is particularly a measure of intended destruction to all the usual operations of exchange. The Bank cannot perform them as she has done. If the State banks promise to perform them, it is all delusion. If they have contracted to perform them, they will break their contract; and if they do not, they will break themselves. If by possibility they could make themselves a Bank of the United States and its branches, which they cannot do, what would the country gain by such a contrivance but a bank with the powers of the present Bank, subject to no restrictions or control by law, and dependent only on the pleasure of him who controls the deposites? Sir, the whole property of the country, in its transfer from place to place within it, is to undergo-has already undergone—a violent change. There is not a man who can now take the management of a crop in the South, or of a manufacture or importation in the North, who is able to foresee how he shall conduct it to its close; and the consequence is, that he will, if possible, have nothing to do with either. This derangement, actual and prospective, sir, enters materially into the present excitement and distress. And does the honorable member from Tennessee propose, as a remedy for all this, to have an inquiry into the affairs of the Bank? Is it for difficulties of this description and magnitude that he demands a sifting inquiry, an inquiry into the printing accounts of the Bank? Is his great object to ascertain how $7,000 of unvouched payments have been distributed, and who is the owner of the National Intelligencer? Sir, I confess my profound astonishment that gentlemen, having the welfare of this great nation confided to them, will descend to inquiries like these, will run after petty accounts with printers and the concerns of the National Intelligencer, and, in the ardor of pursuit, forget the country that is intrusted to them. The time has come, or I greatly mistake the indications around us, when the country demands that our attention be given to objects of a higher nature. I humbly hope, then, Mr. Speaker, that this House will inquire into nothing but the question before it, and from which we cannot escape the evil which now threatens the country, and the proper remedy to be applied. An inquiry of this character is worthy of all attention, and of the devotion of all our faculties and efforts. In such an inquiry, no person will be more ready than myself to forget the Bank, if that shall be the course of patriotism and safety. Except as she ministers to the public good, I regard her as nothing, and less than nothing. The public good, in the preservation of the public faith, in the maintenance of the public currency, and in the support of the constitution-this is an object which this House should never cease to regard, and to which, in my further remarks, I shall endeavor to keep my own attention fixed, without yielding it to any other. Mr. Speaker, the immediate question before the House is, whether the reasons assigned by the Secretary of the Treasury for removing the public deposites are such as ought to satisfy Congress and the country; and, if not, what is the remedy which it is the duty of Congress to apply? The reasons assigned are remarkable, sir, in a particular which cannot have escaped the general observation. The letter of the Secretary consists of certain general propositions, by which he en deavors to sustain his authority, and of certain particular reasons or statements of fact, by which he endeavors to justify its exercise. The general propositions upon which all his particular reasons depend, he does not condescend to argue at all; and I have listened with all due attention to the gentleman who has preceded me, the honorable member from Tennessee, without being able to perceive that his course has in any respect differed from that of the Secretary. The Secretary asserts, sir, that, by the removal of the deposites, by and through his absolute and unconditional power, whether the act was in itself right or wrong, with or without cause, the Bank of the United States is put out of court, and the nation discharged from the contract, without any violation of faith. He further asserts, that while his own power was absolute, that of Congress over the same subject was gone, having been alienated to him; that the Legislature were, as to the treasure deposited in the Bank of the United States, in a condition of impotency and imbecility; that they had bound themselves hand and foot by the charter of the Bank; and that, while they had given unlimited authority over the subject to him, they had reserved no power whatever to themselves or to the people; and, consequently, that in no event, not even if the deposites were unsafe, or the ultimate law of all Governments-the safety of the people-should imperiously have demanded the removal of the deposites, was it in the power of Congress to touch them, without a violation of the public faith. He further asserts, that the rightful exercise of his power is not, even in point of responsibility to Congress, dependent on the safety of the deposites, or on the fidelity of the Bank in its conduct to the Government; but that it was his right and duty to remove them, if the removal tended in any degree to the interest and convenience of the public. He finally asserts, that as it was his right to remove the deposites, so it was his right, as a consequence, to select the places of new deposite; and he did