163 That the pretended statute of March 6, 1893, was not a law of the state of Indiana (for reasons not insisted on in this court), and that on July 11, 1893, the plaintiff, reserving its rights to contest the validity of that statute, filed with the auditor of the state a statement and return, as therein required,-a copy of which was annexed, and which included substantially the same objections as were stated in the bill. and showed that the entire mileage of the company was 189,576 miles, 6,436 of which were in the state of Indiana; that it had no real es tate, machinery, and appliances in Indiana subject to local taxation; that the cost of its real estate in other states was $5,013,326, and the amount of its outstanding mortgage bonds was $1,211,000. had been, a corporation of the state of New York, | plant; and could be replaced by an entirely That the "portion of said telegraphic plant, situated within said state of Indiana, is of the actual cash value of $686,126, the said cash value being ascertained by taking the cost of original construction, as nearly as the same can be ascertained, and deducting therefrom a sum partially equal to the depreciation of the 2d. The number of shares of capital stock issued and outstanding, and the par or face value of each share. 3d. Its principal place of business. 4th. The market value of said shares of stock on the 1st day of April next preceding, and if such shares have no market value, then the actual value thereof. 5th. The real estate, structures, machinery, fixtures, and appliances owned by said association, company, copartnership, or corporation, and subject to local taxation within the state, and the location and assessed value thereof in each county or township where the same is assessed for local taxation. 6th. The specific real estate, together with the permanent improvements thereon, owned by such association, company, copartnership, or corporation, situate outside the state of Indiana and not directly used in the conduct of the business, with a specific description of each such piece, where located, the purpose for which the same is used, and the sum at which the same is assessed for taxation in the locality where situated. 7th. All mortgages upon the whole or any part of its property, together with the dates and amount thereof. 8th. (a) The total length of the lines of said association or company. (b) The total length of so much of their lines as is outside the state of Indiana. (c) The length of the lines within each of the counties and townships within the state of Indiana. Sec. 5. Upon the filing of such statements, the auditor of state shall examine them, and each of them, and if he shall deem the same insufficient, or in case he shall deem that other information is resite, he shall require such officer to make such other and further statements as said auditor of state may call for. In case of the failure or refusal of any association, company, copartnership, or corporation to make out and deliver to the auditor of state any statement or statements required by this act, such association, company, copartnership, or corporation shall forfeit and pay to the state of Indiana $100 for each additional day such report is delayed beyond the 1st day of June, to be sued and That the state board of tax commissioners on August 21, 1893, made its assessment and valuation of the plaintiff's property in Indiana, deducting the real estate, structures, machinery, and apparatus within the state and subject to local taxation, at the sum of $2,297,652, and at the rate of $357 per mile of telegraph line; "and, in fixing said valuation upon complainant's said property in Indiana, acted under and by virtue of the assumed authority of said pretended statute, approved March 6, 1893, and placed upon complainant's said *property [7 additional values, beyond the true cash value of complainant's said property as measured by the cost of replacement of the same, making recovered in any proper form of action, in the name of the state of Indiana, on the relation of the auditor of state, and such penalty, when collected, shall be paid into the general fund of the state. Sec. 6. Upon the meeting of the state board of tax commissioners for the purpose of assessing railroad and other property, said auditor of state shall lay such statements, with such information as may have been furnished him, before said board of tax commissioners, who shall thereupon value and assess the property of each association, company, copartnership, or corporation in the manner hereinafter set forth, after examining such statements, and after ascertaining the value of such properties therefrom, and from such other information as they may have or obtain. For that purpose they may require the agents or officers of said association, company, copartnership, or corporation to appear before them with such books, papers, or statements as they may require; or they may re quire additional statements to be made to them. and may compel the attendance of witnesses in case they shall deem it necessary to enable them to ascertain the true cash value of such property. Sec. 7. Said state board of tax commissioners shall first ascertain the true cash value of the entire property owned by said association, company, copartnership, or corporation from said statements or otherwise, for that purpose taking the aggregate value of all the shares of capital stock, in case said shares have a market value, and in case they