indeed within the last fifty years, nearly all the States have, by constitutional amendments, stripped the local judiciary of its ancient independence and prestige. They have, with hardly an exception, either made the judges elective for short terms by universal suffrage, or else virtually placed all judicial tenures at the caprice of some ward politician. The result is, that as these local, or State courts still have jurisdiction in this vitally important matter, naturalization frauds have become the rule rather than the exception. Any one ought to be able to see that the judge, in such cases, should be independent; least of all, should he be the mere tool of some local political "boss." Besides, since the power of naturalization is, by our constitution, vested in the national legislature exclusively, the power to grant certificates of naturalization should be as exclusively in the national courts. This is of infinitely more practical importance than any probationary term of residence, because it is of no consequence whether that term be long or short, so long as its provisions are habitually disre must have made his preliminary declaration of intention two years beforehand; must take an oath to abjure all former allegiance and to support the Constitution of the United States; must renounce any title of nobility which he may have; must prove, by two citizens, that his residence has been continuous for, at least, five years, and that he has resided one year at least within the State where the court is held; must satisfy the judge that he has, during that time, behaved as "a man of good moral character," that he is attached to the principles of our constitution and is "well disposed to the good order of the government." Finally, the country of his former allegiance must, at the time of his admission, be at peace with the United States, because, by the law of nations, the subject or citizen of a belligerent cannot transfer his allegiance. When thus duly naturalized, he is thenceforth entitled to the full measure of all the privileges and immunities of American citizenship, political as well as civil, except that he must wait two years longer before he is eligible to a seat in Congress, and that he can never be eligible to the office of Presi-garded by the tribunal having the power to dent. If, however, he should visit the country of his former allegiance, the protection to be given him therein by our government must be considered in connection with other questions of natural rights and duties, because he is not necessarily discharged from obligations or penalties which he may have actually incurred before emigration. But of this, we shall have occasion to speak further on. Any "free white woman" married to an alien, becomes naturalized by the naturalization of her husband; and any woman who is eligible to citizenship by our laws, becomes a citizen by marrying a citizen. The minor children of an alien, if living in the United States at the time of his naturalization, are deemed citizens, and if he should die after making his preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and before his actual admission, his widow and children are deemed citizens. The law itself would not be objectionable, if it could be honestly administered; and at the time of its enactment, more than three quarters of a century ago, its honest administration was possible. But since that time, admit to citizenship. The nationality of married women has been the source of much controversy, and although questions closely connected therewith are constantly arising, our Congress has never defined the status of American women married to aliens. The common law rule in such cases is, that marriage produces no dissolution of her native allegiance, and there can be no doubt that this was the rule in the United States, previous to the act of Congress of February 10, 1855. The question then is, did that act change the law? It confers citizenship upon an alien woman who marries a citizen, but it does not say that an American woman forfeits her nationality by marrying a foreigner. If the laws of her husband's country confer citizenship of that country upon her, there seems no good reason why she may not enjoy the privileges without effecting her rights in her native country. Her marriage to an alien domiciled in the United States, does not denationalize her; and if she goes to her husband's country, the objection to double allegiance would not necessarily preclude her enjoyment of rights and immunities incident to her American citizenship. If, on the contrary, it be held that by accepting the privileges conferred by her husband's country, she forfeits her American citizenship, her own right of inheritance, as well as that of her children, may be seriously affected. Therefore, until some legislative act, or some decision of our Supreme Court, shall place this vexed question beyond dispute, it would seem the safer plan for the Executive branch of our Government to adhere to the old common law rule. The attitude of our Government on the subject of expatriation, has never been particularly remarkable for consistency. Until quite recently, we had no statute authorizing the exercise of the right of expatriation by our own citizens; and our Courts had decided in the meantime, that, in the absence of such a statute, an American citizen could not expatriate himself. And yet, in apparent forgetfulness of this fact, we had been naturalizing the subjects and citizens of other countries, on condition of their renunciation of their previous allegiance. We had even gone so far as to ask other countries to place their legislation in harmony with our naturalization laws, quite overlooking the fact of our failure to so harmonize our own. The Declaration of July 27, 1868, known as the "Expatriation Act," was intended to correct this defect. It declares "the right of expatriation" to be "a natural and inherent one of all people," and that "any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or decision of any officer of the United States which denies, restricts, impairs or questions this right, is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government." This language savors of the hustings; and, in