so. Sir, these are startling propositions. They involve grave consequences. They deserve careful consideration. They are far from being self-evident. It was worthy of the officer who asserted them, and who was bound to justify the assertion to Congress, to favor that body with at least an outline of the train of reasoning by which he came to these remarkable conclusions. But, sir, there is no such thing in the book. I have looked carefully through it, to borrow some light on this subject from the mind of the Secretary, by which I might enlighten my own; but, beyond the simple dogmas which I have stated, there is nothing to be found, except the causes of his particular determination, which were of no sort of importance whatever, nor worthy of the least consideration, if his general propositions are true. I am compelled, therefore, from necessity, to assert the contrary of all that the Secretary has asserted, and to take the burden of refuting what it would seem to have been rather his duty to establish. These are points, sir, to which I shall especially call the attention of the House, as involving principles of the highest public importance-principles which, if this House shall affirm them, they will affirm that all power over the Treasury is gone from Congress, and that there is but a single Department in the Government. The first proposition is that with which the Secretary begins his letter. The Secretary says 66 46 "It has been settled by repeated adjudications, that a charter granted by a State to a corporation like that of the Bank of the "United States is a contract between the sovereignty which grants "it and the stockholders. The same principle must apply to a char"ter granted by the United States; and, consequently, the act incorporating the Bank is to be regarded as a contract between the "United States of the one part, and the stockholders of the other; "and, by the plain terms of the contract, as contained in the section "above quoted, the stockholders have agreed that the power reserved "to the Secretary over the deposites shall not be restricted to any par"ticular contingencies, but be absolute and unconditional, as far as "their interests are involved in the removal. The order, therefore, "of the Secretary of the Treasury, directing the public money to be "deposited elsewhere, can in no event be regarded as a violation of "the contract with the stockholders, nor impair any right secured to "them by the charter." That the House may have before them the section to which the Secretary refers, I beg their attention to it. It is the 16th section of the Bank Charter, which enacts: "That the deposites of the money of the United States, in places "in which the said Bank or branches thereof may be established, "shall be made in said Bank or branches thereof, unless the Secretary "of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct; in "which case, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately lay "before Congress, if in session, and, if not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons of such order or "direction." 66 I beg the House to remark that this document proceeds from a gentlemen of distinguished reputation as a jurist, trained to legal investigations, and fully acquainted with the legal effect and value of every word which he has used. The language he has adopted runs, "by the plain terms of the contract, as contained in the section above quoted, the stockholders have agreed," &c. Sir, if the Secretary had said that the contract gave him this power by implication, or that he possessed it by the fair interpretation of the section, or by its reason, spirit, scope, or intention, my perplexity would have been less; but when he asserts that his authority is derived from the terms of the section, and from its plain terms, and that by those terms it is not restricted to any particular contingencies, but is absolute and unconditional, I feel some doubts whether there is that common medium of a common language between the honorable Secretary and myself which is so indispensable to profitable argument. If I rightly understand the proposition, it has no authority in the terms, nor in the reason, spirit, or intention of the section; and it is as revolting to good sense, in the strength of the language which the Secretary has used, as it is to the rules of law. It asserts that, in no event, right or wrong, not even in the extremest case of wilful injustice or fraud, (a case which I am far from supposing to have been in the view of the Secretary, though his language comprehends it,) could the Bank assert the least violation of faith by the Secretary's removal of the deposites. Sir, I submit to the House that the contrary proposition may be easily shown to be true, and therefore that the Secretary's proposition is not true. The right of the Bank to the deposites is derived from contract; a valuable consideration having been paid for it, in a bonus to the Treasury, and in a stipulation for expensive services to be performed through the whole term of the charter. A right in the Secretary to remove those deposites, without good cause, during any part of the time, is not to be presumed, but the contrary; and it should not be conceded, until it is shown to be required by the clear and plain meaning of the whole section. The terms of the section, instead of giving to the Secretary an absolute and unconditional power to remove the deposites, require that he