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settlement in this country, and that it was continued by the framers of the constitution. They were well aware that in a republic there must be some conservatism, even besides virtue and intelligence, in order to baffle the efforts of designing men, and that conservatism they decided to be a representative system of government. Experience has confirmed the wisdom of their decision. If France had no large cities, and could be at once provided with this system, we might entertain sanguine hopes that the experiment of self-government might succeed in that country, on whose soil so much blood has been shed in the cause of liberty.

A large majority in a republic is more powerful than a king in a limited monarchy. In England, the crown cannot alone oppress the people. If it would oppress at all, it must draw to its aid some class of the people, and it might, by such an alliance, be enabled to oppress the other classes. The English people have passed through the fiery furnace of regal oppression, and so many firm principles of liberty have been engrafted on the constitution by several revolutions, and the barriers against the usurpations of the king's prerogative have become so strong, that without the co-operation of tho other branches of the government, the people have little danger to apprehend from its arbitrary exercise. In a republic the majority passes the laws, and may, if disposed, grievously oppress the minority. The minority may, in a few days, become the majority, and the oppression may reach upon those who recently inflicted it. When matters come to violence, the superiority of a majority in a republic over a king in a monarchy is more striking. The king in arms can offer but feeble opposition to the physical force of a united people; but in a republic the majority will generally have the resources which will give it power to subdue the minority. Hence, the necessity of a written constitution, which may bridle the wills of temporary majorities, and protect minorities from their tyranny. The judiciary is to decide upon the violations of this constitution, and their independence should be strongly secured, so that they shall not be amenable to majorities, and be entirely uninfluenced by their demands. He who, in declamatory appeals to the people, urges that no such crisis can possibly occur when the majority shall be induced by unprincipled demagogues to overstep its legal limits, is himself a demagogue and a selfish flatterer, and ought never to be elevated to an office which was instituted to guard the rights and promote the interests of every individual. As a general principle, it is true, that the people have no more right to violate their constitution than their rulers. If the constitution is faulty, it must be altered in a legal manner. Exceptions to this rule may sometimes occur. A convention for forming a constitution, might append to it the article of Median and Persian law, that it should be unalterable. Such cases will, however, rarely occur.

The judiciary was not made independent in England for the sole purpose of restraining the exercise of the royal prerogative within its proper limits. Until the reign of William, the commissions of the judges were held durante bene placito, but they were then appointed to hold their offices quam diu bene se gesserint, with the proviso that the term should expire at the death of the king, and that they could be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament. In the reign of George III., at his recommendation, it was enacted that the judges should hold their offices for life, unless guilty of mal-administration. It is evident, that by this act Parliament surrendered a power, not in order to make the judges independent of the king, because he could remove them previously only at its request, but in order that they should be independent for the future of Parliamentary influence. It is also evident that the Parliament did not pass this act in subserviency to the king, but with a desire to preserve the purity of justice.

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But the judges were corrupted not only by the crown, but by parties and opulent nobles, as the records of English jurisprudence clearly show. There is one reason for an independent judiciary in this country, which does not exist in England. There, no constitution binds the Parliament, but it is supreme. It is the highest tribunal in the kingdom; and its acts cannot be pronounced unconstitutional, or otherwise annulled. Here, the delegated power of the people is limited by a constitution, which they have established. The judges are appointed to interpret that constitution, and nullify those acts of the legislature which contravene its letter or spirit. Hence they should be independent of it, and of those whom it represents. History everywhere proclaims the truth, that an independent judiciary is as necessary in a republic as in a monarchy. It relates the murder of sages by deluded republics, and of devoted patriots by arbitrary monarchs. An independent judiciary, supported by the laws, might have protected Socrates from the madness of the Athenian populace, and Algernon Sidney from the sanguinary despotism of a Stuart.

