citizenship of the parties.

A person having actual notice of an injunction

is amenable thereto, although he was not a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, and has not been served with process, or with notice of application for, or a copy of, the injunc

7. An announcement that he quits the service, made by a locomotive engineer when ordered to take into his train a car which his brotherhood had boycotted, will not relieve him from liability for contempt of an injunction against refusing to receive such cars, when he made the announcement merely as a trick and device to avoid obeying the order of the court, and as soon as he was instructed by the brotherhood, after be had held the train for a few hours, continued with this train to its destination, and said nothing more about quitting.

[No. 254.]

pany, a citizen of Michigan, were defendants. The bill in that case, which was annexed to the petition as an exhibit, averred the com plainant to be the owner of a line of railroad from Toledo, Ohio, northwesterly through the state of Michigan; that a large part of its business consisted in the transportation of freight cars from points in the states of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin to points in Ohio and other states east thereof, and that it was engaged as a common carrier in a large amount of interstate commerce, which was regulated and controlled by the interstate commerce act of Congress. The bill further averred that the defendants' lines of railroad connected with those of complainant at or near Toledo, and that a large and important part of its business consisted in the interchange of freight cars between the defendant and complainant of the interstate commerce act; that it was the companies, and was subject to the provisions duty of the defendant companies to afford reasonable and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, and to receive, forward, and deliver freight cars in the ordinary transaction of business, without any discrimination; that the defendant companies and their employees had given out and threatened that they would refuse to receive from complainant cars billed over its road for transportation by complainant to their destination, for the reason that the complainant had employed *as locomotiveen-[550 gineers in its service men who were not members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, "an irresponsible voluntary association," and that the locomotive engineers in the

1897.

WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United Sixth Circuit to review a decree of that court affirming the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to relieve James Lennon from custody for contempt in disobeying an injunction. Judg. ment of court of appeals affirmed.

See same case below, 54 Fed. Rep. 746, 19 L. R. A. 395, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 22 U. 8. App. 561.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:

This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus originally filed in the circuit court for the northern district of Ohio.

The petitioner alleged that he was a citizen of the state of Ohio, and was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the marshal, under an order of the circuit court of the United States, made in a case pending in that court, wherein the Toledo, Ann Arbor, & North Michigan Railway Company, a corporation of the state of Michigan, was complainant, and several railway companies, citizens of Ohio,

As to suspension of writ of habeas corpus, see note to Luther v. Borden, 12: 581.

As to when an injunction to restrain acts of public officers will be granted, see note to Mississippi v. Johnson, 18: 437.

fused to handle cars to be interchanged with the complainant's road; notwithstanding that they continued to afford the other railroad

change of traffic, while refusing to transact such business with the complainant, thereby illegally discriminating against it.

Upon the filing of this bill, and upon the application of the complainant, the circuit court issued an injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employees, enjoining them from refusing to afford and extend to the Toledo, Ann Arbor, & North Michigan Railway Company the same facilities for an interchange of interstate business between the companies as were enjoyed by other railway companies, and from refusing to receive from the complainant company cars billed from points in one state to points in another state, which might be offered to the defendant companies by the complainant.

The injunction was served upon the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company, one of the defendants, one of whose employees was the appellant, James Lennon, a locomotive engineer, who had received notice of the injunction, and, still continuing in the service of the company, had refused to obey it.

That there is no review of decree punishing for contempt; limits to rule,-see note to New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co. 22: 354.

19: 106.

Dyckman v. New York, 5 N. Y. 434; Jackson ▼. Crawfords, 12 Wend. 533; Betts v. Bagley, 12 Pick. 572; Fisher v. Bassett, 9 Leigh, 119. 131. 33 Am. Dec. 227; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327 [38: 463].