addition to its questionable taste, is both gratuitous and indefinite. It says too much, in that it assumes to speak in behalf of "all people;" and it says too little in that it fails to declare how, or under what circumstances this "right of all people may be exercised by American citizen. It fails to define "expatriation," or to say what is essential to its full attainment, or what shall be the evidence of its accomplishment. The power of Congress to make such laws as it pleases in regard to the denationalization of its own citizens, no one questions. That is an attribute of sovereignty, incident to every independent State. And it may enforce, within its own jurisdiction, such laws as it pleases to make touching the naturalization of foreigners. Inasmuch, therefore, as these are rights of a municipal or domestic character, this declaration, as to the "natural and inherent right of all people," is law as respects our own citizens, but nothing more than an expression of opinion as to what is the law of nations. Consequently, it is not binding on other nations further than they may assent to it by treaty, or that it may, in reality, accord with the law of nations. Again, the language of the act is ill chosen when it declares that "all naturalized citizens of the United States while in foreign countries, are entitled to, and shall receive from this government, the same proteciton of person and property which is accorded to native citizens." Such sweeping assertions of unqualified rights of naturalized citizens in foreign countries, may sound very well at the hustings; and, though always of very questionable taste, may be thought by some to be justifiable as a contrivance to catch the socalled "foreign vote." But sensible people know that Congress cannot alter the law of nations; and that any declaration contrary thereto,is not binding upon the President, who is charged by the constitution with the administration of our foreign affairs. A free State may legislate on the subject of expatriation and naturalization, without enquiry as to the laws of other countries; because the assent of the emigrant's native country to his change of residence, is no longer considered necessary in the country which naturalizes him. And after his naturalization, the emigrant is, with one exception, entitled to all the protection which is usually accorded to native born citizens. But the exception here noted, is an important one; and it arises whenever the emigrant returns to his native country. The question of his protection then becomes complicated with other questions of natural rights and duties, which no government can afford to ignore. He cannot, in such case, justly claim exemption from obligations or penalties incurred before emigration; unless, indeed, they may have been discharged or satisfied by lapse of time or other intrinsic causes. Thus, for example, if he deserted the army or navy, or had be ulations, that they are no longer matters of dispute. they either embroil our government in difficulty, or place it in a wrong position. But, it is said, that, in all cases where, by the laws of their native country, these persons were never expatriated by being naturalized in ours, and where they assume duoriginal allegiance and incompatible with ties or perform acts compatible with their their acquired citizenship, they must be held to have absolved our goverment from all obBut trayed some public trust, or, after having been conscripted, he emigrated in order to escape duty, his change of citizenship does not extinguish the obligation in the one case, nor satisfy the penalty in the other; though it does discharge him from the liability to any service that had not been actually required of him before emigration. These principles are so generally conceded in all our treaties with foreign powers, and so generally recognized even in the absence of treaty stip-ligation to protect them. Very true. this seldom happens, and for obvious reasons. By our treaties with most European countries, and by the laws of nearly all the Latin-American States, expatriation is accomplished whenever naturalization takes place; and since the primary object of these persons is to avoid the duties of citizenship in both countries, they are very careful not to assume duties or perform acts that would imply a purpose to resume their former allegiance. And thus, while living beyond the reach of the authority of our governmentwithout ever having identified themselves with it, and without ever having contributed any thing to its support-they successfully invoke its power to shield them from the ordinary burdens of citizenship in the country of their residence. We usually hear a great deal, once in about every four years, of the failure of our government to protect the rights of its naturalized citizens in foreign countries; and it is but natural that our demagogues, as well in Congress as out of it, should improve the occasion to distinguish themselves by "buncombe" speeches. But intelligent men, familiar with the administration of our foreign affairs, need not be told that where the rights of one naturalized citizen have been neglected by our government, it has espoused the cause of hundreds who have little or no claim upon it. In other words, every well informed man knows, and every candid man must admit, that the abuses of American citizenship in foreign countries have become frequent and shameful. It is a very common thing for natives of other countries to maintain a residence in our midst barely long enough to procure (by purchase or otherwise) certificates of naturalization. They then return to their native country-or take up their abode in some other-with no intention of ever making of the United States their permanent residence. In this way, they enjoy exemption from the duties and burdens of citizenship in both countries; from those in the country of their residence by reason of their naturalization papers, and from those in the country of their adopted allegiance by reason of their continuous absence. And every American Minister and Consul will testify, that it is precisely this class of persons who give our government most annoyance and trouble. They are usually the most importunate