แ tution with power to defend their rights, the mere instrument of a majority of Congress. A surrender, on his part, of the powers with which the constitution has invested his office, would effect a practical alteration of that instrument, without resorting to the prescribed process of amendment. With the motives or considerations which may induce Congress to pass any bill, the President can have nothing to do. He must presume them to be as pure as his own, and look only to the practical effect of their measures when compared with the constitution or the public good. But it has been urged by those who object to the exercise of this undoubted constitutional power, that it assails the representative principle and the capacity of the people to govern themselves; that there is greater safety in a numerous representative body, than in the single Executive created by the constitution, and that the Executive veto is a one-man power," despotic in its character. To expose the fallacy of this objection, it is only necessary to consider the frame and true character of our system. Ours is not a consolidated empire, but a confederated Union. The States, before the adoption of the constitution, were co-ordinate, coequal, and separate independent sovereignties, and by its adoption they did not lose that character. They clothed the Federal Government with certain powers, and reserved all others, including their own sovereignty, to themselves. They guarded their own rights, as States, and the rights of the people, by the very limitations which they incorporated into the Federal constitution, whereby the different departments of the General Government were checks upon each other. That the majority should govern, is a general principle, controverted by none; but they must govern according to the constitution, and not according to an undefined and unrestrained discretion, whereby they may oppress the minority. The people of the United States are not blind to the fact that they may be temporarily misled, and that their representatives, legislative and executive, may be mistaken or influenced in their action by improper motives. They have therefore interposed between themselves and the laws which may be passed by their public agents, various representations, such as Assemblies, Senates, and Governors in their several States; a House of Representatives, a Senate, and a President of the United States. The people can by their own direct agency make no law; nor can the House of Representatives immediately elected by them; nor can the Senate; nor can both together, without the concurrence of the President, or a vote of two-thirds of both House. Happily for themselves, the people, in framing our admirable system of Government, were conscious of the infirmities of their representatives; and, in delegating to them the power of legislation, they have fenced them around with checks, to guard against the effects of hasty action, of error, of combination, and of possible corruption. Error, selfishness, and faction have often sought to rend 'asunder this web of checks, and subject the Government to the control of fanatic and sinister influences; but these efforts have only satisfied the people of the wisdom of the checks which they have imposed, and of the necessity of preserving them unimpaired. The true theory of our system is not to govern [30TH CONG. by the acts or decrees of any one set of representatives. The constitution interposes checks upon all branches of the Government, in order to give time for error to be corrected, and delusion to pass away; but if the people settle down into a firm conviction different from that of their representatives, they give effect to their opinions by changing their public servants. The checks which the people imposed on their public servants in the adoption of the constitution, are the best evidence of their capacity for self-government. They know that the men whom they elect to public stations are of like infirmities and passions with themselves, and not to be trusted without being restricted by co-ordinate authorities and constitutional limitations. Who that has witnessed the legislation of Congress for the last thirty years will say, that he knows of no instance in which measures not demanded by the public good, have been carried? Who will deny that, in the State governments, by combinations of individuals and sections, in derogation of the general interest, banks have been chartered, systems of internal improvement adopted, and debts entailed upon the people, repressing their growth, and impairing their energies for years to come? After so much experience, it cannot be said that absolute unchecked power is safe in the hands of any one set of representatives, or that the capacity of the people for self-government, which is admit❘ted in its broadest extent, is a conclusive argument to prove the prudence, 'wisdom, and integrity of their representatives. The people, by the constitution, have commanded the President, as much as they have commanded the legislative branch of the Government, to execute their will. They have said to him in the constitution, which they require he shall take a solemn oath to support, that if Congress pass any bill which he cannot approve, "he shall return it to the House in which it originated, with his objections." In withholding from it his approval and signature, he is executing the will of the people constitutionally expressed, as much as the Congress that passed it. No bill is presumed to be in accordance with the popular will until it shall have passed through all the branches of the Government required by the constitution to make it a law. A bill which passes the House of Representatives may be rejected by the Senate; and so a bill passed by the Senate may be rejected by the House. In each case the respective Houses exercise the veto power on the other. Congress, and each House of Congress, hold under the constitution a check upon the President, and he, by the power of the