sociated with the President, unless, in case of inferior officers, when the laws shall otherwise direct. Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not. If the constitution has vested all executive power in the President, I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his executive authority." Again: "The doctrine, however, which seems to stand most in opposition to the principles I contend for, is, that the power to annul an appointment is, in the nature of things, incidental to the power which makes the appointment. I agree that, if nothing more was said in the constitution than that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, should appoint to office, there would be great force in saying that the power of removal resulted by a natural implication from the power of appointing. But there is another part of the constitution, no less explicit than the one on which the gentleman's doctrine is founded: it is that part which declares that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States. "The association of the Senate with the President in exercising that particular function, is an exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly. But there is another part of the constitution which inclines, in my judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it. The President is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the Executive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended he should have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that end. Now, if the officer, when once appointed, is not to depend upon the President for his official existence, but upon a distinct body, (for where there are two negatives required, either can prevent the removal,) I confess I do not see how the President can take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It is true, by a circuitous operation, he may obtain an impeachment, and even without this it is possible he may obtain the concurrence of the Senate for the purpose of displacing an officer; but would this give that species of control to the Executive Magistrate which seems to be required by the constitution? I own, if my opinion was not contrary to that entertained by what I suppose to be the minority on this question, I should be doubtful of being mistaken, when I discovered how inconsistent that construction would make the constitution with itself. I can hardly bring myself to imagine the wisdom of the convention who framed the constitution contemplated such incongruity." [FEB. 17, 1835. inevitable. A foreign minister in a remote part of the world is pursuing a course dangerous to the best interests, and ruinous to the character, of the country. He is disgracing us abroad, and endangering the public peace. He has been intrusted with an important negotiation, and is betraying his trust. He has become corrupt, or is entirely incompetent. This information arrives at Washington, three or four days after the adjournment of Congress on the 3d of March. What is to be done? Is the President to be entirely powerless until the succeeding December, when the Senate may meet again? Shall he be obliged to wait until the mischief is entirely consummated--until the country is ruined-before he can recall the corrupt or wicked minister? Or will any gentleman contend that, upon every occasion, when s removal from office becomes necessary, he shall call the Senators from their homes throughout this widely extended Republic? And yet, this is the inevitable consequence of the position contended for by gentlemen. Could the framers of the constitution ever have intended such an absurdity? This argument was also adverted to by Mr. Madison. But again, there are great numbers of disbursing officers scattered over this Union. Information is received, during the recess of the Senate, that one of them in Arkansas or at the Rocky mountains has been guilty of peculation, and is wasting the public money. Must the President fold his arms, and suffer him to proceed in his fraudulent course, until the next meeting of the Senate? The truth is, that the President cannot execute the laws of the Union without this power of removal. But cases still stronger may be presented. The heads of Departments are the confidential advisers of the President. It is chiefly through their agency that he must conduct the great operations of Government. Without a direct control over them, it would be impossible for him to take care that the laws shall be faithfully execu ted. Suppose that one of them, during the recess of the Senate, violates his instructions, refuses to hold any intercourse with the President, and pursues a career which he believes to be in opposition to the constitution, the laws, and the best interests of the country. Shall the executive arm be paralyzed; and, in such a case, must he patiently submit to all these evils until the Senate can be convened? In time of war the country might be ruined by a corrupt Secretary of War, before the Senate could be assembled. It is not my intention on this occasion to discuss the question of the removal of the deposites from the Bank of the United States. I merely wish to present it as a forcible illustration of my argument. Suppose the late Secretary of the Treasury had determined to remove the deposites, and the President had believed this measure would be as ruinous to the country as the friends of the