of a citizen to make his own contract is not to be presumed in the absence of express and apt words compelling that construction. I am of opinion that the term "day's work" is used, and so intended, as a unit representing both the term of labor and the right of compensation for such term. This definition does not prohibit or preclude the making of a special contract which does not adopt such unit as an element of the contract itself, but relates merely to specific employment for specific defined periods of time not referable to the standard of a day's work. It may be that the Legislature had in mind, by reason of its designation of conductors, drivers and motormen, not merely the rights or the protection of the laborer or employee, but the interests and safety of the public; and that the enactment is based upon the judgment of the Legislature, speaking for the public, that employment in the exacting service of operating electric cars for more than the number of hours limited within the twenty-four would be dangerous to the travelling public, because labor protracted beyond such limited hours would tend to impair, through fatigue, the efficiency of the men to whose care the safety of the travelling public was committed. But this possible occasion for, or intent of, the legislation, does not warrant a construction that would require a new significance to be given to the words "day's work" as a term in a contract. See 1 Op. Atty.Gen. 10. Your second inquiry is based upon a statement of facts as follows: "Conductors and motormen are employed in the case cited from 5.30 A.M. to 12 midnight, with a lay-off from 10.45 A.M. to 6.15 P.M., not doing their day's work in twelve consecutive hours." Assuming that such schedule is based upon the special contract above referred to, for the reasons heretofore given I am required to hold that this arrangement is not in violation of the section which I have above cited. Your third inquiry states that: "A conductor and motorman may work from 5.30 A.M. to 11.50 A.M. and from 5.10 P.M. to 10.30 P.M., making eleven hours and forty minutes of actual platform work, and also exceeding the twelve consecutive hours." Here, again, assuming the existence of the special contract, I have to say, for the reasons above set forth, that I am of the opinion that this arrangement is permissible, because not in conflict with the provisions of the same section. To the Super- 1902 October 24. PAUPER LAW MILITARY SETTLEMENT DESERTION. A person is not debarred from gaining a settlement under the provisions of R. L., c. 80, § 1, cl. 10, by reason of the fact that he absented himself from his command, and was thereafter found serving with other troops and was returned to his original regiment, where he remained until honorably discharged from the service of the United States, there being no evidence that such person was ever proved guilty of desertion. In a communication dated September 22, you desired my opinion upon a question with regard to the settlement of a pauper under the provisions of R. L., c. 80, § 1, cl. 10. It appears that the pauper in question "enlisted in Company H, Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry, August 22, 1862, and deserted therefrom on or about the fifteenth day of May, 1864. Under the name of Arthur Bryant he re-enlisted, August 6, 1864, in Company C, Second Infantry, and received a bounty of $325. On June 28, 1865, he was reclaimed as a deserter and returned to the Twenty-ninth Infantry. He was honorably discharged from the service of the United States on the twentyninth day of July, 1865." It is admitted that the pauper would have gained a settlement under the provisions of this clause unless prevented therefrom by the fact that in May, 1864, he absented himself from his command, and was thereafter found serving with other troops, and was returned to his original regiment, where he remained until he received an honorable discharge. I am of opinion that he was not so prevented. The statute in terms provides that, if other conditions are fulfilled, a pauper shall lose the benefit of this clause only when he has been proved guilty of desertion; and it is not enough that a person claiming settlement by virtue of such provisions was absent from duty or was even arrested for desertion, if there is no evidence that such person was convicted or sentenced therefor. Fitchburg v. Lunenburg, 102 Mass. 358, 361. I am aware of no technical signification which would render the words "reclaimed as a deserter" equivalent to a statement that the person to whom they relate was proved guilty of desertion; and, assuming that they are used in their ordinary sense, I am of opinion that there is no evidence disclosed by the record, as quoted in your letter, that the pauper in question was ever proved guilty of desertion within the meaning of the statute, and that such person is therefore entitled to claim a settlement under the provisions of R. L., c. 80, § 1, cl. 10. - CIVIL SERVICE - RE-EMPLOYMENT OF EMPLOYEE DISCHARGED St. 1895, c. 449, entitled "An act to revise the charter of the city of Boston," which provides in § 27 that officers and employees of any department of the city whose positions were abolished or whose tenure of office was affected by the act might be appointed to positions in any department of the city without civil service examination or enrolment, serves to exempt from the operation of the civil service law and rules an employee discharged by reason of such revision, although the re-employment of such employee is deferred until seven years after his discharge. Service Com 1902 I beg to reply to your communication of October 8, requesting To the Civil my opinion upon the construction to be given to St. 1895, c. mission. 