An association collecting premiums from its members, instead of assessments, was not under that section exempt from the operation of chap. 211, acts of 18 G. A., relating to time of bringing action. Ibid.

The creation of a guaranty fund held not to deprive the corporation of the character of a mutual company. Smith v. Sherman, 113-601.

The requirements of Code, § 1741, as to setting out copy of application in connection with the policy are applicable to mutual companies. Corson v. Iowa Mut. Fire Ins. Assn., 115-485.

Although in general a money judgment cannot be rendered against an assessment company, yet if the company has issued a policy in which it agrees to pay a fixed sum in case of loss, such action may be maintained. Byrnes v. American Mut. F. Ins. Co., 114-738.

Under 1160 of Code of '73, mutual companies were contemplated which should not be subject to other provisions of the general chapter on insurance. Corey v. Sherman, 64 N. W., 828.

Where the articles of incorporation showed that the company was organized to do a mutual insurance business and insure only the property of its members, held, that the articles contained no authority to insure the property of any one not a member, and that the issuance of policies of insurance on the stock plan was invalid. Ibid.

Even though the relation between such mutual association and a member thereof is a personal one, not passing to the legal representative, yet the association may ratify and confirm it in the hands of the personal representative of the deceased member, and will be held to do so if it makes assessments of such personal representative as a member. Harl v. Pottawattamie County Mut. F. Ins. Co., 74-39.

Companies organized to do business on the mutual plan cannot issue policies of insurance on the stock plan (§ 1690), and the members of a mutual company are therefore not liable for the payment of losses under such policies. Corey v. Sherman, 64 N. W., 828.

Where it is not required by the articles and by-laws, notice of assessment need not be given before the assessment is made. Ibid.

The members of a mutual insurance company are presumed to have knowledge of its articles of incorporation and by-laws, and general misstatements as to the solvency of the company and its method of doing business will not constitute such fraud as to relieve the members from their obligation to pay assessments on their deposit notes. Ibid.

Sec. 1759-b. County and state associations.

The distinction between state mutual and county mutual associations or companies may be the basis of distinction in the matter of taxation. Iowa Mut. Tornado Assn. v. Gilbertson, 129-653.

The fact that mutual insurance associations are authorized to make assessments to meet expenses indicates that they are associations for pecuniary profit under the incorporation laws. Iowa Mut. Tornado Assn. v. Gilbertson, 129-658.

Proof of loss-waiver of. Where an insurance company was notified of a loss to a corn crop by a hailstorm, and, in response, sent an adjuster, who took the insured's proposition of settlement, and promised to report the company's action thereon, and on renewed demands it promised to send its adjuster again for further inspection, but failed to do so, and did not notify the insured of the acceptance or rejection of his proposition, and did not demand proof of the loss before the claim matured, it waived its right to demand such proof. Condon v. Des Moines Mut. Hail Ins. Assn., 94 N. W., 477.

Mutual hail policy-losses. In an action on a mutual hail policy which provides full loss indemnity from a general fund to be provided by assessment of members, except in case the total losses exceed such amount so collected, then losses to be paid pro rata, the burden of proof is on the company to show insufficient funds to pay losses in full, and in the ab

sence of such showing a judgment for full amount of loss will stand. Delle v. State Mut. Hail, 119 Iowa, 173.

Provisions in articles and by-laws. The articles of incorporation and by-laws in mutual associations become a part of the contract with each member. Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Assn. v. Slattery, 115 Iowa, 410.

Where the by-laws of a mutual hail insurance association at the time of issuance of insured's policy made no provision for the suspension of policies for the failure to meet assessments, insured was not bound by subsequent amendment thereof providing for such suspension though he agreed to be governed by the articles of incorporation and by-laws. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6.

OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES.

Life insurance-place of contract. A policy of life insurance issued to a resident of Iowa, but providing that the premiums were to be paid at the insurer's office in New York, where payment of the insurance was also to be made, and signed at the insurer's home office in New York City, is a New York contract, governed by the laws of that state, though to take effect on delivery to the assured, in the absence of proof of the place of actual delivery. Summitt v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 99 N. W., 563.

Sec. 1773. Annual statement.

This section recognizes the existence of a debt from the company to its policy-holders. Equitable L. Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 74-178. Sec. 1777. Examination by auditor-receiver.

In an action to close the business of a corporation for failure to comply with the provisions of chapter 5, title IX, of the Code of '73, held, that it must be assumed that the corporation was duly organized. State ex rel. v. Iowa Mut. Aid Assn., 59-125.

Sec. 1768. On level premium plan.