bank apprehended. If the Secretary, notwithstand But, sir, if doubts could arise on the language of the constitution itself, then it would become proper, for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of the instrument, to resort to arguments ab inconvenienti. The framers of the constitution never intended it to meaning the remonstrances of the President, had proceeded what would be absurd, or what would defeat the very purposes which it was intended to accomplish. I think I can prove that to deprive the President of the power of removal would be fatal to the best interests of the country. to issue the order for their removal, what should we have heard from those who were loudest in their denunciations against the Executive, if he had said, my arms are tied, I have no power to arrest the act; the deposites must be removed, because I cannot remove my SecreItary? Here the evil would have been done before the Senate could possibly have been assembled. I am indebted to the speech of the Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. CALHOUN,] at the last session, for this illustration. The truth is, view the subject in any light you may, the power of removal is in its nature inseparable from the executive power. And, first, the Senate cannot always be in session. thank Heaven for that. We must separate and attend to our ordinary business. It is necessary for a healthy political constitution that we should breathe the fresh and pure air of the country. The political excitement would rise too high if it were not cooled off in this manner. The American people never will consent, and never ought to consent, that our sessions shall become perpetual. The framers of the constitution never intended that this should be the case. But once establish the principle that the Senate must consent to removals, as well as to appointments, and this consequence is I have been presenting the inconveniences which would arise, during the recess of the Senate, from the want of this power in the Executive. But suppose the Senate to be always in session, would this remove every difficulty? By no means. Confer upon the Senate the power of rejecting removals, and you make the Executive, in the language of the debate of 1789, a doubleheaded monster. That power on whom is devolved the execution of your laws must be able to remove a corrupt or incompetent agent from office, or he cannot perform his duties. The Senate may, without inconvenience, and with very great advantage to the country, participate in appointments; but, when the man is once in office, the President must necessarily possess the power of turning him out in case he does not perform his duties. This power ought not to depend upon the will of the Senate, for that body have nothing to do with the execution of the laws. If the power contended for were vested in the Senate, what would be the consequences? Still more dan gerous, if possible, than any which I have yet depicted. The cases in which removals are necessary must rapidly increase with the number of our officers and our rapidly extending population. If the President must assign reasons to the Senate for his removals, according to the provisions of this bill, or if the Senate must participate in these removals as well as in appointments, it necessarily follows that these reasons must be investigated. Witnesses must be examined, to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the charges made against the officer sought to be removed. The case must be tried judicially. Time must be consumed, to the prejudice of our other duties. The legislative functions of the Senate must thus become impaired, and feelings excited between co-ordinate branches of the Government calculated to produce a most injurious effect upon the country. In this state of things, the case might readily occur which was anticipated by Mr. Madison in 1789. A majority of the Senate might even keep one of the heads of Department in office against the will of the President. Whether they would have done so or not last winter, in the case of the Secretary of the Treasury, I shall not pretend to determine. and consenting to removals. [SENATE. The inference is without The truth is, that the more we discuss this question, we shall have the greater reason to admire the wisdom of the constitution, and of those enlightened and patriotic men who placed that construction upon it in the beginning, which I shall venture to predict never will be disturbed by the American people. The Senate, from the nature of the body, are fully competent to assist the President in appointments. It would change their character altogether, and paralyze the executive arm of the Government, if they were to usurp the power of interfering in removals from office. Let the constitution, and the construction of it by its founders, in this particular, be perpetual! It has been objected that the President, by this construction, is too far removed from responsibility in the exercise of this power. But he is responsible to the American people, whose servant he is in this, as in all other cases. Unless you palsy the executive arm, and render it powerless to do good, lest it may do evil, you cannot support the doctrine which has been urged. You must vest some discretion, you must repose some confidence, in the Executive, or the wheels of Government must stand still. Should he abuse his power, he