LIFE INSURANCE.

Policy Premium Loan - Interest-Prospectus of CompanyDividend.—The policy, interpreted by its own terms, imports that the part of the premium not paid by the insured, but retained by him as a loan, was to bear interest from the time the premium became due. Each annual premium, as to the full amount thereof, was due at the time fixed by the policy for its payment, and so much of the money as was not then paid remained due for the purpose of bearing interest, during the whole period the insured retained it as a loan, to wit, up to the time of the maturity of the policy; and a clause in the prospectus of the company saying: "We require interest on one loan paid annually in advance; all other interest paid by dividends," did not import a guarantee by the company that the dividends would be sufficient to pay all other interest, but signified merely that dividends, so far as they might be sufficient, would be received in discharge of interest, save that which was specified as payable in advance.

Rescission of Contract-Fraud-Laches.

Upon the facts of the

case an alternative prayer in the declaration for a rescission of the contract of insurance for alleged fraud ought not to be granted after the lapse of more than fifteen years after the fraud, if any, was committed.

MacIntire v. Cotton States Life Ins. Co. (Ga. S. C.), 9 Southeastern Reporter (Oct. 15, 1889), p. 1124.

Forfeiture-Accepting Premium After Due- Receipt Proofs of Loss-Waiver.-The policy provided that if the dues and assessments were not paid when due it should be void. Payment of dues more than a month overdue was tendered, and a conditional receipt given by the company, reciting that the time of their payment having expired, the receipt was given and accepted on the condition that the member was then temperate and in good health, otherwise the payment and the certificate to be void. The insured was at the time ill, and died on the next day. Held, (1) that the original contract was terminated by the non-payment of dues, and the subsequent payment and receipt constituted a new contract whose terms bound the insured whether the receipt was read or not; (2) that the conditions of the receipt not having been complied with, the payment became null and the original certificate was not revived; and (3) that a request for proofs of loss in accordance with the terms of the contract, which were necessary to determine the liability of the company, was not a waiver of the forfeiture.

Ronald v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (N. Y. S. C.), 18 Insurance Law Journal (Sept., 1889), p. 733.

Trustee of Policy—Fraudulent Appointment and Surrender of Policy-Liability of Trustee's Estate- Measure of Damage.—A sum of stock was settled in 1834 upon trust to keep up a policy of assurance on the life of D., and subject thereto upon trust for D. for life, and after his decease the fund and the moneys payable under the policy were to be held in trust for his three children, or such one or more of them, and in such shares and proportions, as D. by deed or will appoint. In 1849 and 1850 D. and the three children released the trustees from the stock and from all liability to keep up the policy, D. entering into a covenant to keep it up, and the stock was transferred by the trustees. In 1852 D. appointed the policy to B., one of his daughters, to her separate use, without restraint, on anticipation, upon a bargain with her that she should surrender the policy and pay the money to him. He promised her to effect and keep on foot a fresh policy, and to settle it upon the same trusts as the old one. The trustees, having no notice of the bargain, surrendered the policy to B., who surrendered it to the office and paid the proceeds to D. D. effected the new policy, but failed to devote it effectually to the trusts. The money received on the surrender of the policy was £875, but the sum which would have been payable under it, had it been kept on foot until D.'s death, was more than £5,000. Held, (by Kekewich, J.) that the appointment was invalid, and that D.'s estate after his death was liable for the full amount which would have been received had the policy been kept in force; and the £5,000 must be raised out of his estate and be distributed as in default of appointment. Held (on appeal), that (apart from the question of B.'s concurrence) this was the correct measure of liability; but that B., having been an active party to the transaction could not complain of it, and that the amount payable by D.'s estate must be diminished by the share which she, if not a party to the transaction, would have taken in default of appointment, and that D.'s promise to settle a fresh policy, which promise he failed to keep, was not a misrepresentation entitling her to say that she had been deceived into concurring in the transaction, and was to be treated as if she had not concurred.

Bridger v. Dean (Eng. C. A.—Chanc. Div.), 42 Chancery Division — Law Reports (Sept. 2, 1889), p. 9.

Assignment Insurable Interest.-A person who has procured a policy of insurance upon his life can not assign it to parties who have no insurable interest in his life.

Same-Evidence-Collateral Security.-M., on September 20, 1884, made an assignment, absolute upon its face, of a policy of insurance on his life to R. It appeared, however, from the evidence, that in former transactions about the same matter that the policy was held by R. as security for advancements made for premiums and assessments made upon

A. Held, that the assignment of September 20, 1884, was not a new contract between the parties, and an absolute assignment, but that it bore the impress of the original transactions, and stood merely as security for advances made by R.

Roller v. Moore's Adm'r (Va. S. C. A.), 13 Virginia Law Journal (Nov. 14, 1889), p. 777.

Fraud of Agent--Rescission of Contract.-Misrepresentations by the agent of an insurance company as to its solvency and financial standing, whereby an applicant is induced to take out and pay for a policy, are material, and ground for rescission by the assured.

Same—Asking Instructions –Admission by.—Where, in an action by the company for assessments due on the policy, plaintiff requests a charge that such representations are immaterial, this is a concession that they were made, and it can not be objected to on appeal that the question of the credibility of the witnesses who so testified was not submitted to the jury.

New Era Life Ass'n v. Weigle (Pa. S. C.), 18 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 13, 1889), p. 393.

Policy--Forfeiture-Accepting Premiums After Due-CustomWaiver.-Where a policy of life insurance provides for forfeiture unless the premiums thereon are paid at maturity, but the insurance company has accepted payment of more than half of such premiums after maturity, without warning of any possible forfeiture in the future, if the last premium be paid within the same time after maturity as the majority of the previous ones, the company is estopped from asserting a forfeiture though the insured died before such payment.

