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mode by which it is contemplated to deprive them of that custody is the process of replevin and that of capias ad withernam, in the nature of a distress from the state tribunals organized by the ordinance.

Against the proceeding in the nature of distress it is not perceived that the collector can interpose any resistance whatever; and against the process of replevin authorized by the law of the state, he, having no common law power, can only oppose such inspectors as he is by statute authorized, and may find it practicable, to employ; and these, from the information already adverted to, are shown to be wholly inadequate. The respect which that process deserves must therefore be considered.

force a re-delivery of the thing by attachment or any other summary process; that the question under such a seizure, whether a forfeiture has been actually incurred, belongs exclusively to the courts of the United States, and it depends on the final decree whether the seizure is to be deemed rightful or tortuous; and that not until the seizure be finally judged wrongful and without proba ble cause by the courts of the United States, can the party proceed at common law for damages in the state courts.

But by making it "unlawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of the United States or of the state, to enforce the laws for the payment of duties, and declaring that all judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance of contracts made with purpose to secure the duties imposed by the said acts, are and shall be held utterly null and void," she has in effect abrogated the judicial tribunals within her limits in this respecthas virtually denied the United States access to the courts establish. ed by their own laws, and declared it unlawful for the judges to discharge those duties which they are sworn to perform. In lieu of these, she has substituted those state tribunals already adverted to the judges whereof are not merely forbidden to allow an appeal, or permit a copy of the record, but are previously sworn to disregard the laws of the union, and enforce those only of South Carolina; and, thus deprived of the function essential to the judicial character, of inquiring into the validity of the law and the right of the matter, become merely ministerial instruments in aid of the concerted obstruction of the laws of the

If the authorities of South Carolina had not obstructed the legitimate action of the courts of the United States, or if they had permitted the state tribunals to administer the law according to their oath under the constitution, and the regulations of the laws of the union, the general government might have been content to look to them for maintaining the custody, and to encounter the other inconveniencies arising out of the recent proceedings. Even in that case, however, the process of replevin from the courts of the state would be irregular and unauthorized. It has been decided by the supreme court of the United States, that the courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction of all seizures made on land or water for a breach of the laws of the United States; and any intervention of a state authority, which, by taking the thing seized out of the hands of the United States officer, might obstruct the exercise of this jurisdiction, is unlawful that in such case the union. : court of the United States having cognizance of the seizure, may en

Neither the process nor authority of these tribunals, thus constituted,

can be respected consistently with the supremacy of the laws, or the rights and security of the citizen. If they be submitted to, the protection due from the government to its officers and citizens is withheld, and there is at once an end, not only to the laws, but to the union itself.

Against such a force as the she riff may, and which, by the replevin act of South Carolina, it is his duty to exercise, it cannot be expected that a collector will retain his custody with the aid of the inspectors. In such case, it is true, it would be competent to institute suits in the United States courts, against those engaged in the unlawful proceeding; or the property might be seized for a violation of the revenue laws, and being libelled in the proper courts, an order might be made for its re-dclivery, which would be committed to the marshal for execution. But in that case, the 4th section of the act, in broad and unqualified terms, makes it the duty of the sheriff "to prevent such re-capture or seizure, or to re-deliver the goods, as the case may be," even under any process, order, or decrees, or other pretext, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the ordinance aforesaid." It is thus made the duty of the sheriff, to oppose the process of the courts of the United States, and for that purpose, if need be, to employ the whole power of the country; and the act expressly reserves to him all power, which, independently of its provisions he could have used. In this reservation it obviously contemplates a resort to other means than those particularly mentioned.

