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the work, not control its manner of performance so to be answerable for injury done by the contractor's operations to adjoining land. In a second case, the work was to be done "according to specifications and agreeably to the directions of the company's) engineer,” "earth excavations to be hauled into embankments as far as the engineer directs."
Suit was brought by one over whose land the contractor bad dumped waste dirt. The decision was that the contract did not give the company control over the particular act complained of, and in relation to other clauses of the contract, too long to be put down here, the rule was laid down that a right to direct the amount of work is not identical with a right to prescribe the mode of operation.7
On the other hand, where a contract was to take down a house "carefully, and under direction and subject to approval" of the owners, who, it appeared were present and gave directions almost daily, the owners were held liable as masters.8
The question of independent employment, then, is ruled largely by the circumstances of the case, and the actual intention of the parties.
There is one set of cases to which the strict rule of master and servant applies, as it is said, with uniformity of decision, where personal property is hired out, and with it a servant of the owner to manage it; the contract is said to be, not with the servant, but with the owner of the property, the owner who has lent or hired out his servant still bas control over the doer, and, constructively, over the doing of the work.
Cases of ihis kind may occur where a railroad company supplies its contractor for building the road with a construction train and hands to run it, the train and the men to be entirely under control of the contractor except, perhaps, as to a maximum rate of speed, and the keeping out of the way of regular trains.
Here the company is liable for injury done by the train.9
Another example is that of a workman in the employ of a stevedore, who was injured by the carelessness of the engineer lent by defendants to the stevedore along with their engine.10
On the question of nuisance, also the principal case accords with the authorities. A municipality may, in cases justified by necessity or custom, as for instance, laying of pipes, building, and the like, permit the highway to be occupied by private individuals to an extent which but for ibis permission would amount o a nuisance; and in such cases the owner is not answerable for his contractor's neglect. So, also, although the work requires some lator or some engine in its nature hazardous; provided, however, that this dangerous work may, by using proper care be done with safety, and bas then the sanction of custom regulation; and that the contract contemplates only such careful use. The presumption is, the owner intended the work to be done properly and carefully.ll
CRIMINAL LAW-JURISDICTION OF CRIME.
STATE v. SHAEFFER.
Supreme Court of Missouri, June 21, 1886. 1.Jurisdiction- Where Crime Consummated-Where a defendant obtains money by false pretence by means of a sight draft drawn by him in Kansas City, Mo., on a New York bank, and sent by a Kansas City bank, in which it was deposited, for collection to the New York bank, and by it collected and the amount forwarded to the Kansas City bank where the defendant receives the money, the crime is consummated in New York.
2. Instruction-Reasonable Doubt-Preponderance of Evidence-An instruction explaining what is meant by a reasonable doubt, which declares that "if all facts and circumstances proven can be as reasonably recon. ciled with the theory that the defendant is innocent as with the theory that he is guilty,” is improperly given, as this directs a verdict upon a mere preponderance of evidence.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY SAVAGE. Philadelphia
Appeal from Jackson County criminal Court.
Messrs. J. V. C. Karnes and John W. Beebe, attorneys for Schaeffer; and B. G. Boone, Attorney General, and F. W. Walker, for the State.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
HENRY, C. ,J., delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant was indicted by the grand jury in the criminal court of Jackson county, at the May term, 1885. The following are the charges :
The first count charges that the defendant obtained a large amount of money from John I. Blair under false pretenses, the false pretenses consisting of representations, to Blair, that he, the defendant, had arranged with the heirs of one Anthony to purchase of them for Blair,their interterest in a certain tract of land lying in Jackson county, near Kansas City, and that Blair was to have the land at the lowest price at which it could be obtained, when in fact be purchased it at one price and represented to Blair that he paid a larger sum, and on the foregoing representations obtained from Blair more than the defendant paid to Anthony's heirs.
