Lloyd covers barratry of the mariners, but not of the master, when the master is a part owner of the vessel.

Action on Policy-Complaint-Matter of Defense. In a suit upon such a policy, it is not necessary to negative in the declaration the limitation clause, which exonerates the subscribers from liability beyond the contributed capital paid in and the undivided premiums. That is a matter to be used in defense.

Seaworthiness-Evidence-Selection of Mate.-As bearing upon the seaworthiness of a vessel engaged in the coast wise trade, it is competent for the master to testify, in relation to the selection of his mate, where his discretion has been disputed, that, "I had every reason to suppose the man was sufficient for a coastwise mate. I believed at the time he was capable."

Barratry of Co-Owner-Forfeiture.-The master of a ship, who is part owner, may be guilty of barratry toward his co-owners, so as to avoid a policy of insurance, written in their favor, that does not cover the risk of barratry of the master.

Marine Policy-Negligence.-A marine policy covers negligence of the master and mariners.

Verdiet-Evidence-Condition of Master.-A verdict will not be disturbed when the evidence sustains it, and shows that the stranding of a vessel did not result from the barratrous acts of the master, but rather from his irresponsible condition, occasioned from temporary insanity, resulting from exposure, potent drugs, loss of sleep, or excessive drinking of liquors, or by all of them combined.

Conduct of Mate.-The conduct of the mate in not assuming charge of the vessel when the master thus became incapacitated is excusable on the ground of erroneous judgment of his duty.

Same-Barratry-Semble, That barratry of the mate, upon whom the command of the ship devolves by the incapacity of the master during a voyage, will not avoid insurance covering barratry of mariners but not that of the master.

Statement by Master-Evidence. The statements of the master as he was about to go below at the end of a storm, giving his reason therefor, are admissible as a part of his act, in relinquishing command of the deck for the time being.

Proper Navigation-Evidence.-The testimony of an experienced seaman relative to proper measures which should be taken to prevent stranding, is competent as bearing upon the proper navigation of a vessel, a question wholly for the jury to consider.

Insanity-Physician as Witness.-The opinion of physician, called

as an expert, who has not made a special study of mental diseases, may be excluded in questions of insanity.

Hutchins v. Ford (Me. S. J. C.), 19 Atlantic Reporter (June 11, 1890), p. 832; 19 Insurance Law Journal (July, 1890), p. 589.

Insurable Interest-Charterer.--One in possession of a vessel under a written contract with the owners, which provides that he shall man and run her for a commission, and hold her as security for his disbursements, has an insurable interest.

Seaworthiness-Evidence.-A vessel made a voyage from New Orieans to Frenchman's Harbor, where there was no opportunity to make repairs, took on a load, started back, and almost immediately sprung a leak and was lost, without encountering any sea peril. Held, That the evidence showed that the vessel was not seaworthy.

Policy--" Sea Peril."--Encountering heavy seas is not a sea peril within the meaning of a policy of marine insurance.

The Gulnare (U. S. C. C.), 42 Federal Reporter (Sept. 16, 1890), p. 861. Conflict in Evidence-Jury.- Where, upon a question of fact, there is a conflict in the evidence, a non-suit is error, as the question must be submitted to the jury.

Proximate Cause-Rule of Law.-The fire was the direct cause of the loss; and, in marine insurance, in the absence of fraud, the law looks only to the proximate cause of the loss in determining whether it was caused by a peril insured against.

Singleton v. Phenix Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 32 New York State Reporter (Sept. 1890), p. 594.

MISCELLANEOUS.

OWG

Policy-"Death from Natural Disease or Accident "-StatuteQualified Veterinary Surgeon-Notice of Injury-Waiver.-The ov er of a Clydesdale stallion insured it against "death from natural disease or accident." By the conditions annexed in the policy it was stipulated that in case of the death of any animal notice in writing should be sent to the office of the insurance company within twelve hours of the death, either accompanied by, or followed, within a reasonable time, by a full report in writing from & qulified veterinary surgeon, and that as soon as might be thereafter a claim should be given in with particulars of the loss, and the report of a qualified veterinary surgeon. Notice to an agent was not to be a sufficient compliance with this condition. The horse was found at seven o'clock on a Saturday morning suffering from a compound comminuted fracture of a foreleg, and was destroyed by the advice of a veterinary surgeon, who was not, however, registered as such under Act 44 and 45 Vict., cap. 62. The same afternoon the owner telegraphed to the local agent of the company that the horse had broken its leg, and had been condemned by a veterinary surgeon. This telegram was handed to the manager of the company the same night. On Monday the veterinary surgeon sent a certificate to the company that the horse had been destroyed by his orders, and on the same day the manager of the company telegraphed to the owner of the horse, "If horse killed without written consent, company not liable." In an action on the policy, held (Lord Rutherford Clark, dub.), that the defendant was liable in respect (1) that the injury sustained by the horse necessitated its immediate destruction; (2) that the pursuer had sufficiently complied with the policy as to giving notice; and (3) that the company were barred from raising any objections on the ground of defects in the subsequent procedure required by the policy, these having been caused by the position assumed by the company in repudiating all liability. (Per Lord Trayner), That the veterinary surgeon who ordered the horse to be destroyed was not a "qualified" veterinary surgeon in view of the terms of the Act 44 and 45 Vict., cap. 62.

