Same-Same-Same.-Whether the plaintiff can recover any more out of the proceeds of the policies than the amount of premiums thereon

paid, quaere.

Holmes v. Davenport et al. (N. Y. S. C.), 14 New York Supplement (June 25, 1891), p. 738.

Policy-Paid-up Insurance-Premium Notes.-Under a contract of life insurance which provided that if the assured, after the payment of four annual premiums, desired to dispose of his policy to the company, the company would pay to him the equitable value either in cash, or issue to him a paid-up policy, the insured having paid more than four annual premiums is entitled to the cash value of his policy estimated upon the basis of his cash payments, without reference to the notes which he was required by the terms of the policy to execute, and did execute each year. As these notes were simply liens upon the policy to be deducted from the amount to be paid when the assured died, they are not to be considered in estimating the equitable value of the policy, and the company can not plead them as a counter-claim.

Contract-Canvassing Literature.-Where an insurance company sends out by its soliciting agents a pamphlet making representations as to the plans upon which it insures, such pamphlet is to be regarded as part of the contract of insurance entered into upon the faith of the representations contained therein, and is to be considered in connection with the policy in determining what the contract was.

Statute of Limitation--Construction.-Although this action by the assured to recover the equitable value of his policy was not brought for fourteen years after he ceased to pay and the company forfeited the policy, it is not barred by limitation. The amount to which the insured was entitled was held by the company in trust for him, and his cause of action did not accrue until demand and refusal. Moreover, the company concedes its liability, and denies merely that it is liable to the amount claimed.

Value of Policy.-As the insured had paid to the company $640, and the company had used this money fourteen years, the sum of $449 fixed by the chancellor as the amount which, upon equitable principles, the company should pay to the insured, was not too much.

Southern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hodge (Ky. Superior Ct.), 13 Kentucky Law Reporter (July 1, 1891), p. 42.

Proceeds of Policy-Execution.-Creditors of a widow may subject to their claims the proceeds of a policy of insurance on the life of her husband, in her hands; and she is guilty of contempt in disposing of them in violation of an injunction order in supplemental proceedings. Disapproving Leonard v. Clinton, 26 Hun, 288; and Austin v. McLaurin, 1 N. Y. Sup. 209; and following Crosby v. Stephan, 32 Hun, 478.

Millington v. Fox (Oneida Co. Ct. ), 13 New York Supplement (April 2, 1891), p. 334.

Assignment-Public Policy.—A policy of insurance on the life of a married woman was assigned by her and her husband to one of the husband's creditors, and was assigned by such creditor to one having no insurable interest in the woman's life. Held, that such second assignee acquired no interest by such assignment, it being contrary to public policy that any one should have an insurance on the life of another in whose life he had no insurable interest.

Same-Same-Agreement to Pay Premiums.-The second assignee having no interest in the policy, an agreement to pay the premiums for his benefit can not be enforced.

Kessler v. Kuhns (Ind. App. C.), 27 Northeastern Reporter (July 10, 1891), p. 980.

Policy-Death of Beneficiary-Assignment of Policy-Rights of Parties. By an endowment policy the company promised "and agreed to and with the said assured well and truly to pay, or cause to be paid, the said sum assured at the date aforesaid, or to his executors, administrators, or assigns, in ninety days after the death of the said Geo. H. Elmer, if death occurs prior to his attaining the age of fifty five years. In case of the death of George H. Elmer before attaining the age of fifty-five years, this policy shall be payable to Anna Elmer, wife of said George H. Elmer." Mrs. Elmer died in February, 1889, intesAfter the death of his wife Elmer assigned the policy to plaintiff, and subsequently died before attaining the age of fifty-five years. In an action between the assignee and the representative of the wife, held, that the assignee was entitled to the proceeds of the policy.

tate.

Lambertson v. Bogart (Minn. S. C.),[49 Northwestern Reporter (July 25, 1891), p. 230.

Right of Insolvent to Insure.—An insolvent debtor may insure his life in a reasonable sum for the benefit of his infant children, who are dependent upon him for support, and his creditors can not complain, in the absence of any intention upon his part to defraud.

Same.--An insolvent father insured his life for the benefit of his only child, who was dependent upon him for a support, and in order that he might be able to save enough of his earnings to pay the premiums, which amounted to $190 per year, he sent the child to his grandfather, who provided for him without charge. In this action by antecedent creditors of the father to subject the proceeds of the insurance to the extent of the premiums paid, held, that as the insurance was not unreasonable in amount, and as there was no intent to defraud, creditors can not complain.

Goodpaster, Grd'n, v. Conner et al. (Ky. Superior Ct.), 13 Kentucky Law Reporter (August 1, 1891), p. 138. Not reported in full.

Statute-Rebate-Indictment.-The true construction of the Act Me. 1889, c. 281, is to require life insurance companies to give equal terms to those persons whom it insures that are of the same class, and to stipulate the terms of the insurance in their policies, and to accord to none any other.