The second count charged that the defendant was the agent of said Blair, and, as such, received into his possession a large sum of money, which which he feloniously converted to his own use. It is not necessary to give any other attention to these two counts. the trial court baving, by instruction, withdrawn from the jury all consideration of those counts, confining their inquiry to the charges in the third count, which is as follows:
“And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths as aforesaid, do further say and present that Samuel C. Shaeffer, at the county of Jackson, in the State of Missouri, on the -day of February, 1884, did unlawfully and feloniously obtain, from one John I. Blair, the sum of $7,650, .lawful money of the value of $7,650 of goods, chattels, moneys and property of the said John I. Blair, by means and by use of a cheat and a fraud, and a
7 Burmeister v. R. R. 47 N. Y. S. C. 264; Hughes v. C. & S. Ry. 39 Ohio St. 461.
8 Linnehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 123.
9 Railroad v. Norwood, 62 Miss. 565; Burton v. Railroad, 61 Texas, 526.
10 Coyle v. Pierrepont, 37 Hun, (N. Y.) 379; reversing same case, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 311.
11 Smith v. Simmons, 103 Penna. St. 32; Martin v. Trib. une Assn,, 30 Hun. 391; Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn., 5 87; (Srymour, J. sitting as arbitrator.) Aston v. Nolan, 63 Cal. 269; Bailey v. Railroad, 57 Vt. 252.
false and fraudulent representation and false pre- court to answer the charge. Stewart, not having tense, and false instrument and statement with given the security, was committed to jail, and upthe intent him, the said John I. Blair, then and on a writ of habeas corpus was brought before the there feloniously to cheat and defraud, contrary circuit court of Hamilton county, and on appeal to the form of the statutes, and against the peace to the Supreme Court of the State from a judgand dignity of the State.”
ment of the circuit court against him, the Supreme On this count the jury found him guilty, and as- Court reversed the judgment, holding that the sessed his punishment at imprisonment in the crime was not committed in Indiana, where the penetentiary for a term of eight years, and de- false representations were made, but in the State fendant has prosecuted his appeal.
of New York, where the property was received. The evidence of the State tended to prove that
Numerous decisions of that court to the same efthe defendant made representations to Blair to the fect are cited in the opinion. Norris v. State of effect that he had agreed to pay to the Anthony Ohio (25 Ohio State, 217), is also a case analheirs for their interest in a tract of land near Kan- agous to the case at bar. The defendant was a sas City, $8,450, having, in fact, purchased the resident of Clark county and, by fraudulent repsame at the price of $800.
resentations as to his solvency, in a letter, he inThe agreement between Blair and defendant in duced the Akron Sewer Pipe Company, located in relation to the interest of the Anthony heirs in the Summit county, to ship him by rail to Clark countract was, that Blair would place the money to ty a lot of sewer pipe. He was indicted in Clark make that purcbase to defendant's credit in such county, but the Supreme Court held that the bank at Kansas City as defendant might suggest crime was committed in Summit, and remarked by telegraph, or that he would pay defendant's that “the weight of authority is clear that the draft at sight, National Park Bank, New York. railroad company was the agent of defendant for
It appears that defendant telegraphed Blair Feb- receiving the goods for him at Akron and carrying ruary 12, 1884, that he had drawn on him for $19,- them to Springfield, and the delivery to it by the 668.83, which sum included the $8,450 for the An- sewer pipe company was, in legal contemplation, thony heirs. The draft read as follows:
a delivery of the goods to the defendant at Akron.” “19,668.33. KANSAS City, Mo., Feb. 12, 1884.
So in the People v. Sully, 5 Parke's Com. Ref.
145), defendant was indicted in Buffalo, Erie “At sight, pay to the order of myself, nineteen
county, he having obtained by false pretense in thousand, six hundred and sixty-eight dollars and
Buffalo, a check drawn on a bank in Batana, Genthirty-three hundredth dollars, with exchange,
esee county. The indictment was for obtaining value received, and charge to account of
the signature to the check, and it was held that JOHN I. BLAIR.
he was properly indicted in that county, but the “To Park National Bank, New York City.
court said: “It is not material where the pre“S. C. SHAEFFER.”
tenses were made. The obtaining the signature This was indorsed by Shaeffer to the Traders or property by means of them, with intent to Bank of Kansas City, which sent it for collection cheat and defraud, completes the crime and deto the United States National bank, New York,
termines the place of trial.” And further rewhich collected it and placed it to the credit of marked the court: “The prisoner could not have the Traders' bank of Kansas City, which, after in- been convicted on the first count for obtaining the formed of the payment of the draft in New York,
money through, or by means of the check, for the paid the amount to Shaeffer, at Kansas City. money was obtained at Batana, without the terri
On this state of facts, the question arises, where torial jurisdiction of the court." was the offense with which the defendant is
So in State v. Wychoff, 31 N. J. 68, the general charged committed?
