CORPORATION.

1. A company newly incorporated "for the purpose of manufacturing and selling glass" contracted to purchase glass ware, for the purpose of keeping up their stock and supplying customers until the works which they had bought from a company preceding them were put in repair. Held, that the contract was not ultra vires. Lyndeborough Glass Co. v. Massachusetts Glass Co. 315.

2. A statute authorized a railroad company to take for a passenger station land occupied by another railroad. The by-laws of the company provided that the directors might purchase all real estate they deemed needful for the railroad, and exercise all powers granted to the company by their charter for the purpose of locating, constructing and completing the railroad, and all other powers necessary and proper to carry out the objects of the company and the purposes of their charter. Held, that an acceptance of the statute by the stockholders was not necessary to authorize the directors to take the land. Eastern Railroad Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 125.

8. Until the issue of certificates of stock to the members of a manufacturing corporation they own the stock in common, and therefore under the St. of 1862, c. 218, were all jointly and severally liable for a debt of the corporation contracted before the capital was paid in, although the corporation had voted to divide the capital stock into shares, and one at least of the members had agreed to take a certain number of shares. Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. 200.

See DEED, 3; EMINENT DOMAIN; INJUNCTIon; PartnersHIP, 4; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1; RECEIVER; REMOVAL of Suit.

COSTS.

If the ambiguity of a will renders it doubtful to which of several charities a legacy shall be paid, the costs as between counsel and client of all parties to a bill by executors praying for instructions as to the disposition of the legacy are to be paid out of the testator's general estate. Deane v. Home for Aged Colored Women, 132.

See ACTION, 1.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

Under the St. of 1869, c. 266, the county commissioners of Middlesex have no power to assess the expense of repairing Malden Bridge on any city outside the county. Boston v. County Commissioners, 313.

COVENANT.

In an action on the covenant against incumbrances in a deed given by the de fendant, while seised of the land, to the plaintiff, and under which the plaintiff entered, it appeared that the paramount record title was in A.; that A. gave a quitclaim deed of the land to B., who gave a mortgage deed thereof back to A.; that B. then gave a quitclaim deed thereof to C.; that neither

A., B. nor C. ever entered upon the land, and that A. assigned the mortgage, and C. gave a quitclaim deed of the land, to the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover such reasonable sum as she paid to A. and C. for the assignment and 2sed to her. Farnum v. Peterson, 148.

See ACTION, 3; LEASE, 2.

CRUELTY.

a an indictment for cruelly overdriving a horse, the judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant overdrove the horse knowingly and intentionally; and that he was presumed to intend the natural and necessary results of his acts; but that if, in the proper exercise of his own judgment, he thought he was not overdriving the horse, he must be acquitted. Held, that the defendant had no ground of exception. Commonwealth v. Wood, 408.

See DIVORCE, 2; EVIDENCE, 3, 4.

CUSTOM.

See USAGE.

DAMAGES.

If the maker of a chattel, after it is made, agrees to deliver it at the place of business of the person for whom it was made, he is liable for any injury to it from carelessness in the transportation, although at the time of the contract for making it nothing was said about delivery, and there was no usage as to delivery. Taylor v. Cole, 367.

Bee BOND; COVENANT; EVIDENCE, 18; INSURANCE, 4; INTEREST; JUDGMENT, 1; POND; TENANT IN Common; Waiver.

DECEIT.

In an action for inducing the plaintiff to buy a promissory note by false representations as to the credit of the maker, said representations being alleged by the declaration to be known by the defendant to be untrue, the admission or exclusion of evidence offered by the defendant that he did not know that the representations were untrue, depends upon whether the question as to such knowledge has been presented to the jury by the course of the trial and the plaintiff's conduct of the case; and a ruling of the judge, whether admitting or excluding such evidence, will be presumed correct, and exceptions thereto will not be sustained, unless the bill of exceptions shows it to have been incorrect. Bannister v. Alderman, 261.

DEED.

!. A town owned a strip of land between a highway and tide water and stretching from land of A. to land of B.; on the middle of the water front was a hill, used as a burying ground, which extended back from the shore, but not to the highway. In 1648 the town voted "that the burying hill should be

compassed with a sufficient ditch," and in 1656 they granted a parcel of land, describing it as common ground from A.'s land to B.'s, "which ground is bounded northeast by the highway, and southwest by the skirts of the burying hill as far as is laid out and marked round; the burying hill remaining free and entire for the town use, only liberty is granted to " the grantees" to feed on the burying hill." Held, that the burying hill was a monument or boundary, and not a lot excepted out of the grant, and that therefore the flats between the hill and low-water mark were not included in the grant. Charlestown v. Tufis, 348.