Irrespective of this, however, we think the bill exhibited a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as it appears to have been brought solely to enforce a compliance with the provisions of the Interstate commerce act of 1887, and to compel the defendants to comply with such act, by offer ing proper and reasonable facilities for the interchange of traffic with complainant, and enjoining them from refusing to receive from complainant, for transportation over their lines, any car which might be tendered them. It has been frequently held by this court that a case arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States whenever the party plaintiff sets up a right to which he is entitled under such laws, which the parties defendant deny to him, and the correct decision of the case depends upon the construction of such laws. As was said in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 554] U. S. 257, 264 [25: 648, 651]: *Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, or claim or protection, or defense of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted." See also Starin v. New York, 115 U. S. 257 [29: 390]; Kansas P. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 112 U. S. 414[28:794]; Ames v. Kansas, Johnston, 111 U. S. 462 [28: 487]; New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135 [26: 96].

2. The facts that petitioner was not a party to such suit, nor served with process of subpœna, nor had notice of the application made by the complainant for the mandatory injunction, nor was served by the officers of the court with such injunction, are immaterial, so long as it was made to appear that he had notice of the issuing of an injunction by the court. To render a person amenable to an injunction it is neither necessary that he should have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had actual notice. High, Inj. § 1444; Mead v. Nor ris, 21 Wis. 312; Wellesley v. Mornington, 11 Beav. 181.

Conceding the question whether he had such notice in this case to be open to review here, we are of opinion that upon the facts appear ing in this record this question must be answered, as it was answered in the court below, in the affirmative. The testimony upon this point is fully set forth in the opinion of the circuit court (54 Fed. Rep. 746, 757 [19 L. R. A. 395, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 545]), and it es tablishes beyond all controversy that Lennon had notice and knowledge of the injunction. It appears that, immediately after the injunction order was granted and served upon the Lake Shore Company, the company had copies of the order printed, and attached thereto a notice, signed by its superintendent, calling the attention of employees to the in junction; that printed copies of the injunction and notice were posted on all the bulletin boards at roundhouses where engineers took

their engines, and that it was the duty of engi neers to examine all notices so posted before starting on their runs. That on the morning of the 18th of March, Lennon was upon his engine at Alexis, *making a run with his train[555 from Monroe to Toledo; that on his arrival at Alexis, and before he refused to receive and haul the Ann Arbor car, Mr. Chillcote, an agent of the Lake Shore Company, handed to him (Lennon) a printed copy of said injunction order, and the notice signed by the general superintendent, and he received and examined them.

Mr. Chillcote says: "I handed him these papers and he said he had seen the order; that it was posted somewhere; I think at the roundhouse, I think at Detroit. I wouldn't say positive as to that; but he said he had seen a copy of it. I simply handed it to him, and he said, 'We understand the order,' or 'We have seen the order,' or words to that effect." Chillcote further says: "He stated when I handed him the order, before he read it, that he understood it."

Mr. Keegan testified that he was present when the copy of the order was handed to Lennon, and that he said, "I have seen it before." This occurred about 10 o'clock A. M., and Lennon, after having the copy of the order delivered to him and admitting that he had seen it before and understood it, refused to receive the Ann Arbor car until after 2:30 P. M. when he received a telegram from Mr. Watson, an officer of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, saying, "You can come along and handle Ann Arbor cars," and he then at once proceeded with his train to Toledo, receiving and hauling the Ann Arbor car.

3. To the objection that it was beyond the jurisdiction of a court of equity to compel the performance of a personal contract for service, and to interfere by mandatory injunction with petitioner's contract with the railway company, it is sufficient to say that nothing of the kind was attempted. The petitioner, as one of the employees of the Lake Shore railway, was enjoined from refusing to extend to the Ann Arbor railway such facilities for the interchange of traffic on interstate commerce business between such railways as were enjoyed by other companies, and from refusing to receive from the Ann Arbor Company cars billed from points in one state to points in other states. No attempt was made to interfere with *petitioner's contract with his [556 own company, or to compel a continuance of his service in such company. There could be no doubt of the power of the court to grant this injunction, which bore solely upon the relations of the railway companies to each other. It was alleged in the bill to have been a part of the regular business of the defendant roads to interchange traffic with the Ann Arbor road, and the injunction was sought to prevent an arbitrary discontinuance of this custom. Perhaps, to a certain extent, the injunction may be termed mandatory, although its object was to continue the existing state of things, and to prevent an arbitrary breaking off of the current business connec tions between the roads. But it was clearly not beyond the power of a court of equity, which is not always limited to the restraint

CITY RAILWAY COMPANY, Appt.,

0.