Same-Same-Same.-The defendant was indicted for allowing a rebate on a policy. The indictment failed to state that such rebate was not stipulated for in the policy. Held, that in order to state an offense the indictment should have negatived the fact that such rebate was stipulated for in the policy.

State v. Schwartzschild (Me. S. J. C.), 22 Atlantic Reporter (July 22, 1891), p. 164; 20 Insurance Law Journal, 861.

Insurance by Creditor--Insurable Interest-Evidence.-In an action on a policy for $10,000 taken by a creditor upon the life of his debtor, it appeared that shortly before the policy was issued the debtor had made an unqualified admission of an existing indebtedness of between $5,000 and $6,000 in a written request for further advances. The creditor had promised to make advances up to $10,000, although not bound by written contract do so. The facts were fully stated in the application, and the insurer continued to receive the premiums for several years up to the death of the insured, during which the creditor, on the faith of the policy, made advances, which with the original debt and interest, exceeded the amount of the policy. Held, that the evidence showed an insurable interest in the creditor sufficient to sustain a verdict for $10,000, although at the date of the policy his interest did not amount to that sum.

Action by Assignee of Creditor-Defense.-In an action for the insurance by one to whom the creditor had assigned the policy as collateral security for his own debt, it is immaterial, as between the assignee and the company, that, after loss, the creditor, prior to his death, had paid the debt, since the question can only arise between the assignee and the heirs or personal representatives of the creditor.

Practice-Pleading-Statute of Limitations.-Where the complaint alleges that the insured became indebted to the beneficiary more than four years prior to the date of the policy, a defense that the beneficiary had no insurable interest because the debt was barred by the statute of limitations must be raised by plea, and not by demurrer, since the averment of indebtedness is not inconsistent with the fact of an original promise in writing to pay at a date within four years.

Same-Same-Presumption of Law.-An averment that the bene

ficiary agreed to make further advances to the insured, for which the policy was to stand as security, will be presumed, on general demurrer, to imply that the agreement was written, and hence not void under the statute of frauds.

Insurable Interest-Evidence.-Where a creditor takes a policy on his debtor's life for a sum exceeding his debt, a binding agreement to make further advances on demand to the full amount of the policy gives him an additional insurable interest.

Same-Policy "Subject to Proof.”—A provision in a policy payable to one's assigns, providing that a claim "by an assignee shall be subject to proof of interest," does not apply to one who holds it as security for debt, since the assignee is a mere trustee for the debtor, and must account for any surplus proceeds after paying the debt, and it is not necessary for such assignee to allege that he has an insurable interest in the life of the insured.

Statute-Limitation-Construction.-Code Civil Proc. Cal., 339, providing that actions on written contracts executed out of the state are barred in two years, does not apply to an action on an insurance policy which provides that it shall not be operative until countersigned by the general agent of the insurer in California, and which was countersigned in the latter state after being signed in Connecticut by the insurer.

Curtis v. Etna Life Ins. Co. (Cal. S. C.), 27 Pacific Reporter (August 20, 1891), p. 211.

MARINE INSURANCE.

Policy-Construction-New York Harbor.-Plaintiff held an open policy, accompanied by a book to contain the risks proposed and accepted. A proposal, instead of stating that a boat was to go from Brooklyn to Tarrytown, contained the words: "New York Harbor," under the headings "from" and "to." The boat sunk on a bar at Tarrytown. Held, that Tarrytown was within New York Harbor within the meaning of that term as between these parties, and that the loss was covered by the policy.

Same-Instruction.-The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover though the contract did not name a definite place for the delivery of the cargo. Distinguishing Chadney v. Guion, 97 N. Y.

333.

Petrie v. Phenix Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 32 New York State Reporter (Sept., 1890), p. 965; 11 New York Supplement, 188.

Policy-Damage to Cargo-Proximate Cause.-Goods were insured against damage consequent on collision. The ship in which they were shipped came in collision with another ship, and was thereby damaged, so as to render it necessary for her to go into port for repairs. For the purpose of such repairs it was necessary to discharge a portion of the goods insured. When the repairs were completed the goods were reshipped, and the ship proceeded to her destination. On arrival it was found that the goods, being of a perishable nature, had been damaged by the handling necessary to their discharge and reshipment, and by the delay. In an action to recover for the damage to the goods: Held, that the discharge and reshipment, and consequent delay were the proximate cause of the loss, and not the collision; and that the plaintiffs could not recover.

Pink et al. v. Fleming (C. A. Eng.), 25 Queens' Bench Division Law Reports (Sept. 1, 1890), p. 396.

Policy-"Free from Partial Loss"-Construction.-The plaintiff contended that the risk had been terminated before reaching port, by a constructive total loss and abandonment. It was agreed that there had been a loss of over fifty per cent. of the value of the cargo, and the jury found that there had been an abandonment to the insurer on ac