tween his legs after shooting, is competent and admissible on the question of suicide.

Washburn v. National Accident Society (N. Y. S. C.), 32 New York State Reporter (August, 1890), p. 34; 10 New York Supplement (July 31, 1890), p. 366.

Accidental Death-Presumption— Policy.—The policy provided "the full sum assured shall become payable if the assured shall die from accident" and required "on the death of the assured if the claim is made on the ground of death by accident, satisfactory evidence of the accident." The assured was found drowned in the Clyde, but there was nothing to indicate how he had fallen in the water. The company resisted payment on the ground that there was no evidence that the death was accidental. Held, that the fact that the insured, a respectable man, in no way likely to commit suicide, is found drowned, is prima facie evidence of accidental death.

Macdonald v. The Refuge Assurance Co., Limited (Court of Sessions, Scotland, Sec. Div.), 27 Scottish Law Reporter (July 23, 1890), p. 764.

Policy-Total Disability-Construction.- The policy provided for weekly indemnity in case of injury which should "immediately and wholly disable him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation." The assured, a manufacturer, fell on the ice, and injured his arm so that he had to carry it in a sling for some months; at times it pained him greatly, and he could not lie down, but would obtain rest and sleep while sitting in a chair. He, during all the time, visited his factory and superintended his business as usual. Held, that he was not entitled to recover under the policy.

Gracey v. People's Mutual Accident Insurance Association (Pittsburgh C. C. P. No. 1), 21 Pittsburgh Legal Journal (August 20, 1890), p. 25.

Policy-Limitation of Action-Construction.-The policy provided that the sum insured should be paid within ninety days after the injury received; and further that proofs of death must be furnished the company within six months from the date of the accident; and that claim should be paid within ninety days after satisfactory proof. Held, that the further provision that action should be begun "within one year from the time of the alleged accidental injury" meant not a year from the accident, but from the time when the right of action was comp'et.

Cooper v. United States Mutual Accident Ass'n (N. Y. S. C.), 10 New York Supplement (Sept. 4, 1890), p. 748; 32 New York State Reporter (Sept. 1890), P.725.

Policy-"External, Violent and Accidental Means "—Poison.— The policy insured against death caused by "external, violent and accidental means." The insured came to death by the accidental drinking of poison, and the company claimed that the death was not within the terms of the policy. Held, that a policy of accident insurance is issued

and accepted for the purpose of furnishing indemnity against accidents and deaths caused by accidental means, and the language of the policy must be construed with reference to the subject to which it is applied; and that death from the accidental drinking of poison is within the terms of the policy.

Healy v. Mutual Accident Ass'n (Ill. S. C.), 25 Northeastern Reporter (Sept. 19, 1890), p. 52; 42 Albany Law Journal (Oct. 4, 1890), p. 265.

FIRE INSURANCE.

Assignment of Policy-Effect-Default of Assignor-Forfeiture. -On a sale of the insured property, and an assignment of the policy to the purchaser, duly assented to by the company, a new contract of insurance arises between the purchaser and the company which is not af fected by a default of the assignor before the assignment amounting to a forfeiture of the policy.

Continental Ins. Co. v. Munns (Ind. S. C.), 22 Northeastern Reporter (Oct. 4, 1889), p. 78; 17 Washington Reporter (Oct. 15, 1889), p. 669.

Policy-Construction of Chimneys--Cause of Fire.-A policy of fire insurance provided that the company should not be liable for any loss caused by "the use of fire unprovided with good and substantial stone or brick chimneys, the absence of which was the cause of the fire." Held, that the mere fact that there was no chimney of stone or brick. with a flue to it, but only a tile flue, did not avoid the policy. That was to be the result only in case the flue was "the cause of the fire."

Knowledge of Agent-Estoppel.-When the applicant for insurance states accurately the facts to the agent authorized to write up and issue the policy, he will not lose the protection bought and paid for merely because the agent failed to set out in the policy what was told him.

Same-Same-Sub-Agent.-An agent authorized to issue policies employed another as solicitor to make examinations. Held, that this solicitor was the agent of the company, so that information given to him should be considered as given to the company.

Boatman's F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Young (Ky. Superior Ct.), 11 Kentucky Law Journal (Oct. 1, 1889), p. 288.

