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must have made his preliminary declaration indeed within the last fifty years, nearly all of intention two years beforehand; must the States have, by constitutional amendtake an oath to abjure all former allegiancements, stripped the local judiciary of its and to support the Constitution of the United ancient independence and prestige. They States; must renounce any title of nobility have, with hardly an exception, either made which he may have; must prove, by two citi

the judges elective for short terms by univerzens, that his residence has been continuous sal suffrage, or else virtually placed all for, at least, five years, and that he has resided judicial tenures at the caprice of some ward one year at least within the State where the politician. The result is, that as these local, court is held ; must satisfy the judge that he

or State courts still have jurisdiction in this has, during that time, behaved as "a man of vitally important matter, naturalization

frauds have become the rule rather than the good moral character," that he is attached to the principles of our constitution and is exception. Any one ought to be able to see well disposed to the good order of the gov

that the judge, in such cases, should be indeernment." Finally, the country of his for pendent; least of all, should he be the mere mer allegiance must, at the time of his ad tool of some local political "boss.” Besides, mission, be at peace with the United States, since the power of naturalization is, by our because, by the law of nations, the subject constitution, vested in the national legislature or citizen of a belligerent cannot transfer his exclusively, the power to grant certificates of allegiance. When thus duly naturalized, he

naturalization should be as exclusively in the is thenceforth entitled to the full measure of

national courts. This is of infinitely more all the privileges and immunities of American practical importance than any probationary citizenship, political as well as civil, except

term of residence, because it is of no conthat he must wait two years longer before he

sequence whether that term be long or short, is eligible to a seat in Congress, and that he so long as its provisions are habitually disrecan never be eligible to the office of Presi- garded by the tribunal having the power to dent. If, however, he should visit the coun

admit to citizenship. try of his former allegiance, the protection to The nationality of married women has been be given him therein by our government must the source of much controversy, and although be considered in connection with other

with other questions closely connected therewith are questions of natural rights and duties, constantly arising, our Congress has never because he is not necessarily discharged defined the status of American women marfrom obligations or penalties which he ried to aliens. The common law rule in such may have actually incurred before emigra cases is, that marriage produces no dissolution. But of this, we shall have occasion to tion of her native allegiance, and there can speak further on.

be no doubt that this was the rule in the Any "free white woman" married to an United States, previous to the act of Congress alien, becomes naturalized by the naturaliza of February 10, 1855. The question then is, tion of her husband; and any woman who is did that act change the law? It confers citieligible to citizenship by our laws, becomes a zenship upon an alien woman who marries a citizen by marrying a citizen. The minor citizen, but it does not say that an American children of an alien, if living in the United woman forfeits her nationality by marrying a States at the time of his naturalization, are foreigner. If the laws of her husband's deemed citizens, and if he should die after country confer citizenship of that country upmaking his preliminary declaration of inten

on her, there seems no good reason why she tion to become a citizen, and before his actual

may not enjoy the privileges without effectadmission, his widow and children are deemed ing her rights in her native country. Her citizens.

marriage to an alien domiciled in the United The law itself would not be objectionable,

States, does not denationalize her; and if she if it could be honestly administered ; and at goes to her husband's country, the objection the time of its enactment, more than three

to double allegiance would not necessarily quarters of a century ago, its honest admin preclude her enjoyment of rights and immuistration was possible. But since that time, nities incident to her American citizenship.

If, on the contrary, it be held that by accept

State. And it may enforce, within its own ing the privileges conferred by her husband's jurisdiction, such laws as it pleases to make country, she forfeits her American citizen

touching the naturalization of foreigners. ship, her own right of inheritance, as well as Inasmuch, therefore, as these are rights of a that of her children, may be seriously affected. municipal or domestic character, this declaraTherefore, until some legislative act, or some

tion, as to the “natural and inherent right of decision of our Supreme Court, shall place all people,” is law as respects our own citithis vexed question beyond dispute, it would

zens, but nothing more than an expression of seem the safer plan for the Executive branch

opinion as to what is the law of nations. Conof our Government to adhere to the old com

sequently, it is not binding on other nations mon law rule.

further than they may assent to it by treaty, The attitude of our Government on the sub- or that it may, in reality, accord with the law ject of expatriation, has never been particu- of nations. larly remarkable for consistency. Until