have none, taking the actual value thereof or of the capital of said association, company, copartnership, or corporation, in whatever manner the same is divided, in case no shares of capital stock have been issued: Provided, however, that in case the whole or any portion of the property of such association, company, copartnership, or corporation shall be encumbered by a mortgage or mortgages, such board shall ascertain the true cash value of such property by adding to the market value of the aggregate shares of stock, or to the value of the capital, in case there shall be no such shares, the aggregate amounts of such mortgage or mortgages, and the result shall be deemed and treated as the true cash value of the property of such association, company, copartnership, or corporation. Such board of tax reasonable allowances for deterioration, by adding values of complainant's business, property, and goodwill, both in and outside of Indiana, and franchises granted by the state of New York, the United States and foreign countries: and in witness thereof caused to be entered upon the official record of said board, required by law to be kept by said board, on said August 21, 1893, the following statement and certificate: "That, in making said assessment, said state board of tax commissioners assumed to take as the basis thereof the value of the entire capital stock of complainant, at a valuation per share based upon the price of the shares of complainant's capital stock dealt in in the stock exchange market of New York city, dividing such aggregate value by the total number of miles of telegraph line of complainant, wher ever situated, and both in and outside of "In accordance with the requirements of Indiana, and thereby obtaining a pretended the act of the general assembly of the state of valuation per mile of the telegraph line of Indiana, approved March 6, 1893, the state complainant, amounting to the said sum of [8 board of tax commissioners, after full consid- $357 per mile, which said pretended valuation eration, does hereby assess and value telegraph, per mile said board. acting under the authortelephone, palace car, sleeping car, drawing-ity of said pretended statute, imputed to and room car, dining car, express, and fast freight, imposed upon each mile of the whole numjoint stock associations, companies, copartner- ber of complainant's telegraph line in Indiana, ships and corporations transacting business in thereby imputing to and imposing upon the the state of Indiana, which assessment and whole telegraph line of complainant in Indiana, valuation are as follows, to wit: Assessment which is of the length of 6,436 miles, said preand valuation of telegraph and telephone com- tended valuation of $2,297,652, which said panies in the state of Indiana by the state pretended valuation is grossly excessive and far board of tax commissioners for the year 1893, beyond the true cash value of complainant's exclusive of real estate, structures, machinery, said property in Indiana. fixtures and appliances subject to local taxation within the state.' The first line under that heading was: "Western Union Telegraph Company. Miles, 6,436. Per mile, $357. Total, $2,297,652." "That the state board of tax commissioners, during its said session in the year 1893, did not attempt to specify or describe the property of complainant, falling within the description of real estate, structures, machinery, and appliances subject to local taxation. commissioners shall, for the purpose of ascertaining the true cash value of the property within the state of Indiana, next ascertain, from such statements or otherwise, the assessed value for taxation, in the localities where the same is situated, of the several pieces of real estate situate without the state of Indiana and not specifically used in the general business of such associations, companies, coparnerships, or corporations, which said assessed values for taxation shall be by said board deducted from the gross value of the property as above ascertained. Said state board of tax commissioners shall next ascertain and assess the true cash value of the property of such associations, companies, copartnerships, or corporations within the state of Indiana, by taking the proportion of the whole aggregate value of said associations, companies, copartnerships, or corporations, as above ascertained, atter deducting the assessed value of such real estate without the state, which the length of the lines of said associations, companies, copartnerships, or corporations in the case of telegraph and telephone companies within the state of Indiana bears to the total length of the lines thereof: and in the case of palace, drawing-room, sleeping, dining, or chair car companies, the proportion shall be the proportion of such aggregate value, after such deductions, which the length of the lines within the state, over which said cars are run, bears to the length of the whole lines over which said cars are run; and in the case of express companies, the proportion shall be the proportion of the whole aggregate value, after such deductions, which the length of the lines or routes within the state of Indiana bears to the whole length of the lines or routes of such associations, companies, copartnerships, or corporations; and such amount so ascertained shall be deemed and held as the entire value of the property of said associations, companies, copartnerships, or corporations within the state of