made without intent to deceive, and under ? 139, which provides that a policy "shall be void if any material fact or circumstance stated in writing has not been fairly represented by the insured."

Policy - Construction—"Occupied all the Year Round." — The policy described the property insured as "all while contained in the frame dwelling-house * * * occupied all the year round." It appeared that six months before the loss the house in which the property was situated was unoccupied for about a month. Held, that as the permanen. occupation was resumed so long before the fire, the temporary absence could have no connection with the loss, and defendant could not repudiate the policy.

King et al. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), 14 Northeastern Reporter (Jan. 27, 1888), p 525; 5 New England Reporter (Jan. 24, 1888), p. 387.

Waiver Authority of Agent.-When an insurance company is, from any cause, discharged from liability, responsibility for the loss will not re-attach by waiver without proof of authority in the party whose act of waiver is relied upon, or without a new consideration to sustain it; but when the act of the agent executing the waiver is contemplated in the contract, and the power expressly conferred upon him in writing, no new consideration is required.

Absolute Ownership. The purchaser of real estate by articles being responsible for the purchase money, is liable to the whole loss that may befall it, including the loss of buildings by fire; therefore, he is not guilty of misrepresentation if he states that he is the absolute owner, although he has not paid the purchase money.

Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Dunham (Pa. S. C.), 45 Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 17, 1888), p. 65.

Policy-Sale-Repurchase-Renewal of Policy.-When the insurable interest in property has ceased because of change of ownership, a renewal policy issued to the insured after he has again become owner will operate as a waiver of the forfeiture, if the facts are known to the company.

Insurable Interest-Equitable Ownership.-An equitable title acquired by means of articles of agreement renders the vendee the owner of the property so far as a contract of insurance is concerned.

Elliott v. Ashland Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 45 Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 17, 1888), p. 65.

Reinsurance Contract - Sale of Property.-The plaintiff reinsured certain property in the defendant company. The policy of reinsurance was drawn on a printed form generally used to insure owners, and contained a clause making it void on change of title without the company's consent, and a rider was added providing that it should be subject to the risks, conditions and assignments as might be assumed or adopted by the plaintiff. The property was sold, and the plaintiff consented to the

change of title and assignment of its policy Held, that the defendant could not avoid the policy of reinsurance on the ground that its consent was not obtained.

Manufacturers' F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Western Assurance Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), 14 Northeastern Reporter (Feb. 3, 1888), p. 632; 5 New England Reporter (Feb. 14, 1888), p. 501.

Mutual Company-Fire and Marine Departments-Expense--Liability of Members-Estoppel.—Upon the organization of the "Milville Mutual Marine & Fire Ins. Co.," the corporation declared that the business of the two departments, marine and fire, should be carried on separately; that there should be no other connection between the two than that the expense of the institution should be equitably borne by each. This intention was made known by the by-laws, circulars and agents, and for more than twenty years the company thus conducted its business, even when one of the departments was losing money Held, that whether or not it was the intention of the legislature in granting the company's charter to permit the carrying on of two distinct branches of business, the members who had taken out policies in either department, having done so with full knowledge that the premium notes and assets of the other department were not, under the rules of the company, subject to the payment of their losses, were estopped to assert any such claim.

Same Statute-Insolvent Company-Payment of Debts-Premium Notes-Equitable Assets.-Revision N. J. chapter on " Corporation," ? 80, provides that “in the payment of creditors, and in the distribution of the funds of any such company, the creditors shall be paid proportionately to the amount of their respective debts, excepting mortgage and judgment creditors, when the judgment has not been confessed for the purpose of preferring creditors;" and the premium notes and other assets of a mutual insurance company are applicable to the payment of the debts of the corporation in the manner provided by said section, and not otherwise, though they may be equitable assets.

Cancellation of Policy-Insolvency of Company-Liability of Policy-Holder.-The officers of a mutual company, with knowledge of its insolvency, but before it had been so declared, voluntarily canceled the policy of one of its members, and executed a release from all liability thereunder. Held, that the policy-holder was still liable for all losses and expenses incurred during the life of the policy, and which actually existed at the time of cancellation.

Insolvency-Priority of Creditors. A judgment creditor of an insolvent company, to avail himself of the preference allowed such creditors in the distribution of assets, must have obtained his judgment before the court has taken control of the company by injunction or other preliminary order, and a creditor who obtains a judgment the day on

which a bill for a receiver is filed, and a restraining order issued, is entitled to no preference over general creditors.

Loss After Appointment of Receiver.-A policy-holder whose loss occurred after an appointment of a receiver is not entitled to a share in the distribution of assets.

Doane v. Milville Mut. M. & F. Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch. C.), 11 Atlantic Reporter (Feb. 1, 1888), p. 739.

Payment of Premium-Jury.-Plaintiff sent one C. to obtain insurance on his property, and gave C. money to pay the premium. C. procured a policy from the general agent of defendant, and delivered it to plaintiff. C. offered to pay the premium, but the general agent, expecting to obtain another policy, told C. to keep it until that was done, and charged C. on his books, and credited defendant with the amount, and in due course remitted it to defendant. Held, that the question of the payment of the premium was for the jury, and an instruction to find for defendant was error.

Pittsburgh Boat Yard Co. v. Western Assur. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 11 Atlantic Reporter (Feb. 8, 1888), p. 801.

Practice-Amendments to Pleading--Refusal to Allow Ameudment-Error.-Where a party, after a reversal of a case, desires to amend his pleading, and such amendment states the real defense in the action, it is reversible error on the part of the trial court to refuse to permit such amendment.

Adjustment and Payment of Loss-Repudiation of by Insured— Retention of Money.-The insured, while retaining the money received from a company on the adjustment of a loss, can not deny such adjustment on the ground that it was obtained by fraud.