proposition is asserted that a crime is to be tried It is no crime to make use of false pretenses, in the place in which the criminal act has been unless, by means of such pretenses, the party
committed. It is not sufficient that part of such making them obtains money, or property from acts shall have been done in such place, but it is another to which he had no right. And the crime the completed act alone which gives jurisdiction." is consummated where the money or property is In the State v. Dennis, 80 Mo. 594, the defendreceived. Commonwealth v. Troyl, Met. (Ky.) 1; ant was indicted for obtaining, by false pretenses, State v. House, 58 Ind. 466; Stewart v. Jessup, 51 a lot of mules, and the question was whether he Ind. 415. In the latter case, the substantial facts had received the mules in Randolph county or in were that one Kerr, relying upon false represent- the city of St. Louis In delivering the opinion atives of Stewart, sold the latter, twelve horses, of the court Judge Norton said: “It is, however, which Kerr had shipped to New York, where earnestly insisted by counsel that, if any offense Stewart got possession of them; Stewart was ar- was committed, the evidence shows that it was rested in Indiana on the charge of obtaining the committed in the city of St. Louis and not in horses by false pretenses, and, on a preliminary Randolph county, and that the demurrer to the examination before a justice of the peace, was evidence should have been sustained on the ground adjudged guilty and required to give security in that the Moberly court of common pleas, of Ranthe sum of $3,000 for his appearance in the circuit dolph county, had no jurisdiction. If the pre
mises assumed be well founded, the legal conclusion drawn from them is undoubtedly correct.” The judgment was affirmed, the majority of the court holding that the mules were received by defendant in Randolph county. I dissented, believing that the evidence established the reception of the mules in the city of St. Louis.
We entertained no doubt that the place where the money or goods are obtained, without regard to where the representations were made, is the place where the party should be prosecuted.
Where did Blair pay the money? Where did he lose his property in the money and his dominion over it? If he deposited it in the Park National bank to the credit of Shaeffer, that was a payment in New York to Shaeffer. If he had money on deposit to his own credit, and directed the bank to pay it on Shaeffer's check or draft, then, when so paid in New York, whether on Shaeffer's check or draft, he then parted with his money. The United States National bank was the agent of the Traders bank at Kansas City, which was unquestionably the ageni of Shaeffer. Neither of those banks were, in any sense, the agent of Blair. But whether the United States National bank is to be considered as the agent of Shaeffer, or the agent of the Traders bank, is wholly immaterial, since it is clear that it was not the agent of Blair, or of the National Park bank, after the National Park bank paid the money in the United States National bank. Blair's obligation to pay the money was discharged, and if that bank had become insolvent, or failed to account for the proceeds of the check to the Traders bank, Shaeffer could have had no recourse upon Blair. The Traders bank received the draft for collection for Shaeffer's accommodation, and paid him the amount of the draft only on the assurance from its correspondent in New York that the Park bank had paid the draft; that the Traders bank then paid the amount of the draft to Shaeffer was not a payment by Blair. But the substance of the transaction was the collection of the money in New York from Blair, and a disposition in Kansas City by Shaeffer of that money so colleeted in New York. If instead of receiving the money, Shaeffer had received property in Kansas City from the Traders bank, instead of the money, the principle applicable would have been the same. The Traders bank paid Shaeffer its money, not Blair's. The United States National bank held the money sent, not as Blair's money but really as Shaeffer's, though nominally as the money of the Traders bank, and the transfer of the draft to the Traders bank by Shaeffer, operated to transfer the proceeds of the draft to the Traders bank when paid by the Park National bank to the United States National bank. A merchant in New York who draws a draft on a customer in St. Louis, which is paid by the latter to the bank in St. Louis, to which the draft is sent for collection, does not thereby pay the money in New York but in St. Louis, and that the New York merchant indorses
