16. EQUITY.-Judgment Execution Sale - Bills Quia Timet.-One who is not a part or privy to a judgment is not affected by it, and, as to him, the judgment, and all proceedings under it, are void; and therefore neither the judgment, nor an execution sale of land affected by it, can change his rights in the land, or create a cloud upon his title, nor would a deed resulting from such a sale be valid, or work any mischief. Fears of such an injury would be, therefore, unreal; and a court of equity never interferes to enjoin a sale of land upon an idle or groundless suspicion, an unreal fear, or the mere possibility of its casting a cloud over the title of one in actual possession of the land under an unchallenged title. Roman Catholic Archbishop etc. v. Shipman, S. C. Cal., May 25, 1886, 11 Pac. Rep. 343.

17. EQUITY-Specific Performance. - Where the owner of lands, through or near which it is proposed to run a railroad, binds himself by writing under seal to convey to the projectors, their associates or successors, all the coal and iron upon and in certain designated lands, and to secure to them the right of way, in consideration that they would construct the road to a named point within a specified time; and the road is completed within the specified time, and a bill filed to compel the specific performance of the contract, the objection that it is wanting in mutuality, because of a stipulation that the projectors should not be liable for damages if they failed to construct the road, comes too late after the completion of the work. Since railroads may be built by private enterprise, without the aid of corporate powers, it is no objection to a specific performance that the projectors of the road had not been incorporated when the contract was made. The bond being made payable to the projectors by name, "their associates and successors," and duly assigned by them to a corporation, by which the road was built as stipulated, a bill for specific performance may be maintained by that corporation. The objection that a railroad corporation is not authorized by its charter to acquire any easements or interest in lands not necessary for the operation of its road, can only be raised by the State in a proceeding for the abuse of corporate franchise, and is not available in defense of a suit for the specific performance of a contract. Affirmed. Wilks v. Georgia, etc. Co., S. C. Ala.

ness.

18. EVIDENCE Witness-Expert Witness - Right to a Preliminary Cross-Examination—Qualifications of an Expert-Municipal Corporations— Sewers-Notice.-It is not error to refuse to permit the defendant to cross-examine an expert witness called by the plaintiff before the examination in chief by the latter. No standard exists by which to determine the qualifications of an expert witIf it appears that he is prima facie qualified to testify, the court may allow his testimony to go to the jury, allowing the adverse party to crossexamine as to his qualifications, and leaving to the jury the duty of determining the weight of the testimony. In an action to recover for injuries resulting from negligence in constructing a sewer, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the ordinance directing its construction was regularly adopted. For the purpose of establishing notice of the defective condition of a sewer, it is proper to prove that the sewer gave way at a point not far distant from the break which caused the injury. City of Fort Wayne v. Coombs, S. C. Ind., June 16, 1886, 7 N. E. Rep. 743.

19. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - Sales Administrator's Deed.-A deed which, merely from its recitals, purports to have been executed by an administrator upon a sale of lands previously directed and subsequently confirmed by the probate court, is inadmissible in evidence, and proves no conveyance of title, unless coupled with competent proof of the jurisdictional steps thus recited. Tucker v. Murphy, S. C. Tex., June 11, 1886, 1 S. W. Rep. 76.

20. FRAUD-Fraudulent Representations of Value of Property of Stock Company-Misrepresentations as to Boundary of Real Estate Questions of Fact for the Jury.-A false and fraudulent representation, as to the property of a corporation, of material facts which necessarily affect the value of shares of stock therein, constitutes a cause of action against a party inducing another, by means of such fraudulent representations, to purchase such shares, quite as sufficient as if the purchase had been of the property of the company with regard to which the representation was made, nor is it material in either case, that the purchase price of the property, or the money advanced on the faith of the representation, be paid to the party making it for his individual benefit. If known to be false, and made with intent to deceive and defraud the person who is thereby induced to pay out his money, the person guilty of the fraud is liable to respond in damages, on the same principle on which one person is held liable in damages for fraudulently giving a false recommendation by which another is induced to give credit to a third party. The purchaser of an interest in real estate may rely upon the owner's representations as to its boundary line, there being nothing to indicate to the purchaser, at the time of inspecting the premises before purchase, that the line was different from that described by the owner; and the purchaser may maintain an action for damages sustained by reason of such false and fraudulent representations. Where there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether the representations were fraudulently or mistakenly made, it becomes a question for the jury. Scharenck v. Naylor, N. Y. Ct. App. June 1, 1886, 5 E. Rep. 868.

