right by the defendants, and disregard of public duty by the councils of the city. Injunction granted. Lyman Gilbert, on behalf or the attorney-general, with whom were associated George Biddle and George W. Biddle, Esqs. Moses A. Dropsie, Esq., for defendants. [Leg. Int., Vol. 32, p. 238.] J. M. POWER WALLACE, TRUSTEE FOR MARY FRY, PLAINTIFF, v8. HENRY AUER, Defendant. The business of a gold or silver beater, set up in a quiet dwelling neighborhood and by its noise and concussion unreasonably interfering with the quiet enjoyment, and perhaps safety, of neighboring property, is a nuisance which equity will restrain. Motion for injunction. Opinion delivered June 26, 1875, by ALLISON, P. J.-The bill recites that the plaintiff rented to the defendant premises No. 608 Wood street, for the term of one year from November 26, 1873, for purposes of a dwelling-house. That the defendant converted the back building of the house into a workshop, in which he carried on the business of a gold-beater, and manufacturer of silver leaf. That the adjoining residents complained, that by reason of the noise and concussion incident to said business, their homes were rendered uncomfortable, and the stability of their houses imperilled, and legal redress against plaintiff threatened, for which reason he notified the defendant to remove at the end of his term. The defendant then removed into the adjoining house, 606 Wood street, where he carries on his business from early in the morning until late in the evening. That the effect of this is to seriously impair the comfortable enjoyment of the premises of plaintiff, rendering it impossible to hear conversation, and by the concussion, to shake his house to its foundation, and keep it in a state of constant vibration while the work is in progress, whereby, as plaintiff asserts, the stability of the house is imperilled, and its destruction will be caused, unless the evil complained of is arrested. It is charged that, by reason of the matter of which he complains, the house of the plaintiff has become uninhabitable, and its value as a dwelling utterly destroyed. The prayer of the bill is, that the defendant be enjoined from carrying on his business on the premises which he now occupies. The affidavits read in support of the motion for an injunction fully sustain the existence of the causes of complaint as stated in the bill, not only as to the serious disturbance of the comfort of the inhabitants of 608 Wood street, but to the safety of the building as well. A builder swears that the concussion, if continued, will probably cause the walls to crack, the foundations to settle, and the mortar to fall out. The neighborhood in which this house is situate is devoted to private residences, almost exclusively, and has been so appropriated and used since the present structures were erected. The testimony of owners of neighboring property is, that the value of said property is greatly injured by the business of the defendant, which is carried on from seven in the morning to six in the evening, with only the intermission at noon. That persons who have examined houses of the affiants refuse to rent them, on account of the noise and concussion which result from the pounding incident to defendant's business. The defendant meets the case, as presented in the bill and accompanying affidavits, by a general denial, made by himself, as to the purpose for which he rented premises No. 608 Wood street, from the plaintiff, and the effect produced by his business upon the adjoining house. This is fortified by the affidavits of a builder, who says, that no injury can result from the concussion arising from the business of gold or silver beating; and also of a gold-beater and of a lumber merchant, who deny in a general way, the statements contained in the affidavits filed by plaintiff, but that which they assert is mostly a statement of opinion and belief, and of the condition in which they found the premises of defendant when they were there. These affidavits are not responsive to those of the plaintiff; nor do they attempt to meet the allegations of the owners and occupants of property on Vine street, who are most competent to testify on this subject, being constantly exposed to the annoyance of which they complain; nor are the facts sworn to, of the inability of owners of properties in the block to rent them, and the statements of persons seeking these houses as tenants, and their refusal to lease them, because of the noise and concussion caused by the defendant in the prosecution of his business, answered. The jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin against carrying on business which injuriously affects the property or comfort of his neighbor, is now so firmly established that no one longer doubts it. The foundation of the jurisdiction is that sort of material injury to the property or to the comfort of those who dwell in the neighborhood, which requires on equitable principles the application of a power to prevent, as well as to remedy the evil: Eden on Injunction, 269. To restrain