachusetts to construct a railroad from the northern terminus of the railroad authorized by this act, to the town of Worcester. And when the two companies shall have so united, the stockholders of one company shall become stockholders in the other company. And the two companies shall constitute one corporation, by the name of the Providence and Worcester Railroad Company, and all the franchises, property, powers and privileges granted or acquired under the authority of the said States, respectively, shall be held and enjoyed by all the said stockholders in proportion to the namber of shares or amount of property held by them respectively, in either or both of said corporations. § 16. One or more of the directors or other officers of said Providence and Worcester Railroad Company, as is provided in the preceding section, shall at all times be an inhabitant of this State, on whom processes against said company may be le s. c. 6 Eastern Reporter, 677. gally served; and said company shall be held to answer in the jurisdiction where the service is made and the process is returnable. § 17. The said company shall keep separate accounts of their expenditures in the States of the Rhode Island and Massachusetts respectively; and two commissioners shall be appointed, one by he governor of each of said States, to hold their offices for the term of four years; and to be reasonably compensated by said company, who shall decide what portion of all expenditures of said company and of its receipts and profit, properly pertain to that part of the road lying in said States respectively, and the annual report required to be made to the legislature of this State shall be approved by said commissioners. § 18. The said company and the stockholders therein, so far as their road shall be situated in this State, shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities of the Providence and Worcester Railroad Company created by the provisions of this act, and to the general laws of this State to the same extent as the said Providence and Worcester Railroad Company and the stockholders therein would have been had the whole line of said railroad been located within the limits of this State. § 19. The provisions contained in the four preceding sections shall not take effect until said provisions shall have been accepted by the stockholders of the said wo corporations respectively, at a legal meeting called for that purpose. And the charter granted by the general court of the State of Massachusetts, in A. D. 1844, contains similar provisions. James Tillinghast, for complainant. Hart and Edwin Metcalf, for respondent. Charles TILLINGHAST, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The main questions presented for our consideration by the numerous exceptions to the defendants answer to the bill are, first, whether the provisions public statutes R. I., chapter 139, which prohibit discriminations being made by common carriers in the transportation of goods and merchandise, can be construed to affect contracts made in this State for transportation of goods and merchandise to points beyond the limits thereof; and, second, if they can be so construed, whether they are not to that extent in conflict with the "commercial clause" of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "the congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States." The defendants are common carriers owing and operating the Providence and Worcester railroad, which is situated partly in Rhode Island and partly in Massachusetts. The corporation has been consolidated under the statutes of both States. The bill seeks reliuf against the defendants for the discrimination alleged to have been made by them against the plaintiffs, both on contracts for the transportation of merchandise to points within the State, and also to points without the State, on the line of their road. Most of the exceptions are to the refusal of defendants to answer the allegations of the bill as to business transacted by them on contracts made for the shipment of merchandise to points without the State. The defendants contend that they are not called upon to answer these allegations, because they are only a Rhode Island corporation, owning and operating a railroad wholly in this State; that part of the road beyond the limits thereof being owed and controlled by another and distinct corporation, created by and only amenable to the aws of another State. By the express provisions of the defendant's act of incorporation in this State, of May, 1844, sections 15 to 18, the consolidated company forms but one corporation; and by section 18 it is expressly made subject to all the duties and liabilities of the Providence and Worcester Raiload Company created by the provisions of this act and to the general laws of this State to the same extent as said Providence and Worcester Railroad Comanpy ; and the stockholders / therein would have been had the whole line of said railroad been located within the limits of this State. The defendants, then, are a consolidated railroad company owning and operating a railroad extending, as alleged in the bill, from Providence, Rhode Island, to Worcester, Massachusetts; and we think it is well settled that such a corporation is but one entity, "and that the acts and neglects of the corporation are done by it as a whole.” In Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 13 R. I. 260, 262, this court, speaking of the Boston, Hartford and Erie Railroad Company, which was chartered by the State of Connecticut, says that it "was not a Rhode Island corporation except so far as it became, by virtue of the sale and action of the legislature, the successor of the Hartford, Providence and Fishkill Railroad Company. Yet as a foreign corporation it might be empowered to own and operate a railroad within this State, the policy of such authority being wholly within the discretion of the egislature.” "But the Boston, Hartford and Erie Railroad Company can hardly be regarded as a foreign corporation. True, it was not a Rhode Island corporation in the sense that it was chartered here, but it was subject to Rhode Island laws and control as fully as a domestic railroad company." And then, after reciting the legislative action concerning it, the court further says, 'it was thenceforth a corporation in this State, though not of this State." In Scofield