the evidence, and is not inconsistent with the principles of law applicable. The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. [No. 2172.] TELLER V. HILL. 1. Statute of Uses-Conveyances-Trusts. The statute of uses (27 Henry VIII, chap. 10) is in force in Colorado, and where land is conveyed to one person for the use of or in trust for others, by a deed which expresses a mere passive trust, the legal as well as the equitable title vests thereby in the cestuis que trust and the trustee takes nothing. 2. Same-Judgment Liens. Where land was deeded to one person for the use of others by a deed which merely expressed a passive trust and such deed was recorded, a title in fee was thereby vested in the cestuis que trust, and a transcript of judgment against the cestuis que trust being filed, the judgment lien thus created in favor of the judgment creditors was superior to any secret lien or trust existing in favor of the trustee created by oral agreement between the trustee and the cestuis que trust of which the judgment creditors had no notice. 3. Same-Attorneys' Liens. Where land was conveyed to a trustee for the use of other parties by a deed which expressed a mere passive trust which deed was recorded, a judgment lien created by filing a transcript of judgment against the cestuis que trust was superior to an attorney's lien in favor of the trustee of which the judgment creditors had no notice. 4. Attorneys' Liens-Waiver-Contracts. An agreement between an attorney and his clients whereby the attorney at a sale of land, under a decree obtained by him for his clients was to purchase the property in trust for his clients and sell the same and out of the proceeds pay his fee and costs was a waiver of his attorney's lien. Appeal from the District Court of Arapahoe County. Mr. H. M. TELLER and Mr. JAMES H. TELLER, of counsel. Mr. W. C. KINGSLEY and Mr. RICHARD MCKNIGHT, for appellee. GUNTER, J. September, 1887, Ellen R. Seymour and W. G. Pell, owners of certain mining property, conveyed the same to the Slide and Spur Gold Mines Company (Limited). In 1889, the company having defaulted in the payment of the purchase price of the property so conveyed, the vendors, Seymour and Pell, sued in the United States circuit court for the district of Colorado to have decreed a vendor's lien upon the property sold, and in July, 1890, obtained a decree establishing their lien. September, 1894, the master in chancery sold the property under the decree, and in May following made a deed, pertinent parts of which are as follows: "Now, therefore, I, Adolphus Capron, one of the masters in chancery of the said court, did on the said 24th day of September, A. D. 1894, at one o'clock p. m. of the said day, at the front door of the court house of the county of Boulder, in the city of Boulder, it being the time and place at which the said sale was announced in the said advertisement to take place, offer for sale to the highest bidder for cash the same premises above described, except that in and by the terms of said decree the complainants were allowed at the said sale to bid for said property up to the amount of said decree with interest thereon without paying any cash except sufficient to pay costs, and thereupon Willard Teller bid for the said complainants, in his name for the use of complainants, the sum of $362,000, and he, at that price, being the highest bidder therefor, the same was struck off and sold to the said Willard Teller, and "Whereas, it was further in said decree ordered and decreed that upon said sale the said master in chancery making such sale should make, execute and deliver to the purchaser a deed of the property so sold by him, upon the execution and delivery of which the said defendant, the Slide and Spur Gold Mines Company (Ltd.), its successors and assigns, and all persons claiming through, by or under it, should be forever barred of all right, title or interest in said property, and of all equity of redemption thereof. "Now therefore I, Adolphus Capron, master in chancery aforesaid, do by these presents grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Willard Teller, trustee, and to his heirs and assigns forever the said real estate to have and to hold to the said Willard Teller, trustee, for his heirs and assigns forever." This deed was of date May 11, 1895, and recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county wherein the property was situate May 13, same year. April, 1894, a judgment for $3,571.00 and costs was recovered by appellee Hill against Ellen R. Seymour and W. G. Pell et al., and a transcript thereof was filed in the office of the clerk of the said county of Boulder. In April, 1895, the present action was instituted by appellee for the purpose of subjecting the above mining property conveyed by the deed from the master in chancery to Teller, trustee, to the judgment of appellee, and to have his judgment declared a prior lien to any claim of the appellant Teller. From the judgment awarding appellee the relief prayed the defendant below has appealed. The position of appellee is that the Statute of Uses, 27 Henry VIII, c. 10, operated upon the legal estate conveyed to Teller by the master's deed executing the legal estate and uniting thereby the legal and equitable estate in the cestuis que use, who thus became complete owners of the estate as well at law as in equity; that upon the estate of the cestuis que use Seymour and Pell thus created the transcript of the appellee's judgment by operation of law became a lien, and that such lien was superior to any secret lien existing between appellant Teller, and Seymour and Pell, the beneficiaries under the master's deed. Appellant denies that the Statute of Uses is in force in Colorado. Contends that if it is, it did not operate upon the master's deed, because the trust created thereby and by a certain oral agreement was an active trust, and therefore not within the statute. Further, that the firm of Teller & Orahood had an attorney's lien upon the estate created by the master, superior to the lien created by the transcript of judgment of appellee. 1. We have adopted, along with the common law of England, "all acts and statutes of the British parliament made in aid of or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First" as are of a general nature, except designated statutes.-Mills' Ann. Stats., vol. 2, $4184. That the Statute of Uses was one of the statutes so adopted by this commonwealth, was ruled in Morgan v. Rogers (Cir. Ct. App., 8 Cir.), 79 Fed. 577. No authority is cited to the contrary. 2. The master's deed recites that "complainants Pell and Seymour were allowed to bid without paying any cash except sufficient for costs, and that thereupon Willard Teller bought for complainants in his own name for the use of said complainants Therefore I, Adolphus Capron * grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Willard Teller, trustee, to have and to hold unto * the said Willard Teller, trustee, ** According to the language of this deed Willard Teller purchased the property conveyed for the use of complainants, and it was deeded to him, according to the language of this deed, for the use of complainants, that is, Seymour and Pell. "Recitals are introduced for the purpose of explaining why the deed is executed, or of showing circumstances which preserve the connection in the chain of title, Particular recitals are conclusive evidence of the facts recited in actions in which the purpose of the deed is directly involved."-Devlin on Deeds, § 992. "The rule is well settled that the parties to a deed are bound by the recitals in it legitimately appertaining to the subject-matter, and that this applies to privies in blood, privies in estate and privies in law."-Robbins v. McMillan, 26 Mass. (4 Cush.) 434. There is thus on record a deed wherein the grantor conveys to the grantee certain real estate for the use of third parties. The parties thus created, if we look to the recorded deed alone, an express passive trust. A conveyance of such character is within the Statute of Uses. "Thus, if A. grants or bequeaths land to B. and his heirs, in trust for C. and his heirs, the trustee B. will take nothing in the land, but the legal title, as well as the beneficial use, will vest immediately in C., for the Statute of Uses, so called, executes the possession and the legal title in the same person to whom the beneficial interest is given. A use, a trust and a confidence is one and the same thing, and if an estate is conveyed to one person for the use of or upon a trust for another, and nothing more is said, the statute immediately transfers the legal estate to the use, and no trust is created, al- . though express words of trust are used. So absolute |