mitted within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. ARTICLE IV. Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress. The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state. Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. ARTICLE V. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided, that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. ARTICLE VI. All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this constitution, as under the confederation. This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. ARTICLE VII. The ratification of the conventions of nine, states, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the states so ratifying the same. DONE in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and NEW-HAMPSHIRE, John Langdon,—Nicholas Gilman. NEW-JERSEY, W. Livingston,- David Brearley,—W. Patterson,—Jonathan Dayton. MARYLAND, James M'Henry,—Dan. of St. Thos. Jenifer,—Danl. Carroll. VIRGINIA, John Blair,—James Madison, junior. NORTH-CAROLINA, Wm. Blount,—Richd. Dobbs Spaight,—Hu. Williamson. SOUTH-CAROLINA, J. Rutledge,—Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,—Charles Pinckney,Pierce Butler. GEORGIA, William Few,—Abr. Baldwin. Attest. WILLIAM JACKSON, Secretary. IN CONVENTION. Monday, September 17, 1787. present, The States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton from New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, SouthCarolina and Georgia. Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each state by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its Legislature, for their assent and ratification; and that each Convention assenting to, and ratifying the same, should give notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the states which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution. That after such publication the electors should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of the President, and should transmit their votes certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the time and place assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose of receiving, opening and counting the votes for President; and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without delay, proceed to execute this Constitution. By the unanimous Order of the Convention, G. WASHINGT N, Preside t. W. Jackson, Secretary. In Convention, September 17, 1787. Sir, We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has appeared to us the most advisable. The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities, should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union But the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident -Hence results the necessity of a different organization. It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these States, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all—Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest—The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved: and on the present occasion this difficulty was encreased by a difference among the several states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests. In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved. our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each State in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected and thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable. That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not perhaps to be expected: but each will doubtless consider, that had her interests been alone consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected we hope and believe that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish. APPENDIX. No. 9. Queries and Remarks on a Paper, entitled "Hints for the Members of ConNo. II. in the Federal Gazette of Tuesday, Nov. 3, 1789. vention." [Referred to, page 396 of MEMOIRS.] HINT 1 OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. "Your executive should consist of a single person." On this I would ask, is he to have no council? How is he to be informed of the state and circumstances of the different counties, their wants, their abilities, their dispositions, and the characters of the principal people, respecting their integrity, capacities, and qualifications for offices? Does not the present construction of our executive provide well for these particulars? And during the number of years it has existed, have its errors or failures in answering the end of its appointment been more or greater than might have been expected from a single person? "But an individual is more easily watched and controlled than any greater number." On this I would ask, who is to watch and control him? And by what means is he to be controlled? Will not those means, whatever they are, and in whatever body vested, be subject to the same inconveniences of expense, delay, obstruction of good intentions, &c. which are objected to the present executive ? 2. The Duration of the Appointment. "This should be governed by the following principles, the independency of the magistrate, and the stability of his administration: neither of which can be secured but by putting both beyond the reach of every annual gust of folly and of faction." On this it may be asked, ought it not also to be put beyond the reach of every triennial, quirquennial, or septennial gust of folly and faction, and in short beyond the reach of folly and of faction at any period whatever? Does not this reasoning aim at establishing a monarchy at least for life, like that of Poland? or, to prevent the inconveniences such as that kingdom is |