against nuisances is a fruitful subject of chancery jurisdiction: 2 Johns, Chan. R. 164; the term nuisance signifying anything which causes hurt, inconvenience or annoyance to the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another, or to the reasonable enjoyment of the same. In England, injunctions have been granted to restrain injuries resulting from brewhouses, glass-houses, lime-kilns, dye-houses, smelting-houses, chandlers' shops, and pig-stys, when set up in such parts of a town or city as that they inconvenienced the neighborhood: Eden, 264. Our equity jurisdiction is not as extensive as that conferred on courts of equity in England, but under the act of 1836, the power is given to restrain the commission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals. The rights of individuals spoken of are the rights of property: Judge Strong's opinion, Sparhawk vs. The Union Passenger Railway Company, 4 P. F. Smith, 410; he further says, that owners of dwelling-houses have a right to protection against all unlawful noise and disturbance of domestic quiet; noise is an annoyance which may be complained of, and of which courts will take notice. The late Chief Justice Thompson granted an injunction against a tinsmith at the suit of a householder disturbed by the noise of his business. Everything that disturbs in an unreasonable degree the quiet enjoyment of a home or dwelling-house, is a nuisance. A man is to be protected in the enjoyment of his property against all unlawful disturbances, if he does not, by such enjoyment, invade the rights of others: Bonaparte vs. The C. & A. Railroad Company, 1 Baldwin, 230. We think the defendant, in the manner in which he is carrying on his business, is clearly within the principle which warrants the interposition by injunction. It is a case of substantial injury requiring speedy relief, because the injury of which plaintiff complains, interferes to an unreasonable degree, with the quiet enjoyment, to say nothing of the safety, of the houses of the residents of the neighborhood, including that of the plaintiff. The defendant has no right to complain if the injunction presses hard on him. He intruded his business into one of the nost quiet neighborhoods in the city; a neighborhood rendered desirable as a home, in which quiet and rest could be found. This was wholly unnecessary on his part, many portions of the city being given up to business and its attendant noise and turmoil; other portions affording isolation, in which his business could be carried on, causing discomfort to no one. While business is to be fostered and protected against unreasonable objection, the home of the citizen, under the law, has an equal right to be defended against a wanton intrusion that destroys or unrea sonably impairs its enjoyment. Henry C. Titus and George W. Thorn, Esqs., for plaintiff. Wm. A. Manderson and Alexander Thackara, Esqs., for defendant. [Leg. Int., Vol. 32, p. 248.] GOWEN vs. MCPHERSON. A general allegation upon information in an affidavit of defence that another than the plaintiff owns the note in suit, is insufficient. The averment must be more specific as to the source and character of the information. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence. Opinion delivered July 3, 1875, by ALLISON, P. J.—This is an action against a second indorser on a promissory note, who swears to that which we think would be a good defence to this suit, if the note, as stated in the affidavit, is still the property of Alfred G. Miller, who is using the name of Gowen, as plaintiff asserts, to avoid the defence set up in the affidavit. This the defendant swears he has been informed and believes, and expects to be able to prove it true. We have recently held, in more than one instance, that this is not sufficient in a suit upon negotiable paper. That an affiant, who desires to prevent judgment upon copy filed, must be more specific in his statement as to the information, which he asserts in his affidavit, so that the court can judge whether this defence is bona fide or made in general terms, to prevent judgment. Rule absolute. Thomas Hart, Esq., for plaintiff. W. W. Wiltbank, Esq., for defendant. [Leg. Int., Vol. 32, p. 248.] DE HART vs. MCGUIRE. A treasurer's bond, given on his re-election in 1873 for the faithful accounting for funds coming into his hands for the term, will cover funds then remaining in his hands from prior terms. Exceptions to auditor's report distributing fund arising from sale of defendant's property. Opinion delivered July 3, 1875, by ALLISON, P. J.