pofition for calling another convention, in order more effectually to fecure the rights of the citizen. In corroboration of this, permit me to read the following from the proceedings of the new convention, December 9th, 1789.

A motion was made by Mr. James Rofs, feconded by Mr. Timothy Pickering, to introduce the following refolution :

Resolved, That that part of the conflitution of this Commonwealth, called a declaration of the rights of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth or state of Pennsylvania, requires alterations and amendments, in fuch manner as that the rights of the people referved and excepted out of the general powers of government, may be more accurately defined and fecured, and the fame andfuch other alterations and amendments as may be made in thefaid conftitution, be made to correfpond with each other."

By this you will fee, fir, that the primary object appears to have been perfonal liberty and the rights of man, and it was under that view, that the measure was finally agreed to. Under this impreffion, we fee them framing the conftitution, under which we now act. Here, fir, we find them acting upon the idea adopted by the council of cenfors, and with the view of preventing encroachments upon the liberties of the people, they Legin by faying that "the Legislative power of this Commonwealth fhall b vefted in a General Affembly, which shall confift of a Senate and Houfe of Reprefentatives." They found, fir, that the people were willing to place another check upon the inroads of illegal power, by establishing two branches in the Legislature. And, again, fir, to guard more effectually against encroachment, they declared that the fupreme executive power fhould be vested in a Governor, with a qualified negative upon the acts of the Legislative branches.

Again, with a design to prevent, as far as poffible, the enacting of fuch laws, whereby the right of jury trial had been taken away from them, the judicial powers were particularly defined. The 5th article of the conftitution declares, that "the judicial power of this Commonwealth, fhall be vested in a Supreme Court, Court of Oyer and Terminer, Court of Common Pleas, &c.

"The Judges of the Supreme Court, fhall hold their offices during good behavior; but, for any reafonable caufe, the Governor may remove any of them, on the addrefs of two thirds of each brauch of the Legislature," &c.

Here, fir, the Judges are made more independent, than under the former conftitution, more independent, perhaps, than is confiftent with free government; their falaries are ample, and cannot be reduced.

Having thus fhewn how they are established by the conflitu tional power, let us now advert to the Bill of Rights to the conftitution, under which we are now acting:

ARTICLE IX.

"That the general, great, and effential principles of liberty and free government, may be recognized and unalterably established, WE DECLARE,

SECT. 1. "That all men are born equally free and inde pendent, and have certain inherent and indefeafible rights, among which are thofe of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, poffeffing, and protecting property and repu tation, and of purfuing their own happiness."

SFCT. 2. "That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and inftituted for their peace, fafety and happiness: For the advancement of thofe ends, they have, at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their government in fuch manuer as they may think proper."

SECT. 6. "The trial by jury, fhall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate."

SECT. 7. That the printing preffes fhall be free to every perfon, who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the Legillature, or any branch of government: And no law fhall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communica

tion of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any fubject, being refponfible for the abufe of that liberty. In profecutions for the publication of papers, inveftigating the of ficial conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence: And, in all indictments for libels, the jury fhall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the Court, as in other cafes."

SECT. 8. "That the people fhall be fecure in their perfons,houfes, papers & poffeffions, from unreasonable fearches and feizures; and that no warrant, to fearch any place, or to feize any perfon or things, fhall iffue without defcribing them as nearly as may be,nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation."

SECT. 9. That, in all criminal profecutions, the accufed hath a right to be heard by himself and his counfel, to demand the nature and caufe of the accufation against him, to meet the witneffes face to face, to have compulfory process, for obtain

ing witneffes in his favor, and, in profecutions by indictment of information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage That he cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."

SECT. 10. "That no perfon fhall, for any indictable offence, be proceeded against criminally by information, except in cafes ariling in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in a&tual fervice in time of war or public danger, or, by leave of the Court, for oppreffion and mifdemeanor in office. No perfon fhall, for the fame offence, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb nor fhall any man's property be taken or applied to public ufe without the confeut of his Reprefentatives and without juft compenfation being made."

SECT. 12. "That no power of fufpending laws fhall be exercifed, unless by the Legislature or its authority."

SECT. 13. "That exceffive bail fhall not be required, nor exceffive fines impofed, nor cruel punishments inflicted."

SECT. 14. "That all prifoners fhall be bailable by fuffici ent fureties, unlefs for capital offences when the proof is evident or prefumption great; aud the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus fhall not be fufpended, unless when, in cafes of rebellion or invafion, the public fafety may require it."

SECT. 16. "That the perfon of a debtor, where there is not strong prefumption of fraud, fhall not be continued in prifon after delivering up his eftate for the benefit of his creditors in fuch manner as fhall be prefcribed by law."

SECT. 26. "To guard against tranfgreffions of the high powers which we have delegated, WE DECLARE, That every thing in this article, is excepted out of the general powers of government, and fhall for ever remain inviolate."