Indiana. From the entire value of the property within the state, so ascertained, there shall be deducted, by said board, the assessed value for taxation of all the real estate, structures, machinery, and appliances within the state and subject to local taxation in the counties and townships as herein before described in item No. 5 of 88 1 | "That said state board of tax commissioners, in reaching said valuation of complainant's said property in Indiana, did not consider and assess the value of the property of complainant situated in Indiana, otherwise than pursuing the requirements of said pretended statute. "That neither on April 1, 1893, nor at any time prior or subsequent thereto, was there any market value for all the shares of the capital stock of complainant;" that the whole number of shares was 948,200, of the par value 4 of this act; and the residue of such value so ascertained, after deducting therefrom the assessed value of such local properties, shall be, by said board, assessed to said association. Sec. 8. Said state board of tax commissioners shall thereupon ascertain the value per mile of the property within the state by dividing the total value, as above ascertained, after deducting the specific properties locally assessed within the state, by the number of miles within the state; and the result shall be deemed and held as the value per mile of the property of such association, company, copartnership, or corporation within the state of Indiana. Sec. 9. Said state board of tax commissioners shall thereupon, for the purpose of determining what amount shall be assessed by it to said association, company, copartnership, or corporation in each county in the state through, across, into, or over which the line of said association, company, copartnership, or corporation extends, multiply the value per mile, as above ascertained, by the number of miles in each of such counties, as reported in said statements or as otherwise ascertained, and the result thereof shall be, by said board, certified to the auditor of state, who shall thereupon certify the same to the auditors, respectively, of the several counties through, into, over, or across which the lines or routes of said association, company, copartnership, or corporation extend: and such auditors shall apportion the amount certified for their counties, respectively, among the several townships into, through, over, or across which such lines or routes extend, in proportion to the length of the lines in such townships. Sec. 10. To enable said county auditors to properly apportion the assessments between the several townships, they are authorized to require the agent of said association or company to report to them, respectively, under oath, the length of the lines in each township; and the auditor shall thereupon add to the value so apportioned the assessed valuation of the real estate, structures, machinery, fixtures, and appliances situated in any township, and extend the taxes thereon upon the duplicates. as in other cases. 163 of $100 each; that the number of shares sold | of the value of 40 per cent of the value of the "That any price at which any or all shares of complainant might be sold, by any holder or holders thereof, whether such price be calculated upon any market value or upon actual value, includes, amongst other things, a consideration of franchises of great value owned or exercised by complainant, granted by the state of New York, by the United States, by Canada, by Great Britain, by Cuba, and by other states, countries, and municipalities; a consideration of complainant's goodwill, its past earnings from every source, its probable future earnings from every source, the business ability, enterprise, and skill of the present managers of complainant's business, the probable continuance of business ability, enterprise, and skill in the future management of complainant's business; the contract and other re9]lations of complainant to powerful *railroad, telephone, and cable companies; a consideration of the real estate of complainant situated in the city of New York, which is of great value, to wit, of the value of $3,500,000, and in the city of Chicago, which is of great value, to wit, of the value of $1,700,000, and of the real estate of complainant of great value, situated in many other states and countries, none of which is situated in the state of Indiana; as well as the consideration of the actual value of all complainant's telegraph lines, poles, wires, conduits, instruments, appliances, and office furniture, including that which is situated in Indiana and taxable by the state of Indiana. "That, in estimating such market or actual value of the shares of the stock of complainant, the values of said intangible franchises, rights, contracts, earnings, business, business ability, enterprise, skill, and management, and goodwill, and of all said real and personal | estate of complainant, are blended so as to render it impossible to separate and distinguish the portions of value applicable to any or each of said elements of value of said shares." That the plaintiff was the owner of many thousand miles of telegraph in the states of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, and in other densely populated portions of the United States, of the cost and value of $2,500 per mile on the average, and requiring great expenditures for the maintenance thereof; of many thousand miles of cable under the high seas, of the cost and