Shiells v. Scottish Assurance Corporation (Limited) (Ct. of Sessions, Scotland), 26 Scottish Law Reporter (Aug. 28, 1889), p. 702.

Insurance Company-Service of Summons--Officer.--A service of summons by a constable of Philadelphia county, deputized by a constable of another county, under act of June 20, 1883 (P. L., 134), relat

ing to foreign insurance companies, is irregular where the record does not show that the company is a foreign insurance company.

Berkenstock v. People's Mutual Live Stock Co. of Pa. (Luzerne C. P. C.), 6 Lancaster Law Review (Nov. 11, 1889), p. 397.

Inland Revenue--Income Tax-Mutual Company--Statute.—A life insurance company had no shares or shareholders. The only members were the holders of participating policies, each of whom was entitled to a share of the assets, and liable to all losses. A calculation was made by the company of the probable death among the members, and of the probable expenses and other liabilities, and the amount claimed for premiums from members was commensurate therewith. An account was annually taken, and the greater amount of the surplus of such premiums over expenditures, referable to these policies, was returned to the policyholders as bonuses, either by addition to the sum insured, or in reduction of future premiums. The remainder of the surplus was carried forward as funds in hand to the credit of the general body of the members. It being admitted that the income derived by the company from investments, and from all transactions with persons not members, was assessable to income tax. Held, by Lords Watson, Bramwell, Herschell and Macnaghten-Lord Halsbury, L. C., and Lord Fitzgerald dissentingthat no part of the premium income received under participating policies was liable to be assessed to income tax as profits or gain under Schedule D, 16 and 17 Vict., c. 34, and that Last v. London Assur. Corp. (10 App. Cas. 438), was distinguishable, the income in that case being derived by the company from investments and transactions with persons not members, and not (as in the present case) from mutual insurance between members only.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Styles (Eng. H. of L.), 15 Appeal Cases, Law Reports (December 2, 1889), p. 381.

Mutual Company--Insurance Against Marriage--Public Policy. -A contract issued by an association, agreeing to pay a certain sum at the end of two years upon the condition that the member should not marry within that time; or, if he did marry, then to pay him an agreed sum per day for the time he remained single after the contract was entered into, is contrary to public policy and void.

Same-Same-Same-Assignment.-An assignment of said contract is a speculation. The assignee has no interest in the marital relations of the assignor; the contract is void in his hands.

Same-Same--Recovery of Premiums.—Although there was no law authorizing the formation of such corporations, it does not follow that the applicant can recover money paid into it. If there was fraud in the transaction, he, being a member, and his assignee, were parties to it, and can not take advantage of their own wrong-doing.

Chalfont v. Peyton et al. (Ind. S. C.), 19 Insurance Law Journal (Feb., 1890), p. 175.

Foreign Company-Jurisdiction.--An English insurance company, whose chief office was at Perry Barr, Birmingham, appointed a solicitor in Edinburgh as their district manager. They issued handbills describing his office as their Edinburgh branch office and agency. The form of interim covering-note contained a similar description. The district manager transmitted proposals for insurance to the head office, and when he received therefrom the policies he stamped them with the words “Edinburgh Office," and his business address. Held, that the company had no place of business in Scotland, and an action against them dismissed on the ground of no jurisdiction.

Laidlaw et al. v. The Provident Plate-Glass Ins. Co. (Court of Sessions, Scotland), 27 Scottish Law Reporter (April 2, 1890), p. 354.

Steam-Boiler Insurance--Liability to Third Person.--The defendant having insured a steam-boiler, which was in a building adjacent to the mill of plaintiff, and which mill had been injured by the bursting of such boiler, and it appearing that the defendant had cooperated actively with the owner of the boiler in its management, held, that the defendant was responsible for such danger, if the same was occasioned by the want of care and skill in the management of the boiler.

Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co. (N. J. S. C.), 19 Atlantic Reporter (April 30, 1890), p. 472; 41 Albany Law Journal, 519.

Taxation - Corporate Franchise-Constitutional Law - Statute.-Act N. Y, May 26, 1881, c. 361 provides that every corporation, with certain exceptions, doing business in the state, shall be subject to a tax upon "its corporate franchise or business" to the amount of onequarter of a mill upon its capital stock for each one per cent. of its dividends, where they amount to six per cent. on its capital, a less rate to be paid where the dividends are less than 6 per cent. Held, that the tax is one upon the "corporate franchise" or privilege of being a corporation, and not on the capital stock, to which reference is made only for the purpose of fixing the amount of the tax; and hence its validity is not affected by the fact that any part of the capital stock is invested in securities of the United States. (Miller & Harlan, JJ., dissent.)

Same-Same-Same-Same.-Such statute is not unconstitutional as depriving any person, natural or artificial, of the equal protection of the laws; for under its provisions, all corporations of the same kind are subject to the same tax.

Home Ins. Co. v. State of New York (U. S. S. C.), 10 Supreme Court Reporter (April 28, 1890), p. 593; 30 Central Law Journal (May 30, 1890), p. 453; 41 Albany Law Journal (May 31, 1890), p. 436.

Policy-"Void "--Construction.-A condition in a policy of insurance that, in case any of the representations or statements are untrue, the policy shall be null and void, does not make the policy absolutely