21. GUARANTY-Condition That Co-Guaranty be Secured Leaving of Instrument by Obligor With His Agent, With Condition for Delivery, not an Escrow-Evidence-Parol Evidence as to Written Contract—Parol Directions as to Delivery of Document Admissible-Executors and Adminis trators-Invalid Written Claim Presented-Recovery on Former Claim, of Which This was Renewal, not Allowed.-Where the president of a corporation, as a guarantor of a draft by the corporation upon a bank, directed the treasurer of the corporation to inform the cashier of the bank that the draft was not to be taken unless A. placed his name on the back of it, which the treasurer communicated to the bank cashier, and A. did not place his name on the back of the draft, but gave a subsidiary separate writing of guaranty, whereupon the bank took the draft, there was no perform. ance of the condition, and no guaranty by the president. The leaving of the draft in the hands of the drawer's own treasurer, as above stated, by the company, and its president as guarantor, do not constitute a delivery in escrow by such guarantor. Directions to an agent as to the delivery of a written contract may be shown by parol in an action on the contract. Where a written obligation

is presented as a claim against an estate, and such instrument proves to be invalid, but was given in renewal of a former obligation, a recovery upon the former obligation cannot be allowed in that proceeding. Belleville, etc., Bank v. Bornman, S. C. Ill., May 12, 1886, 7 N. E. Rep. 686.

22. INFANCY-Guardian and Ward-Disability-Statutory Relief From.-In relieving minors of the disabilities of infancy (Code, §§ 2735-41), the chancery court exercises a special and limited jurisdiction, and its decrees stand on the same footing as the judgments of courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction, whose recitals of notice or appearance may be impeached and contradicted, in a collateral proceeding, by extrinsic evidence. When the infant has a guardian, the petition asking to be relieved of the disabilities of non-age must be signed by the infant in person, and the guardian must join in the petition; and if the petition is signed by the guardian, in the name of the infant, but without his knowledge or consent, the decree founded on it is a fraud on the jurisdiction of the court, which the court will set aside on a direct proceeding, or, without setting it aside, will prevent the guardian from using it against the infant. A settlement of a guardian's accounts in the probate court, made during the minority of the ward, before the resignation of the guardian, and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, is void for want of jurisdiction; and a decree in chancery removing the ward's disabilities as an infant, fraudulently procured by the guardian, imparts no validity to the settlement. A bill in equity filed by a ward within twelve months after attaining majority, seeking to compel a settlement of the accounts of his guardian, and to set aside conveyances executed by him to his guardian during his minority, based on a void settlement rendered by the probate court, is neither multifarious, nor wanting in equity. Cox v. Johnson, S. C. Ala.

23. LAND LAW-Entry Writ of-- Unrecorded Deed-Attachment-Judgment-Execution-Levy and Sale. -In a writ of entry, A.'s title to certain premises was by deed of one B., executed and delivered in 1878, and recorded in 1880. C.'s title was under a levy and sale on execution in 1881 in a suit against B., in which the premises were attached in 1879. A. held an unrecorded deed when the premises were attached as the property of his grantor, B., but had recorded his deed before judgment and execution. Held, that A.'s right was collaterally affected by the judgment against B.; and, as he was not a party or privy to that judgment so that he could reverse it on error, he could avoid it by proof, and was entitled to judgment in the writ of entry. Safford v. Weare, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., July 2, 1886, 7 N. E. Rep. 730.

24. MECHANICS' LIEN-Construction of StatuteAction by Mechanic-Set-Off- Claim Against Contractor.-The statutes of this State upon the subject of mechanics' liens, being remedial in their nature, are to be liberally construed in order to carry out the purpose of the legislature in their enactment. Where a mechanic, who, under the employment of a contractor, and with the knowledge of the owner, has performed labor upon the construction of a building, and, the account not being paid, takes all necessary steps, as provided by §§ 3193, 3195, 3201 and 3202 of the Revised Statutes, to fix the liability of the owner, and to obtain a lien upon the premises, and brings his ac

tion against the owner to recover the amount due, and have the same declared a lien, such account being less than the balance unpaid on the contract, such owner cannot be allowed to set off a claim against the contractor, not growing out of the contract, acquired by him after the labor was performed, although such claim was acquired before notice that the mechanic's demand had not been paid. Bullock v. Horn, S. C. Ohio, June 29, 1886; 7 N. East. Rep. 737.