It is not unlawful for an insurance company to discriminate between policy-holders and those who are not policy-holders in the loaning of money, nor for it to agree that one who takes insurance shall have a loan thereon. Key v. National Life Ins. Co., 107-446.

The provisions of this section as to "any contract of insurance agreement other than as plainly expressed in the policy issued" is to be limited in its application by the title of the act in which it was first enacted, and by the general provisions of the section, and is therefore applicable only to cases of discrimination. Kelley v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 109 Fed., 56.

The provision as to contracts "plainly expressed in the policy issued" includes in the term "policy" the provision of the application endorsed thereon, in accordance with Code § 1819. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 114 Fed., 268.

The amendment of this section made by 27 G. A., chap. 46, held not applicable where the policy had been issued and the death had occurred prior to the taking effect of the amendment. Beverly v. Northern L. Assn., 112-730.

It is not unlawful for an insurance company to discriminate between policy-holders and those who are not policy-holders in the loaning of

money, nor for it to agree that one who takes insurance shall have a loan thereon. Key v. National Life Ins. Co., 107-446.

The provisions of this section as to "any contract of insurance agreement other than as plainly expressed in the policy issued" is to be limited in its application by the title of the act in which it was first enacted, and by the general provisions of the section, and is therefore applicable only to cases of discrimination. Kelley v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 109 Fed., 56.

The provision as to contracts "plainly expressed in the policy issued" includes in the term "policy" the provision of the application endorsed thereon, in accordance with Code § 1819. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 114 Fed., 268.

The amendment of this section made by 27 G. A., chap. 46, held not applicable where the policy had been issued and the death had occurred prior to the taking effect of the amendment. Beverly v. Northern L. Assn., 112-730.

CHAPTER 7.

OF STIPULATED PREMIUM AND ASSESSMENT LIFE INSURANCE ASSOCIATIONS.

Sec. 1784. Defined.

Members of a mutual benefit association are bound to take notice of and be governed by its by-laws. Fitzgerald v. Metropolitan Acc. Assn., 106-457.

The statutory provisions with reference to mutual benefit associations, held to be applicable to an association organized under such provisions, although it had not fully complied therewith. Crocker v. Hogin, 103-243.

Life insurance companies, except as otherwise specially provided, are incorporated under the general provisions as to the formation of corporations. Krause v. Modern Woodmen, 133-199.

Accident death-blood poisoning. Where the deceased accidentally received a wound on his finger, causing inflammation, which developed into blood poisoning, resulting in his death, such death resulted from a disease which followed as a natural consequence of the physical injury, and was an accidental death within a policy requiring that death must result solely from accidental injuries. Delaney v. Modern Acc. Club, 97 N. W., 91.

Under the constitution of the association known as the Ancient Order of United Workmen, held, that such association, notwithstanding its fraternal character, was in effect a mutual insurance company, and that the supreme lodge of that corporation, being incorporated under the laws of Kentucky, was not authorized to exercise any powers or do business in Iowa without compliance with the laws of Iowa with reference to life insurance companies. State ex rel. v. Miller, 66-26.

Where one of the objects of an association is to pay to the beneficiaries a sum of money upon the death of a member which is to be raised by assessments upon other members it is to be deemed an insurance company. Grimes v. Northwestern Legion of Honor, 64 N. W., 806.

Former provisions of this character, held applicable to a fraternal society such as the Ancient Order of United Workmen, having life insurance and insurance against sickness and disability as its main object. State ex rel. v. Nichols, 78-747.

Mutual aid associations organized to furnish financial aid and benefits to the families of deceased members on the payment of membership fees, dues and assessments, held, not to be within the former provisions as to

life insurance companies. State ex rel. v. Iowa Mut. Aid Assn., 59-125. And see 1798.

A railroad relief association organized by the railroad company for the benefit of employes who participate therein is not a life insurance company. Maine v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 70 N. W., 630.

An employe, member of such association who has accepted the benefits provided for by his contract of membership is bound by the terms of such contract. Ibid.

Sec. 1785. Articles of incorporation.

The president and the board of directors of a mutual life association are both governed by the association's articles of incorporation and the statutes of the state defining and limiting their respective duties and powers. Sherman v. Harbin et al., 100 N. W., 629.

Money judgment against assessment life associations. Where the articles of incorporation of a mutual benefit life insurance association provide that the beneficiaries shall be entitled to a sum equal to what would be realized from an assessment upon all members, as shown by the books, at the time of death, but in no case shall the sum exceed the amount stated in the certificate, and also provide for a mortuary fund, to be raised by assessments, from which death losses shall be paid, and the certificate itself stipulates that the beneficiaries shall receive a definite sum, the amount due to be provided for by assessment, etc., as provided for in the articles of incorporation, the beneficiary is entitled to a money judgment, and not merely a mandatory order to make and pay over the proceeds of an assessment. Thornburg v. Farmers' Life Association, 98 N. W. 105.

