Hale v. Young. This "to pay the first interest note to F. J. Hale." tends to show that Osborn had knowledge of the real contract between plaintiff and the Youngs, and assumed to carry out its provisions. There is other proof which tends to show Osborn's knowledge at the time of the purchase, which we need not here notice. It is clearly shown that he had knowledge of what the contract was, and that he was to perform its conditions. He testified that his contract with the Youngs was that he was to pay the interest annually. This being true, the reformation of the contract in that behalf could work no injury to his principal, Hale. We cannot, therefore, discover the hardship imposed upon defendant Hale, and are satisfied that the decision of the district court upon this part of the case was correct. The next question presented is, as to the decision of the trial court in decreeing the reformation of the contract as prayed by defendant, so far as it affected the leases upon the school lands referred to in the pleadings. The testimony throughout tends to show that at the time the contract was made the school land leases were considered as a part of the contract, and as a part of the consideration of the notes. Two of the leases held by the plaintiff were actually assigned to defendants Young and delivered to them. They were often referred to by the plaintiff and the Youngs in conversation subsequently had, and it sufficiently appears that they were returned to plaintiff, he being a resident of this state and near the land, to enable him as a representative of the Youngs to provide for the payments due the state as they matured, or if he thought proper to cause the land to be appraised and purchase it from the state for the benefit of the Youngs. This was done, the purchase being made in his own name. There may be some doubt as to his purpose at the time of this purchase, whether made for defendants or not. We need not discuss this feature of the case, for whatever that purpose may Hale v. Young. have been, the Youngs, and, through them, defendant Hale, were entitled to the benefit of it, upon refunding to him with legal interest the amount paid by him. It is shown that the taxes were paid by him after they became delinquent, defendants having failed to pay them, and this he is also entitled to with like interest. So far as it appears from the record, after as careful an examination and computation as we have been able to make, we conclude the following items were allowed in favor of plaintiff: First, certain improvements placed upon the school land, consisting of one corral, valued at $90, one well, valued at $50, and two acres of breaking, valued at $5, and principal paid to the state at the time of the purchase, $168, interest paid to the state at the time of the purchase, $83.16, and for the year 1886, $90.72, making a total of $486.88. As we have before said, plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed the amount of principal and interest paid the state upon the purchase of the land. This would be the sum of $341.88, and interest thereon from the time that the several payments were made, which to this date would be $424.48. We are unable to find any evidence that the corral, well, and breaking were placed upon the land by the direction of defendants, but as the well and breaking were permanent improvements in their character, we are inclined to permit the decision of the district court, so far as it referred to them, to remain, but the construction of the corral cannot be charged to defendants, whatever its value may have been. This item, therefore, of $90, will be excluded, but with permission to plaintiff, if he sees fit so to do, to remove the corral within two months of this date. The construction of the well and the breaking of the ground, amounting to $55, will be charged to defendants without interest, as plaintiff has had the use of the improvements, making a total of $396.88 principal and $82.60 interest. The decree of the district court will, therefore, be modified to the ex Hale v. Young. tent that defendants be required to pay to plaintiff the sum of $479.48, within ninety days from this date, and upon such payment being made or tendered to plaintiff, or his attorneys, or to the clerk of this court, he will be required to assign to defendant Hale his contract of purchase executed to him by the state. Defendant D. A. Hale will also be required to execute to plaintiff the bond required in the original decree, to indemnify him against the note of $1,512 given to the state, unless he shall procure the said note to be surrendered and canceled by the state authorities. In that event no bond shall be required. In case of default in said payment, the cross-petition of defendants will be dismissed, and their claim upon the said school land will be forever barred. The decision of the district court in declaring the taxes paid by plaintiff upon the deeded land for all years subsequent to the year 1882, is affirmed. Its decision upon the motion to retax the costs is reversed, and one-half of the costs in the district court is taxed to defendants and one-half to plaintiff. The same judgment will be entered as to the costs in this court. As thus modified, the decision of the district court is affirmed. THE other judges concur. JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY. Hilton v. Bachman. 24 490 39 174 24 490 43 687 24 490 48 316 24 490 54 490 GEORGE H. HILTON, JAMES F. HILTON, AND JOSEPH B. 1. Pleading. Title 7 of the civil code names and defines the pleadings required in a civil action. In all cases the pleadings in such action should be made to conform to the provisions of said title. 2. Practice in Supreme Court. Only such portion should be included in a transcript brought to this court as is necessary to a correct understanding of the case. Galley v. Galley, 13 Neb., 200. 3. Jurisdiction. A party to a proceeding in the district court, where such court has jurisdiction over the parties and subjectmatter of the action, will be bound by the judgment in such cases when collaterally attacking it, even though that jurisdiction was irregularly or erroneously executed. 4. : PRESUMPTIONS. All presumptions are in favor of the regularity of the proceedings of courts of record when collaterally assailed, and where a decree contains the finding of a fact specially, which is pleaded in the petition, it must be presumed that sufficient evidence was submitted to the court to justify such finding. APPEAL from the district court of Lancaster county. Heard below before HAYWARD, J. George H. Hilton, pro se, cited: Perry on Trusts, Secs. 274-288, and cases cited. Wade Notice, Sec. 17. Willes v. Chandler, 1 McCrary, 276. Williamson v. Berry, 8. How., 495. John S. Gregory and J. R. Webster, for appellants, cited: Drane v. Gunter, 19 Ala., 731. Shepherd v. MeEvers, 4 John. Ch., 136. Cruger v. Halliday, 11 Paige, Hilton v. Bachman. H., 129. 1 Perry Trusts, 314. Wilson v. Towle, 36 N. 3d Ed., Sec. 268 and note 2. v. Scott, 11 Iowa, 589, 597. Gray v. Brignardello, 1 Wall., 627. Shriver v. Lynn, 2 How., 43. Rorer Judicial Sales, Sec. 56. Rogers v. Dill, 6 Hill, 415. In re Price, 67 N. Y., 233. In re Ellison, 5 Johns. Ch., 261. Harwood, Ames & Kelly, and Mason & Whedon, for appellees, cited: Mills v. Paynter, 1 Neb., 444. Miller v. Finn, 1 Neb., 289. State v. Buffalo County, 6 Neb., 461. Jennings v. Simpson, 12 Neb., 565. McGavock v. Pollack, 13 Neb., 537. Bryant v. Estabrook, 16 Neb., 220. Gould v. Loughran, 19 Neb., 392. Mc Cormick v. Paddock, 20 Neb., 489. Wash. Real Prop., 3d Ed., 478 and notes. Jackson v. Delaney, 13 Johns., N. Y., 537. Freeman on Judgments, 151. Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal., 274. Benson v. Cilley, 8 O. S., 604. Tyler Infancy and Coverture, 52, 172, 289 et seq. REESE, CH. J. This action was instituted in the district court for the purpose of setting aside certain conveyances to real estate, and to remove from his trusteeship one John Hilton, of the state of Iowa, and the appointment of another in his stead. The record in the case is voluminous, and from the transcript of the proceedings it is very difficult to understand the exact condition of the case. The amended petition filed in the district court is denominated an "Amended Bill in Equity," in writing which the pleader has followed the common law form of pleading, styling the plaintiffs orators and indulging in the usual circumlocution of a common law pleading. The district court would have been justified, upon its attention being called to the fact, upon a refusal of plaintiff to reform his petition, in striking the paper from the files and requiring a petition |