is no ground for the existence of a different rule in respect to the general amount of taxes to be raised, and I am clear that no reasons can be suggested why the power to designate the amount should, in boroughs not lying on the ocean, be committed to the people at large, while in boroughs on the sea the power should be placed in the hands of commissioners." In State v. Hammer (33) the court gave as an example of a legitimate classification a law giving to all cities situated on tidewater the privilege of using such water in connection with sewers. It would seem, therefore, that a valid classification may conceivably be based upon permanent geographical features, if the basis of classification is germane to the pur poses of the act.

§ 32. Other methods of classification. An example of another basis of classification is found in Bronson v. Oberlin (34) in which the act applied to "all villages having within their limits a college or university," and was held constitutional. How easy it is to overstep the limits is shown by a recent Missouri case (35) in which the act of the legislature whose validity was disputed provided that "no dramshop license shall hereafter be granted to any person to keep a dramshop within five miles of any state educational institution which now has enrolled fifteen hundred or more students." The act applied only to the state university, and was held unconstitutional. A simple change so that the law would apply to any state educational institution of the size in question

would doubtless cure the defect. On the whole, it seems that these constitutional provisions have not accomplished as much good as was expected from them, as the courts have permitted classifications based upon rather small differences to slip through unchallenged; and on the other hand, they have produced a great deal of litigation and introduced doubt and difficulty into the law. Might it not be better to seek to improve legislatures and depend on their good sense, rather than to attempt to tie the hands of the legislative body in a way which, at the best, must often produce unfortunate and arbitrary results?

§ 33. Provisions requiring local choice of city officials. Another common provision found in the various state constitutions is intended to preserve to the localities the right to choose their own local officials (36). These take various forms, sometimes forbidding the legislature to provide by special act for local offices, or for commissions to regulate local affairs, but more commonly, perhaps, conferring upon the people of the locality the right to select all or a part of the local officials. Of the latter, the provisions of the Wisconsin constitution may be taken as an example. That provides that "sheriffs, coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys, and all other county officers, except judicial officers, shall be chosen by the electors of the respective counties once in two years" (37). It also provides in another section that "all county officers whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitution shall be elected by the electors

(36) Goodnow, Munic. Home Rule, 60. (37) Wisconsin Const., Art. VI, sec. 4.

of the respective counties, or appointed by the boards of supervisors or other county authorities, as the legislature shall direct. All city, town, and village officers whose appointment is not provided for by this constitution shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns, and villages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such authorities thereof as the legislature shall designate for that purpose" (38).

§ 34. What are local officials? Under such provisions it becomes an interesting question as what are local, i. e., city, town, or village officers within the meaning of the constitution. As we saw in the first chapter (§ 9), the legislature has thrown upon the cities of America a constantly increasing amount of state administrative business to attend to, usually leaving the choice of the officials to discharge such functions to the city itself. May the state deprive the city of the right to elect or appoint officials of this kind, or has the city a vested right in the matter? According to the view accepted by the courts. in the states having such provisions, the constitution does not intend that the line shall be drawn between officials discharging functions primarily local in character, such as those relating to local public works, and officials attending to matters in which the primary interest is that of the state as a whole. Ignoring any such reasonable basis, the constitution, as interpreted by the courts, provides for an unchangeable organization in which officials who were locally elected or appointed at the time the

(38) Ibid., Art. XIII, sec. 9.

constitutional provision was adopted must continue to be so chosen no matter what functions they discharge; while on the other hand, officials holding positions newly created since the adoption of the provision do not fall within its scope, even if their functions be local in character. For example, although in all other branches of the law the administration of the state's laws through the police is regarded as a state function, it is held that if at the time of the adoption of the provision in question the police were locally chosen, they must continue to be so chosen. This was held where the office in question was that of chief of police (39). The same test had been laid down in many earlier cases, among which we may cite that relating to the office of city attorney (40). This interpretation, whatever be its justification from a legal point of view-and there seems to be much evidence to show that the framers of the provision meant just this-has led to the unfortunate situation that the state is prohibited from itself appointing officers to act in enforcing the state laws within the limits of one of the local areas.

§ 35. Methods of evading provisions for local choice of officials. The words "one of" in the last sentence above must, however, be emphasized or a wrong impression will be obtained. To bring this out clearly, let us imagine a state law providing for a state chief of police at the head of a state police force, having jurisdiction throughout the state. Surely no one could contend that the constitutional provision for the local election of local officials would prevent this from being valid. Once grant the

constitutionality of such a procedure, however, and it becomes possible to nullify the evil results of the constitutional limitations. For example, in People v. Draper (41) the court sustained as constitutional a law creating a metropolitan police district out of New York county and three adjacent counties, placing at the head of the police of the district a chief appointed by the governor of the state. The same result was reached later in the case of the Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister (42) in which, as the name indicates, a number of counties were formed into a metropolitan health district. So long as an area having boundaries substantially different from the old public corporation is created the state appointment will be valid, seems to be the view of the New York court. For example, in creating the "Rensselaer police district" the legislature made a slight addition to the area of the city of Rensselaer, but, as the addition was not substantial, the court held the act void (43). This method of evading the constitutional restriction is a favorite one in New York, where the political opposition between the city of New York on the one side and the rest of the state on the other is very pronounced. In order to have a state-appointed supervisor of elections to insure honesty in the count of the ballots at elections of state and national importance, it was necessary for the legislature to create a metropolitan election district differing substantially in area from the city of New York. Any such situation is of course unfortunate, and, as Mr.