is liable to the censure of public opinion; and, in flagrant cases, he may be impeached. It was contended in the first Congress, and the same argument has been urged upon the present occasion, that the power of removal was not recognised by the constitution; that it was a case omitted, and that therefore, by implication, it belongs to Congress. This argu ment was fully met and successfully refuted in 1789. If this principle were established, the executive power would have no necessary control over executive officers. Congress might confer the power of removal upon the Senate alone, upon the House of Representatives alone, or upon both conjointly, without any participation of the President. This Government-the admiration of the without any control over executive agents, except what might be granted to him by the Legislature. We are not placed in this unfortunate predicament. The President, under the constitution, has the power of removal. It is a constitutional power, not to be controlled by the Legislature. It is a power equally sovereign in its nature with that of legislation itself. He is a coordinate branch of the Government, and has the same right to exercise his discretion in removals from office, that Congress possess in regard to the enactment of laws. If this power were conferred upon the Senate, it. would interfere with our judicial functions to a danger-world--would present the solecism of an Executive ous and alarming extent. The removal of a high officer of the Government is recommended by the President to the Senate, because of official misconduct. The charges are tried before the Senate. From the very nature of the question, it must become, in fact, a judicial investigation. The Senate determine, either that he shall remain in his office, or that he shall be removed. In either case, the House of Representatives, possessing the sole power of impeachment under the constitution, determine to exercise it against this officer. But the Senate have, by their previous proceedings, utterly disqualified themselves from giving to the accused an impartial trial. They have already decided upon his guilt or his innocence. Instead of proceeding to the trial unbiased by favor or by prejudice, their minds are inflamed, their judgments are biased, and they come to the investigation with the feelings of partisans rather than those of judges. The House of Representatives would have a just right to complain loudly against the exercise of this power by the Senate. We should thus disqualify our. selves from judging impartially in cases between the people of the United States and the high officers of the Government. I think I have successfully established the position that no two things can in their nature be more distinct than the power of appointment and that of removal. If this be the case, then what becomes of the argument of the gentleman from Massachusetts? [Mr. WEBSTER.] It rested entirely upon the principle that these two powers were so identical in their nature, that because the Senate, under the constitution, have the express power of advising and consenting to appointments, therefore, by implication, they must possess the power of advising It This brings me to consider the constitutionality of the third section of the bill now depending before us. provides "that in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by removal from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for such removal." Whence do we derive our authority to demand his reasons? If the constitution has conferred upon him the power of removal, as I think I have clearly shown, is it not absolute in its nature, and entirely free from the control of Congress? Is he not as independent in the exercise of this power as Congress in the exercise of any power conferred upon them by the constitution? Would he not have the same authority to demand from us our reasons for rejecting a nomination as we possess to call upon him for his reasons for making a removal? Might he not say, I am answerable to the American people, and to them alone, for the exercise of this power, in the same manner that the Senate is for the exercise of any power conferred upon them by the constitution? With all the deference which I feel for the opinions of the Senator from Tennessee, [Mr. WHITE,] I think he has arrived at the conclusion that the third section of this bill is constitutional, by blending things together which are in their nature entirely distinct. He asks, is it not in the power of Congress to create the office, to define its duties, and to change and vary these duties at pleasure? Granted. May they not, if they believe the office unnecessary, repeal the law, and must not the officer fall under it? Granted. These are legislative powers, clearly conferred upon Congress by the constitution. It is then asked, may Congress not prescribe it as the duty of these officers to give reasons for their conduct? Certainly they may. And why? Because they are the creatures of Congress, they are called into existence by Congress, and they will cease to exist at the pleasure of Congress. Is this the condition of the Executive, who is a co-ordinate branch of the Government, and who is answerable for his conduct, not to Congress, but to the people of the United States? What right have we to demand reasons from the servant of another as to how he performs his duties? To his own