Contract-When Complete.-The plaintiffs, a firm of merchants in New Zealand, in October, 1886, employed a firm of insurance brokers in London to effect for them insurances against fire upon goods in New Zealand. The brokers instructed B., an insurance broker at Lloyd's, to effect a portion of the insurances, and B. prepared a slip containing particulars of the risk, which was initialed by the defendant and other underwriters at Lloyd's. Owing to a misunderstanding between the insurance brokers no policy was put forward for signature by the defendant and the other underwriters, and in February, 1887, the goods in New Zealand were seriously damaged by fire. No premiums had then been paid, but two days after the fire the premiums were paid by the plain

tiffs to the insurance brokers. A policy was then tendered to the defendant for signature, but he refused to sign it or to pay the amount for which he had initialed the slip. Held, that the slip formed a complete and binding contract of insurance, that it was not subject to an implied condition that a policy should be put forward for a signature within a reasonable time, and that, in the absence of circumstances showing an intention on the part of the plaintiffs to abandon the insurance, they were entitled to recover.

Thompson v. Adams (Eng. C. A., Q. B. D.), 23 Queen's Bench Division,— Law Reports (Sept. 2, 1889), p. 361.

Policy-Forfeiture-Waiver. -Where an action on a policy is barred at its commencement by an express stipulation in the policy that the action shall be commenced within a certain time after loss, such bar is not waived by defendant's failure to mention it in an affidavit of defense filed, or by an offer to settle the suit made at the term when it is on trial.

National Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown (Pa. S. C.), 18 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 13, 1889), p. 389.

Statute-Notice and Proof of Loss-Jury.—Act Pa. June 27, 1883, for the protection of persons whose property is burned while insured, provides that "the conditions of insurance as to loss and the furnishing of preliminary proofs shall be deemed to have been complied with if the 俯 shall furnish to the company assured * * the notice of

*

loss within ten days from the date of the fire, and the preliminary proofs within twenty days from said notice." Held, that such act does not require such proofs shall be furnished within the time mentioned; but where no time is mentioned in the policy a reasonable time is allowed, and the question of what is a reasonable time is for the jury when the evidence is conflicting.

Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Brown (Pa. S. C.), 18 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 13, 1889), p. 396.

Policy-Encumbrance-Waiver.-Where no written application is made for insurance of property, and the agent solicits the insurance without asking any questions as to incumbrances, and no representations relative thereto are made, the fact that incumbrances exist does not invalidate a policy which provides that it shall be void if the property shall be sold or incumbered.

Dwelling-House Ins. Co. v. Hoffman (Pa. S. C.), 18 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 13, 1889), p. 397.

Mutual Company-Charter-Notice of Assessments.-Under a clause in the charter of a mutual insurance company which directs managers, when they make an assessment, to "publish" it, and provides that on neglect of members to pay their assessments within sixty days after "public notice" their insurance shall be suspended, and requires "public notice of this clause to be given when advertising an assess

ment," actual notice of an assessment to each member is not required, but notice by publication is sufficient.

Pennsylvania Training School for Feeble Minded Children v. Independent Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 18 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 13, 1889), p.

392.

Agency-Policy-Evidence.-In an action to recover on a fire insurance policy, it appeared that one S. subscribed his name to plaintiff's application for insurance as agent for the company, made a statement of the exposures as agent, approved the risk as agent, and that, after these transactions were brought to the notice of the company, the policy was forwarded to S., who delivered it to plaintiff, lifted the premium, embraced it in a former report, deducting commissions, sent it to the special agent, and thereafter collected assessments, which were recognized by the company. Held, that the provision in the policy that "if any broker or other person than the assured shall have procured this insurance to be taken, he shall be considered the agent of the assured, and not of the company," referred to persons doing business on their own account, and not to agents of the company; and that S. was the agent of the company in effecting the insurance.

Application-Fraud of Agent-Estoppel.-Where the questions asked the assured by an insurance agent are answered truthfully, but the agent writes down false answers, and cheats the assured into signing a false warranty and paying the premium, a policy issued thereon can not be avoided on the ground that the warranty is false, nor will the assured be estopped to show the deceit and falsehood of the agent by the rule that oral evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict his written warranty.

Policy-Encumbrance.-A condition of an insurance policy that it shall be void "if the assured have the property encumbered without notice to the company endorsed hereon," is not violated by liens placed on the property after it is insured, to take the place of liens thereon existing at the date of insurance, and of which the company then had notice.

Kistner v. Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 18 Atlantic Reporter (Nov. 13-20, 1889), p. 447.

Policy-Cancellation.--An insurance policy issued to a firm contained a condition that it "may also be at any time canceled by the company on refunding or tendering to the assured

a ratable proportion of the premium for the time unexpired." Held, that a return of the policy by one of the partners for cancellation, without exacting payment of the return premium, and his agreement to await for the payment thereof until some future time, operated as a cancellation of the policy.

Evidence-Verdict of Jury-Error.-In an action on the policy the company's agent testified that one of the partners, on returning the