qualified veto, a check upon Congress. When the President recommends measures to Congress, he avows, in the most solemn form, his opinions, gives his voice in their favor, and pledges himself in advance to approve them if passed by Congress. If he acts without due consideration, or has been influenced by improper or corrupt motives-or if from any other cause Congress, or either House of Congress, shall differ with him in opinion, they exercise their veto upon his recommendations, and reject them; and there is no appeal from their decision, but to the people at the ballot-box. These are proper checks upon the Executive, wisely interposed by the constitution. None will be found to object to them, or to wish them removed. It is equally 2D SESS.] The President's Message. [DECEMBER, 1848. important that the constitutional checks of the | as the President does by refusing to approve and executive upon the legislative branch should be preserved. If it be said that the Representatives in the popular branch of Congress are chosen directly by the people, it is answered, the people elect the President. If both Houses represent the States and the people, so does the President. The President represents in the executive department the whole people of the United States, as each member of the legislative department represents portions of them. The doctrine of restriction upon legislative and executive power, while a well-settled public opinion is enabled within a reasonable time to accomplish its ends, has made our country what it is, and has opened to us a career of glory and happiness to which all other nations have been strangers. In the exercise of the power of the veto, the President is responsible not only to an enlightened public opinion, but to the people of the whole Union, who elected him, as the representatives in the legislative branches, who differ with him in opinion, are responsible to the people of particular States, or districts, who compose their respective constituencies. To deny to the President the exercise of this power, would be to repeal that provision of the constitution which confers it upon him. To charge that its exercise unduly controls the legislative will, is to complain of the constitution itself. sign it. This power has been exercised by the Vice President in a few instances, the most important of which was the rejection of the bill to re-charter the Bank of the United States in 1811. It may happen that a bill may be passed by a large majority of the House of Representatives, and may be supported by the Senators from the larger States, and the Vice President may reject it by giving his vote with the Senators from the smaller States; and yet none, it is presumed, are prepared to deny to him the exercise of this power under the constitution. But it is, in point of fact, untrue that an act passed by Congress is conclusive evidence that it is an emanation of the popular will. A majority of the whole number elected to each house of Congress constitutes a quorum, and a majority of that quorum is competent to pass laws. It might happen that a quorum of the House of Representatives, consisting of a single member more than half of the whole number elected to that House, might pass a bill by a majority of a single vote, and in that case a fraction more than one-fourth of the people of the United States would be represented by those who voted for it. It might happen that the same bill might be passed by a majority of one, of a quorum of the Senate, composed of Senators, from the fifteen smaller States, and a single Senator from a sixteenth State, and if the Senators voting for it happened to be from the eight of the smallest of these States, it would be passed by the votes of Senators from States having but fourteen Representatives in the House of Representatives, and containing less than one-sixteenth of the whole population of the United States. This extreme case is stated to illustrate the fact, that the mere passage of a bill by Congress is no conclusive evidence that those who passed it represent the majority of the people of the United States, or truly reflect their will. If such an extreme case is not likely to happen, cases that approximate it are of constant occurrence. It is believed that not a sin If the Presidential veto be objected to upon the ground that it checks and thwarts the public will, upon the same principle the equality of representation of the States in the Senate should be stricken out of the constitution. The vote of a Senator from Delaware has equal weight in deciding upon the most important measures with the vote of a Senator from New York; and yet the one represents a State containing, according to the existing apportionment of representatives in the House of Representatives, but one thirty-fourth part of the population of the other. By the constitutional composition of the Senate, a majority of that bodygle law has been passed since the adoption of the from the smaller States represents less than onefourth of the people of the Union. There are thirty States; and, under the existing apportion ment of representatives, there are two hundred and thirty members in the House of Representatives. Sixteen of the smaller States are represented in that House by but fifty members; and yet the Senators from these States constitute a majority of the Senate. So that the President may recommend a measure to Congress, and it may receive the sanction and approval of more than three-fourths of the House of Representatives, and of all the Senators from the large States, containing more than threefourths of the whole population of the United States; and yet the measure may be defeated by the votes of the Senators from the smaller States. None, it is presumed, can be found ready to change the organization of the Senate on this account, or to strike that body practically out of existence, by requiring that its action shall be conformed to the will of the more numerous branch. Upon the same principle that the