master, which, in this particular, is the American people, and to them alone, he is responsible. If Congress can command him to give reasons to the Senate for his removals, the Senate may judge of the validity of these reasons, and condemn them if they think proper. The Executive of the country is thus rendered subordinate to the Senate--a position in which the constitution of the country never intended to place him. In my opinion, this bill as strongly negatives the constitutional power of the President to remove from office, without the concurrence of the Senate, as if it were so declared in express language. For this reason I shall vote against it. But if no such question were involved in the bill, I should equally condemn its policy. Its evident tendency is substantially to make all offices offices for life, or during good behaviour, which is contrary to the genius of our institutions. But the arguments against the policy of this bill have been fully and ably insisted upon by others. At this late period of the session, when so much important business remains undone, I shall not occupy the time of the Senate in discussing this branch of the subject. I rose merely to present my views upon the constitutional question. After Mr. B. had concluded, Mr. CLAYTON said he proposed to say a few words on the bill before the Senate. He concurred with the honorable Senator from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BUCHANAN,] that it was an important constitutional question. But he would not at that time enter into a discussion whether it was constitutional or unconstitutional, but whether Congress had the power to regulate executive power or not. He wished to see nothing of party feeling in the discussion. He entered upon the debate entirely destitute of party politics. If it had been his design to serve party purposes, he should not, when his friends were out of office, and his opponents in power, advocate a bill which was to continue in office those who now held places of trust to the exclusion of his own friends. He wished to go back to the origin of the principles set forth in the bill. In 1826 a report embracing the same principles as this bill was made by a special committee of the Senate, consisting of nine highly intelligent gentlemen, eight of whom concurred in the report, and were of the same political faith as the present administration. He believed they were sincere in the principles they advocated, and was willing to give them credit for the correctness of their views. But now there seemed to be an attempt to give a party character to the bill. He did not think it just for its former friends to cast it in the teeth of those who now advocated it. It had been well said by the Senator from Pennsylvania, that it was dis [FEB. 17, 1835. cussed in 1789 by those fresh from the hall where the constitution was framed. The most enlightened of those great men discussed it on the ground that the right of removal was contained in that clause of the constitution which says the President shall see all the laws executed; and on that point they rested their opinions. But the great mass, who voted in favor of the construction then given, he believed, grounded their opinions on the expediency and necessity of such powers being vested in the Executive, for the removal of negligent and unfaithful officers. And that was the only use they expected would be made of it. If the power of the Executive was exerted only to remove such officers, there would be no abuse; but if it was exercised to remove for party purposes, it was an abuse never apprehended by those who gave such a construction to the constitution. Mr. C. contended that the executive power was circumscribed and limited to particular clauses of the constitu tion; that there was no power delegated further than was specially specified. He thought that Congress had the power to legislate on the subject, as the constitution gave them power to pass laws to carry into effect its provisions. The only reason he could assign why the power of removal had remained so long in the hands of the President, was, that Congress had neglected to legislate on the subject. He thought the Senator from Pennsylvania was mistaken in his apprehension of the bill. It was not intended to take away the removing power from the President, but merely to require his reasons for the act. The Senate ought to know the grounds on which the removal was made. If the President should tell the Senate it was on account of political principles, he, in his place as a Senator, would vote to reject every nomi nation made to fill the place, ad infinitum. He would ask whether they were acting for party effect, or as Senators of the country? He regretted that there should be any attempt to introduce the bill as a party question, and gentlemen be denounced as party men. He could find nothing in the present bill impairing the decision of 1789. Mr. PRESTON declared that it had not been origi nally his intention to take part in this debate; the state of his health was such as not to admit of it; but he felt himself bound to rise and express a general opinion, and more especially to enter his most solemn protest against the strange and unwarrantable doctrines which he had heard brought forward in the course of this discussion. He would chiefly direct his attention to what had fal len from the gentleman