Pangborn v. Continental Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 12 Western Reporter (Feb. 4, 1888), p 489; 35 Northwestern Reporter (Feb. 4, 1888), p. 814.

Conditions of Policy-Ignorance of Contents-Pleading.—Every policy-holder, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment, must be held to have knowledge of its contents when he has opportunity to examine it before he accepts it; and a pleading which alleges ignorance of the contents of a policy, but which does not allege fraud, misrepresentation or concealment, is insufficient.

Policy-Other Insurance to be Indorsed on Policy-Waiver— Power of Agent.-The policy contained a provision that the procuring or having other insurance on the property, not made known to the company, and consented to thereon, would render the policy void. The plaintiffs offered to show that the agent, who was shown to have power to issue and cancel policies, and make indorsements of other insurance when necessary, was informed of the other insurance complained of, made no objection thereto, but promised to indorse it on the policy; that plaintiffs relied on such promise, and that, just before the loss oc

curred, the agent arranged to renew the policy at its expiration, and a memorandum for renewal was made, with such reinsurance contained in it, but was never indorsed on the policy. This evidence was excluded. Held, that the company was bound by its acquiescence in the acts of its agent, although the policy contained a clause that no agent had authority to bind the company in violation of any of the printed terms of the contract, and no condition or restriction contained in the policy, which by its terms may be waived, shall be deemed to have been waived, except by distinct agreement contained in the body of the policy.

Morrison et al. v. Ins. Co. of North America (Texas S. C.), 6 Southwestern Reporter (Feb. 20, 1888), p. 605.

Policy-Forfeiture for Attempt at Fraud-Statement of Loss.The policy provided that a statement should be rendered in case of loss, "setting forth the value of the property insured," and that it should be void "if the assured shall make any attempt to defraud the company, either before or after the loss." Held, that an omission in the proofs to give any quantities or items of the goods destroyed, in detail, although under some circumstances it might be evidence of fraud, did not of itself defeat the claim, or make the statement of loss insufficient under the policy.

Same-Statement of Other Insurance in Proofs.-Plaintiff had insured a portion of the goods with another company, and in his statement of loss set out an exact copy of the items of the property so insured. Held, that he had sufficiently set forth, as required by the policy sued on, "all other insurance thereon in detail."

Same-Separate, Adjoining, Store-rooms-Statement of Loss.The property insured was situated in two adjoining store-rooms, a portion of one of which was separately occupied, and the property in each store was separately named and valued in the policy. The "other insurance" referred to only covered the property in one store. In his statement plaintiff claimed a total loss, alleging that the building containing the property was occupied in its several parts" by him, and did not distinguish the stores, or the value of the property therein, cr state that one was, in part, separately occupied. Held, that the statement was insufficient under the policy.

Towne v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), 15 Northwestern Reporter (Feb. 24, 1888), p. 112; 5 New England Reporter (Feb. 7, 1888), p. 484.

Insurance by Mortgagee-Loss-Cancellation of MortgageConveyance by Mortgagor to Mortgagee.-Where a mortgagee insures the mortgaged premises for his own benefit, and at his own expense, and after a loss occurs discharges the mortgagor from all liability upon his bond and mortgage upon receiving conveyance of the premises, and thus destroys the right of the insurer to be subrogated to the bond and mortgage, his right to recover upon the policy of insurance is defeated.

Same-Retention of Policy by Mortgagee-Question for Jury.— Au action of foreclosure was discontinued by stipulation, a receipt for the money being given containing these words: "This action to be discontinued and the bond in suit surrendered." Some time afterward the

bond and mortgage were delivered to defendant's attorney, with an indorsement upon the bond: "Received in full of the within

bond, 帶 and the same is hereby surrendered and canceled. But the insurance procured by E. L. Thomas, and any sum he may

collect on the same, are not affected by this surrender, but are and re

main his property." The testimony was conflicting as to whether it was understood and agreed, at the time of the settlement, that plaintiff should retain or reserve the right to the insurance policy; but the court, relying upon the indorsement upon the bond, directed a verdict for plaintiff. Held, that the question should have been submitted to the jury.

Thomas v. Montauk Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 27 New York Weekly Digest (March 2, 1888), p. 555.

Foreign Company-License-Evidence.-There being no law requiring the license of a foreign insurance company for transacting business in this state to be recorded, or requiring the fact that such license had been issued to be recorded, it is competent to prove by parol that one has been issued when its loss has been shown.

Same-Compliance With Statute-Presumption of Regularity.— The court found that a license had been issued to plaintiff, but was unable to find that the plaintiff had filed with the secretary of state a copy of its by-laws. It was obligatory on plaintiff to file such a copy before the issuing of the license. Held, in the absence of a finding that the bylaws had not been filed, it would be presumed that they were filed, under the rule that acts which purport to have been done by public officers in their official capacity will be presumed to be regular.

Same Statute-Principal and Agent-"Law of the State."Section 2, act No. 1, Laws 1874, prohibited foreign insurance companies from transacting business in Vermont unless such company was responsible by "the laws of the state" in which said company was situated for the acts and neglects of its agents. Held, that "the laws of the state," as here used, were not restricted to statute laws, but included, as well, the common law.

Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright (Vt. S. C.), 12 Atlantic Reporter (Feb. 29, 1888), p. 103; 5 New England Reporter (March 6, 1888), p. 640; 17 Insurance Law Journal (Feb., 1888), p. 119.

Contract of Insurance- What Constitutes-Authority to Make Statute.-Plaintiff called on defendant, an insurance agent, stating that he desired a certain amount of insurance placed on his property. Defendant agreed to place the desired amount; risk to begin at noon of that day. Held, that this contract was not one made as agent to procure the insurance for a customer if responsible companies could be found to