value of $3,500 per mile on the average; and of many thousands of miles of telegraph in uninhabited or sparsely inhabited portions of the United States and Mexico, which, by reason of the great cost of transportation of material, and cost of maintenance, were of great cost and value; that all the plaintiff's lines in the state of Indiana, by reason of the proximity to supplies of material, and the very cheap transportation, were of minimum value, as compared with the plaintiff's lines situated elsewhere; and that, by reason of these facts, the average mile of the telegraph line of the plaintiff in Indiana was That the plaintiff duly accepted the provisions of the act of Congress of July 24, 1866, chap. 230, now U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 5263, 5269; that all the telegraph lines owned or operated by the plaintiff in Indiana were constructed upon railroads, streets, and other post roads of the United States, and thereby the plaintiff was an agent of the United States in the transmission of intelligence by electricity; and that the statute of Indiana of March 6, 1893, and the assessment of the valuation of the plaintiff's property under that statute rendered its property in Indiana substantially valueless, and prevented it from performing its obligations to the United States. That much of the plaintiff's capital stock, to the amount of $7,633,230, "is invested in and represented by the capital stock and bonds of other telegraph and telephone corporations, whose telegraph or telephone plants are leased to or operated by complainant, which said telegraph or telephone corporations possess no property in the state of Indiana, and do not own or use any franchise granted by the state of Indiana, and are wholly situated outside of the state of Indiana. "That the attempted and pretended valuation of complainant's said property by said state board of tax commissioners, in manner aforesaid, upon the value of complainant's shares of stock, whether said board pretended to value said property upon a basis which included the consideration or estimation of market value or actual value of the shares of stock of complainant, necessarily includes, and does in fact include, values which are no part of the true cash value of the property of complainant in Indiana; but are imputed and ficti tious values *distributed to complainant's [11 said property in Indiana, as portions of the value of the business, business ability, enterprise, and skill of complainant, of the real and personal estate owned and leased by complainant and outside of the state of Indiana, and of complainant's franchises granted by states other than Indiana and municipalities outside of Indiana and by the United States and by foreign states and nations, and of the contract relations and other relations existing between complainant and other corporations, all of which said property, things in action, and other things and matters of value, are beyond the jurisdiction of the state of Indiana, whether for the purpose of taxation or for any other purpose.' That the auditor of the state, on September 15, 1893, certified the valuation aforesaid to the auditors of the counties through which the plaintiffs' telegraph lines extended; and that the county auditors were engaged in apportioning | 241; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Seay, 132 U. S. and distributing the same among the town- 472 (33: 409), 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 726; Lyngv. ships, and were preparing to deliver tax dupli- Michigan, 135 U. S. 165 (34: 153), 3 Inters. cates to the county treasurers, to the end that Com. Rep. 143. they might collect the tax from the plaintiff. That the statute of 1893, chap. 171, was contrary to the Constitution of Indiana in various particulars pointed out (but not now relied on), and that this statute, and the assessment and valuation of the plaintiff's property by the state board of tax commissioners in compliance with its provisions, levied a tax upon interstate and international commerce, in violation of U. S. Const. art. 1, § 8, and deprived the plaintiff of its property without due process of law, and denied it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. The defendants demurred generally to the bill. The court sustained the demurrer, and, the plaintiff declining to amend its bill, entered final judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court of Indiana, which affirmed the judgment. 141 Ind. 281. The plaintiff thereupon sued out this writ of error. Messrs. John F. Dillon, Rush Taggart, Alpheus H. Snow, Willard Brown, and Charles W. Wells, for plaintiff in error: In the method of valuation prescribed by the statute and in the assessment now in question actually made by the board of assessors pursuant to the statute there was necessarily included a valuation of the Federal franchises of the plaintiff in error, which Federal franchises, or the value thereof, are not taxable by the state of Indiana. Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 96 U. S. 1 (24: 708); California v. Central P. R. Co. 127 U. S. 1 (32: 150), 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 153; Minot v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co ("Delaware R. Tax") 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 206 (21: 888); Taylor v. Secor ("State R. Tax Cases") 92 U. S. 575 (23: 663); Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 (31: 790): Massachusetts v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 141 U. S. 40 (35: 628); People, Union Trust Co., v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. 