Again, the language of the act is ill chosen quite recently, we had no statute authorizing when it declares that “all naturalized citizens the exercise of the right of expatriation by of the United States while in foreign counour own citizens; and our Courts had decided tries, are entitled to, and shall receive from in the meantime, that, in the absence of such this government, the same proteciton of pera statute, an American citizen could not ex- son and property which is accorded to native patriate himself. And yet, in apparent for- citizens.” Such sweeping assertions of ungetfulness of this fact, we had been natural- qualified rights of naturalized citizens in forizing the subjects and citizens of other coun- eign countries, may sound very well at the tries, on condition of their renunciation of hustings; and, though always of very questheir previous allegiance. We had even gone tionable taste, may be thought by some to so far as to ask other countries to place their be justifiable as a contrivance to catch the solegislation in harmony with our naturaliza- called “foreign vote.” But sensible people tion laws, quite overlooking the fact of our know that Congress cannot alter the law of failure to so harmonize our own.

nations; and that any declaration contrary The Declaration of July 27, 1868, known thereto, is not binding upon the President, who as the "Expatriation Act,” was intended to is charged by the constitution with the adcorrect this defect. It declares "the right of ministration of our foreign affairs. A free expatriation” to be "a natural and inherent State may legislate on the subject of expatrione of all people," and that “any declara

ation and naturalization, without enquiry as tion, instruction, opinion, order or decision to the laws of other countries ; because the of any officer of the United States which de- assent of the emigrant's native country to his nies, restricts, impairs or questions this right, change of residence, is no longer considered is inconsistent with the fundamental princi- necessary in the country which naturalizes ples of this government."

him. And after his naturalization, the emiThis language savors of the hustings; and, grant is, with one exception, entitled to all in addition to its questionable taste, is both the protection which is usually accorded to gratuitous and indefinite. It says too much, native born citizens. But the exception here in that it assumes to speak in behalf of "all noted, is an important one; and it arises people; ” and it says too little in that it fails whenever the emigrant returns to his native to declare how, or under what circumstances country. The question of his protection then this “right of all people may be exercised by

becomes complicated with other questions of American citizen. It fails to define "expa

natural rights and duties, which no governtriation," or to say what is essential to its ment can afford to ignore. He cannot, in full attainment, or what shall be the evidence such case, justly claim exemption from of its accomplishment. The power of Con- obligations or penalties incurred before emigress to make such laws as it pleases in re- gration; unless, indeed, they may have been gard to the denationalization of its own citi- discharged or satisfied by lapse of time or zens, no one questions. That is an attribute other intrinsic causes. Thus, for example, of sovereignty, incident to every independent if he deserted the army or navy, or had be


trayed some public trust, or, after having they either embroil our government in diffbeen conscripted, he emigrated in order to

culty,or place it in a wrong position. escape duty, his change of citizenship does

But, it is said, that, in all cases where, by not extinguish the obligation in the one case,

the laws of their native country, these pernor satisfy the penalty in the other; though

sons were never expatriated by being nat

uralized in ours, and where they assume duit does discharge him from the liability to any service that had not been actually required original allegiance and incompatible with

ties or perform acts compatible with their of him before emigration. These principles are so generally conceded in all our treaties

their acquired citizenship, they must be held

to have absolved our goverment from all obwith foreign powers, and so generally rec

But ognized even in the absence of treaty stip-ligation to protect them. Very true. ulations, that they are no longer matters of

this seldom happens, and for obvious readispute.

By our treaties with most European We usually hear a great deal, once in about

countries, and by the laws of nearly all the every four years, of the failure of our gov

Latin-American States, expatriation is acernment to protect the rights of its natural

complished whenever naturalization takes ized citizens in foreign countries; and it is place; and since the primary object of these but natural that our demagogues, as well in

persons is to avoid the duties of citizenship Congress as out of it, should improve the oc

in both countries, they are very careful not casion to distinguish themselves by "bun

to assume duties or perform acts that would combe" speeches. But intelligent men, fa

imply a purpose to resume their former allemiliar with the administration of our foreign giance. And thus, while living beyond the affairs, need not be told that where the rights

reach of the authority of our governmentof one naturalized citizen have been neglected

without ever having identified themselves with

it, and without ever having contributed any by our government, it has espoused the cause of hundreds who have little or no claim

thing to its support—they successfully invoke In other words, every well informed

its power to shield them from the ordinary man knows, and every candid man must ad

burdens of citizenship in the country of their

residence. mit, that the abuses of American citizenship in foreign countries have become frequent

An effective remedy for such abuses is not and shameful. It is a very common thing for

possible,except by some well digested scheme natives of other countries to maintain a resi

of Congressional legislation. There should dence in our midst barely long enough to pro

be some explicit declaration by Congress of

the conditions under which citizens of the cure (by purchase or otherwise) certificates of naturalization. They then return to their

United States shall be deemed to have expanative country—or take up their abode in

triated themselves; and when a man, in a some other—with no intention of ever mak

foreign country, demands protection as an ing of the United States their permanent res

American citizen, he should be required to idence. In this way, they enjoy exemption produce some better evidence of his nationfrom the duties and burdens of citizenship in ality than that afforded by the certificate of both countries; from those in the country of

a petty municipal magistrate who, although he their residence by reason of their naturaliza may have common law jurisdiction, and "a tion papers, and from those in the country of

seal and clerk,” usually obtains his office as their adopted allegiance by reason of their

a reward for some supposed political service continuous absence. And every American

at the primaries, and holds it by the extremeMinister and Consul will testify, that it is pre

ly uncertain tenure of the popular will.