it for collection to a bank in New York and secures the money in New York from that bank af. ter the latter has notice of the payment of the draft in St. Louis to its correspondent there, does not make the payment by his customer to the bank in St. Louis a payment of the money to the New York merchant in New York. There are other important questions in this case, which it is not thought necessary to determine, in as much as holding that the crime was not committed in Jackson county, and that the criminal court of that county had no jurisdiction of the cause, the judgmust be reversed and the accused discharged. There is, however, one instruction given by the court for the State, upon which it is thought best to express our views. It is as follows: Sixth“In law a party accused of crime is presumed to be innocent, until the contrary is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If, therefore, upon a consideration of all the evidence in this cause you entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, you will give him the benefit of such a doubt and find him not guilty. In applying the rule as to reasonable doubt, you will be required to acquit, if all the facts and circumstances proven, can be reasonably reconciled with any other theory than that the defendant is guilty; or, to express the same idea in another form, if all the facts and circumstances proven before you, can be as reasonably reconciled with the theory that the de fendant is innocent, as with the theory that he is guilty, you must adopt the theory most favorable to the defendant, and return a verdict finding him not guilty. You will observe, however, that the doubt to authorize an acquittal on that ground alone, must, as stated, be reasonable, and it must be also as one fairly deducible from the evidence considered as a whole. The mere possibility that the defendant may be innocent will not authorize an acquittal." "It declares very.properly" that "one accused of crime is pronourced to be innocent until the contrary is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If, therefore, upon a consideration of all the evidence in this case, you entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant you will give him the benefit of such doubt, and find him not guilty," but then proceed to explain what is meant by a reasonable doubt as follows:
“In applying the rule as to reasonable doubt, you will be required to acquit, if all the facts and circumstances proven,can be as reasonably reconciled with the theory that the defendant is innocent, as with the theory that he is guilty, you must accept the theory most favorable to the defendant, and render a verdict finding him not guilty." This attempted explanation of the term "reasonable doubt” would eliminate it from the criminal code, and leave juries to find verdicts in criminal cases upon the mere preponderance of the evidence.
By that explanation, the benefit of a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is no more than the advantage a defendant has in a civil case. The doc
trine expressed in the explanation is exactly that which is applicable in a civil action, in which if the facts proven, can be as reasonably reconciled with the theory that the defendant owns what he is sued for, as that he does not, the defendant is entitled to a verdict. The plaintiff must make out his case, and if the evidence is evenly balanced he cannot recover. But for the explanation
of what was meant by reasonable doubt, the in• 'struction correctly declares the law, and why that
should have been injected into the instruction is inconceivable.
The instruction in regard to reasonable doubt approved in State v. Newshin,20 Mo. 111, has been repeatedly sanctioned by this court. Juries understand it. The bench and bar are familiar with it, and it is not safe to depart from it, in efforts to make clear what is now well understood.
This case illustrates the danger of such experiments. Here the said matter introduced into the instruction vitiated it, and if for nothing else, the judgment would have been reversed for that error. As long as this court adheres to what it has ruled, especially in criminal cases, it is the better and safer practice for trial courts to be guided by its rulings. The judgment is reversed, and the prisoner discharged.
Following is Judge Norton's concurring opinion in the above case :)
I place my concurrence in reviewing the judgment in this case, not only on the ground so clearly stated in the opinion of the court, but on the further ground that the misrepresentations made by the defendant, if made as disclosed in the evidence, and for which it is sought to make him criminally liable, having been made in the progress of a long, real — not bogus – business transaction, are not embraced in the class of offenses against which section 1561, revised statutes, is directed. In what is here said, Judge Ray concurs with me.