It is not to be disguised, that the power which it is thus enjoined upon the sheriff to employ, is nothing less than the posse comitatus, in all the rigour of the ancient common law. This power, though it may be used against unlawful resistance to judi

cial process, is in its character forcible, and analogous to that conferred upon the marshals by the act of 1795. It is, in fact, the embodying of the whole mass of the population under the command of a single individual, to accomplish by their forcible aid, what could not be effected peaceably, and by the ordinary means. It may properly be said to be a relict of those ages in which the laws could be defended rather by physical than moral force, and, in its origin, was conferred upon the sheriffs of England, to enable them to defend their country against any of the king's enemies, when they come into the land, as well as for the purpose of executing process. In early and less civilized times, it was intended to include "the aid and attendance of all knights and others who were bound to have harness.” It includes, the right of going with arms and equipments, and embraces larger classes and greater masses of population than can be compelled by the laws of most of the states, to perform militia duty. If the principles of the common law are recognised in South Carolina, (and from this act it would seem they are,) the powers of summoning the posse comitatus will compel, under the penalty of fine and imprisonment, every man, over the age of fifteen, and able to travel, to turn out at the call of the sheriff, and with such weapons as shall be necessary; and it may justify beating, and even killing such as may resist. The use of the posse comitatus is therefore a direct application of force, and cannot be otherwise regarded, than as the employment of the whole militia force of the county, and in an equally efficient form, under a different name. No proceeding which resorts to this power, to the extent contemplated by the act, can be properly demominated peaceable.

The act of South Carolina, how. ever, does not rely altogether upon this forcible remedy. For even attempting to resist or disobey, though by the aid only of the ordinary officers of the customs, the process of replevin, the collector and all concerned are subject to a further proceeding in the nature of a distress of their personal effects, and are moreover made guilty of a misdemeanour, and liable to be punished by fine of not less than one thousand dollars, nor more than five thousand, and to imprisonment not exceeding two years, nor less than six months; and for even attempt. ing to execute the orders of the court for retaking the property, the marshal and all assisting would be guilty of a misdemeanour, and so liable to a fine of not less than three thousand dollars, and to imprisonment not exceeding two years, nor less than one; and in case the goods should be retaken under such process, it is made the absolute duty of the sheriff to retake them.

It is not to be supposed, that in the face of these penalties, aided by the powerful force of the county which would doubtless be brought to sustain the state officers, either that the collector could retain the custody in the first instance, or that the marshals could summons sufficient aid to retake the property, pursuant to the order or other process of the court.

It is moreover obvious, that in this conflict between the powers of the officers of the United States and the state, (unless the latter be passively submitted to,) the destruction to which the property of the officers of the customs would be exposed, the commission of actual violence, and the loss of lives, would be scarcely avoidable.

Under these circumstances, and

the provisions of the acts of South Carolina, the execution of the laws is rendered impracticable, even through the ordinary judicial tri bunals of the United States. There would certainly be fewer difficul. ties, and less opportunity of actual collision between the officers of the United States and of the state, and the collection of the revenue would be more effectually secured—if indeed it can be done in any other way-by placing the custom house beyond the immediate power of the county.

For this purpose it might be proper to provide, that whenever, by any unlawful combination or obstruction, in any state, or in any port, it should become impracticable faithfully to collect the duties, the president of the United States should be authorized to alter and abolish such of the districts and ports of entries as should be necessary, and to establish the custom house at some secure place within the same port or harbour of such state; and in such cases, it should be the duty of the collector to reside at such place, and to detain all vessels and cargoes, until the duties imposed by law be properly secured, or paid in cash, deducting interest; that in such cases it should be unlawful to take the vessel and cargo from the custody of the proper officer of the customs, unless by process from the ordinary judidicial tribunals of the United States; and that in case of an attempt otherwise to take the property by a force too great to be overcome by the of ficers of the customs, it should be lawful to protect the possession of the officers by the employment of the land and naval forces and the militia, under provisions similar to those authorized by the 11th section of the act of the 19th January, 1809.

This provision, however, will not shield the officers and citizens of the United States, acting under the laws from suits and prosecutions in the tribunals of the state, which might thereafter be brought against them, nor would it protect their property from the proceeding by distress; and it may well be apprehended that it would be ineffi. cient to insure a proper respect to the process of the constitutional tribunals in prosecutions for offences against the United States, and to protect the authorities of the United States, whether judicial or ministerial, in the performance of their duty. It would, moreover, be inadequate to extend the protection due from the government, to that portion of the people of South Carolina, against outrage and oppression of any kind, who may manifest their attachment, and yield obe. dience to the laws of the union.