433, 12 L. R. A. 762: People, Manhattan R. Co.. v. Barker, 146 N. Y. 304; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 316 (4: 579); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U. S 9 Wheat. 738 (6: 204); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 419 (6: 678); Thomson v. Union P. R. Co. 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 579 (19: 792); Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 5 (21: 787); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 34 (35: 621), 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (39: 311), 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 1. If the tax levied by a state is upon a Federal "franchise" it is settled that it is unconstitutional. Weston v. Charleston, 27 U. 8. 2 Pet. 449 (7: 481). Nor is the Western Union Telegraph Company, having accepted the act of Congress of July 24, 1866, subject to have imposed on it a license tax by the state of Indiana. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32: 311), 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129 (32: 368), 2 Inters. Com. Rep. A state may tax the "property" of a corporation having a Federal franchise, but it cannot tax the "Federal franchises" of a corporation. California v. Central P. R. Co. 127 U. S. 1 (32: 150), 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 153. Clearly such a tax on the Federal franchise of the Western Union Company would be void. Is it any less invalid by being (as in this case) included in a general assessment in which the value of the "franchises" and of the "property" of the company are combined. None of the cases cited by the attorney general of Indiana so hold. Such a holding is in conflict with the decisions or the principle of the decisions of this court in the following cases. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432 (24: 760); New York v. New York Tax Comrs. 67 U. S. 2 Black, 620 (17: 451); New York v. New York Tax Comrs. ("Bank Tax Case") 69 U. S. 2 Wall, 200 (17: 793). The necessary effect of the method of taxation adopted by the taxing authorities of Indiana in this case was to bring within the operation of the statute of Indiana property, or the value of property, of the telegraph company outside of the state of Indiana. Such taxation cannot be deemed due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and therefore the stat ute requiring or permitting such a mode of assessment, and the assessment made under it, must be treated as unconstitutional and void. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 446 (38: 1046), 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 677; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 431 (38: 1038). The case at bar is distinguishable from and not controlled by the Indiana railway cases. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, and Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, supra. The mode prescribed or allowed by the stat ute (act of March 9, 1893, § 7), viz., the market value of its shares, etc., for ascertaining the true cash valuation of the entire property of the plaintiff in error, which mode it is admitted on the record was followed by the tax commissioners of Indiana in arriving at the assessment now complained of, is a mode under which, as applied to the plaintiff in error, it is legally impossible that it should result in ascertaining the true cash value of the property of the plaintiff in error within the state of Indiana, and therefore such assessment upon the plaintiff in error (which is a Federal agency and engaged in interstate commerce), is in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution and of the 14th Amendment thereto. Messrs William A. Ketcham, Attorney General of Indiana, Judson Harmon, and Alonzo Greene Smith, for defendants in error: The act of March 6, 1891, concerning taxation, etc. (Acts of 1891, pp. 199-291; Burns' Anno. Rev. of 1894, §§ 8408 et seq.), and the act of March 6, 1893, supplementary to and amendatory thereof (Acts of 1893, pp. 374-383; Burns' Anno. Rev. of 1894, SS 8494-8506), are in pari materia and should be construed to gether as a homogeneous system providing for | uses to which it can be put, its surroundings, the taxation of all property in the state. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Taggart, 141 Ind. 281. Therefore the constitutionality of the act of March 6, 1893, cannot be considered as providing a separate system entirely distinct from the act of March 6, 1891. So construed, the legislation attacked in this action is valid and constitutional, and is not subject to the objection tendered by the com. plaint of the plaintiff in error. By such legislation and the action of the state board of tax commissioners in compliance therewith the plaintiff in error was deprived of its property without due process of law. By such legislation and the action of the state board in compliance therewith the plaintiff in error was deprived of the equal protection of the laws. By such legislation and the action of the state board in compliance there with the state of Indiana had levied a duty on imports. By such legislation and the action of the state board in compliance there with the state of Indiana had levied a tax either upon interstate or foreign commerce. Taylor v. Secor ("State R. Tax Cases") 92 U.S. 575 (23: 663); Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky ("Kentucky R. Tax Cases") 115 U. S. 321 (29: 414); Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 431, 438, 439 (38: 1038, 1040). The system of assessing and levying a tax upon property that has a unity of character, existence, and operation in several states, based upon the proportion that the mileage within bears to the mileage without the state, is in accord with the requirements of the United States Constitution. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 (31: 790); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Hayward, 131 U. S. 36 (35: 621); Massachusetts v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 141 U. S. 40 (35: 628); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (35:613), 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595. Whether it is or not, the statutes of the state of Indiana, providing for the assessment of telegraph, telephone, etc., companies, does not require or permit the state board of tax commissioners to assess a valuation based only on the proportion that the mileage within bears to the mileage without the state, but requires it to assess and determine the true cash value of the property within the state, and in such assessment permits and requires the board to take into consideration such proportion upon the mileage basis, with all other matters that will enable it to ascertain and determine the true cash value of the property to be assessed. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Henderson, 68 Fed. Rep. 589. The value of any given piece of property is not necessarily properly represented by the cost of construction less the depreciation that has taken place since the original construction. Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470 (38: 240). The value of any given piece of property is not necessarily to be determined by the cost of reproduction or replacement. Essential ingredients to be considered in determining the value of any property are the whether it can or cannot be made to produce earnings in its ordinary operation, and a valuation made after considering these in connection with such other matters as tend to show the value cannot be said to be a valuation of the earnings, the income, or the surroundings. Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470 (38: 240); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439 (38: 1041), 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 677; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 18 L. R. A. 729. A telegraph company is as essentially and properly a unit in its existence and operation as a railroad company, and in order to properly ascertain the value to be placed thereon it is proper to pursue the same methods and apply the same principles that have been pursued and applied to ascertain the value of railroad property. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Poe, 69 Fed. Rep. 557; Western_U. Teleg. Co. v. Taggart, 141 Ind. 281; Union P. R. Co. v. United States ("Sinking Fund Cases"), 99 U. S. 718 (25: 501). Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: It is not and cannot be doubted that each state of the Union may tax all property, real and personal, within its borders, belonging to persons or corporations, although employed in interstate or foreign commerce, provided the rights and powers of the national government are not interfered with. Minot v. Philadel phia, W. & B. R. Co. ("Delaware R. Tax") 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 206, 232 [21: 888, 896]; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 464 [26: 1067, 1068]; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Atty. Gen. 125 U. S. 530 [31: 790]; Marye v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 127 U. S. 117, 123, 124 [32: 94, 96, 97]; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 649 [32: 311, 314, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134]; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 [35: 613, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595]; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439, 445 [38: 1041, 1046, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 677]. The principal grounds upon which the plaintiff contends that the statute of Indiana of March 6, 1893, chap. 171, is unconstitutional, and the valuation and assessment of the plaintiff's property under it invalid, are that they necessarily included a taxation of franchises granted to the plaintiff by the United States, as well as of the plaintiff's property outside of the state of Indiana, neither of which was subject to that taxation in that state; and also by taking the market value of shares of the plaintiff's stock, in fixing the valuation of the entire *property of the plaintiff, and by apportion [15 ing that valuation according to the proportion thereof within the state of Indiana, of all the plaintiff's telegraph lines every where, adopted an arbitrary rule and imposed an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce. But in each of these respects the case presented by this record appears to us to be governed by previous decisions of this court. The argument for the plaintiffs in error, in effect, if not in express words, invites the court to modify or to overrule those decisions. It becomes important, therefore, to state somewhat fully the scope and ezant of those decisions, |