veto of the President should be practically abolished, the power of the Vice President to give the casting vote upon an equal division of the Senate, should be abolished also. The Vice President exercises the veto power as effectually by rejecting a bill by his casting vote, constitution, upon which all the members elected to both Houses have been present and voted. Many of the most important acts which have passed Congress have been carried by a close vote in thin Houses. Many instances of this might be given. Indeed, our experience proves that many of the most important acts of Congress are postponed to the last days, and often the last hours of a session, when they are disposed of in haste, and by Houses but little exceeding the number necessary to form a quorum. Besides, in most of the States the members of the House of Representatives are chosen by pluralities, and not by majorities of all the voters in their respective districts; and it may happen that a majority of that House may be returned by a less aggregate vote of the people than that received by the minority. If the principle insisted on be sound, then the constitution should be so changed, that no bill shall become a law unless it is voted for by members representing in each House a majority of the whole people of the United States. We must remodel our whole system, strike down and abolish not only the salutary checks lodged in the Executive branch, but must strike out and abolish those lodged in the Senate also, and thus practically invest the whole power of the Government in a majority of a single assembly a majority uncontrolled and absolute, and which may become despotic. To conform to this doctrine of the right of majorities to rule, independent of the checks and limitations of the constitution, we must revolutionize our whole system. We must destroy the constitutional compact by which the several States agreed to form a Federal Union, and rush into consolidation, which must end in monarchy or despotism. No one advocates such a proposition; and yet the doctrine maintained, if carried out, must lead to this result. One great object of the constitution, in conferring upon the President a qualified negative upon the legislation of Congress, was to protect minorities from injustice and oppression by majorities. The equality of their representation in the Senate, and the veto power of the President, are the constitutional guarantees which the smaller States have that their rights will be respected. Without these guarantees, all their interests would be at the mercy of majorities in Congress representing the larger States. To the smaller and weaker States, therefore, the preservation of this power, and its exercise upon proper occasions demanding it, is of vital importance. They ratified the constitution, and entered into the Union, securing to themselves an equal representation with the larger States in the Senate; and they agreed to be bound by all laws passed by Congress, upon the express condition, and none other, that they should be approved by the President, or passed, his objections to the contrary notwithstanding, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses. Upon this condition, they have a right to insist, as a part of the compact to which they gave their assent. A bill might be passed by Congress against the will of the whole people of a particular State, and against the votes of its Senators and all its Representatives. However prejudicial it might be to the interests of such State, it would be bound by it if the President shall approve it, or it should be passed by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses; but it has a right to demand that the President shall exercise his constitutional power and arrest it, if his judgment is against it. If he surrender this power, or fail to exercise it in a case where he cannot approve, it would make his formal approval a mere mockery, and would be itself a violation of the constitution, and the dissenting State would become bound by a law which had not been passed according to the sanctions of the constitution. [30TH CONG, For the same reason that the Executive veto should, according to the doctrine maintained, be rendered nugatory, and be practically expunged from the constitution, this power of the court should also be rendered nugatory and be expunged, because it restrains the legislative and executive will, and because the exercise of such a power by the court may be regarded as being in conflict with the capacity of the people to govern themselves. Indeed, there is more reason for striking this power of the court from the constitution than there is that of the qualified veto of the President; because the decision of the court is final, and can never be reversed, even though both Houses of Congress and the President should be unanimous in opposition to it; whereas the veto of the President may be overruled by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, or by the people at the polls. It is obvious that to preserve the system established by the constitution, each of the co-ordinate branches of the Government-the executive, legislative, and judicial-must be left in the exercise of its appropriate powers. If the executive or the judicial branch be deprived of powers conferred upon either as checks on the legislative, the preponderance of the latter will become disproportionate and absorbing, and the others impotent for the accomplishment of the great objects for which they were established. Organized as they are by the constitution, they work together harmoniously for the public good. If the Executive and the Judiciary shall be deprived of the constitutional powers invested in them, and of their due proportions, the equilibrium of the system must be destroyed, and consolidation, with the most pernicious results, must ensue-a consolidation of unchecked; despotic power, exercised by majorities of the legislative branch. The executive, legislative, and judicial, each