1. The owner of a parcel of land bounding on a street, conveyed it by a deed containing a condition that the grantee, or his heirs or assigns, should not build on the land within eight feet of the street. The grantee conveyed the land in several lots. Held, that the grantor could not maintain a bill in equity, for the benefit of the owners of some of these lots to restrain the owner of another from violating the condition, in the absence of evidence that the condition was imposed as part of a general plan for the benefit of the land granted and of other land on the street. Dana v. Wentworth, 291. 1. The proprietors of certain lands and flats were incorporated into the M. Corporation for the purpose of improving other flats across a channel, and fixed the interest of each proprietor in the property and rights of the corporation, in proportion to his shore frontage. A., who was a corporator by virtue of his ownership of a wharf and flats, conveyed by deed dated June 1, 1857, to B. and C., partners, the wharf with all the flats thereto belonging, and all the flats to which he was entitled as owner of the wharf, "by an act of the Legislature, called the M. Corporation." The corporation, to raise money to improve the flats, fixed the value of the interest of proprietors, and voted that the interests should be represented by shares at $5 a share, but that no certificate of shares should be issued to any one for any interest until he paid for his proportion of such new stock as should be issued; that new stock at $5 a share should be issued to raise money; that each member paying for his proportion of the new stock should be entitled to a certificate therefor, and also to a certificate for an equal number of shares on account of his original interest. Certificates were thus issued for two years, but afterwards simple receipts were issued for the assessments laid by the corporation. In those two years, B. and C. paid for their proportion of the new stock issued, and took, according to the plan, certificates for twice the number of shares for which they had paid; so that beside their certificates for shares on account of new stock, they had certificates for shares for about one fifth of their original interest. They then executed a deed by which they conveyed to D. he wharf and flats, by metes and bounds, and "also all the flats which we are entitled to as owners of the above described wharf, being the same premises conveyed to us by A. by deed, dated June 1, 1857." The corpo ration refused to pay any dividend of profits to D. until the certificates were surrendered. Held, that the right to these certificates passed to D., and that

he could maintain a bill in equity to have them delivered up to him. Hopkins v. Smith, 176.

Bee ACTION, 8; ATTACHMENT, 8; COVENANT; DISSEISIN; EASEMENT; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1; LEASE, 2; MORTGAGE, 1, 3; PLEADING, 3; WAY, 1.

DELIVERY.

See DAMAGES; EVIDENCE, 12; Sale, 2–6.

DEMURRER.

The objection that a demurrer to a bill in equity is not accompanied by the certificate required by the Gen. Sts. c. 113, § 5, cannot be taken after the case has been reserved on bill and demurrer. Nelson v. Ferdinand, 300.

DESCENT.

Under the Gen. Sts. c. 91, § 1, cl. 5, if an intestate leaves no issue or parents, and no brother or sister, his nephews and nieces take his estate per capita and not per stirpes. Snow v. Snow, 389.

DESERTION.

See DIVORCE, 1, 2.

DEVISE AND LEGACY.

1. J. S. owned a parcel of land, on the westerly part of which was the house in which he lived, with the land about it inclosed by a fence, a well inside the inclosure, and a barn. He built a new house on the easterly part, moved into it, occupied the barn and used the well as before, occupied part of the I of the old house, as he had for many years, as a carpenter's shop, but leased the old house and the inclosed land about it: six years afterwards he made his will and died, devising his "homestead" to his wife. Held, in a writ of entry to recover the premises, that the above facts would warrant a finding that the old house and the inclosed land about it did not pass under the devise. Backus v. Chapman, 386.

2. A testator by his will, in which he named his three sons, A., B. and C., gave the residue of his estate "to my three before named sons to be equally divided between them." By a codicil he provided as follows: "I revoke and make void the legacy by my will given to A., he being since deceased." Held, that the share originally given by the will to A. did not pass to the survivors, but went as undevised estate. Smith v. Haynes, 346.

See CHARITY; COSTS.

DISSEISIN.

A deed to a disseisor from one to whom the disseisee has since the disseisir given a deed of the land, is a release of the right of the disseisee therein Farnum Peterson, 148.

DISTRIBUTION.

See DESCENT.

DIVORCE.

1. Misconduct of the libellant may be a sufficient defence to a libel for deser. tion, although not sufficient to support a libel for divorce by the libeller. Lyster v. Lyster, 327.

2. A libel by a wife against her husband for a divorce from bed and board on the ground of extreme cruelty and gross and confirmed habits of intoxication contracted since marriage, was dismissed. Subsequently the husband brought a libel against the wife for desertion. Held, that she could introduce evidence of his cruel and abusive treatment, not amounting to extreme cruelty, and of his gross habits of intoxication. Ib.

B. A man living with his wife in the county of N. was sentenced to be confined in the state prison in the county of M. for six years, and was imprisoned accordingly; his wife moved into the county of S.; and he was afterwards adjudged bankrupt and joined with his assignee in the sale of his homestead in the county of N. Held, that while in prison he was "still living" in the county of N., within the meaning of the Gen. Sts. c. 107, § 14, and that a libel for divorce against him must be heard in that county Hanson v. Hanson, 158.

See HUSBAND and Wife, 3.

DOMICIL.

A master mariner, whose domicil of origin was in the town of A., left A. in 1867 and went to sea with his wife, intending to make his home in the town of B. In pursuance of this intent, he in 1868 sent his wife to B., where she boarded at her father's house, and in July 1869 he arrived at B. himself. Held, that in May 1869 his domicil was in B. Bangs v. Brewster, 382. See DIVORCE, 3; LIMITATIONS, Statute of, 2.

DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS.

See PROMISSORY NOTE, 5.

DRAIN.

See SEWER.

EASEMENT.

The eight co-tenants of two adjoining lots of land conveyed the first lot to A. by a deed containing covenants of warranty and against incumbrances; six of them executed a deed of their interest in the second lot to the other two co-tenants, and both deeds were on the same days respectively dated, acknowledged and recorded. On the second lot was a house with three windows, each the sole means of lighting the room in which it was placed, open