25. MORTGAGE-Foreclosure-Sale-Palpable Error-Validity, how Affected-Surplus After Sale Tender-Burden of Proof.- When the deed of mortgage contains a palpable clerical error in the figures of the sum due, the mortgagee may, after default, foreclose, aud sell the property to satisfy the amount really due, without a previous reformation of the deed. The burden of proof is not upon the party claiming under a foreclosure of mortgage to show that the surplus over the amount due was, after sale, tendered the mortgagor. Damon v. Deeves, S. C. Mich. July 15, 1886; 29 N. W. Rep. 42.

26. NEGLIGENCE-Landlord and Tenant-Liability for Nuisance-Fall of Awning, Liability forLandlord and Tenant.-A landlord is not liable for the consequences of a nuisance in connection with his building, which is in the possession and control of his tenants, unless the nuisance occasioning the injury existed at the time the premises were demised, or the building was defectively constructed, or was in such a condition, at the time of the demise of the building, that it constituted a nuisance, or would be likely to become such in the ordinary uses for the purposes for which it was constructed. A landlord is not liable for an injury caused to a bystander by the fall of an awning belonging to his building, which is in the possession of tenants, if the fall of the awning was attributable to an improper and negligent use of the awning by the tenant in permitting crowds of people to go upon it, when the only purpose of the awning was as a protection from sun and rain, and when, but for such crowd upon it, it would not have fallen. Kalis v. Shattuck, S. C. Cal., May 25, 1886; 11 Pac. Rep. 346.

27.

Pleading-Injury to Servant - Master and Servant-Duty to Furnish Suitable ToolsYouth and Inexperience of Employe.-In an action against a railroad company for an injury to the plaintiff's eyes by a fragment of steel, struck off by him in working on an engine, with a cold-chisel, if the declaration fails to aver any fact tending to show that he was not rightfully put at the particular work, or that the cutting of steel with a coldchisel was not such work as an employe of the plaintiff's age and experience might be employed at, the declaration would be fatally defective on demurrer. It is the duty of the master to furnish his employe with suitable tools for the performance of the duties to which he may be assigned, and to give such instructions to a youthful and inexperienced employe as would enable him, with the exercise of ordinary care, to perform the duties of his employment with safety to himself. A declaration would be good on demurrer, which averred that the plaintiff, a youth of about 19 years of age, had never in fact been employed in the particular work in the doing of which the injury sued for was incurred, and was ignorant of the proper tools to perform the work with safety, was not instructed by the defendant as to the dan

ger of the work, nor furnished with suitable tools to do the work. Whitelaw v. Memphis, etc. R. R. Co., S. C. Tenn., June 5, 1886; 1 S. W. Rep. 37. 28. Pleading-Injury to Property Contributory Negligence-Municipal Corporations - SewersNotice of Defects-Wabash & Erie Canal-Use of Highways-Use of Private Property-Liability to Property Owners Who Make Connection With Sewer for their Private Benefit.-A complaint to recover for injuries to property caused by negligence must show that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. Where a municipal corporation itself constructs a sewer, it is bound to use ordinary care and skill, and is liable for injuries resulting from its negligence, without proof that it had notice of defects in the work or materials. The right of the public to construct sewers under the Wabash & Erie canal was not extinguished by the sale of the canal by the State. A municipal corporation may rightfully use highways for the purpose of constructing sewers. A city is liable for negligence in constructing and maintaining a sewer, although it is constructed in part on private property, and in order to obtain the right to make use of such property the municipal authorities were compelled to build the sewer according to the plans and specifications furnished by the owner of such property. A municipal corporation is liable for injuries arising from the negligent construction of a sewer to property owners who make connection with such sewer for their

private benefit. City of Fort Wayne v. Coombs, S. C. Ind. June 16, 1886; 7 N. East. Rep. 743.

29. RAILROAD COMPANIES - Fences-Negligence— Double Damage Act.—If a railroad company has, within six months, duly fenced its road, it is necessary to show some neglect on the part of the company in maintaining the fence, or that it had notice of its being out of repair, or that it had remained so long out of repair that want of knowledge could be imputed to the negligence of the company, in order to recover for injury to cattle under the double damage act. Townsley v. Mo. Pac. etc. Co., S. C. Mo. June 7, 1886: 1 S. W. Rep.*

15.