constitutes a separate co-ordinate department of the Government; and each is independent of the others. In the performance of their respective duties under the constitution, neither can, in its legiti mate action, control the others. They each act upon their several responsibilities in their respective spheres; but if the doctrines now maintained be correct, the executive must become practically subordinate to the legislative, and the judiciary must become subordinate to both the legislative and the executive; and thus the whole power of the Government would be merged in a single department. Whenever, if ever, this shall occur, our The objection to the exercise of the veto power glorious system of well-regulated self-government is founded upon an idea respecting the popular will, will crumble into ruins-to be succeeded, first by which, if carried out, would annihilate State sover- anarchy, and finally by monarchy or despotism. I. eignty, and substitute for the present Federal Gov-am far from believing that this doctrine is the senernment a consolidation, directed by a supposed numerical majority. A revolution of the Government would be silently effected, and the States would be subjected to laws to which they had never given their constitutional consent. The Supreme Court of the United States is invested with the power to declare, and has declared, acts of Congress passed with the concurrence of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the approval of the President, to be unconstitutional and void; and yet none, it is presumed, can be found, who will be disposed to strip this highest judicial tribunal under the constitution of this acknowledged power--a power, necessary alike to its independence and the rights of individuals. timent of the American people; and during the short period which remains in which it will be my duty to administer the Executive Department, it will be my aim to maintain its independence, and discharge its duties, without infringing upon the powers or duties of either of the other departments of the Government. The power of the Executive veto was exercised by the first and most illustrious of my predecessors, and by four of his successors who preceded me in the administration of the Government, and, it is believed, in no instance, prejudicially to the public interests. It has never been, and there is but little danger that it ever can be abused. No President will ever desire, unnecessarily, to place his opinion 2D SESS.] [DECEMBER, 1848. Death of Hon. Dixon H. Lewis. this honorable body to an afflictive dispensation of Providence, which has deprived the Senate of the United States of one of its most esteemed and honored members, the country of a talented and useful citizen, and the State of Alabama of a vigilant and faithful representa in opposition to that of Congress. He must always exercise the power reluctantly, and only in cases where his convictions make it a matter of stern duty, which he cannot escape. Indeed, there is more danger that the President, from the repugnance he must always feel to come in collision with Congress, may fail to exercise it in cases where the preservation of the constitution from infraction, or the public good, may demand it, than that he will ever exercise it unnecessarily or wantonly. During the period I have administered the Executive Department of the Government, great and important questions of public policy, foreign and domestic, have arisen, upon which it was my duty to act. It may indeed be truly said, that my administration has fallen upon eventful times. I have felt most sensibly the weight of the high responsibilities devolved upon me. With no other object than the public good, the enduring fame, and permanent prosperity of my country, I have pursued the convictions of my own best judgment. The impartial arbitrament of enlightened public opinion, present and future, will determine how far the public policy I have maintained, and the measures I have from time to time recommended, may have tended to advance or retard the public prosperity at home, and to elevate or depress the estimate of our national character abroad. Invoking the blessings of the Almighty upon your deliberations at your present important session, my ardent hope is, that in a spirit of harmony and concord, you may be guided to wise results, and such as may redound to the happiness, the honor, and the glory of our beloved country. tive. On the 25th day of October last, and in the 47th year of his age, DIXON H. LEWIS, a Senator from the State of Alabama, breathed his last in the city of New York. Although far from his home, he was surrounded by anxious and devoted friends. The amiable and affectionate partner of his bosom watched over him with that tender care which none but woman could bestow; and nothing was omitted which, it was believed, could contribute to his recovery, allay his sufferings, or soothe his dying moments. His immortal spirit calmly passed alone remained to his bereaved family and away without a struggle, and his lifeless body sorrowing friends. Then it was, Mr. President, that the Mayor and Common Council of the city of New York, actuated by that liberal spirit which has ever characterized the emporium of our country, desirous of showing the high respect in which they held that distinguished individual for his many private virtues and useful public services, asked and obtained permission to take upon itself the necessary arrangements for his funeral. They were of a public character, and conducted in such a manner as could not fail to be most gratifying to the family and friends of the deceased. Greenwood, in the identical spot, as I am inHis body reposes in the beautiful grounds of formed, where he once expressed a wish to be interred, should it so happen that his earthly career should be terminated while in its vicinity. Providence so ordered it; and I avail myself of this occasion to tender to the Mayor and Common Council of the city of New York, the gratitude