While the judiciary is of great importance in preserving a just balance in our government, there is little danger of its disturbing it by a forcible extension of its powers. Much greater danger is to be apprehended from the usurpations of the executive or legislature. The latter enacts the laws and commands the revenues of the state; the former confers emoluments and executes the laws. Both of these are active in the exercise of their powers, while the judiciary is the passive expositor of the constitution and laws, and unless the other branches obey and carry its decisions into effect, it has an ideal rather than a real existence. It can forcibly restrain neither the executive nor the legislature, but may be forcibly restrained by them. The executive may refuse to execute the laws as it has expounded them, and the legislature may repeal or amend the laws, if their exposition has been either incorrect or too rigorous. In either case the judiciary has no means of retaliation. Such, then, being its importance, when firmly guarded, its incapacity of inflicting injury when vigorously opposed by the other branches of the government, and of defence when attacked by them, it is of great importance, in order to secure the good for which it was instituted, that its dignity and independence be strongly guarded, and its independence firmly maintained. All American statesmen, who have expressed an opinion upon it, have, with one exception, been in favor of giving it a permanent tenure. In the convention which framed the constitution, a motion was made to make the judges removable by the executive upon an address of Congress; but it received the vote of only a single state. In the early part of his political life, and until he became president, Mr. Jef ferson prized as high as any one the independence of the judiciary. He thus speaks of it, in a letter to Mr. Madison: This is a body which, if rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department, merits great confidence for their learning and integrity. In fact, what degree of confidence would be too much for a body composed of such men Wythe, Blair, and Pendleton? On characters like these, the civium ardor prava jubentium, would make no impression." But during the term of Mr. Adams, several new courts were erected, which, as many thought, were sinecures, created in order to furnish support for the patrons of the administration. The abolition of these courts was strongly resisted in Mr. Jefferson's administration, on the ground that to abolish them, when once erected, is a violation of that clause of the constitution which enacts that the judges shall hold their offices during good behavior. Mr. Jefferson firmly believed that the federal party would entrench themselves behind the judiciary until they had completed the project, which, in his opinion, they

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had long cherished, of converting the republic into a monarchy. He thenceforth became the determined opponent of a permanent judiciary; and his example confirms the truth, that the wisest and purest statesman will occasionally be misled by circumstances.

The tenure of the judiciary should be permanent, in order that regularity may be preserved in the interpretation, and consequently in the execution of the laws. Mischiefs arise from the repeal of old and the enactment of new laws. Greater mischief would arise from the irregular interpretation of them. Their enactment is generally foreseen and prepared for by the public, but their interpretation is not, and must necessarily come upon them unawares. If rotation in office is to prevail in the judicial system, one judge may make a decision to-day, which another may reverse to-morrow, and the government will be far more deranged by such counter decisions than when a legislature repeals the acts of its predecessors. One instance is sufficient to show the evil operation of such a principle. An important decision is to be given by the Supreme Court, on the Rhode Island case. After that decision has been given, suppose that the term of the present judges should expire, and others should be appointed in their place. A case might be brought before the court similar to the one now pending, and the new bench might reverse the decision of its predecessor. Different governments would be recognised by different judges, and every citizen would hesitate to which he owed his allegiance. It requires no farther illustration to show how our political affairs would be deranged by the operation of such a system.

If the election of the judges should be triennial or quadrennial, they would often be elected on account of the opinions which they held on some important question, and not on account of their intrinsic merits. This is the case, as it should be, with the executive and legislature; but the judge should assume the ermine, untrammeled by previous commitments, save the oath which he takes to preserve its purity unspotted. If he should be chosen because he was of a certain opinion upon a question, it would be impossible for him to investigate it candidly. If he should decide contrary to his professions, however just his decisions, he would perhaps be stigmatised as a traitor; his influence would desert him, and all hopes of re-election would be lost. If a juryman has formed an opinion on a case which he is empanneled to try, he is challenged, and his impartiality will be greater, if he has previously never heard its circumstances related, or its merits discussed. The same principle is applicable to the judge; and the fewer the prepossessions with which he enters his office, the greater will be his impartiality in discharging its duties. In some of the states, the candidate for office makes personal appeals to the people, and without condemning the practice, as it regards the executive and legislators, it may be fairly asked, how it would seem if adopted by the judges. It would certainly be no very desirable spectacle to the anxious patriot, to witness the judge canvassing his district, and, as it were, offering justice for sale in the public market, to the highest bidder. The knowledge requisite for an able judge exceeds that required of those who are engaged in the other departments of government. To prevent arbitrary decisions in the courts of judicature, they have been bound to abide strictly by numerous precedents. These have swelled to such a number, that it requires a person of great research and acute discrimination, to be acquainted with them, and fix the precise limit of their application. While a stainless integrity, an indispensable requisite for a judge, is possessed by a much less number than is supposed, few even of the learned members of the legal profession have the patience and the

discrimination necessary for a faithful discharge of the difficult and responsible duties of a judge. Small as is the number qualified by their moral and intellectual qualities for the judgeship, it is sending superior talent and integrity into exile, to make rotation in office a principle in the election of judges; and this principle would eventually prevail, if their tenures were limited, as it does in all civil offices of a limited tenure.