PANY.

It appears from the testimony in this case that Lennon was on his run as engineer from Detroit, Michigan, to Air Line Junction, near Toledo, with a train of forty five cars. Having reached an intermediate station called Alexis, he was ordered to take on an empty car from the Ann Arbor road. He refused to take the car into the train and held the train there for five hours, and then proceeded on his run after receiving a despatch from the chairman of a committee of the Engineer Brotherhood instructing him to "come along and handle Ann Arbor cars." When he first received the order at Alexis to take the Ann Arbor car he refused, and said "I quit," but afterwards agreed with the superintendent of the division to take the train to its destination if the order to take the boycotted car was countermanded. Though he claimed to have quit at Alexis at about 10 o'clock he brought his train to its destination, and when told what his next run would be gave no notice of having quit or intending to quit.

It is not necessary for us to decide whether 557]an engineer may suddenly and without notice quit the service of a railway company at an intermediate station or between stations, though cases may be easily imagined where a sudden abandonment of a trainload of passengers in an unfrequented spot might imperil their safety and even their lives. It is sufficient, in the present case, to observe that the court found, upon the testimony, that the petitioner did not quit in good faith in the morning, but intended to continue in the company's service, and that his conduct was a trick and device to avoid obeying the order of the court.

The finding of the court in this particular is not open to review, and hence the question whether the court has power to compel the performance of a personal contract for service does not arise. It was a question for the court to determine whether the petitioner's action in delaying the train five hours at Alexis was taken in pursuance of a determination to abandon the service of the company, or for the purpose of disobeying the lawful injunction of the court. The finding of the court was against the petitioner upon that point.

There was no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and it is therefore affirmed.

(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 557-571.)

Federal question-statute, when retrospectiveestoppel-consideration-acceptance of franchise-consent by manager-acceptance of ordinance ratification — contract with street railroad.

1.

A claim by a corporation in good faith that it has a contract with a city, which the latter has attempted to impair by a grant to another corporation, is sufficient to give jurisdiction to a circuit court of the United States of a suit to enjoin the latter corporation from interfering with the rights of the former, although both parties are corporations and citizens of the same state.

2. A statute should not be construed to act retrospectively or to affect contracts entered into prior to its passage, unless its language be so clear as to admit of no other construction.

3. A city is estopped to assert that an ordinance extending the franchise of a street-railway company is invalid for want of consideration, as against bondholders who have in good faith invested their money in the bonds of the company relying upon the validity of the ordinance.

4. The continued operation of a street railroad is a sufficient consideration for the extension of its franchise.

5.

No formal resolution of acceptance of the ex

tension of a franchise of a street-railway company is necessary if there is an actual practical acceptance or action which would be explicable only in case of the acceptance.

A consent by the manager of a street-railway company to an ordinance modifying the provision which he sought to have made by an amendment to the ordinance granting the company's franchise obviates the necessity of a subsequent acceptance of the new ordinance by the corporation.

7. The acceptance of an ordinance extending the franchise of a street-railway company may be presumed from the facts that the amendment is beneficial to the corporation, and that it issued bonds falling due at the expiration of the enlarged franchise.

8. A statute allowing cities to permit the use of electricity on street railways ratifies a previous consent by a city to the use of such power, on the faith of which large expenditures have been incurred.

9. A contract by a city with a railway company giving it permission to lay its tracks for streetrailway lines through streets occupied by the lines of another company under a previous unexpired contract with the city is invalid so far as it interferes with the latter company in the construction, operation, and maintenance of its street-car system.

[No. 214.]

Argued March 16, 17, 1897. Decided April 19,

1897.

NOTE.-As to concurrent jurisdiction of state and United States courts as to territory and offenses, see note to United States v. Bevans, 4: 404.

As to what laws are void as impairing obligation of contracts, see note to Fletcher v. Peck, 3: 162. As to retrospective statutes, when valid, see note to Otoe County v. Baldwin, 28: 331.