449, § 27. This statute is entitled "An act to revise the charter November 3. of the city of Boston," creating certain departments of the city of Boston, and abolishing or consolidating some of those already existing. Section 27 is as follows: "The officers and employees of any department who may be removed from the service of the city, or whose tenure of office may be affected by the provisions of this act or the carrying out thereof, may be appointed to positions in any department of said city without civil service examination or enrolment." It appears that, at the time when the statute took effect, one Townsend was, and had been since 1890, employed in the labor division of the water department of Boston, in a branch of the service which was abolished under the provisions of this act. On August 5, 1902, more than seven years after the discharge of Mr. Townsend, consequent upon the abolition of the department in which he was employed, the present water commissioner of the city of Boston notified the Civil Service Commissioners that he had appointed Townsend an inspector in the water department, a position in the first division of the classified service, without any requisition, examination or certification by the Civil Service Commissioners, claiming to act therein under authority of § 27, above quoted. Your letter further states that: "The specific question upon these reported facts is, whether William H. Townsend was legally appointed inspector in the water department in August, 1902, solely under and by virtue of § 27 of c. 449 of the Acts of 1895, without requisition or certification." Although the question is not free from doubt, I am of opinion that the appointment of Townsend was legal under the provisions of St. 1895, c. 449, § 27. The obvious purpose of § 27 was to provide for the appointment in other departments of officers and employees of the city of Boston who were thrown out of office or employment by the abolition or consolidation of the departments with which they were connected by the legislation of 1895, without subjecting them to the inconvenience and delay of taking a civil service examination, and awaiting their turn for appointment upon the classified lists of the service. The section does not in terms limit the time within which such appointments may be made, and I can see no valid ground for reading such a limitation into the act by implication. If the statute were construed to require, by implication, the immediate appointment to positions in the service of the city of Boston of persons displaced therefrom by St. 1895, c. 449, even allowing a reasonable time for arranging for transfers or re-employment, it would follow that a separate adjudication would be necessary in the case of each appointment to determine what should constitute a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, with the possible result that an adverse conclusion would deprive the person for whose advantage § 27 was enacted of the very benefit which it was intended to confer. I cannot believe that such was the intent of the Legislature, and I am therefore constrained to advise you that, in my opinion, the appointment of Mr. Townsend as inspector in the water department of the city of Boston was authorized under the provisions of St. 1895, c. 449, § 27, although made without requisition upon or certification by your commission. Upon this view of the question it seems unnecessary to reply to the general inquiries submitted. The Board of Commissioners of the Firemen's Relief Fund is authorized under existing statutes to discontinue the allowance of $400 established by such Board to widows of deceased firemen, under the provisions of St. 1892, c. 177, in view of the payment of $1,000 designated and established for such purpose by R. L., c. 32, § 77. of Commis To the Board Firemen's 1902 You desire the opinion of this department upon the question "whether it is obligatory to pay to the widows of deceased firemen killed in the service anything in addition to the amount now granted to minor children." You state that, in accordance with November 7. the provisions of § 77 of c. 32 of the Revised Laws, an allowance of $2 per week is given to such children under sixteen years of age; and that, prior to the enactment of the statute authorizing the State Treasurer to pay $1,000 to widows or dependents, under § 32 of above cited chapter of the Revised Laws, your Board has allowed $400 for death claims, $100 of which was for funeral expenses; and you further state that since the later enactment your Board has discontinued the death allowance of $400. R. L., c. 32, §§ 71-77, inclusive, contain provisions relating to the firemen's relief fund, § 71 providing that the sum of $10,000 shall be paid by the Treasurer of the Commonwealth to the treasurer of the association, from money received from taxes on fire insurance companies doing business in this Commonwealth, and that such sum shall be known as the firemen's relief fund of Massachusetts. Sections 73, 74 and 77 of said chapter provide as follows: "Section 73. Such fund shall be used for the relief of firemen, |