If the arguments which have been produced are correct, they prove incontestibly, that in a republic an independent judiciary is necessary, in order to resist the encroachments of rulers and majorities upon the constitution of the body politic, and the inalienable rights of the individuals who compose it; and that to secure this end, the judges should hold their offices during good behavior. Let, then, not a reckless spirit of innovation invade a system which has uniformly been the means of puuishing crime and protecting innocence. Let that confidence continue to be reposed in the judiciary, which it so justly deserves for its past reputation, and the American bench may long be honored by future Marshalls and Storys. Edward S. Peirce. of Stoughton

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THE CHESAPEAKE.

ON thy brim I am standing, thou beautiful bay!
Where in childhood as free as the zephyr I stray'd,
And as glad as the lark at the dawning of day

In the beams of the morning disported and play'd:
With entrancing delight viewed thy waters afar,
That lay like a banner of silver unfurl'd,

Until glow'd in the westward the soft vesper star,

And the Queen of the Night she her smile o'er the world.

With my book I have walked on thy blossoming strand,
While I sent my young thoughts down the vale of the past,
To the time when the Red man was lord of the land,
And his ear unattuned to the cannon's fierce blast;

Or ensconced in these bowers of roses serene,

And woodbines from morning till eventide dwelt
O'er the sorrows of Harold, and Spenser's fair Queen-
At the altar of Homer enraptured have knelt.

Yes, beloved Chesapeake! ah! how oft on thy bank,
When the flowerets were smiling, the birds were all glee,
And the young panting fawn stooped beside thee and drank,
The fountains were leaping through woodland and lea;
And the world was effulgent with beauty and life,

Have I roved with one dear to affection and love,
Till my soul with bright visions of glory was rife,
And my thoughts were all pinioned in regions above!

But those days have departed—those visions are o’er—
That dear one has gone to the land of the bless'd-
The friends that watch'd over my slumbers of yore,
And soothed by affection my sorrowing breast,

Are roving afar, or repose in the clay

And naught now is left midst the world's crowded mart,
Save the memory of these to enliven my way,

And illumine the void in this desolate heart!

THE DEATH OF FRANCESCO FRANCONIA.

As the era of profound learning and philosophic pursuit was restored by men of powerful genius and great talents, so also was the painters' art, like the Phoenix, revived from its slumbering ashes by highly-gifted and noble spirits. These are to be viewed as true champions of the art. We could sigh with Ossian, that the strength and greatness of those days of heroism have passed away. The histories of many of those who have earned a reputation by their own industry and genius, are valuable, and would well repay the trouble of a detailed chronicle, such as might be collected from the hands of the then patrons of the art; they are worthy of being preserved, and their memories should be venerated as are their portraits, which we respectfully contemplate.

There occurred in those days many unusual, and at present discredited facts; for the enthusiasm that now glimmers but as a wavering light in that golden age burned brightly, lighting the whole world. Degenerate posterity, doubtless, laugh over the many true histories of those days as idle tales, while the god-like spark is neatly extinguished in their souls. One of the most remarkable incidents of that time, and one that I could never read without emotion, and one that my heart was never tempted to doubt, was the account of the death of Francesco Franconia, the founder of the school of Bologna and Lombardy. Francesco Franconia, although of humble origin, yet through his unwearied industry and aspiring genius, raised himself to the highest pinnacle of fame. In his youth he was apprenticed to a goldsmith, where he wrought articles in gold and silver of a beauty to excite the astonishment of the observer. He made casts for medals, and princes and dukes were thought to confer an honor by allowing him to transfer their likenesses to the medals; for at that period it was the custom for the nobility as well as the citizens to encourage the artists by their patronage. An infinite number of royal personages were constantly passing through Bologna, none of whom failed to have their likenesses drawn by Francesco, and afterward engraved on a medal. But Francesco's restless, glowing genius, longed for another field of action, and as his warm ambition was gratified in one pursuit, his spirit rested not until he had found another, as yet, untrodden path to fame. At forty years of age he entered upon a new art, and guided his pencil with untiring patience; he directed his whole energies to the grand and sublime, the effect of colors; and his rapidity in executing works that commanded universal admiration, was remarkable. He was, in truth, a distinguished painter; for although he had many competitors, (among whom was the god-like Raphael himself, who, at that time, flourished in Rome) yet his works were always ranked among the most eminent; for this sublime art is not so limited that one mortal can compass all its beauties; neither is it a prize, which falls, by lot, to one favored individual; but its light is distributed in a thousand beams, whose refulgence is reflected back to our enraptured vision by the many noble geniuses whom heaven has sent among us. Francesco succeeded the generation of worthy painters who so deservedly obtained enduring celebrity from having founded a new school upon the ruins of ancient barbarism; and in Lombardy he was the founder and the prince of this new empire.

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