LOCKHART v. COVINGTON. property or estate had been advanced, leaving no lawful issue, then in that event the property so advanced to revert to those of my children, or the heirs of my children that are alive-I mean of my living children and the children of those who are dead." In the facts agreed it appears that the widow died in 1897 without having remarried, and had given off to the children all of the property left by her husband except some personalty disposed of by her will; that in 1892 and 1893 she conveyed to her son J. G. Covington the lands here in controversy; that she died in 1897; that J. G. Covington married in 1898 and died in 1902 without issue, having devised said lands to his wife. This action is by the heirs at law of D. A. Covington to recover said lands upon the ground that they had reverted to them at the death of J. G. Covington. The evident purport of the will is to give the entire estate to his wife in trust for herself and children with power of advancement, but providing for a final division, allotting to the children their shares in severalty either at her marriage or death, and, if at her marriage, then her share to be for life and that to be divided at her death among the children. The provision in the postscript restricts the advancements made so that if any child advanced shall be dead, without issue, at the time specified for the final division (i. e., at the death of the wife), not its share but its advancement shall revert, and be brought into hotch potch and divided. The "reverter" takes effect at the final division at the death of the wife. It is in the clause providing for such division, which has no reference to any later time. The Code 1327 has no application. There is no limitation in this will to the children at all, but a provision for the final division at the death of the wife (both in the event of her remarriage or not remarrying) and that she may make advancements, but if the child advanced by her shall LOCKHART v. COVINGTON. die without leaving issue "the property so advanced, to revert to those of my children, or the heirs of my children, that are alive" meaning those alive at the time of the division. By the final division, the property was vested in each of the children, in fee simple and J. G. Covington had full power to devise it. Sain v. Baker, 128 N. C., 256, in no wise conflicts with this. There, a defeasible estate was given to the son. Here, nothing was given to the son except a right to share in the final division of the estate at the death of his mother, equally with his brothers and sisters (or their issue) then alive, subject to the mother's power to make advancements, which power was clogged with the requirement that if the child so advanced should die without issue, such advancement should revert and be divided among the children that are alive, i. e., alive at the time of this final division. It must be noted that no property except the advanced property would revert-thus showing conclusively that the reverter must have taken place at the time of the final division. No Error. WALKER, J., did not sit on the hearing of this case. MCLEOD v. GRAHAM. MCLEOD v. GRAHAM. (Filed April 28, 1903. 1. JUDGMENTS-Irregular-Complaint-The Code, Sec. 206. Acquiscence in a judgment waives the failure to file a complaint. 2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—Arbitration and AwardReferences-The Code, See. 1426. The Code, Sec. 1426 authorizes the submission to arbitration of a claim against an administrator. 3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-Claims-Filing-Pleadings. An action brought against an administrator is a sufficient filing of a claim against the estate. 4. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—Judgments—Distributees. On a motion by an administrator to set aside a judgment by a creditor of the estate upon an alleged irregularity of the judgment, the distributees cannot intervene. 5. ARBITRATION AND AWARD―Judgments—References - The Code, Secs. 276, 1426-Appeal. After an award has passed into final judgment, it is too late to contest the same for alleged mistake in calculation of arbitrator, or that the arbitration had not been made a rule of court, or that the amount was agreed upon by the parties, or that the reference to arbitration was invalid. For an erroneous judgment the only remedy is by appeal. ACTION by N. A. McLeod against G. W. Graham, administrator, heard by Judge Charles M. Cooke, at February Term, 1903, of the Superior Court of CUMBERLAND County. From a judgment setting aside a judgment for the plaintiff, he appealed. Rose & Rose, for the plaintiff. CLARK, C. J. This is an action brought against the defendant administrator for an alleged indebtedness by his intestate to the plaintiff. After suit brought and without MCLEOD v. GRAHAM. pleadings having been filed, the parties agreed in writing to submit the matter in dispute to arbitration. The Code, Sec. 1426. The arbitrators made an award and reported the same. to court and judgment was duly entered thereon. At the next term, a distributee of the estate filed a petition to set aside the judgment, and subsequently thereto the arbitrators filed a statement that they had detected an error in the addition of the figures to the amount of $168 and "authorized and instructed the clerk to change their report in making the award $146.44 instead of $314.44." Notice was issued to the parties of the motion to modify and reduce the judgment, and at February term, 1903, the defendant administrator asked that the judgment be set aside, which the court did upon the ground that it was an irregular judgment. The motion having been made after the trial term and not upon any of the grounds set out in The Code, Sec. 274, could only be sustained upon the ground of irregularity. Turner v. Davis, at this term. No fraud is alleged, and if there had been it would have been ground for an action and not for a motion in the cause, this being a final judgment. Carter v. Rountree, 109 N. C., 29. But we can not discover any irregularity in the judgment. The action was pending and the judgment was regularly entered and in due course. The failure to file a complaint was ground to dismiss the action, if objection had been taken in apt time, The Code, Sec. 206, but its absence was cured by acquiescence in the judgment. Vick v. Pope, 81 N. C., 22; Leach v. Railroad, 65 N. C., 485; Stancill v. Gay, 92 N. C., 455; Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N. C., 167; Little v. McCarter, 89 N. C., 233; Robeson v. Hodges, 105 N. C., 49; McNeill v. Hodges, 105 N. C., 52; Peebles v. Braswell, 107 N. C., 68; McLean v. Breece, 113 N. C., 390. Besides, the submission (in writing) to arbitration, the written award and the consent to the judgment thereon show that the de MCLEOD v. GRAHAM. fendant had as full information as could have been had from a complaint. The submission to arbitration or reference was authorized by The Code, Sec. 1426. Lassiter v. Upchurch, 107 N. C., 411. The action brought was sufficient "filing" the claim, Stonestreet v. Frost, 123 N. C., 640, but if it were otherwise, that was a matter to have been heard in opposition to the judgment and not as ground to set it aside, for the defendant not only was a party to the arbitration, but it is found as a fact that his counsel knew of the arbitration and knew of the signing the judgment. Whether the judgment will protect the defendant administrator against the distributees in an action charging negligence or want of care in his administration, can not now be raised, for the distributees are not parties to this action. This motion is between the parties and rests upon the alleged irregularity of the judgment. The attempted intervention and affidavit of the distributee can not be considered. Walton v. McKesson, 101 N. C., 428. If the award itself had been contested for error in calculations therein, judgment thereon could not have been defeated for alleged mistake, when even this was denied, we have proceeded beyond that, for the award has passed into a solemn judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. For the same reason, it is too late now to contest that the arbitration not having been made a rule of court, judgment should not have been entered upon it. Metcalf v. Guthrie, 94 N. C., 451. The parties accepted and agreed upon the award as the amount due, and judgment was by consent. Moore v. Austin, 85 N. C., 179. If the judgment was erroneous, the only remedy was by appeal. Henderson v. Moore, 125 N. C., 383. The defendant properly concedes in his brief that the court could not modify or amend such consent judgment, citing Kerchner v. McEachern, 93 N. C., 455, and rests his case upon the power of the court to set aside an irregular |