in their demands for protection, and generally the first to complain, if their demands are not readily complied with. And it sometimes happens that, by misrepresentation and falsehood, An effective remedy for such abuses is not possible, except by some well digested scheme of Congressional legislation. There should be some explicit declaration by Congress of the conditions under which citizens of the United States shall be deemed to have expatriated themselves; and when a man, in a foreign country, demands protection as an American citizen, he should be required to produce some better evidence of his nationality than that afforded by the certificate of a petty municipal magistrate who, although he may have common law jurisdiction, and "a seal and clerk," usually obtains his office as a reward for some supposed political service at the primaries, and holds it by the extremely uncertain tenure of the popular will. WILLIAM L. SCRUGGS. Supreme Court of Missouri, March 18, 1886. NEGLIGENCE-Fellow-Servants-Road Master aud Common Laborer are not.-Where a road-master of a railroad company has superintendence of the road department, and jurisdiction over all wrecking trains, and through his negligence in giving a wrong signal to an engineer of a wrecking train, engaged in removing a wreck, one of the laborers is injured in performing a duty imposed upon him by the "boss" of the gauge, such road-master, in giving the signal, was not acting as fellow-servant of such laborer, but was acting as vice-princidal or "alter ego" of the railroad company. The facts appear in the opinion. RAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action for damages for an injury alleged to have been done to plaintiff by defenddant and its employees, while engaged in loading a wrecked car upon a wrecking train of defendant. This action was commenced in the Lincoln County Circuit Court, and afterwards transferred . to that of St. Charles, where there was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $10,000, from which the defendant appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed, and the case remanded, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. The case is reported in the 11 Missouri Appeal Reports, 574, where the general facts of the case appear; except that the record shows the extent and nature of the powers, duties of jurisdiction of Tracy, as road-master of defendant, more fully than appears by the opinion. The controlling question in the case, and upon which it was made to turn in the Court of Appeals, is, whether the plaintiff and said Tracy were fellowservants in the transaction in which the injury was received; or whether said Tracy, in said transaction, acted as vice-principal, or "alter ego" of the defendant company. The Court of Appeals, in effect, held that plaintiff and said Tracy were fellow-servants, and that it did not appear that the injury complained of arose from any negligence of Tracy's in the matter of employing hands, or in any matter, in which he replaced the master, or in any of the business, in which, he was vice-principal, or “alter ego" of the master, and that plaintiff could not, therefore, recover, and for that reason reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the cause, and the propriety of this ruling is the question now before us. The record shows, not only that said Tracy was road-master of defendant road, with power to employ and discharge hands, but, also, that as such road-master, he had jurisdiction over the road bed and tracks of defendant throughout its entire line; that his duties were to keep road-bed, tracks, cattle guards and fencing in repair; that he had authority to employ and discharge section foremen, foremen of construction and wrecking trains, bridge watchmen, and also all men and laborers in his department; that his jauthority and jurisdiction extended alike, to laborers, section foremen, foremen of construction and wrecking trains engaged in the work of clearing away, or removing a wreck from the road-bed or track; or any special foreman engaged in the special work of clearing away such a wreck, etc. The record, also, shows that in August, 1879, a supply train of defendant's cars, consisting of 3 box and 3 flat cars, had been wrecked on defendant's road, near Foley station, and the evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that the plaintiff, at the time of the injury complained of, was working in defendant's employ as a laborer, under Michael Fitzgerald, an agent and servant of defendant, who was superintending or bossing the body of laborers, of whom plaintiff was one; that plaintiff was acting as a laborer under the direct supervision, direction and control of John Tracy. who was defendant's road-master, and as such had control of the road-bed and track of defendant's entire line, with the powers, duties and jurisdiction heretofore stated, in that behalf; that said Fitzgerald was section and construction foreman of defendant, and was assisting said Tracy in superintending plaintiff and other laborers in removing the wreck and loading a flat car, whose wheels and trucks had been broken off, upon a wrecking train, both of which were owned by defendant, and being controlled by defendant's agents. The wrecking train was composed of an engine and flat cars, and had been cut in two, some of the cars attached to the engine being south of the wrecked flat car, and other cars standing still north of the wrecked car. The flat or wrecked car had been lifted upon the track of defendant road, when the train was cut in two, and the north end of the wrecked flat car had been lifted up and placed on the first car in the wrecking train, north of the wrecked car, and the other laborers and plaintiff, under the control and supervision of Tracy and Fitzgerald, were attempting to place the south end of the wrecked car on the first car of the wrecking train, immediately south of the wrecked car, so that the first car of the south might be pushed under the wrecked car. This wrecked car was held up above the level of the first flat car south, by levers resting on the floor of the first flat car south, the north ends of which levers extending a few inches under the south end of the