$337.50. This is an action to recover of the defendants thirty per cent. of this amount paid in cancelling the policies. Held, that the defendants were, under the terms of the contract, liable to plaintiffs for thirty per cent. of the returned premiums. (NOTE.-The fact that the defendants had left the employ of plaintiff, and were engaged as agents of a rival company, and had induced H. & Co. to cancel their policies with plaintiff and insure with such rival company, was not deemed by the court of any importance in the decision of the case.-ED.) American Steam Boiler Ins. Co. v. Anderson et al. (N. Y. City S. C.), 6 New York Supplement (August 15, 1889), p. 507. Statute "Retaliatory Law"-Construction.-Rev. St. Ill., 1874, sec. 29, provides that whenever the existing or future laws of any state shall require of insurance companies incorporated under the laws of Illinois, and having agencies in such other state, any deposit, or the payment of any tax, license, fee, etc., greater than the amount required for such purpose of similar companies by the then existing laws of Illinois, then all companies of such state establishing or having an established agency in Illinois shall be required to pay to the auditor for taxes, license fees, etc., an amount equal to the amount required by the laws of such other state. Held, that this section became operative upon the enactment by the other state of the law with the additional requirements, and it is immaterial that there is no Illinois company doing business in such other state. Germania Ins. Co. v. Swigert, Auditor (Ill. S. C.), 21 Northeastern Reporter (June 28, 1889), p. 530. DIGEST OF Insurance Cases EMBRACING THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME AND CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE OF THE VARIOUS STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, REFERENCE TO ANNOTATED INSURANCE CASES AND LEADING ARTICLES IN LAW JOURNALS ON INSURANCE. VOL. III FOR THE YEAR ENDING OCTOBER 31, 1890. BY JOHN A. FINCH, OF THE INDIANAPOLIS BAR. INDIANAPOLIS: THE ROUGH NOTES COMPANY, PUBLISHERS. ACCIDENT INSURANCE. Policy-"External, Violent and Accidental Means "-Evidence. -In an action on an accident policy, testimony of physicians that the insured bore upon his back marks of extreme violence, apparently recently inflicted, and that his injuries produced his death, is prima facie evidence of death resulting from bodily injuries "through external, violent and accidental means." Same-Indorsements-Defense--Presumptions of Law.-There is no presumption that the injuries which it is claimed caused the death of the insured resulted from any of the causes not covered by the policy, as specified in the "agreements and conditions indorsed on it." The stipulations therein are not conditions precedent, and are not inserted in the body of the policy. They are separate provisos qualifying the general words in the policy; and in such case if anything contained in the provisos will defeat the action, it is matter of defense. Accident--Presumption.-Where it is claimed that the injuries were self-inflicted, or were caused by the negligence of the insured, until such self-infliction or negligence should be proved the presumption of accident will prevail. Cronkhite v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 43 Northwestern Reporter (December 7, 1889), p. 731. Policy--"Obvious Risk of Injury."-The policy excepted from the risk insured against accidents happening "by exposure of the insured to obvious risk of injury." The insured met his death while attempting, in broad daylight, to cross the main-line of a railway in front of an approaching train, by which he was run over and killed. There was no evidence that he was short-sighted or deaf. At the place where the accident happened there was no station or proper crossing; and there was no obstruction to prevent a person about to cross from seeing an approaching train. There was no ground for imputing negligence to the servants of the railway company. Held, that the risk incurred by the insured being one which was either obvious to him, or would have been obvious to him if he had been paying reasonable attention to what he was doing, the case came within the exception of the policy. Cornish v. Accident Ins. Co. (Eng. C. A.-Q. B. Div.), 23 Queen's Bench Division-Law Reports (November 1, 1889), p. 453. L Policy—“ Voluntary Exposure"-Construction.—In an action on an accident policy which does not cover "death or disability resulting from voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger" where it appears that the insured, in order to escape police officers at the door of the room where he was, lowered himself from the window by a piece of bed ticking, which broke and let him fall, causing his death, it is proper to instruct the jury to find for the defendant. Shaffer v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Ill. S. C.), 22 Northeastern Reporter (December 6, 1889), p. 589. Policy-Cause of Death-Disease Accelerated by Accident.—A person insured his life for £1,000 with an accident insurance company. The policy provided that to recover under it, an accident must be the direct cause of the death, and that within three months, and provided that the company would not be liable for death arising from natural disease, although accelerated by accident. The insured was thrown from a cart and died within three months. After proof, from which it appeared that the insured had for years suffered from kidney disease, that he was free from active symptoms of that disease when he met with the accident, and that the disease had again shown itself five weeks after the accident, held, that death was caused by kidney disease accelerated by the accident, and, therefore, the company is not liable. Anderson et al. v. Scottish Accident Ins. Co. (Scotland), 27 Scottish Law Reporter (November 13, 1889), p. 20. Policy--Riding on Platform-Exposure to Unnecessary Danger. -The policy provided that "no claim for insurance shall be made when death or injury may have happened in consequence of exposure to unnecessary danger, hazard, or perilous adventure," and that "standing, riding, or being upon the platform of moving railway coaches * while the same is in motion, are hazards not contemplated by the contract." The insured met his death by falling from the platform of one of the cars of a railway company while riding on the platform, or while passing from one car to another. Held, (1) that the clause of the policy excluded death while riding on the platform, but not while passing from one car to another; and (2) that passing from one car to another was "exposure to unnecessary danger," avoiding the insurance. Sautelle v. Railway Passengers Assurance Co. (U. S. C. C.), 18 Insurance Law Journal (November, 1889), p. 892. Application-Mistake of Agent-Estoppel.-Where the defendant's agent, in filling up the application, deceased merely giving him the year in which he was born, made a miscalculation, and wrote down the wrong age, there was no misrepresentation as to age on the part of the deceased. (With note.) Same-Occupation.-Deceased stated that his occupation was that of a "livery stable proprietor (not worker)," and his duties as such as were required of him in that occupation." The evidence showed that he |