-The contest is between the Shamrock Building Association and the Francis Cooper Saving Fund and Building Association, on judgments entered against James A. McGuire, on official bonds, with whom is joined in the bonds Ann McGuire. The bonds were given to the associations by James A. McGuire, as treasurer. We are of the opinion that the terms of the instruments are broad enough to cover all moneys which were in the hands of defendant when he was re-elected treasurer in 1873. They are conditioned for a faithful accounting for and payment over, of all sums of money which have come into his hands, as treasurer for the term above mentioned. When the old bond was satisfied at the request of the defendant, he had moneys in his hands belonging to the associations, or ought to have had. When the term commenced in 1873, and the bonds now in question were given, whatever moneys had been received in prior years, not properly disbursed, he continued to hold by virtue of his re-election. In effect these moneys passed from the hands of James A. McGuire, as treasurer for 1872, and the years prior to that date, to James A. McGuire, as treasurer, under his election in 1873, and in this sense he received the moneys which were found due to each association by the auditor, under the bonds executed in 1873. Exceptions dismissed and report confirmed. J. D. O'Bryan and E. C. Quin, Esqs., for plaintiff. [Leg. Int., Vol. 32, p. 248.] WISTAR, TO USE, ETC., vs. CAMPBELL. A surrender and acceptance of premises stops rent within the meaning of a recognizance on certiorari. Rule for judgment for want of sufficient affidavit of defence. Opinion delivered July 3, 1875, by ALLISON, P. J.-This is a suit on a recognizance on certiorari. The condition is to pay costs and rent that then had accrued, or might thereafter accrue, to the final determination of the cause. The affidavit of Olhs, the principal debtor, is, that on the 14th day of November, 1872, he removed from and gave up peaceable possession to plaintiff. Hiram Campbell, the surety, swears that Olhs, before the finding of the sheriff's jury, did deliver up quiet possession of said premises to plaintiff, who accepted the same. This constitutes a clear assertion of an acceptance by plaintiff of the surrender of the term, which, if proved, would defeat his action. Rule discharged. A. M. Burton, Esq., for plaintiff. [Leg. Int., Vol. 32, p. 256.] BARTON et al. vs. MORRIS et al. A farmer who sells the product of his own farm, and occasionally that of his neighbor, cannot be rated as a dealer in goods, commodities, within the meaning of the mercantile tax law. In equity. Opinion delivered July 3, 1875, by BIDDLE, J.-The complainants in this case allege that they are farmers residing in the adjacent counties of Chester, Delaware and Montgomery, and that they have stands in the various public markets of Philadelphia, where, twice a week, they sell the products of their own farms, and occasionally somewhat from that of a neighbor. That they have recently been rated by the appraisers of mercantile taxes, in the 14th class of "dealers in goods, wares, merchandise, commodities or effects of whatsoever kind or nature," and are now required to pay the State tax appropriate to that class. The act under which this claim is made was passed on the 4th of May, 1841, and does not appear ever before to have had the signification given to it which is now placed upon it by the appraisers. On the contrary, for thirty-four years, all those whose duty it was to enforce it, and the succeeding Legislatures, who must naturally have been aware of the construction put upon it, have acquiesced in considering it as having no application to those situated as complainants. Most of the occupations of life trench on each other, and almost every one performs some function which belongs to a business other than his own. If, by a reference to these occasional and incidental acts, his pursuit is to be determined, he could be rated and taxed under very many heads. The law, however, regards his permanent and regular occupation, and fixes his liability by that, and not by some act which naturally grows out of it. He may, of course, have two distinct callings, and render himself liable to taxation under both. A physician who should open an apothecary shop could not, probably, claim exemption from a tax on druggists because of his profession. Yet if he occasionally compounded prescriptions for his patients, it would hardly be held sufficient to constitute him a vendor of drugs. A dealer is one whose business it is to buy and sell. It is a term of trade having as distinct and well known a signification as that of merchant, mariner or broker. He is the middleman, who stands between the producer and consumer, his profit is not derived from selling the produce of his farm or his factory, but from his skill in knowing when to buy and how to sell the products of others. The Supreme Court has affirmed this to be the legal definition of the phrase. In Norris vs. Commonwealth, 3 Casey, 494, where an attempt was made to tax, as dealers, Norris Brothers, who made and sold locomotives, the court said, a dealer is not one who buys to keep, or makes to sell, but one who buys to sell again. So in Commonwealth vs. Campbell, 9 Casey, 380, which was the case of a tanner who sold his leather, the court reiterate their definition, and expressly overrule Berks County vs. Bertolet, 13 State Rep. 522, in which too wide a definition had been given to the meaning of the word "dealer;" the definition there being what the respondents contend for |