30. RAILROAD-Fire Caused by Defective SmokeStack-Question for Jury.-Plaintiff's barn took fire soon after the passing of three of defendant's engines. There was some evidence that the firescreens on two were in good order, but there was no proof given as to the condition of the third. Held, that it was by no means conclusive that the fire was caused by either of the two engines which it was claimed were in perfect order, and it was a question of fact for the jury to determine which engine caused the fire, and a non-suit was improperly granted. Seeley v. New York, etc. R. R. Co., N. Y. Ct. App., June 1, 1886; 7 N. East. Rep. 734. 31. RAILWAY COMPANIES-Liability as Warehouseman-Time Within Which Goods Must be Removed.-The consignee is allowed a reasonable time to remove the goods after they arrive at the place of destination, and if not present on their arrival, the company may deposit them in its depot or warehouse for safe keeping without additional charge until such reasonable time expires. Until the consignee has had a reasonable opportunity to remove the goods, the liability of the railroad company as a carrier continues; but on his failure to do so, the company is only responsible thereafter as a warehouseman or keeper for hire. Ala

& Tenn. Rivers R. R. Co. v. Kidd, 35 Ala. 209; S. & N. Ala. R. R. Co. v. Wood, 66 Ala. 67; Kennedy v. Mo. & Gir. R. R. Co., 74 Ala. 430; McGuire v. L. & N. R. R. Co. (Dec. Term, 1885,) 1 So. Law Times, 492. What length of time will be reasonable, must of necessity depend in a great measure upon the attendant facts and circumstances, which must be submitted to the jury under proper instructions from the court. It may be generally said, that in determining what constitutes a reasonable opportunity, the convenience or necessities of the consignee will not ordinarily be taken into consideration. The question is, has suitable time been allowed to a person, living in the vicinity of the place of delivery, to remove the goods in the ordinary course and in the usual hours of business; more prompt diligence being required, if the consignee has been informed of the shipment of the goods by receipt of a duplicate bill of lading or otherwise. Hutch. on Car. § 377. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Oden, S. C. Ala., Dec. Term, 1885-86.

32. SALE-Implied Warranty-Goods for Particular Purpose-Warranty-Recoupment of Damages.When specific chattles are purchased for a particular purpose understood by vendee and vendor, and the vendee has no opportunity to inspect them, there is an implied warranty, usually, that they shall be reasonably fit for that purpose. Where there is a warranty, express or implied, in the sale of goods, the vendee need not return, or offer to return, the goods in order to establish his right to recoup the damages he sustains by a breach of such warranty. Best v. Flint, S. C. Vt., July 19, 1886, 5 Atl. 192.

-

33. TRUST Resulting Trust Purchase - With Money of Third Party - Promise to DeviseLaches. Where funds of A. were used by M. in the purchase of real estate, with the implied consent of A., M. promising that at her death the property should be A.'s, and M. died, leaving a will in which the property was left to B., to whom she was indebted, on condition that he should pay to A. a certain sum, and A. was notified of the provisions of the will, but took no steps in the premises for 23 years, A. is to be presumed to have acquiesced in the provisions of the will, and cannot maintain a bill in equity to compel B. to convey to him the estate purchased by him. McGivney v. McGivney, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., June 30, 1886, 7. N. E. Rep. 721.

34. WILL-Bequest in Trust to Testator's Children and Descendants-Public Charity-Rule Against Perpetuities.-A bequest to trustees, their heirs and assigns, forever, in trust, "to appropriate such part of the principal and interest as they may deem best for the aid and support of those of my (the testator's) children, and their descendants, who may be destitute, and, in the opinion of the trustees, need such aid," will not admit of being construed as a gift to the testator's children and their descendants who might be living at the time of the testator's decease, or that of the last of his children. Such a bequest is not a public charity, and, being too remote, as tending to create a perpetuity, is to be deemed invalid and without effect. Kent v. Dunham, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., July 6, 1886, 7 N. E. Rep. 730.

36.

37.

Importunity - Instruction to Jury - Error. Where the validity of a will was involved, and the verdict of the jury was written upon the back of one of the judge's instructions as follows: "We, the jury, find this not to be the will of the testator, Samuel Bledsoe. D. B. DAILEY, Foreman;" held, that the verdict was sufficiently certain and respon sive to the issue. The fact that two of the jurymen separated from the others for a few moments after the cause had been submitted to them for a verdict, and before its rendition, will not vitiate the verdict, where it does not appear that there was any corrupt purpose upon the part of any one, or that during such separation the two jurymen were approached as to the case, or that anything occurred during such absence which influenced or produced the verdict. Undue influence, obtained by importunity, and which gave dominion over the will of the testator to such an extent as to destroy his free agency, will vitiate a writing, purporting to be a will, which was the product of such importunity or influence. If a testator has capacity to make a will, and is not unduly influenced, he may make as unequal a disposition of his property among his children as he pleases; and it is error to single such unequal distribution out from other evidence and to instruct especially as to that, thus giving it undue prominence and tending to lead the minds of the jury from the real issue of capacity or undue influence. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, Kentucky Ct. App., June 17, 1886, 1 S. W. Rep. 10.