The burden is on the defendant association to show that an assessment at the time of the member's death would not have yielded the full amount named in the certificate. Ibid.

Sec. 1786. Name.

The provisions of Code § 1689 as to including the word "mutual" in the name of a mutual company has no application to associations organized under this chapter. Moore v. Union Frat. Acc. Assn., 103-424.

The action of the auditor in determining the name under which the association may do business is not conclusive as to another association claiming a prior right to the use of the same or a similar name. Grand Lodge v. Graham, 65 N. W., 837.

Therefore held, that plaintiff, an association of the character contemplated in this section and authorized to do business under the name of the Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of Iowa, could not enjoin an unincorporated society or voluntary association from using the name, it appearing that defendant had a prior right to the use of such name. Ibid.

Sec. 1787. Conditions for commencing business.

Under the bond given by the president of an assessment life insurance company, the sureties are not liable to a receiver of the company for moneys wrongfully paid by him to one member which were collected for the benefit of another who has in turn been satisfied from funds subsequently collected or for money misappropriated after the expiration of the bond. Sherman v. Harbin, 124-643.

Any act of the president of the association contrary to his duty under its articles of incorporation, even though directed or acquiesced in by the board of directors, constitutes a breach of duty involving liability of the surety on his official bond if it results in loss to the association. Sherman v. Harbin, 125 174.

A new bond executed on re-election for another year is a new and independent undertaking and not a continuance of the bond for the previous year. Ibid.

Auditing the books of the company being no part of the duty of the president, he is not liable under his official bond for not discovering errors overlooked by the auditing committee. Ibid.

The act of the president in diverting the beneficiary fund to the payment of expenses in resisting claims renders him liable on his bond. Ibid. Fidelity bonds of the president of a mutual life association organized under chapter 65, acts of the Twenty-first General Assembly, though running to the association, may be enforced by any one for whose benefit they were executed. Sherman v. Harbin et al., 100 N. W., 622.

While in the enforcement of a claim for a death loss against a mutual benefit association resort must be had in the first place to an action in mandamus to compel a levy of an assessment, yet, where the corporation fails to make the levy at a time when it would be effectual in furnishing the fund for the payment of the claim, and postpones it until long after, when by reason of decrease in the membership in the association it becomes ineffectual, the association may be held liable in damages. Christie v. Iowa L. Ins. Co., 111-177.

In such case interest from the time the money should have been collected and paid over under the terms of the contract may be added. Ibid. The beneficiaries being entitled to the amount realized on particular assessments under their certificates, the misappropriation of an assessment made for a loss under one certificate to the payment of a loss under a different certificate, does not give rise to an action on the bond of the officer making such appropriation at the suit of the receiver of the company. Sherman v. Harbin, 124-643.

The provisions of section 1788 of the Code, that the articles, by-laws, and notices of assessment of assessment life insurance associations shall state the object to which the money to be collected is to be devoted, and that no part of the proceeds shall be applied to any other purpose, apply only to assessments, and not to dues for contingent expenses or fixed charges, such as an agent's commission charge on policy renewals. Schrimplin v. Farmers' Life Assn., 98 N. W., 613.

Assessments-to what applied. Moneys collected from assessment levied in accordance with the provisions of section 1788 of the Code, should be applied on the particular loss for which the assessment, or a specific proportion thereof, was raised, and that neither the association nor its officers were entitled to direct the same to other liabilities or losses. Sherman v. Harbin et al., 100 N. W., 622.

Where benefit assessments levied by a mutual life association belonged to certain of its beneficiaries, and the association's articles contained other provisions for ordinary expenses and those incident to the protection of the association against unjust claims, the association's officers had no authority to use money received from benefit assessments, made to pay death losses, for the payment of expenses incurred in the litigation of alleged unjust claims. Sherman v. Harbin et al., 100 N. W., 629.

By-laws of mutual benefit associations-effect of. Where the bylaws of an insurance company provided several sources from which death losses might be paid, and it was nowhere indicated that an assessment must necessarily be made for each loss, a by-law providing that a beneficiary should be entitled to a sum of money equal to what would be realized from an assessment from all members in good standing at insured's death, not exceeding the amount of the certificate, did not make the levy of an assessment a condition precedent to insurer's liability. Wood v. Farmers' Life Assn., 95 N. W., 226.