from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT.] With that gentleman he confessed he was ready to concur, that, if we traced back the source of executive pat ronage to its head, we should find it in Congress. True it was, that Congress alone authorized appropriations; true it was, that every expenditure which added to the mass of executive patronage took its rise in Congress. But what had that to do with the question as it related to the immediate subject of executive patronage? Are we to imagine that the power possessed by the Presi dent ceases to be dangerous because Congress has helped to establish the foundation of that power in authorizing the expenditure on the basis of which the patronage is rested? Is the aggregate of unlimited pow er at all diminished because Congress is the source from whence the hand of patronage is enabled to make its disbursements? True it is, the public money which the President disburses, or which goes to extend the sphere of his influence, is ours, and not his; but is the power less, is the sum total of patronage less, is the danger less, because it is the public money which constitutes the whole means, and creates all the influence of the patronage? True it is, that we authorize the expenditure, but who is it that profits by it? Who is it that obtains power and patronage by it? We legislate, we make appropriations, we give authority and legitimacy to every expenditure, but it is not for ourselves; it is not for our hands to wield the mighty lever which is created by our votes. Another hand than ours wields that lever, and shall we therefore suffer it to be left there at its own discretion, without check or limitation? Shall we suffer the power which we originate to be directed against us, to our own destruction, by leaving it to be exerted at the will of a single individual? [SENATE. class may appear to him, the aggregate mass of patron- But (said Mr. P.) by what magic is it that executive patronage, which was pronounced by a committee of gentlemen, who were now in the ranks of the administration, to be highly dangerous in 1826, and to have arrived at a pitch demanding checks and restrictions-by what magic is it that the same executive patronage and power, which is now doubled, ay, trebled, is no longer dangerous? They (the same gentlemen who declared it dangerous in 1826) now come forward when it is mightily increased, and attempt to laugh at the idea of its being dangerous in 1835! By what magic is this that the mere atoms of the colossal building, which now exists, alarmed them in 1826, and the gigantic structure itself now seems only to excite their love and admiration? This is strange, indeed! In 1826 there was an army, a navy, a Post Office Department, a pension list: all this mass of dependants were dangerous in 1826, and now that they are infinitely increased, the same gentlemen tell us that they are no longer dangerous as means of executive patronage. Willing, however, as he professed himself to be, to acknowledge that Congress was the first spring and source of expenditure, he must beg to recall gentlemen to the consideration of the real question-which was not the question of origin, but of actual existence. The inquiry was directed to executive power, as now found to be, whatever may have been the errors, if they were errors, which first injudiciously suffered such a great and tremendous power to rise and grow to its present alarming height. Congress must make appropriations, and authorize expenditure for the necessities and for the welfare of the country; but does it follow, therefore, that, because Congress must, by necessity, originate expenditure, that therefore it is admissible that these expenditures should be turned aside, or employed to the creation of a power preponderating over Congress and over every thing in the country? Does it follow that it is a harmless and innocent thing, that all this expenditure should go to the profit of one individual, to I would ask the gentleman from New York, (said Mr. aggrandize his power, to increase his influence, to aug- P.,) to whose efforts I always listen with great attenment his patronage, and to render him the unlimited tion, as marks of an intelligent mind, I ask him, if remaster who dictates the destiny of those to whom these strictions upon an increased executive power were neexpenditures are disbursed by his hand? If Congress cessary in 1826, are they not now much more necessary, holds the purse and pours out its treasures, does it fol- in the much more augmented extent of the executive low that one hand is to receive them and control their patronage? If he acted with his party then, and imdisbursement, and be established necessarily as the mas- plicitly followed the measures it put in action for its ter over all who look up to that hand for the sweets it own specific objects, how is it that now he does not act dispenses? Vain, therefore, and futile, idle, and untena- in the views and upon the principles which, in 1826, ble, is the specious argument which has been so much his party have left upon record? What change of poand so strongly dwelt upon, that, because the source of sition has produced this change of principle? That the expenditure is in Congress, therefore there is no which was right and good then, is now wrong, and false, dangerous accumulation of patronage with the President. and every thing that is bad, with the