wrecked car; and while the wrecked car was held up by the levers, plaintiff was ordered by Fitzgerald and Tracy to go under the wrecked car, and push out one of the levers. The plaintiff obeyed the order and whilst pushing at the lever, Tracy, intending to signal the engi neer to move the engine north, and thus force the flat car, on which the levers were resting, under the wrecked car, by carelessness and mistake, signaled the engineer to move south, in consequence of which, the engine was moved south, and thereby drew the flat car and levers from under the wrecked car, and caused the same to fall on plaintiff, crushing and crippling him for life. The testimony on the part of the defendant, on the contrary, tended to show that Tracy gave the right signal, but that the engineer, by mistake and carelessness moved the engine south, instead of north, thus causing the accident. On this point, the testimony is conflicting as to what signal Tracy gave, but all agree, that if he gave the signal the plaintiff's witnesses say he gave, he gave the wrong signal, caused the cars to move the wrong way, and thus occasioned the accident and injury in question, and so the jury found. The material instructions given and refused in the cause, are set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and are as follows: Those given for the plaintiff are two in number, as follows: 1. If the jury find from the evidence that one John Tracy was the road-master of defendant's railroad, and as such road-master was the superintendent for the defendant of the work of removing and loading up the wreck in question, and had entire control and charge thereof, with power to employ the section foreman and section hands, and that the plaintiff was subject to his orders and directions, then the jury are instructed that said Tracy was not a fellow-servant with the plaintiff, and that said Tracy's acts and conduct, in connection with said work, were and are the acts and conduct of the defendant, so far as this case is concerned. 2. If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, while employed by defendant as a section hand, on or about the 15th day of August, 1879, in the discharge of his duty as such section hand, was ordered by his superior to step under the wrecked car and push out a certain lever, and that in discharge of said duty, and in obedience of said order, plaintiff stepped under said car, and while engaged in attempting to carry out said order, the defendant, through negligence or mistake, and without warning to the plaintiff, gave to the person in charge of the engine a signal to move said engine and the cars attached to it southward, when the proper signal would have been to move the engine and cars attached northward, and that in obedience to said signal, the person in charge of the engine moved said engine and cars attached to it southward, and that, in consequence thereof, said wrecked car fell upon and injured plaintiff, the verdict must be for the plaintiff. Three were given for the defendant, as follows: 1. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that at the time plaintiff was injured, he was an employe of the defendant, and engaged with a number of other men in loading a wrecked train on a flat-car attached to an engine on defendant's track, and that John Tracy, defendant's roadmaster, gave a signal to the engineer in charge of the engine to move his engine northwardly, and that the engineer instead of moving his engine northwardly, moved southwardly, and that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the southward movement of the engine and the car thereto attached, the plaintiff cannot recover, and they must find for the defendant. 2. Even though the jury may believe, from the evidence, that plaintiff's injury was caused by the southward movement of the train, by the engineer in charge, in obedience to an order of John Tracy, the defendant's road-master, so to do; yet, if they also believe from the evidence that the said engineer had reasonable grounds to believe that this was a wrong signal, and that obedience to this signal would cause damage or injury, the plaintiff cannot recover, and the finding must be for the defendant. 3. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that prior to the happening of the accident which caused the injury to plaintiff, defendant's road master, John Tracy, gave the men employed in loading the wrecked car on another flat-car warning that they must get out of the way, that he was going to move the train, or words to that effect, and that said warning was given in sufficient time before the moving of said train for said men to get out of the way, and loud enough for the men to hear said warning; and shall further believe that plaintiff. in the exercise of reasonable care, could have heard said warning, and failed to get out of the way, then the defendant is not liable in this action and the verdict must be for defendant, unless the jury further find, that said Tracy saw that plaintiff was in danger in time to have prevented the injury, and failed to make proper precaution to prevent said injury. The court gave the following instruction, upon its own motion: 9. The court instructs the jury that a servant of a corporation, who is injured by the negligence or misconduct of his fellow servant, can maintain no action against the master for such injury, and that this rule applies in all cases, without regard to the degree of subordination in which the different servants or agents may be placed with reference to each other, and if the jury find from the evidence that plaintiff, Tracy and Fitzgerald were, at the time of the injury complained of, all employes of defendant, in the service of the defendant, then the verdict of the jury must be for defendant, unless the jury should also find and believe from the evidence that the roadmaster, Tracy, had sole charge and control of the work, as superintendent thereof, with power to employ the hands employed, and that the plaintiff was at the time subject to his order, and that the injury complained of was caused by his (the said Tracy's) negligence. Defendants asked the court to instruct the jury, "that if plaintiff and Tracy were fellow servants of |