Prayers, and praises, and repentance for fins paft, are acts of devotion, which nature pretends to inftruct and direct us in. But why does fhe teach us to pray, to praife, or to repent, but that the esteems one to be the proper method of expreffing our wants, the other of expreffing our gratitude, and the third of making atonement for iniquity and offences against God? In all these acts reference is had to the overruling power of the Almighty; and they amount to this confeffion, that the upfhot of all religion is to please God in order to make ourfelves happy.

This will fhew us what muft neceffarily be understood by any perfon's, or by any religion's, having the words of eternal life: for, fince eternal life can only be had by pleafing God, no perfon, no religion, can be faid to have the words of eternal life upon any other account, than because it teaches and enables us fo far at least to please God, as to obtain eternal life from him.

If we confider God as the ruler of this world as well as of the next, religion indeed will be as neceffary a means of obtaining the bleffings of this life, as of that which is to come. But this will make no alteration in the nature of religion: for, if the bleffings of this life are the gift of God, they must be obtained by pleafing God; and the fame fervices must entitle us to the bleffings of this life and of the next, unless you can fuppofe that there are different ways of pleafing God; one way to please him, in order to obtain the bleffings of this world; and another, in order to obtain the bleffings of heaven.

From this account of the nature of religion, that it is the knowledge of pleafing God, and ferving him acceptably, (I speak of religion now confidered only as a rule,) there are some confequences which naturally follow, that may be of great fervice to us in directing us in our choice of religion.

First then; Since it is the perfection of religion to inftruct us how to please God; and fince to please God, and to act according to the will of God, are but one and the fame thing; it neceffarily follows, that must be the moft perfect religion, which does moft perfectly inftruct us in the knowledge of the will of God. Allow then Nature to have all the advantages that ever the greatest patrons of natural religion laid claim to on her behalf; allow Reason to be as clear, as uncorrupted, as unprejudiced, as even our fondest wishes would make it; yet ftill it can never be fuppofed, that Nature and Reafon, in all their glory, can be able to know the will of God fo well as he himself knows it and therefore, fhould God ever make a declaration of his will, that declaration muft, according to the nature and neceffity of the thing, be a more perfect rule for religion, than reafon and nature can poffibly furnish us with. Had we the wisdom and reafon of cherubims and feraphims to direct us in the worship and service of our Maker, nevertheless it would be our highest wisdom, as it is theirs, to fubmit to his laws, that is, to the declarations of his will.

Secondly; From hence it appears, how extremely wrong it is to compare natural religion and revelation together, in order to inquire which is

preferable; for it is neither more nor less than inquiring, whether we know God's will better than he himself knows it. Falfe revelations are no revelations; and therefore to prefer natural religion before fuch pretended revelations, is only to reject a forgery but to suppose that there is, or may be, a true revelation, and yet to say that natural religion is a better guide, is to fay that we are wifer than God, and know better how to please him without his directions than with them. Upon this ftate of the cafe then, a revelation must be entirely rejected as a forgery, or entirely fubmitted to; and the only debate between natural religion and revelation must be, whether we really have a revelation, or no; and not whether revelation or nature be, in the nature of things, the beft and fureft foundation of religion: which difpute but ill becomes our condition, and is a vain attempt to exalt ourselves and our own reafon above every thing that is called God.

Since then revelation, confidered as fuch, must needs be the fureft guide in religion, every reasonable man is bound to confider the pretenfions of revelation, when offered to him; for no man can justify himself in relying merely on natural religion, till he has fatisfied himself that no better directions are to be had. For, fince it is the business of religion to please God, is it not a very natural and a very reasonable inquiry to make, whether God has any where declared what will please him? at leaft, it is reasonable when we are called to this inquiry, by having a revelation tendered to us, fupported by fuch evidence, which, though it may

be easily rejected without reafon, yet to reason will ever approve itself.

But the inquiry into the evidence for any particular revelation is excluded by those who argue against all revelation a priori, as being inconfiftent with the wisdom of God. What they fay amounts to this; That God, having given us reason, has bound us to obey the dictates of reason, and tied himfelf down to judge us by that rule, and that only to suppose otherwise, they imagine, would be to maintain that God gave us an imperfect rule at first, and which wanted to be mended; a thing, they imagine, inconfiftent with his wifdom: and, the rule of reafon being fufficient, all revelation, they judge, must be useless and impertinent, and confequently can never derive itself from God. But, as it is too apparent to be denied, that reason. and natural religion never did in any age univerfally prevail; to help out the argument, it is farther fuppofed, that whatever happens in the world is agreeable to the original defign of God, and confequently, that those who have leaft of reafon and natural religion are in the ftate for which God defigned them; and, if so, it is abfurd to suppose a revelation fhould be given, to take men out of that state in which God originally defigned to place them.

This is the fum of the argument against revelation a priori: to confider it particularly will take more time than can be allowed: but in brief we may obferve,

1. That to argue, from the perfection of human reason, that we are difcharged from receiving any

new laws from God, is inconfiftent with as clear a principle of reason as any whatever, and which ne-, ceffarily arifes from the relation between God and man; which is, that the creature is bound to obey the Creator, in which way foever his will is made known to him and this furely is true with refpect, to the highest order of beings, as well as to the loweft; for this plea, now made for human reason, would be presumptuous in the mouth of an angel, and inconfiftent with the fubjection he owes to God.

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2. As to the perfection of human reason, it cannot be, nor, I suppose, will it be maintained, that human reason is abfolutely perfect; and therefore the meaning muft be, that reafon is relatively perfect, confidered as the rule of our obedience. But this is true only upon fuppofition that reafon is the only rule of our obedience; for, if there be any: other rule befides, mere reason cannot be the perfect rule of our obedience: and therefore this argument is really begging the thing in queftion; for it supposes there is no other rule but reason, which is the thing not to be fuppofed, but to be proved. As much may be faid for every law, as is faid in this cafe for human reason: every law, being the only law in the cafe, is a perfect rule for the fubject's obedience, because the fubject is bound to no more than the law requires: but, if the law be amended and enlarged by the fame authority that made it, it is no longer a perfect rule of obedience; but, to make it fuch, it must be taken jointly with the corrections and enlargements made by the proper authority.