WILLIAM L. SCRUGGS. cisely this class of persons who give our government most annoyance and trouble. They are usually the most importunate in their demands for protection, and generally the first to complain, if their demands are not readily complied with. And it sometimes happens that, by misrepresentation and falsehood,

upon it.

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Supreme Court of Missouri, March 18, 1886. NEGLIGENCE-Fellow-Servants--Road Master aud Common Laborer are not.-Where a road-master of a railroad company bas superintendence of the road department, and jurisdiction over all wrecking trains, and through his negligence in giving a wrong signal to an engineer of a wrecking train, engaged in re. moving a wreck, one of the laborers is injured in performing a duty imposed upon him by the “bosz” of the gauge, such road-master, in giving the signal, was not acting as fellow-servant of such laborer, but was acting as vice-princidal or "alter ego" of the railroad company.

The facts appear in the opinion.
RAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action for damages for an injury alleged to have been done to plaintiff by defenddant and its employees, while engaged in loading a wrecked car upon a wrecking train of defendant.

This action was commenced in the Lincoln County Circuit Court, and afterwards transferred . to that of St. Charles, where there was a verdict

and judgment for plaintiff for $10,000, from which the defendant appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed, and the case remanded, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.

The case is reported in the 11 Missouri Appeal Reports, 574, where the general facts of the case appear; except that the record shows the extent and nature of the powers, duties of jurisdiction of Tracy, as road-master of defendant, more fully than appears by the opinion.

The controlling question in the case, and upon which it was made to turn in the Court of Appeals, is, whether the plaintiff and said Tracy were fellowservants in the transaction in which the injury was received; or whether said Tracy, in said transaction, acted as vice-principal, or "alter ego" of the defendant company.

The Court of Appeals, in effect, held that plaintiff and said Tracy were fellow-servants, and that it did not appear that the injury complained of arose from any negligence of Tracy's in the matter of employing hands, or in any matter, in which he replaced the master, or in any of the business, in wbich, he was vice-principal, or “alter ego" of the master, and that plaintiff could not, thereforə, recover, and for that reason reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the cause, and the propriety of this ruling is the question now before us.

The record shows, not only that said Tracy was road-master of defendant road, with power to employ and discharge hands, but, also, that as such road-master, he had jurisdiction over the road

bed and tracks of defendant throughout its entire line; that his duties were to keep road-bed, tracks, cattle guards and fencing in repair; that he had authority to employ and discharge section foremen, foremen of construction and wrecking trains, bridge watchmen, and also all men and laborers in his department; that his fauthority and jurisdiction extended alike, to laborers, section foremen, foremen of construction and wrecking trains engaged in the work of clearing away, or removing a wreck from the road-bed or track; or any special foreman engaged in the special work of clearing away such a wreck, etc.

The record, also, shows that in August, 1879, a supply train of defendant's cars, consisting of 3 box and 3 flat cars, had been wrecked on defendant's road, near Foley station, and the evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that the plaintiff, at the time of the injury complained of, was working in defendant's employ as a laborer, under Michael Fitzgerald, an agent and servant of defendant, who was superintending or bossing the body of laborers, of whom plaintiff was one; that plaintiff was acting as a laborer under the direct supervision, direction and control of John Tracy. who was defendant's road-mas. ter, and as such had control of the road-bed and track of defendant's entire line, with the powers, duties and jurisdiction heretofore stated, in that behalf; that said Fitzgerald was section and construction foreman of defendant, and was assisting said Tracy in superintending plaintiff and other laborers in removing the wreck and loading a flat car, whose wheels and trucks had been broken off, upon a wrecking train, both of which were owned by defendant, and being controlled by defendant's agents.

The wrecking train was composed of an engine and flat cars, and had been cut in two, some of the cars attached to the engine being south of the wrecked flat car, and other cars standing still north of the wrecked car. The flat or wrecked car had been lifted upon the track of defendant road, when the train was cut in two, and the north end of the wrecked fiat car had been lifted up and placed on the first car in the wrecking train, north of the wrecked car, and the other laborers and plaintiff, under the control and supervision of Tracy and Fitzgerald, were attempting to place the south end of the wrecked car on the first car of the wrecking train, immediately south of the wrecked car, so that the first car of the south might be pushed under the wrecked car. This wrecked car was held up above the level of the first flat car south, by levers resting on the floor of the first flat car south, the north ends of which levers extending a few inches under the south end of the wrecked car; and while the wrecked car was held up by the levers, plaintiff was ordered by Fitzgerald and Tracy to go under the wrecked car, and push out one of the levers. The plaintiff obeyed the order and whilst pushing at the lever, Tracy, intending to signal the engi

neer to move the engine north, and thus force the flat car, on which the levers were resting, under the wrecked car, by carelessness and mistake, signaled the engineer to move south, in consequence of which, the engine was moved south, and thereby drew the flat car and levers from under the wrecked car, and caused the same to fall on plaintiff, crushing and crippling him for life.