v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 43 Ohio St.; s. C., 54 Am. Rep., wherein this question has recently been fully considered by the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court says: "A further question is presented, whether the decree for plaintiffs should be limited to and enforced only in this State, or should it extend to and be enforced against the defendant at all points reached by defendant's railroad, its branches and connecting lines?" "The district court finds that the defend ant is a consolidated company, its lines of road extending to various points in Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois. It is an artificial person and the same person in all this territory, and this court has acquired jurisdiction of the person of the corporation and the right to enforce all proper decrees against it." "The railroad is an entirety, whether within the State or without; and the artificial person, by the acts of the several States authorizing consolidation, has been created one and not two or more, and no reason is perceived why it may not be dealt with by the courts of either State that has procured jurisdiction." "This artificial person not only holds itself out, but does make contracts for the transportation of freight over its connecting lines as well as its own line, and it makes rates to points only reached by connecting lines. No reason is perceived why it should not be ordered to make no discriminations to the injury of the plaintiff in its rates to points thus reached. Of course it may, at any time, refuse to make any rates beyond its own lines; but if it makes rates to points on connecting lines, the rates should be equal to all." See also McDurffee v. Portland etc. R. Co., 52 N. H. 430; Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, 176; Horne v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 50. This doctrine is now so fully settled that a review of the cases is quite unnecessary. Construing the statute, then, to include contracts for the transportation of merchandise to points without the State on the line of the defendants' road, is it obnoxious to the constitutional provision before mentioned? We do not think it is. It is not, in our judgment, a regulation of commerce, within the meaning of the "commercial clause" as heretofore construed, either by the State courts or by the final arbiter of questions of that sort the Supreme Court of the United States. It opposes no obstruction and causes no delay to commerce. Neither does it lay any tax thereon so as to make it abnoxious to the rule as laid down by the Supreme court of the United States in Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471; Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 id. 21; Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 id. 232; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Walling v. Michigan, 116 id. 446; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 id. 196, and many others of the same class. It simply prohibits discriminations being made in favor of one, and against another, having occasion to use the facilities afforded for the transportation of goods, by common carriers under like circumstances, a substantial declaration of the common law doctrine upon this subject. Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 37 N. J. Law, 531: s. C., 18 Am. Rep. 754; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11. And although a statute of this sort may doubtless be properly said to effect commerce, yet, as held in the State Tax Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall, 284, 293, "it is not every thing that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution." In Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, in which the power of the Legislature of Wisconsin, to provide by law for a maximum charge to be made, for fair and freight, for the transportation of persons and property carried within the State, or taken up outside the State and brought within it, or taken up inside and carried without, was considered, the Supreme Court of the United States says: "As to the effect of the statute as a regulation of inter-state commerce, the law is confined to State commerce, or such inter-state commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of this company to inter-state commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate its fares, etc., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. Incidentally these may reach beyond the State. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide for those within, even though it may indirectly affect those without." In the case of Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, 161, the same doctrine was maintained. The conclusion deducible from the numero us decisions bearing upon this subject, as well stated by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12; S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 692, "is, that the States cannot embarass commercial communication, abridge the freedom of commerce, discriminate in favor of the products of one State, lay burdens upon the instruments of commerce, or exact licenses from persons, natural or artificial, engaged in interState commerce." See cases there cited. Accepting this as a summary of the law applicable to the case before us, we do not see that the statute under consideration is obnoxious thereto. Commercial intercourse is not thereby abridged or fettered, and no new duty or burden is imposed thereon. The defendants are only called upon to do, under a certain penalty, precisely what the common law declares it to be their duty to do without the statute, viz. to treat all alike under similar circumstances-a mere police regulation. The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently had occasion to construe a similar statute, and in so doing inter alia, says: "It is no doubt true that the statute to prevent unjust discrimination in the rates of charges of railroad companies, under which this action was brought, may affect commerce, but in our judgment it cannot be said to be a law regulating commerce among the States, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The law does not purport to exercise control over any railroad corporation except those that own or operate a railroad in the State, such corporations as have domestic relations with the people of the |