instrumentality of innocent agents, the defendant at the time being in the State of Ohio. As there was no question raised as to the form of the indictment or plea, the only point presented to the court for decision was, whether there was an offense committed by the defendant "within the boundaries of the State of New York,” the crime charged being a statutory offense. In delivering the opinion, Beardsley, J., said: Suydam Sage and Co. were induced by false and fraudulent pretenses to sign certain written instruments, and to part with large sums of money. The fraud may have originated and been concocted elsewhere, but it became mature, and took effect in the City of New York, for there the false pretenses were used with success, the signatures and money of the persons defrauded being obtained at that place. The crime was therefore committed in the City of New York and not elsewhere.3 Personal presence, at the place where a crime is perpetrated, is not indispensable to make one a principal offender in its commission. Thus, where a gun is fired from the land which kills á man at sea, the offense must be tried by the admiralty and not by the common law courts; for the crime is committed where the death occurs, and not at the place from whence the cause of the death proceeds. And on the same principle, an offense committed by firing a shot from one county which takes effect in another, must be tried in the latter, for there the crime was committed. In such cases the person is an immediate actor in the perpetration of the crime, although not personally present at the place where the law adjudges it to be committed. He is there, however, by the instrument used to effect his purpose, and which the law holds sufficient to make him personally responsible at that place for the act done there.” In Reg. v. Leach,5 a letter containing a false pretense was received by the prosecutor through the post in the borough of C., but it was written and posted in another borough. In consequence of that letter, he transmitted through the post to the writer of the first a post office order for £20, which was received out of the borough. In an indictment against the writer of the first letter for false pretenses, it was held that the venue was well laid in the borough of C. In giving the opinion, Jervis, C. J., observed: “The venue was well laid. The delivery of the letter through the post in the borough, was the making of a false pretense there."
In Reg. v. Jones,6 money was obtained by means of a false statement of the name and eircumstances of the prisoner in a begging letter which reaches the prisoner in County B., but had been transmitted to him in a letter posted at his request in County A. Here it was held that he is liable in A. In the opinion, Alderman, B., cited R. v. Buttery, referred to by Abbott, C. J., in R. V. Burdett, 4 B. & A. 179 (not reported elsewhere), to show that the offense consists in obtaining the money; and observed, that here, when the party solicited put the letter containing the post office order into the post at Sunbury in Middlesex, the post master became the agent of the prisoner and the latter must thus be taken to have received it in Middlesex..
In Regina v. Cook, on an indhotment for obtaining
NOTE.-The law deems that a crime is committed in the place where the criminal act takes effect. Hence, in many circumstances, one becomes liable to punishment in a particular jurisdiction while his personal presence is elsewhere. Even in this way he may commit an offense against a State or country upon whose soil he never set his foot. Thus, where a person who puts forth a letter making a false pretense to a person who thereupon parts with his goods in the county where he receives it, he may be indicted in the county to which it is sent, though he does not go there him. self.ly/ In People v. Adams, the intent to cheat and defraud were virtually conceded, and the alleged criminal acts were expressly admitted to have been committed by the defendant in the City of New York, through the
11 Bish. on Crim. Procedure, (3rd ed.) § 53; See Reg. v. Jones, 1 Den. C. C. 551; Teinp. & M. 270; 1 Eng. L. and Eq. 533; Norris v. The State, 25 Ohio St. 217; Adams v. People, 1 Comst. 173; People v. Adains, 3 Denio, 190; Reg 7. Leech, Dears, 612, 7 Cox, C. C. 100, 36 Eng. L. und Eq., 589; Reg. v. Cooke, 1 Fost. & F, 61. 2 3 Denio (N. Y.), 190.
3 2 R, S. N.Y. 677, $ 53; 1 Chit. Cr.Law,(4th Amer.ed.) 191; Rex v. Buttery, mentioned by Chief Justice Abbott in The King v. Burdett, 4 B. & A. 95.
4 Chit. Crim. Law, 155; U. 8. v. Davis, 2 Sum. 485.
5 7Cox C. O. 100; S. C. 36 Eng. L. and Eq.589; 8. O. Dears. 642.
6 Den. B. C. C 551. 71 Fogt. & F. 64.
BAILMENT—FOR HIRE – NEGLIGENCE
QUESTION FOR JURY.
KINCHELO V. PRIEST.*
Supreme Court of Missouri, June 7, 1886. 1. Whether a bailment was for hire, or merely gratuitous, is purely a question of fact for the jury in each particular case.