of the State of Alabama, for the distinguished respect paid to the memory of one of her most honored and cherished sons. Mr. LEWIS, Mr. President, was a native of the State of Georgia. He received his education at the College of South Carolina, where, by his social qualities, he endeared himself to his associates; while his scholastic attainments furnished evidence that he was possessed of talents of a superior order, and pointed him out as one destined to acquire reputation in whatever pursuit he might engage. On the completion of his collegiate course, Mr. LEWIS moved to the State of Alabama, became a student in a law office, and by close application, soon qualified himself for the bar. He obtained a license to practise in the several courts of the State. His professional career was short, but he had obtained a reputable standing; and had he continued to pursue the profession, he must soon have become eminent as a lawyer. The inclination, however, of Mr. LEWIS, immediately led him to engage in poli [30TH CONG tics. He became a candidate for the State | mark of respect for the memory of the Hon. Legislature, and the people of the county in DIXON H. LEWIS, the Senate do now adjourn. which he resided, elected him with great unanimity as one of its members. Although quite a young man, he very soon acquired a commanding influence with the members of the House in which he served. Mr. LEWIS was what is termed a State-rights man, a strict constructionist; and, while a member of the Legislature, rendered himself conspicuous by an able advocacy of resolutions denying to Congress the power to establish a national bank, to impose a tariff for protection, or to execute works of internal improvement. His opinions were in accordance with those of a large majority of the people of Alabama; in the year 1829, as I believe, he was elected by the Congressional district in which he resided to represent them in the Congress of the United States. He continued, without intermission, to serve in the House of Representatives until the spring of the year 1844, commanding, by his talents, firmness, and urbanity, the respect and confidence of its members. In 1844 a vacancy was produced in the Senate of the United States by my resignation, and Mr. LEWIS was appointed by the Governor of Alabama to fill the vacancy. On the meeting of the State Legislature, the selection of the Governor was approved, and Mr. Lewis was elected, without opposition, for the unexpired term. Again was he chosen, at the session of the Legislature of the last winter, for the full term of six years. Few, Mr. President, very few of the distinguished men of our country have, for so long a period, maintained their position in the councils of the nation, and have more firmly adhered to the principles they professed, than my late lamented colleague. Most of the Senators present have served with him, and to them I can fearlessly appeal to bear testimony to the high esteem in which he was held by his brother Senators, and to the zeal and ability with which he discharged the various duties which devolved upon him. But it is not my purpose to pronounce a eulogy on the life and public services of DIXON H. LEWIS. They are known and properly appreciated by his countrymen; and nothing which I could say would add to his well-earned reputation, or cause his loss to be more deeply lamented. He has gone from among us; and the places which knew him shall know him no more forever. It only remains for me, Mr. President, to submit the following resolutions for the adoption of the Senate: Resolved, unanimously, That the Senate, from a sincere desire of showing every mark of respect due to the memory of the Hon. DIXON H. LEWIS, deceased, late a member thereof, will go into mourning by wearing crape on the left arm for thirty days. Resolved, unanimously, That, as an additional The resolutions being under consideration— tions offered by the honorable Senator from When the career of his lamented colleague York, I chanced to be there, and I was the was suddenly terminated in the city of New only one of his associates on this floor who had the opportunity of following him to his final resting-place. It seemed to me for this reason that I might appropriately speak of his last illness; of the honors paid to his memory; and for the satisfaction of distant friends, of the spot where his remains repose. Of his talents, his patriotism, his public services, the kindly feeling which he carried into his intercharacter, his stern integrity, and his fidelity course with others, the purity of his private to all the obligations of life, I need say nothing. On this subject the honorable Senator who But I cannot forbear to add, that all my intermoved the resolutions has left little to be said. course with him in this body strongly impressed me with his liberality as a gentleman, his uprightness as a man, and his conscientiousness as a legislator. of October, unwell, though not, as was sup- mournful intelligence, called the Common The Mayor of the city, on receiving the Council together, and it was immediately re solved, with one accord, to give his remains a ceremonies performed at the City Hall, the public burial. I will not dwell on the funeral words of eloquence spoken over him, or the extended procession moving through streets thronged with the population of the city. Suffice to say, the former Mayors of New York, members of Congress, State and city authorities, public societies, citizens, all united in paying the honors due to him as one of the body, cut off at a distance from those by whom representatives of a sovereign State in this these tributes of respect would otherwise have been rendered. Thus attended, his remains were consigned to the earth, in one of the rural cemeteries, which the principal cities of New York and some of the neighboring States have, within a few years, set apart for the reception of their dead-places selected for their natural beauty, and adorned with all that art could devise, or |