Bell v. Arndt. The only error complained of in this court is the allowance of interest at ten per cent. The matter is regulated entirely by statute. Sec. 2, Chap. 44, Comp. Stat., provides that, "Interest upon the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action shall be at the rate of seven dollars per year upon one hundred dollars, unless a greater rate, not exceeding ten per cent per annum, be contracted for by the parties. Sec. 3 provides that, "Interest on all decrees and judgments for the payment of money shall be from the date of the rendition thereof at the rate of seven dollars upon each one hundred dollars annually, until the same shall be paid; provided, that if said judgment or decree shall be founded upon any contract, either verbal or written, by the terms of which a greater rate of interest, not exceeding the amount allowed by law, than seven per centum shall have been agreed upon, the rate of interest upon such judgment or decree shall be the same as provided for by the terms of the contract upon which the same was founded." Sec. 4 provides that, "On money due on any instrument in writing, or on settlement of an account from the day the balance shall be agreed upon, on money received to the use of another and retained without the owner's consent, express or implied, from the receipt thereof, and on money loaned or due, and withheld by unreasonable delay of payment, interest shall be allowed at the rate of seven per cent per annum. Unsettled accounts between parties shall bear interest after six months from the date of the last item thereof." These sections seem to regulate the rate of interest in all cases where there is no agreement. In this state interest is allowed as compensation for the use of or withholding of money, and the rate of compensation fixed by law applies in all cases where there is no contract for a higher rate, which in no case can exceed ten per cent. Clark v. State. It is claimed on behalf of the defendant in error that, as the money was wrongfully withheld by the plaintiff in error, that, therefore he was liable for interest at ten per cent as a punishment of the wrongful retention of the money. But in this state punitive damages are not recoverable in any case, and therefore the highest rate of interest will not be imposed as a punishment. The court below, therefore, erred in allowing interest at a rate in excess of seven per cent, and the judgment will be modified by reducing the interest from ten to seven per cent, and as thus modified, the judgment is affirmed. JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY. REESE, CH. J., did not sit. W. H. CLARK ET AL., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, V. THE DEFENDANT IN ERROR. 1. Liquors: REMONSTRANCE. Where a remonstrance is filed with a village board against the issuance of license to a particular applicant to sell intoxicating liquors, it is the duty of such board to set a time for the hearing of such remonstrance, and to grant the persons so remonstrating a reasonable time to produce their testimony. 2. Mandamus. When the right is clear, a judge at chambers within his district may, under the statute, grant a peremptory writ of mandamus. ERROR to the district court for Merrick county. Tried below before POST, J. G. G. Bowman and Sullivan & Reeder, for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendant in error. 24 263 30 748 24 263 60 775 BY THE COURT. Clark v. State. The question presented in this case is, the authority of a judge of the district court to grant a peremptory writ of mandamus in a county in his district other than that in which the respondents reside. The facts as shown by the record are as follows: "On the 25th day of May, 1887, John S. Dunham, relator, made an application to Hon. A. M. Post, one of the judges of the district court of the fourth judicial district, for a writ of mandamus requiring respondents to convene in session and set a day for hearing the petition of one R. R. Douglas to sell malt, spirituous, and vinous liquors in the village of Clarks, and a certain remonstrance against issuing said license." The objections of the remonstrators were, that Douglas was not the real party for whose benefit the license was to be issued, but that one Lomax, who for cause had previously been refused a license, was in fact to be the beneficiary. On the day set for the hearing the remonstrants asked one or two days further time in order to produce their proof. This the village authorities refused, but after a show of fairness proceeded to issue the license. There is but little dispute as to the facts-the principal question being as to the reasonableness of the delay sought. A reasonable time should be given in all cases to both parties to produce their witnesses. It is important that the sale of intoxicating liquor be confined to persons who will observe the law in all respects, and who have not been guilty of previous violations of the same. Therefore, when charges are made against a party of a character to call for an investigation, the fullest opportunity should be given all parties to present their proof, both in support of and to disprove the charge. The object of the investigation is to ascertain the facts, and this can only be done upon full and fair examination of the evidence. The village board is presumed to be anxious to promote the peace and welfare of the municipality which Langan v. Thummel, it represents and governs, and therefore will not grant a license to any person who has shown by his previous conduct that he will disregard the law. All parties, therefore, are interested in having a reasonable time in which to produce testimony. 2d. When the right is clear, there is no doubt under our statute that a judge at chambers within his district may grant a peremptory writ of mandamus. The statute expressly confers this power, and its exercise is frequently necessary to prevent a failure of justice. The right of the relator to the relief sought is clear, and the judge did not err in granting the writ. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Judgment afFIRMED. MARY LANGAN, APPELLEE, V. GEORGE H. THUMMEL, APPELLANT. Contract: CONSTRUCTION: TIME. On the 8th day of May the parties entered into a contract in writing, by which T. sold to L. a land contract for a quarter section of land held by T. from a land grant railroad company, for the price of $1,200, L. paying $456 down in cash, and note of another party which was received as cash, and agreeing to pay on or before July 1 balance of $750, and the balance of full payment in one year after June 1, 1886, with interest at 10 per cent per annum. The writing contained the following clause, "And this contract is to be construed strictly as to payments." No payment was made July 1. July 6, T. notified L. by letter of the cancellation of the contract, and returned the note received in first payment. July 10, L. tendered to T. the amount of the July payment, with six dollars additional to cover interest, etc. In an action by L. against T. for specific performance of the contract, Held, That time was not of the essence of the contract, and that, Langan v. Thummel. under the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced at the trial, L. had not been guilty of gross negligence in making the July payment. APPEAL from the district court of Hall county. Heard below before TIFFANY, J. W. H. Platt, for appellant, cited: Wat. on Specif. Performance, Sec. 629. Richmond v. Gray, 3 Allen, 25. Goldsmith v. Guild, 10 Allen, 239. Carter v. Phillips, 144 Mass., 100. Presidio Min. Co. v. Bullis, 4 S. W. Rep., Ames v. Brooks, 9 East. Rep., 534. 860. O. A. Abbott, for appellee, cited: Kellogg v. Lavender, 9 Neb., 419. Leaird v. Smith, 44 N. Y., 623. COBB, J. This case comes before this court by appeal from the decree of the district court of Hall county. The plaintiff on July 8, 1886, filed her amended petition in the court below setting up that, on May 8, 1886, she purchased of George H. Thummel, of Grand Island, through William H. Platt, his partner, attorney, and agent, certain Union Pacific Railroad contracts for the sale of the N. E. quarter section 13, of township 10, range 12 west, for the consideration of $1,200, under the following memorandum of sale: "OFFICE OF THUMMEL AND PLATT, LAWYERS, "GRAND ISLAND, NEB., May 8, 1886. ( "This is to certify that we have this day disposed of our contracts on the north-east quarter of section 13, town 10, range 12 west, to Mary Langan, for the sum of twelve hundred dollars. That the said Langan agrees to pay thereon as follows, to-wit: $750 as follows: $150 cash, note of Pat Nevils, $306; balance on or before July 1, 1886. The balance of full payment in one year after |