Spoeri v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C.), 39 Federal Reporter (Oct. 29, 1889), p. 752.

Adverse Claim--Notice to Company-Evidence. In an action by an executrix on an insurance policy of her intestate, the company having paid the amount of the policy to the assignee, a letter by the assignee's agent to the company urging payment, and stating that the writer would be responsible if the company should have any trouble about it, and adding that there was no danger in that respect, is not admissible for plaintiff to show notice to the company of adverse claim, and that payment was not made in good faith.

Same--Same--Proofs of Loss-Payment.--A provision in the policy that the company should pay the loss "within ninety days after the notice and proofs * shall have been furnished," etc., does not entitle plaintiff to ninety days after the proofs by the assignee within which to make known her claim, as plaintiff had nothing to do with such proofs, and the company was not bound to wait ninety days after proof before paying the loss.

Assignment of Policy-Insurable Interest-Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the assignment of the policy was not valid, or that the assignee had no insurable interest in the life of the deceased; and, neither having been shown, the prima facie title of the assignee is a complete defense to the action.

Home Mutual Ins. Co. v. Saeger (Pa. S. C.), 18 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 27, 1889), p. 517.

Evidence--Coroner's Inquest-Public Record.--In an action on a policy of life insurance the coroner's inquisition on the body of the insured is competent evidence as to the cause of his death, as the Illinois statutes requiring the inquest to be returned to the clerk of the circuit court of the county, and filed, make it a public record.

United States Life Inc. Co. v. Kieglast (Ill. S. C.), 22 Northeastern Reporter (Nov. 29, 1889), p. 467.

Paid-up Policy-Interest on Note-Forfeiture-Estoppel.-The assured owed the company certain notes for premiums on a policy, which he surrendered and took a paid up policy, which provided that failure to pay interest on the premium notes on a given day of each year should avoid the policy. About the time the first policy was issued, and about three years before the exchange and surrender were made, defendant published a pamphlet which recommended its policies as preferable to those of other companies, saying that its policies were non-forfeitable and incontestable, and that it allowed thirty days grace for payment of premiums after the first one, which was for the benefit of persons so situated that they could not pay when their premiums were due. The original policy was substantially according to these representations. A copy of the pamphlet was sent to the assured and was found in his possession with the policy, at his death. Assured paid the interest promptly the next year after the second policy was issued, and was only prevented from paying the next installment by the fault of his agent. Held, that as there was no evidence that the insured was induced by the pamphlet to believe that he had thirty days within which to pay the interest, but, on the contrary, his promptness indicated a contrary belief, sending him the pamphlet would not estop the defendant from insisting on the forfeitur..

Same Same-Same-Equity.-A provision in a policy that the amount of notes due on a policy for premiums, where the policy is taken up in exchange for a paid-up policy, shall be deducted when the insurance money is paid, and that failure to pay interest on the notes annually shall forfeit the policy, is not unconscionable, and there is no reason for equitable relief against the forfeiture without some element of fraud, accident, or mistake.

Fowler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 22 Northeastern Reporter (December 6, 1889), p. 576; 18 Insurance Law Journal (November, 1889), p. 857.

Re-insurance Contract-Guaranty-Construction. — One inзne

ance company was re-insured by another under a contract whereby the latter agreed to fulfill contracts entered into by the former with policyholders, "to the same extent, and in the same manner, as if no change should take place." The defendant and others subscribed to the following guaranty of the contract of re-insurance: "In consideration of one dollar *** we hereby, individually and collectively, guarant the fulfillment of the agreement in the foregoing letter," etc. Held, in an action by the receiver of the re-insured company on the guaranty contract, that the contract of re-insurance was not a contract to pay in any event what might be due on the policies, but to fulfill the contracts the same as if no change had occurred, and the receiver of the re-insured company could not sue on a guaranty of the contract without showing that it would have been solvent if the consolidation had not occurred, or that the failure of the policy-holders to obtain redress resulted from the mismanagement of the re-insuring company.

Same-Same-Action by Receiver.-Where the receiver applied for and obtained an order to bring suit on the guaranty, he can not maintain such suit on the ground of misappropriation of assets of the company by the defendant.

Pierson v. Cronk (N. Y. S. C.), 7 New York Supplement (December 12, 1889), p. 573.

Verdict-Evidence-Setting Aside.-On motion to set aside the verdict of jury as contrary to evidence: Held, that where the testimony of the attending physician and others regarding the intemperate habits of the insured in violation of his policy, is so positive that stronger evidence could hardly be conceived, while the evidence to the contrary was of a negative character, a verdict in favor of the claimant will be set aside as contrary to the evidence.

Same Same-Same.-Where a former verdict was set aside for errors in the charge and not of the jury, the rule that a second verdict on the facts will not be interfered with does not apply.

Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Davey (U. S. C. C.), 18 Insurance Law Journal (October, 1889), p. 811.

Statute-Conflict-Construction-"Assessment Plan."-St. Mass. 1885, c. 183, relating to insurance on the assessment plan, defines, in section 7, a contract of insurance on the assessment plan as a contract whereby a benefit is to accrue to a party or parties named therein upon the death of a person, which benefit is in any manner conditioned upon persons holding similar contracts. Held, that the chapter authorized the insurance of a person for his own benefit, the proceeds of the policy going to his personal representatives for the benefit of his estate; sections 10 and 11, forbidding insurance for the benefit of a person not having an insurable interest in the life, and exempting from attachment the money paid under the policy, not being inconsistent with such construction.