4

though no excuse, that they had no more apprehension of an attack from Early than from Canada."

It was the known absence of Sheridan, and the equally known supposed security of his army, that Early took advantage of to attack it by surprise. Nor were measures for such an end ever more wisely and promptly adopted than by the Confederate General on this occasion. Separating his army into two bodies, so as to strike our right and left wings at the same moment, he made his approach, not by the main road, but over rough mountain passes, where his men had to hold on to bushes to preserve their standing, and twice to ford the Shenandoah. That no noise might be made, his soldiers were required to leave their canteens in camp, lest their striking against their guns should create an alarm among the Union forces. As the enemy drew near, a rustling as of the trampling of many feet in the underbrush was heard by our pickets, and the news sent to head-quarters. A good look-out was ordered, but no reconnoiterers were sent out. At one hour before dawn, both bodies of Early's command were in their desired places, both our wings being flanked, while the muskets of many of our soldiers were unloaded, and all our men, with the exception of those on duty, were resting in deep slumber. As soon as the dawning light revealed the distant hill-tops, volleys of musketry on our flanks and in our rear startled the sleepers. The next moment, with multitudinous yells peculiar to the Confederate soldiery, Early's forces leaped into our trenches, and charged into our camps. In a few minutes after the first dawn, Crook's entire command was a mingled mass, flying they knew not whither.

The 19th corps made a short and bloody resistance, but was soon driven back in confusion. The 6th, finding resistance vain, retreated in good order. The victory was with the Confederates, with the loss on our part of quite 1,200 prisoners, our camps, defences, and twenty-four guns. Had Early's army been in a condition to follow up his advantage, our defeat would have been complete and most disastrous. His men, however, were too weary, hungry, and thirsty, and eager for plunder, to enable him to reap the full results of his easy victory. Hence the pursuit was not rapid, and

our broken columns at length began to re-form behind Wright's unbroken ranks.

At 10 a.m. Sheridan, who had slept at Winchester, on his return to his army, was, after his famous ride, at the front. Just at this time Wright had halted, and the pressure of Early had ceased to be severe. As soon as our broken forces could be rallied and re-formed, our army took the offensive, and the Confederates, in their turn, fled from the field, leaving in our hands quite as many prisoners as they had taken from us, and twenty-three of their own guns in addition to the twenty-four which we had previously lost, and then recovered. Such is the difference which the presence or absence of a single individual often makes upon the battle-field. Our loss in this double battle was quite 3,000 men, and that of the Confederates considerably larger. With this battle, the campaign in the Shenandoah, and until next spring throughout the sphere of the Army of the Potomac, ended. For about six months from this time, October 18th, "all was quiet on the Potomac," in the trenches before Petersburg and Richmond, in Washington, and in the States which had been three times invaded by the Confederate armies. This unheard-of quietude of more than 1,000,000 of armed men, the small portion under Sherman and Thomas, and under Pleasanton in Missouri, excepted, will be the subject of remark in future portions of this treatise. All that we need to say here is that all this needless and useless slaughter and desolation in connection with the Army of the Shenandoah was wholly occasioned by General Grant's vicious plan, and more vicious conduct, of the campaign in Virginia in the year 1864.

CHAPTER XXVII.

SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

THE object of this history, as the reader is aware, is a peculiar and special one-an exposition of the leading facts of this war from one single standpoint, its military aspect. The object of the work is to subject each campaign to a most rigid and impartial criticism, that its excellences, errors, and blunders may be distinctly understood; my fixed aim being to enable my countrymen to know the past as it was, to comprehend fully and truly the real merits and demerits of the commanders of our armies, and the character of the soldiery whom they led and so mercilessly slaughtered; and this as a means to a still higher end that the errors and blunders of the past may never be repeated in future. We are conscious of no sentiment in regard to General Sherman, or any other individual that ever held command in our armies, that would conceal or eclipse one of his excellences, or hide, diminish, or magnify in public estimation one of his defects, our object being criticism in that form which, in all future time, will stand the test of criticism. General Sherman actually accomplished reveals him as a military man of whom our nation has no reason to be ashamed. While we freely admit and affirm this, we are also most fully persuaded that there were errors in the plan of his compaigns, and blunders in their conduct, which no future commander should copy. Let us advance to a direct consideration of the subject before us.

What

According to his own statements, he had at his disposal an available force amounting to upwards of 180,000

men, all the forces in his department amounting to upwards of 340,000. The forces by which he was directly opposed, no well-informed individual estimates at over 55,000 men. When Generals Grant and Sherman were assigned to their respective commands, they met at Nashville, and passed in company together to Louisville. During this interval, the plan of their respective campaigns was definitely settled. One fixed element of the plan was, as we have already stated, that both Generals should move at the same time, and that their campaigns should not be opened until the month of May. The openly avowed reason for this simultaneous movement was to prevent General Johnston dividing his little army of 55,000 men, and reinforcing General Lee, on the one hand, and General Lee dividing his small force of 70,000, and reinforcing General Johnston, on the other, and this when it was well known that these two little armies were from 600 to 1,000 miles distant from each other, and each commander of the same was confronted by forces quite three times larger than his own, and much more numerous than both the Confederate armies united. Here, undeniably, was "a step from the sublime to the ridiculous."

Neglected opportunity.

When General Sherman moved out, May 6th, from Chattanooga, what did he find in his immediate front? At Dalton, about thirty miles from the former place, at the junction of the railroads from Chattanooga and Knoxville to Atlanta, he encountered General Johnston in a position strong in itself, and very strongly fortified. At Resaca, about fifteen miles farther on, upon the Oostenaula river, in a still stronger and more formidably fortified position, he encountered the Confederate army a second time. After the retreat of General Bragg, General Hooker, with only 10,000 men, captured Dalton, and would have held it but for the fact that he was positively commanded to return to Chattanooga. From the latter part of November, 1863, to the 6th May, 1864, our army, quite 100.000 strong, lay in perfect idleness at Chattanooga, allowing General Johnston to advance with

his little army into our immediate presence, and there, on our known and predetermined route to Atlanta, raise up, at his leisure, the formidable fortifications above designated, and that without the remotest attempt on our part to disturb his operations. What excuse, but the baldest ignorance of what is essential to the proper conduct of a great campaign, can be offered for such neglect? Any General well instructed in the science of war, and half awake to his duties as the commander of a great army, would, if he had determined to advance no farther until the May following, have promptly seized Dalton and Resaca both, and prepared the latter as his advanced depôt of supplies. The location of this place upon the river designated rendered it most obviously the proper position for the purpose named, and for opening the spring campaign. A correspondent in our army in Western Virginia, when McClellan was in command there, made this statement, namely, "that the fixed policy of our commander seemed to be this, to suffer the enemy to approach as near to us as he chose, select his position, and at his leisure fortify it to his own full satisfaction. Then our commander would set his wits to work to dislodge the enemy.' This seems to have been the equally fixed policy of our General in command at Chattanooga.

The campaign as it should have been conducted.

The advance of General Sherman from Chattanooga to Atlanta, the time spent in capturing the latter place included, occupied just four months, and those, the last three especially, the worst of the year, the three months of summer, and was attended, as we have already stated, with the loss of upwards of 40,000 men, almost as many as General Johnston had in his army. We now lay down this proposition, the validity of which we expect to render demonstrably evident, to wit, that this campaign ought not to have been, at the farthest, of more than four weeks' continuance, and ought not, by any means, to have been attended with the loss of 5,000 men on our part. History furnished any number of precedents from which our commander might have drawn a proper plan for the conduct of his campaign. Among these precedents, we specify but one, the famous