self-same party! I There is (continued Mr. P.) a formidable amount of have not (said Mr. P.) changed my relative position: I executive patronage. It is a proposition which no one feel now as I did then; but if I had changed my posican or will dare to deny, that this patronage has increas- tion, I would not have changed my views and princied, and is still increasing. This is the proposition on ples. No! if my best friend were in power, I should which the report is founded: it is a proposition which say now as I said then-for the sake of our country, let imperatively calls upon all the power, and feeling, and us destroy the germes of a power which threatens ruin energy of the people to awake and rouse themselves, to the country, and utter destruction to our institutions. and know their real situation; and, above all, not to be I should feel bound to do so, if my best and dearest led to lose sight of the real fact, of the undeniable friend were the object, and possessed of the patronage, proposition, by being sent a hunting after collateral the evils and dangers of which a man must be volunquestions, leading away from the main point, and bewil-tarily and wilfully blind if he will not see. How much dering the judgment with disquisitions upon the various actions of Congress, and the wisdom or folly of those actions. The gentleman from New York (observed Mr. P.) has analyzed and divided the mass of dependants, and then asked of each part, separately, whether there existed any danger in it? First he takes the pensioners, then the army, then the navy, and so on, and after reducing each to the utmost possible insignificancy, he then triumphantly asks, "is there danger here?" By this specious mode of representing things, the honorable gentleman is mistaken if he imagines that he will succeed in convincing the country that an army of dependants, of all classes, gives no undue influence to the power which is made to preside over the mighty mass. However contemptible the mere individuals of each more are they bound to carry out the principles to which now they are opposed, who came into power wholly and solely on the basis and foundation of these very principles? How much more are they bound to sustain and maintain the principles on which they rode into power? But now we see them turn round and deny those principles; now they argue that, when executive power is increased tenfold, it is not dangerous, it is not to be restricted. They argue and vote thus, who, in 1926, when it was not half so great as now, recorded in their report that it was dangerous and ought to be restricted! But (said Mr. P.) I rejoice to see one honorable and illustrious gentleman who sits before me [Mr. WHITE] form a great and magnanimous exception; I am glad to see him persist now in the principles and opinions which he recorded then. If these principles had been maintained, if the President had acted upon them, I should not be where I am, (observed Mr. P.;) I should not be found opposed to his measures. Whatever personal feelings I might entertain, public opposition to principles which were my own, I never should have given. It is only because these principles have been abandoned, that I have been found in the position I occupy; but I must say, in reference to the present question, that it is pefectly insignificant who or what he may be, who is pro tempore the President of this Union; the question does not direct itself to the person of any individual; it is a question in which the country and posterity is deeply concerned, not for a day, but in perpetuity. The safety of our Republic depends entirely upon stripping the President, not merely the present incumbent, but every future President, of a dangerous power, of a destructive and pernicious prerogative, which cannot safely be left in the hands and at the discretion of any single individual. Let it be remembered that we are not here to legislate for a day-for the mere object of putting in one man, or turning out another; but we legislate for many years to come, and on subjects in which the course we take will decide hereafter upon our fame and character. As for myself, (said Mr. P.,) the Senate knows, every individual knows, that the principles which I now advocate are those which I always did advocate, at all times, and in all places. This measure has been attacked, on the grounds that, in 1789, men of known talents passed an opinion favora ble to the existence of the quantum of patronage which at that time was possessed by the President. I profess (said Mr. P.) I have heard with perfect dismay the gentlemen from New York and Pennsylvania [Messrs. WRIGHT and BUCHANAN] avow sentiments extremely dangerous! yes, extremely dangerous! The former gentleman opposes the bill, because he says it is not constitutional to limit the power of the Executive! The latter gentleman also takes the constitution as his basis, and builds upon it claims for the individual power of every Chief Magistrate-such as are so highly dangerous, and so overwhelming and sweeping in their consequences, that though it is not the first time I have heard such monstrous claims asserted as flowing from the same fountain, yet I am filled with the most serious apprehensions when I hear them. These gentlemen, it is true, profess great veneration for the constitution, and, with the salvo of its name, they set about establishing such claims of arbitrary