ULTRA VIRES. See CORPORATION, 1. UNITED STATES COURT. See ACTION, 1; Bankruptcy; Removal of Suit. USAGE. 1. The plaintiffs, stone cutters, agreed in writing with the defendant to fur nish stone for his building according to the plans and specifications of an architect, and to do all the fitting and rebating necessary. Wooden patterns were necessary for cutting the stone according to the plans, and the plaintiffs procured and paid for them, without asking the defendant or the architect to furnish them. Held, in an action to recover the amount paid for these patterns, that evidence of a usage for stone cutters, in cutting stone for a building, to procure such patterns and recover the cost from the owner of the building, was inadmissible; and that the plaintiffs could not recover. Davis ▼. Galloupe, 121. 2. If the plaintiff introduces evidence of a usage, and the defendant introduces evidence of a different usage, the refusal of the judge to rule that if the evidence is conflicting the defendant cannot maintain his defence on the ground of usage, gives the plaintiff no ground of exception, if the defendant relies upon his evidence of usage only to negative the usage sought to be established by the plaintiff. Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton Mills, 446. See INSURANCE, 2, 3; SALE, 3, 4. VARIANCE. See BREAKING And Entering; EVIDENCE, 1; Indictment, 1. VENUE. See DIVORCE, 3. VOTING. See MANDAMUS, 2; TOWN, 2. WAIVER. One for whom a kettle had been made, examined it and knew that it leaked somewhat, but ordered it to be delivered, without objection; it continued to leak, but notwithstanding he gave his promissory note for the price, without objection. Held, that these facts were not, as matter of law, conclusive evidence of his waiver of all claim to damages for its being leaky. Taylor v. Cole, 863. See INSURANCE, 5; SALE, 2; SPECIFIC PERFORmance, 1. WAREHOUSEMAN. See SALE, 4. WARRANT. See COMPLAINT, 2 WARRANTY. See EVIDENCE, 15. WAY. 1. A deed described the premises conveyed as bounded "on the southerly side of a proprietor's way, thence running westerly by said way to a stake by the side of said way." The grantor owned the land called “a proprietor's way." Held, that the grantee had a right of way over said land. Gaw▾. Hughes & Welch, 296. 2. A woman was driving in the daytime, with due care, a horse which would sometimes shy but had not a vicious habit of shying, along a highway twenty feet wide on the top of an embankment. Owing to a depression in the highway, filled with mud and water, the travelled rut, along which she drove, was within fourteen inches of the edge of the embankment. There was no railing on the edge. By reason of the horse shying, the travelled way being so near the edge, and the want of railing, her wagon was overturned and she was injured. Arbitrators, to whom was referred a claim by her against the town bound to keep the highway in repair, found the above facts, and also that the highway was defective in having the travelled way so near the edge without a railing, and that the town knew the defect. Held, that these findings would warrant an award in favor of the woman. Woods v. Groton, 857. See BETTERMENT; Negligence, 4, 6. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. A provision dealer had his shop in N., but most of his customers lived in W., and he weighed and measured the provisions from his market-wagon as he delivered them to his customers. His weights and measures were sealed in W., but not in N. Held, that they were not sealed in the town where he had his "usual place of business" within the St. of 1870, c. 218, § 1, and that he could not recover for goods sold by them. Palmer v. Kelleher, 320. WHARF. WILL. A copy of the record of a court in another state contained a copy of the will of J. S., of the affidavit of the subscribing witnesses to its execution, and of a certificate of the clerk of the court that the will was duly admitted to probate. It appeared that the record was in the usual form of recording proceedings for the probate of wills in said state. Held, that it was proper for a probate court here to order the copy to be filed and recorded under the Gen. Sts. c. 92, § 22. Shannon ▼. Shannon, 331. 2. The executors named in a will filed a petition to the probate court declining the trust but praying that the will might be admitted to probate, and J. S. appointed administrator with the will annexed. Notice was issued setting forth the prayer of the petition; but before the petition was acted on, one of the executors filed a paper withdrawing his declination and praying to be appointed executor. Held, that he might be appointed executor without further notice. Shannon v. Shannon, 331. See CHARITY; COSTS; DEVISE AND LEGACY; EVIDENCE, 17; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. WITNESS. On an indictment for sodomy with J. S., J. S. testified to the commission of the crime, but denied his voluntary participation therein. The district attorney admitted in argument that J. S. substantially acquiesced in the act, and must be regarded as an accomplice and in need of corroboration. The defendant requested the judge to rule that it followed from this admission that J. S. knowingly and wilfully testified falsely; and that therefore the defendant could not be properly convicted upon his testimony. The judge refused so to rule. Held, that the defendant had no ground of exception. Commonwealth v. Snow, 411. See ACCOMPLICE. WORDS. "Benevolent." See Chamberlain v. Stearns, 268. "Breaking and entering." See Commonwealth v. Glover, 895, 402. See Commonwealth v. Glover, 395, 402. "Entry." "Founded on contract." See Wyman v. Fabens, 82. "Good tenantable repair." See Thorndike v. Burrage, 531. "Homestead.” See Backus v. Chapman, 386. "Living in." See Hanson v. Hanson, 159. "Machinery." See Seavey v. Central Ins. Co. 540. "Malice." See Mitchell v. Wall, 498. "May." See Commonwealth v. Smith, 407. "Place," "place of business." See Palmer v. Kelleher, 821, 822. "Police officer." See Commonwealth v. Smith, 408. "Probable cause." See Mitchell v. Wall, 498. "Steal." See Green v. Commonwealth, 419. "Usual place of abode." See Palmer v. Kelleher, 322. "Usual place of business." See Palmer v. Kelleher, 821, 822. WRIT. At the trial in the Superior Court of a case raising the issue whether a person was legally arrested on a writ from said court, the judge ruled on inspection of the writ that the capias clause therein was erased, and refused to admit ●vidence to show that no erasure was intended; there was no question that |