2. A gratuitous bailee must exercise the same degree of care and diligence that an ordinary prudent man would in relation to his own business affairs.
money by false pretenses, which in one count was alleged to have been by sending a certain false return of fees to the commissioner of the treasury, it appearing that the return was received by them in Westminster, with a letter dated Northampton, and an affidavit sworn there; and that they, on the faith of it, drew up a "minute," which operated as an authority to the Paymaster-General to pay a certain amount to the prisoner (as compensation), at Westminster, the venue laid being Northamptonshire. The venue was sustained; for, in effect, the money was obtained by means of the minute, being a mere matter of regulation, and not á judicial proceeding. Coleridge, J., remarked (p. 66): "The letter was written and the affidavit sworn in Northamptonshire, and the jury may inser that the documents were posted there. They are material facts in the case, and one of the counts alleges the offense to have been in this, that the prisoner ‘forwarded' to the commissioners a representation which was false, and which he certainly may be presumed to have 'forwarded' in Northamptonshire. There is reasonable evidence that it was so."
In Stewart v. Jessup, referred to in the principal case, where the facts are set out, the court said: “It may be assumed, as a general proposition, that the criminal laws of a State do not bind, and cannot affect those out of the territorial limits of the State. Each State, in respect to each of the others, is an independent sovereignty, possessing ample powers, and the exclusive right to determine within its own borders, what shall be tolerated, and what prohibited; what shall be deemed innocent and wbat criminal; its powers being limited only by the Federal Constitution and the nature and objects of government. While each state is thus sovereign within its own limits, it cannot impose its laws upon those outside of the limits of its sovereign power. Our own Constitution has expressly fixed the boundaries of its sovereignty.9 And the right of punishment extends not only to persons who commit infractions of the criminal law actually within the State, but also to all persons who commit such ivfractions as are, in contemplation of law, within the State.10 Every person being without this State, committing or consummating an offense by an agent or means within the State, is liable to be punished by the laws thereof in the same manner as if he were present, and had commenced and had consummated the offense within the State.” 11
In Commonwealth v. Van Tuy1,12 the indictment was for obtaining money by false pretense. The fraud was concocted in the State of Ohio, where the representations, which were designed to render it successful, were made, but the scheme was consummated and the money obtained in Kentucky. The defendant was tried and punished in the latter State, the court holding that as the crime was not committed until the money had been obtained, not being mature and taking effect until then, the crime was, therefore, committed in Kentucky and not elsewhere, and the defendant was properly indicted and tried therefor in the county where the money was paid to him. EUGENE MCQUILLIN.
St. Louis, Mo.
Appeal from Scotland circuit court.
on to recover the val of notes left by plaintiff with defendant's testate for collection, and by the latter held, uncollected, until barred by the statute of limitations. Judgment for defendant, and appeal therefrom by plaintifi.
Mckee and Smoot, for appellant, James H. Kinchelo.
BLACK, J., delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, in 1867, before leaving this State, gave to the defendant's testate, Green, 14 notes, and took a receipt therefor, in which it is stated that the notes are to be collected and accounted for. Green died in 1882, and plaintiff filed an account in the probate court, giving a list of the notes, and stating that he did not know whether the notes had been collected; that they could have been collected, and, if not, deceased suffered them to become barred by the statute of limitations; that deceased was to have five per cent, for his services, and that the estate owed him, etc. Three of the notes, signed by Downing and others, and one small one, signed by Green, in all amounting to about $700, were found by the executor among the papers of the deceased, with credits upon the Downing notes. Some correspondence, offered in evidence, shows that, from 1867 to 1882, Green collected and remitted to the plaintiff various sums of money; and the evidence is strong to the effect that he remitted or applied all money collected. Green, in a letter dated in 1867, says Downing had promised payment in the following January. In 1881 be says Downing had promised several times to pay, and expressed some fears about the Arnold note; and in 1882, speaking of this same note, which was signed by Downing, he says he let the date slip out before he knew it, and that Mr. Downing said "a note never dies with him." The real contest is as to the barred notes.
The court, for the plaintiff, instructed the jury, that if deceased, while in the discharge of his trust, negligently permitted the statute of limitations to run against part of the notes, and by reason of said neglect the debts were lost, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover; and refused to instruct that if the notes could have been collected by resorting to legal means, and yet were al
8 51 Ind. 413.
1, $ 2. il See also Johns v. The 3tate, 19 Ind. 421. 12 1 Met. (ky.) 4.
*S. C. 1 $. W. Rep. 235.