and despotic power for the Chief Magistrate, as, if they succeed in their doctrine, will very soon show that a constitution which warrants such doctrines is any thing but a free constitution. So, then, if we are to give heed to the arguments and inferences of these gentlemen, and others who reason in the same strain, then we are bound by the constitution itself (as they are pleased to interpret it) to surrender up our liberties, to abandon the rights of the people, to give up all that our brave fathers contended for! Yes, we are bound to do all this by the constitutition! We are bound by the constitution to be without freedom and without a constitution. They rest their argument upon the various clauses of the constitution, and because this instrument says the executive power shall be in the President, they seriously maintain that the despotic and arbitrary pow. er which it is the object of this bill to restrict and limit, belongs by right to the President! They prove this, or imagine they prove it, by the constitution! And with the sound of that name issuing from their lips, perhaps they imagine they will be able to prove the same monstrous doctrines which they maintain to the people of this country; but they are deceived! The people of this country are not yet, I trust, prepared to submit to individual power placed upon a pedestal out of the reach and control of the people. They argue that, because the constitution says the executive power shall be in the [FEB. 17, 1835. President, therefore we are to submit to erect a power over us which is utterly incompatible with the existence of liberty and the existence of a republic. Because the executive power is to be in the President, therefore they resist this bill which imposes limitation to his power, and are anxious to give to him and preserve to bim uncontrolled, unlimited, and most dangerous power. And what is executive power? Where do they go to find out definitions for this executive power, by which they mean all power-unlimited power; and with which they seek to clothe the President? Where do they hunt up their definitions of this term "executive power,' that they may know their own meaning and find arguments by which to establish a perfect despotism in our Republic? They go to the ruined and mouldering columns of the prostrate temples of Asia; they go to the palaces of European monarchs, to Buckingham House, White Hall, and St. James's; they go to the Russian Kremlin and Sublime Porte, to find a definition for executive power, and, having found it in the persons of Kings, sovereigns, and despots, they come here to our America, and seek to transfer to the White House the definition which they have found in transatlantic palaces. If it be so--if it be as they maintain, that executive power is granted to the President by the constitution— (I speak not, said Mr. P., of the present incumbent, but of the corporation of our Presidents universally)—if the constitution makes a grant of this power, and they will not admit of any limitation to it, as they show by their opposition to the provisions of this bill, then I ask, since all power is granted to the President, what executive power is left to the States? None whatever is left to them, at that rate. It was once proposed to grant to the President a veto on the States; but the proposition fell to the ground. What it, however, proposed, was trifling, indeed, compared to what they confer by the interpretation which they put upon the constitution--they, the gentlemen of the administration. But I believe, throughout the whole country, none others will be found to do so. If the word executive power is to cover and include all, and to admit of no limitation or control to executive patronage and power, then I ask why should there be an enumeration in that instrument of specific acts which the President is authorized to perform? If it is to be interpreted as conceding to him all power, why should it be said that he shall be required to see that the laws are executed? Why should this be said, if all power is already his by the grant of the constitution? The "general welfare doctrine," which has been squeezed out of the constitution, annihilating the independence of the States, never, I confess, said Mr. P., monstrous as the doctrine is, excited such alarming apprehensions in my mind as this doctrine, which is now so strenuously urged by the supporters of the administra tion. The spirit of our fathers, the genius of our institutions, all rise up in dismay, and cry out against it! I lift up my feeble voice against it; I pronounce my solemn protest against it, as being contrary to all that our fathers hoped and fought for, as contrary to the safety and welfare of the country, and as being a desperate struggle against the principles of that great and glorious struggle for which our ancestors laid down their lives! Mr. WRIGHT said he felt bound to say a very few words in reply to what had fallen from the Senator from South Carolina. Knowing, as he did, how precious the time of the Senate was at that period of the session, he should content himself with making two or three remarks by way of explanation. The honorable Senator had represented him, (Mr. W.,) though unintentionally no doubt, as saying what he, in fact, never intended to advance. The gentleman had said he regarded the 100,000 pensioners, or dependants upon the bounty of |