I ought to apologize, fir, for trefpaffing fo much upon the patience of this honorable Court, but I thought it eflential to trace the origin and progrefs of our government, and the principles upon which it has been founded.

Thus, fir, by a curfory view of the old conflitution, as well as by a view of the prefent conftitution, it will appear, that the protection of the liberty of the citizen, has always formed an indifpenfable feature, and has never been loft fight of. The prefent conftitution, like every other human work, bears the

mark of imperfection. Perhaps no man, nor fet of men, could have made a better under all the attendant circumstances; and great care has been taken to fecure the rights of the people. But all thefe guards, all thefe bulwarks, to fave the liberties of the citizen, have been thrown down, and trampled under foot, by those who ought to have been their fupporters. But, I hope, fir, that this day may prove aufpicious to the liberties of the people; and it is to you, gentlemen of the Senate, that we now look, as the guardians of thofe rights-that you will do juftice to an injured people, and that you will not fuffer their rights to be trampled upon with impunity. Gentlemen, never was there a matter of greater importance fubmitted to the confideration of a public body. The question is, fhall we hold our liberties by the facred tenure of the conftiturion, or by the uncertain tenure, or capricious will of an angry Judge, or Judges. This conftitution is the rule by which we are all to be governed.

By this, my conduct is to be tefted; by this, the conduct of the House of Reprefentatives will be tested; and, by this conftitution, will the measures of this Senate be tested. The eyes of our conflituents are upon us, and they expect from us, and from you ail that juice requires, and the conftitution authorizes. This conftitution, is in the hands of every man ; it needs not any extraordinory talents to understand it; it is plain and comprehenfible. Not like the Roman tyrant, who wrote his laws with a type fo fmall, and elevated them fo high, that even the eagle eye of a lawyer could not read them. This conftitution will justify you, in rigidly examining the conduct of thofe who are now arraigned at your bar; and, it is by the decifion that you will give upon this all-important subject, that you will be judged. In almost every part of this conftitution, you will perceive the jealoufy of the people for their rights. No man, fr, in Pennsylvania, can be addreffed in this way“You can do no wrong." That only belongs to the King, and is an attribute unknown among freemen. You, gentlemen, must be amenable to to the fovereign people, for all your public conduct. We, the members of this Houfe, every year must bs tried by that great tribunal. Let them try us every year—and, let them try you, gentlemen, every four years-and it must be grateful to our feelings, that in difcharging the important, tho' painful duties now devolved on us all, we have only to adhere to this conftitution, and be tested by it.

From this curfory view, therefore, of the conftitution, and of the duties it prefcribes to us, this all-important inference is deduced, that perfonal liberty was the principal feature-the pole-ftar of the first convention. But in the convention which formed the prefent conflitution, it feems to have gained additional strength.

Before I proceed to state the facts, upon which the prefent accufation is founded, permit me to advert to that part of the conftitution, which gives us as members of the House of Re prefentatives, the power of bringing impeachments, and you the power of trying them. The first section of the fourth article of

the conftitution fays

"The House of Reprefentatives fhall have the fole power of impeaching."

SECT. 2. All impeachments fhall be tried by the Senate."

Thus, it appears to have been the object of the framers of the constitution, to place no man above it, and for that purpofe they established a competent tribunal, for the trial of all thofe who might attempt to fubvert it. Even the Governor, is amenable to this tribunal. It cannot be faid even of the Governor, that he can do no wrong. We cannot fay to him"You can do no wrong." No, fir, if he acts in contravention to the principles of the conftitution, you are bound to bring him to your bar. We are bound to watch even him, and upon complaint being made, you are bound to judge him. We can fay to him, exalted as you are by the public confidence, you are not to exceed the bounds of the conftitution. You are not exempted from the fcrutiny of your conftituents.

SECT. 3. "The Governor and other civil officers under this Commonwealth, fhall be liable to impeachment."

All civil officers in the government, are therefore fubject to impeachment; and you, Mr. Speaker, and gentlemen of the Senate, are invefted with the high and neceffary power to hear accufations, and to fit in judgment upon them ;-and the folemity and importance of the prefent occafion, calls for your moft ferious attention.

What we are about to fubmit to you, is a charge of high misdemeanor in office, a difregard of the duties to which they were moft folemnly bound, by Edward Shippen, Chief Juftice, Jafper Yeates, and Thomas Smith, affociate Juftices of the Supreme Court. It appears from the evidence taken by the House of Reprefentatives, and which the managers on their behalf, and on behalf of the good people of this Commonwealth, are about to prove, that an amicable fuit was entered into on the 13th of July, 1802, on a contefted policy of insurance. Both parties having chofen their man, as referees, with power in cafe they difagreed, to choose an umpire. The referees not agreeing, William Haslet was chofen umpire, who, with one of the referees, reported on the 6th of Aug. 1802, an award in fa