The testimony on the part of the defendant, on the contrary, tended to show that Tracy gave the right signal, but that the engineer, by mistake and carelessness moved the engine south, instead of north, thus causing the accident. On this point, the testimony is conflicting as to what signal Tracy gave, but all agree, that if he gave the signal the plaintiff's witnesses say he gave, he gave the wrong signal, caused the cars to move the wrong way, and thus occasioned the accident and injury in question, and so the jury found.

The material instructions given and refused in the cause, are set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and are as follows: Those given for the plaintiff are two in number, as follows:

1. If the jury find irom the evidence that one John Tracy was the road-master of defendant's railroad, and as such road-master was the superintendent for the defendant of the work of removing and loading up the wreck in question, and bad entire control and charge thereof, with power to employ the section foreman and section hands, and that the plaintiff was subject to his orders and directions, then the jury are instructed that said Tracy was not a fellow-servant with the plaintiff, and that said Tracy's acts and conduct, in connection with said work, were and are the acts and conduct of the defendant, so far as this case is concerned.

2. If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, while employed by defendant as a section hand, on or about the 15th day of August, 1879, in the discharge of his duty as such section hand, was ordered by his superior to step under the wrecked car and push out a certain lever, and that in discharge of said duty, and in obedience of said order, plaintiff stepped under said car, and while engaged in attempting to carry out said order, the defendant, through negligence or mistake, and without warning to the plaintiff, gave to the person in charge of the engine a signal to move said engine and the cars attached to it southward, when the proper signal would have been to move the engine and cars attached northward, and that in obedience to said signal, the person in charge of the engine moved said engine and cars attached to it southward, and that, in consequence thereof, said wrecked car fell upon and injured plaintiff, the verdict must be for the plaintiff. Three were given for the defendant, as follows: 1. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that at the time plaintiff was injured, he was an employe of the defendant, and engaged with a number of other men in loading a wrecked train on a

flat-car attached to an engine on defendant's track, and that John Tracy, defendant's roadmaster, gave a signal to the engineer in charge of the engine to move his engine northwardly, and that the engineer instead of moving his engine northwardly, moved southwardly, and that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the southward movement of the engine and the car thereto attached, the plaintiff cannot recover, and they must find for the defendant.

2. Even though the jury may believe, from the evidence, that plaintiff's injury was caused by the southward movement of the train, 'by the engineer in charge, in obedience to an order of John Tracy, the defendant's road-master, so to do; yet, if they also believe from the evidence that the said engineer had reasonable grounds to believe that this was a wrong signal, and that obedience to this signal would cause damage or injury, the plaintiff cannot recover, and the finding must be for the defendant.

3. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that prior to the happening of the accident which caused the injury to plaintiff, defendant's road master, John Tracy, gave the men employed in loading the wrecked car on another flat-car warning that they must get out of the way, that he was going to move the train, or words to that effect, and that said warning was given in sufficient time before the moving of said train for said men to get out of the way, and loud enough for the men to hear said warning; and shall further believe that plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable care, could have heard said warning, and failed to get out of the way, then the defendant is not liable in this action and the verdict must be for defendant, unless the jury further find, that said Tracy saw that plaintiff was in danger in time to have prevented the injury, and failed to make proper precaution to prevent said injury.

The court gave the following instruction, upon its own motion: 9. The court instructs the jury that a servant of a corporation, who is injured by the negligence or misconduct of his fellow servant, can maintain no action against the master for such injury, and that this rule applies in all cases, without regard to the degree of subordination in which the different servants or agents may be placed with reference to each other, and if the jury find from the evidence that plaintiff, Tracy and Fitzgerald were, at the time of the injury complained of, all employes of defendant, in the service of the defendant, then the verdict of the jury must be for defendant, unless the jury should also find and believe from the evidence that the roadmaster, Tracy, had sole charge and control of the work, as superintendent thereof, with power to employ the hands employed, and that the plaintiff was at the time subject to his order, and that the injury complained of was caused by his (the said Tracv's) negligence.

Defendants asked the court to instruct the jury, "that if plaintiff and Tracy were fellow servants of

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