Estate Less Than one of InheritanceAct of April 8, 1833.-Where a devise is that A. shall retain property devised by the will to B., and pay to the latter the interest thereof annually during his natural life, and that after B.'s death "his share" shall be "equally divided among his children, if he should have any," there is a sufficient indication of the testator's intention to give B. less than the fee, to satisfy the requirements of the act of April 8, 1833, which provides that by a devise without words of inheritance or of perpetuity the whole estate of the testator shall pass unless the contrary appear by a devise over or by words of limitation, or otherwise in the will. Under such a devise the only interest given to B. is a right to the income for life. McDevitt's Appeal, S. C. Penn., May 31, 1886, 22 Rep. 125.

General Power of Disposal to Devisee Accompanying a Life Estate-Circumstances Showing Intent to Give Power of Absolute Disposition -Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence of Condition of Property Admissible to Determine Extent of Power.-Where a power of disposal accompanies a bequest or devise of a life-estate, the power of disposal is only co-extensive with the estate which the devisee takes under the will, and means such disposal as a tenant for life could make, unless there are other words clearly indicating that a larger power was intended. Where the life-tenant is given a power of disposition for a certain purpose, which it would be impossible to accomplish by a sale of the life-estate, and which can be accomplished only by a disposal of the fee, the power must be held to be that which is necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. And where the life-estate is, in the main, in unimproved and unproductive realty, and the purpose is the support of the family, the power will be held to allow an absolute disposition. In interpreting such a power the court will look at the circumstances under which the devisor makes the will, as the state of

Answer.-Ohio has the following statute, passed May 11, 1878, and amended, March, 1882. Sec. 7014. Whoever assigns or transfers any claim for debt against a resident of this State, for the purpose of having the same collected by proceedings in attachment in courts outside of this State, or whoever, with intent to deprive a resident of this State of a right to have his personal earnings exempt from application to the payment of his debts, sends out of this State any claim for debt against such person for the purpose aforesaid, where the creditor and debtor and the person or corporation owing the money intended to be reached by such proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, shall be fined not more than fifty nor less than twenty dollars; and the person whose personal earnings are so attached shall have a right of action before any court of this State having jurisdiction, to recover the amount attached, and any costs paid by him in such attachment proceedings, either from the person so assigning, transferring, or sending such claim out of this State to be collected as aforesaid, or the person to whom such claim is assigned, transferred, or sent as aforesaid, or both, at the option of the person bringing such suit. The assignment, transfer, or sending of such claim to a person not a resident of this State, and the commencement of such proceedings in attachment, shall be considered prima facie evidence of a violation of this section. J. E. P.

Warren, Ohio.

The question is not answered because it is not shown whether the statute is constitutional or not There seems to be no ruling on that point. Ed. Cent L. J.

Query 34. [22 Cent. L. J. 287].—A. offers for sale to B. a horse for $100, on six months credit. B. accepts the offer, whereupon A. says: "Then you must give me your note for the amount due in six months." This B. declines to do-whereupon A. says "Well,

take the horse and you need not give the note,❞— whereupon B. says: "Well, I decline to take the horse." Is there any contract by which the parties can be held liable to each other. JAS. B. STUBBS.

Galveston, Tex.

Answer. To make a contract, the minds of the two parties must agree. When B. accepted A's offer, there was a contract, but A. withdrew his offer by insisting upon additional conditions. B. evidently did not try to hold A. on his original proposition, so the offer and acceptance were mutually withdrawn. After that, the minds of the two parties did not come together, for when A. renewed his offer, B. declined it. But the whole contract would be invalidated by the statute of frauds, which in this case would require both on acceptance and delivery of the property to make the contract binding. In this case there was no delivery. S. S. M.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

FEDERAL DECISIONS.-Cases argued and determined by the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of the United States. Comprising the opinions of those courts from the time of their organization, to the present date, together with extracts from the Opinions of the Court of Claims, and the Attorneys-General, and the Opinions of general impatienc of the Territorial courts. Arranged by William G. Myer, Author of an Index to the United States Supreme Court Reports; also Indexes to the Reports of Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Missouri, and Tennessee, a Digest of the Texas Reports, and local works on Pleading and Practice. Vol. XIV. Dedication-Equitable Suits. St. Louis, Mo: The Gilbert Book Company, 1886.

