Arapahoe Village v. Albee. careful consideration of the question, and we believe it is a correct statement of the law. The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, and the reasons which operate in favor of an individual are at least equally as strong in favor of a municipal corporation. The law favors diligence, and compels a party holding a warrant of a municipal corporation to take the necessary steps to enforce the payment of the same within the period fixed by statute or be barred. If this were not so, warrants might be fraudulently issued by the authorities of a municipal corporation and held for ten, fifteen, or twenty years, or more, and then presented for payment when the evidence of their fraudulent character had become obscure or inaccessible. In our view the ends of justice will be better subserved by placing individuals and municipal corporations on the same plane and governed by the same law of limitations. It follows that all the causes of action were barred when the action was brought. Objection is made that the village of Arapahoe was not legally organized in the year 1873, and that therefore it had no authority to act as a village. The agreed statement of facts shows that in the year 1873 the village was organized, and that this organization continued up to the year 1879, when it reorganized under the laws of the state, and has continued under such organization up to the present time. Village officers were elected each year, except in the year 1877. It is evident that the village was a de facto corporation, and upon the facts stipulated was authorized to transact business. The several causes of action, however, being barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment of the district court against the village of Arapahoe is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. THE other judges concur. 24 248 Black v. Cabon. 24 250 24 248 40 496 24 248 50 321 BRICE BLACK, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. ANTON CABON, DEFENDANT IN ERROR. Judgment in County Court. In an action in the county court on a promissory note, where the sum claimed was less than $200, judgment was rendered as follows: "It is the opinion of the court that Anton Cabon is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $117.90, and attorney's fee. It is therefore considered by me and adjudged that the plaintiff have and recover from the defendant, Anton Cabon, the sum of $117.90 and $3.46 attorney fees, together with the costs of this suit, $4.25.-J. B. SHAROT, Co. Judge." Held, That the judgment was not void, and that the district court erred in striking the transcript from the files. ERROR to the district court for Pierce county. Tried below before TIFFANY, J. E. P. Weatherby and J. R. Webster, for plaintiff in error, cited: Lewis v. Watrus, 7 Neb., 477. Ransdell & Reed v. Putnam, 15 Neb., 642. Ordinary v. McClure, 1 Bailey, 7. Barrett v. Garragan, 16 Iowa, 47. Freeman on Judgments, Secs. 47, 50, 51, 52. No appearance for defendant in error. BY THE COURT. The plaintiff brought an action in the county court of "January 15, 10 o'clock A.M., in 1884, the plaintiff, by his attorney, E. P. Weatherby, appeared; no appearance on the part of the defendant; cause continued for one hour, at which time, there still being no appearance on the part of the defendant, case called at request of plaintiff; E. P. Weatherby sworn; after hearing the evidence and Black v. Cabon. the note on file, it is the opinion of the court that Anton Cabon is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $117.90, and attorney's fee. It is therefore considered by me and adjudged that the plaintiff have and recover from the defendant, Anton Cabon, the sum of $117.90, and $3.46 attorney's fees, together with the costs of this suit, $4.25. "J. B. SHAROT, "Co. Judge." "January 19, 1884, E. P. Weatherby appeared and demanded an execution issue on above judgment; execution issued of this date and delivered to E. P. Weatherby. "J. B. SHAROT, A transcript of the judgment was filed in the district. court and an execution issued thereon, and levied upon certain real estate, the sale of which was enjoined. The attorneys for the defendant thereupon filed a motion as follows: "Now comes the defendant herein and moves the court here to quash the execution issued in this case on the 29th day of January, A.D. 1885, and all proceedings had by and under the same, and to strike the transcript heretofore filed in this case from the files of this court, for the following reasons, to-wit: "1st. That there is no finding of facts by the court by which the above entitled cause was tried to sustain the pretended judgment of said court. "2d. That there is no judgment rendered and entered in the above entitled cause by the county court of Pierce County, Nebraska. "3d. That the district court of Pierce county, Nebraska, has no jurisdiction of this case." This motion was sustained, and the transcript stricken from the files. In this we think the court erred. The judgment, although informal, is not void. The question was before this court in Marsh v. Synder, 14 Neb., 8. In that case the judgment was: "I hereby render judgment Black v. Cabon. against plaintiffs for costs herein. Judgment rendered against plaintiffs for costs." Crowell v. Johnson, 2 Neb., 155. Vangeazel v. Hillyard, 1 Houston (Del.), 515. In McNamara & Duncan v. Cabon, 21 Neb., 589, the identical question now involved was presented to the court, and the judgment was held to be irregular, but not void. Lewis v. Watrus, 7 Neb., 477. Taylor v. Runyan, 3 Clarke, (Ia.), 474. Minkhart v. Hankler, 19 Ill., 47. Fish v. Emerson, 44 N. Y., 376. Ransdell v. Putnam, 15 Neb., 642. The motion to dismiss should have been overruled. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. THE other judges concur. BRICE BLACK, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. ANTON CABON, DEFENDANT IN ERROR. BY THE COURT. The question involved in this case is the same as that in Black v. Cabon, just decided, and the same judgment will be entered, The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Benschoter v. Lalk. ELIZABETH A. BENSCHOTER, APPELLEE, V. EDWARD H. * * 1. Husband and Wife: 'POWER OF ATTORNEY TO CONVEY 2. : : CONSTRUCTION OF POWER. Where the evident purpose of a power of attorney is to enable the attorney in fact to control and convey lands obtained after the execution of such power, it will be so construed. APPEAL from the district court of Sherman county. Heard below before GASLIN, J. Congdon, Clarkson & Hunt, for appellants, cited: Wharton on Agency, Sec. 223. Blackett v. Royal Ex. Assur. Co., 2 Cr. & J., 244. De Tastet v. Crousillatt, 2 Wash., C. C., 132. Brown v. McGran, 14 Peters, 479. Stall v. Meek, 70 Pa. St., 181. Weed v. Adams, 37 Conn., 378. A. H. Conner, Wall & Long, and G. M. Lambertson, for appellee, cited: Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis., 636. Mead 24 251 25 650 24 251 61 540 |