It may therefore be desirable to revive, with some modifications better adapted to the occasion, the 6th section of the act of 3d March, 1815, which expired on the 4th of March, 1817, by the limitation of that of 27th of April, 1816, and to provide that in any case where suit shall be brought against any individual in the courts of the state, for any act done under the laws of the United States, he should be authorized to remove the said cause by petition into the circuit court of the United States, without any copy of the record, and that that court should proceed to hear and determine the same as if it had been originally instituted therein; and that in all cases of injuries to the persons or property of individuals acting under the laws of the United States for disobedience to the ordinance and laws of South Carolina in performance thereof, re

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dress may be sought in the courts of the United States.

It may be expedient, also, by modifying the resolution of the 3d of March, 1791, to authorize the marshals to make the necessary provision for the safe keeping of prisoners committed under the authority of the United States.

Provisions less than these, consisting, as they do for the most part, rather of a revival of the policy of former acts called for by the exist ing emergency, than of the introduction of any unusual or rigorous enactments, would not cause the laws of the union to be properly respected and enforced. It is believed these would prove adequate, unless the military forces of the state of South Carolina authorized by the act of the legislature, should be actually embodied and called out in aid of their proceedings, and of the provisions of the ordinance generally. Even in that case, however, it is believed that no more will be necessary than a few modifications of its terms to adapt the act of 1795 to the present emergency; as by that act the provisions of the law of 1792 were accommodated to the crisis then existing: and by conferring authority upon the president to give it operation during the session of congress, and without the ceremony of a proclamation, whenever it shall be officially made known to him by the authority of any state, or by the courts of the United States, that within the limits of such state the laws of the United States will be openly opposed, and their execution obstructed, by the actual employment of military force, or by any unlawful means whatsoever, too great to be otherwise overcome.

In closing this communication I should do injustice to my own feel

ings not to express my confident reliance upon the disposition of each department of the government to perform its duty, and co-operate in all measures necessary in the present emergency.

The crisis undoubtedly invokes the fidelity of the patriot and the sagacity of the statesman; not more in removing such portion of the public burthen as may be unneces. sary, than in preserving the good order of society, and in the maintenance of well-regulated liberty.

While a forbearing spirit may, and I trust will be exercised towards the errors of our brethren in a particular quarter, duty to the rest of the union demands, that open and organized resistance to the laws should not be executed with impunity. The rich inheritance bequeathed by our fathers has devolved upon us the sacred obligation of preserv. ing it by the same virtues which conducted them through the eventful scenes of the revolution, and ul. timately crowned their struggle with the noblest model of civil institutions. They bequeathed to us a government of laws, and a federal union, founded upon the great prin. ciple of popular representation. Af ter a successful experiment of 44 years, at a moment when the go. vernment and the union are the ob.

jects of the hopes of the friend of civil liberty throughout the world, and in the midst of public and individual prosperity unexampled in history, we are called upon to de. cide whether these laws possess any force, and that union the means of self preservation. The decision of this question by an enlightened and patriotic people cannot be doubtful. For myself, fellow citizens, devoutly relying upon that divine Providence, which has hitherto watched over our destinies, and actuated by a profound reverence for those institutions I have so much cause to love, and for the American people, whose partiality honoured me with their highest trust, I have deter. mined to spare no effort to discharge the duty which in this conjuncture is devolved upon me. That a similar spirit will actuate the representatives of the American people is not to be questioned; and I fervently pray that the Great Ruler of nations may so guide your delibe. rations and our joint measures, as that they may prove salutary examples, not only to the present, but to future times, and solemnly proclaim that the constitution and the laws are supreme, and the union indissoluble.

ANDREW JACKSON. Washington, January 16th, 1833.

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND NAPLES.

Convention between the Government of the United States of America and his Majesty the King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, to terminate the reclamations of said Government for the depredations inflicted upon American commerce by Murat, during the years 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1812.

THE government of the United States of America, and his Majesty the king of the kingdom of the Two

Sicilies, desiring to terminate the reclamations advanced by said go. vernment against his said Majesty,

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