shall have reasons for the removal, which reasons he shall immediately communicate to Congress. This is the condition upon which the Bank submits to the exercise of his powerthat he shall have reasons, and communicate them; and such is the agreement of the parties. The whole section is agreement, as the whole charter is. It is all contract, from the beginning to the end. Now, if Congress have agreed with the Bank that the Secretary shall give his reasons for the act, and, consequently, that he shall have reasons, the difficulty, sir, is to understand how, according to approved rules of interpretation, these reasons can be considered as of no concern to the Bank, but only to Congress; how we can understand that it is of no sort of moment to the Bank whether there are reasons or not, when the Bank is to be affected by the removal, and Congress have agreed with the Bank that the reasons shall be given. Sir, in my judgment, the Secretary has directly inverted the object of the provision. The reasons concern the Bank only, and not Congress: or rather, they concern Congress only because they concern the Bank. The contract for the deposites with the Bank is a mockery under any other interpretation. Congress is above the reasons. Whether good or bad, she can do right and justice to herself, whatever the Secretary may argue. The Bank, on the other hand, is wholly dependent upon them, and has no other protection from injustice; and the stipulation for communicating the reasons to Congress is, therefore, for the plain and manifest object of giving to the Bank the benefit of a review by Congress, upon such principles as ought to govern such a contract. On Sir, the honorable member from Tennessee seems to me not to have been fortunate in his reference to the former head of the Treasury, Mr. Crawford, for his doctrine on any branch of this case. this, in particular, the opinion of Mr. Crawford was directly against him, as well as against the present Secretary, and in favor of that interpretation which I suppose to be the true one. On the 25th May, 1824, the select committee on the memorial of Ninian Edwards, reported that, in certain instances, deposites of the public money were made by Mr. Secretary Crawford in certain State banks situated in places where the Bank of the United States had branches, and that he made no such communication of his reasons to Congress as the charter requires. "This omission," says the committee, "is acknowledged by the Secretary, who says it was owing to inadvertence; and 2 that the inattention to the provision of the law was unimportant, in- The honorable member from Tennessee is not more fortunate in the suggestion of his own reasons for supposing the provision to regard Congress and not the Bank. I understand him to have said that the section required this communication from the Secretary, that Congress might know, 1st, where the deposites were made by the Secretary after their removal; and 2d, whether the Secretary was or was not liable to impeachment for the act. Now, sir, I think myself entitled to ask it as a concession from the honorable member, that a communication of the fact where the public money is placed, is not a communication of the reasons why it was removed from the Bank of the United States. That fact is precisely what the Secretary is not directed to communicate. His communication is, by the plain terms of the section, confined to the reasons for ordering and directing that the deposites should not be made in the Bank or the branches thereof. As to the object of impeachment, sir, it is as much in derogation of that principle of our constitution, that no man shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, as it is of the character of the Legislature for plain and honest dealing with its officer, to impute to it the design of drawing the Secretary of the Treasury into a confession which may be read against him to the Senate. No, sir; this was not the design of Congress, nor can any course of decent reasoning sustain the enormous proposition of the Secretary, that his power is absolute and unconditional. It is a power which Congress did not, could not, give. An absolute and unconditional power, derived by implication from a contract, for valuable consideration, belongs to doctrines which a court of justice would spurn from its hall. It has no countenance in our institutions; it has none in our constitution, which was ordained to establish justice, as well as to secure the blessings of liberty; it has no countenance from any thing but the poverty of the case, which, finding a reason to be impossible, makes it unnecessary. Sir, the interpretation of the section is, to my mind, abundantly clear. The Legislature did not see fit to part with the absolute right to the deposites, nor to make the right of the Bank a judicial question by defining the exceptions to it. In consequence of the fiscal relations of the Secretary of the Treasury to the Bank, and of the probability that whenever the proper reasons should occur they would call for immediate action, the parties have agreed that he shall exercise such upon a provisional power over the subject, under the stipulation that his reasons shall come immediately to Congress for their review, principles as belong to the contract; and if, according to those principles, the reasons of the Secretary are insufficient for the act, then it will be an open breach of the public faith, not merely sanctioned, but |