The learned editors and enterprising publishers of this valuble collection are pushing along their work bravely and energetically. Within the last four

months we have had occasion to notice the issuance of four volumes of the series and the fifth now before us is in no respect inferior to its predecessors. Considering the subjects included in it, it is perhaps more important than any of them. Four hundred and thirty two pages are devoted to Domestic Relations, than. which no more important and all-pervading topic is to be found in the Law. The other subjects to which this volume is devoted, are, Dedication, Domicile, Duress, Easements, Elections and Eminent Domain, all, little less important than which occupies more than half the book. This volume is fully up to the standard of the general work in editorial ability and acumen, as well as mechanical execution, and we could give it no higher praise.

We learn that Vol. XV will soon be issued, and the remaining volumes of the series will follow in rapid succession. When the thirty volumes which it is understood will constitute the whole work, shall have been placed before the public, they will, in our judgment, form the most valuble and important compilation of living law within the same compass, now extant in the English language.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

GOOD ADVICE.-The late Thomas Corwin of Ohio, once gave this wholesome advice to a law-student: "After all, you must have one thing at command, without which all books are useless-a mind that hungers and thirsts after truth. This last and greatest requisite you can command if you will. If you have it,

you have one of the rarest attributes in the character of our young men.

"Young men seem to me not to know that they have work to do. It is one of the most discouraging signs of our times, that young men live in the habitual idea that they are to be fed with a pap-spoon. They will learn, when it may be too late, that God has sent just one message to every man and woman which He has created or will create. It is short, simple, and can not be misunderstood:

"Know thy work, and do it.""

RETORT COURTEOUS.—Exciting as are the political contests of these days, they are mild in comparison with those which seventy-five years ago arrayed Federalists and Democrats against each other.

The War of 1812 was strongly favored by the Democrats, and as strongly opposed by the Federalists. One of the incidents of the war was the famous Hartford Convention, which the Democrats denounced as "infamous."

Roger Minot Sherman and Calvin Goddard, who had been members of the Convention, were one day talk ing with Judge Peters, a strong Democrat, and one of the United States District judges. The conversation having drifted on the subject of the Convention, Judge Peters said, half facetiously and half in earnest:

"Well, gentlemen, if you had been tried before me for that matter, I would have hanged you both, not only without law and evidence, but, if need be, against both."

"That only proves your honor's remarkable impartiality," answered Sherman, making a low bow-"that you would decide our case on the same principle that you do the greater part of the cases which come before you."

ACCENT.-Homer nods, and even the most skilful of jury lawyers may err through excess of zeal. Sir James Scarlett was noted for his tact in cross-examining a witness; but occasionally he would get a fall, from not looking ahead and seeing where he was going.

Once a boy whom he was examining said, "I suppose."

"Suppose!" interrupted Scarlett, "you have no business to suppose anything."

The examination went on, and to a question of Scarlett's the boy answered, "I don't know."

"Don't know!" rejoined the irritated lawyer, "perhaps you can't even suppose?"

"I suppose I have no business to suppose anything,” replied the boy, amid the laughter of court and bar.

But the great advocate's severest "tumble" was while examining a witness named Tom Cooke. One music publisher had sued another for violating his copyright of an arrangement of the song, "The Fine Old English Gentleman." Said Scarlett, in cross-ex amining Cooke.

"Now, sir, you say that the two melodies are the same, but different. What do you mean by that?"

"I said that the notes in the two copies were alike,” answered Cooke, "but with a different accent, the one being in common time, the other in six-eight time; and consequently, the position of the accented notes was different."

"Now, sir, don't beat about the bush, but explain to the jury the meaning of what you call accent," said Scarlett, in his roughest style.

The lawyer's manner put the witness on his mettle, and he answered.

"Accent in music is a certain stress laid upon a particular note, in the same manner as you would lay a stress upon any given word for the purpose of being better understood.

"Thus, If I were to say, 'You are an ass,' it rests on ass; but if I were to say, 'You are an ass, it rests on you, Sir James."

The shouts of laughter which followed this explanation caused Sir James to become scarlet in more than name, and in a great huff he said,"The witness may go down."