V.

CHA P. notice of philofophers. The relations upon which some of them are founded, are perfectly obvious to the mind; thofe which are the foundation of others, are difcovered only in confequence of particular efforts of attention. Of the former kind, are the relations of Refemblance and Analogy, of Vicinity in time and place, and those which arife from accidental coincidences in the found of different words. Thefe, in general, conne& our thoughts together, when they are fuffered to take their natural course, and when we are confcious of little or no active exertion. Of the latter kind, is the relation of premifes and confequences, and thofe others, which regulate the train of thought in the mind of the philofopher, when he is engaged in a particular investigation.

THE facility with which ideas are affociated in the mind, is very different in different individuals: a circumftance which, as I fhall afterwards fhew, lays the foundation of remarkable varieties among men, both in respect of genius and of character. I am inclined, too, to think that, in the other fex (probably in confequence of early education) ideas are more eafily associated together, than in the minds of men. Hence the liveliness of their fancy, and the fuperiority they poffefs in epiftolary writing, and in thofe kinds of poetry, in which the principal recommendations are, eafe of thought and expreffion. Hence, too, the facility with which they contract or lose habits, and accommodate their minds to new fituations; and, I may add, the difpofition they have to that fpecies of fuperftition which is founded on accidental combinations of circumftances. The influence which this facility of affociation has on the of tafte, fhall be afterwards confidered.

power

CHAP.

V.

SECTION III.

Of the Power which the Mind has over the Train of its
Thoughts.

BY

Y means of the Affociation of Ideas, a conftant current of thoughts, if I may use the expreffion, is made to pafs through the mind while we are awake. Sometimes the current is interrupted, and the thoughts diverted into a new channel, in confequence of the ideas fuggested by other men, or of the objects of perception with which we are furrounded. So completely, however, is the mind in this particular fubjected to phyfical laws, that it has been juftly obferved *, we cannot, by an effort of our will, call up any one thought; and that the train of our ideas depends on caufes which operate in a manner inexplicable by us.

THIS obfervation, although it has been cenfured as paradoxical, is almost self-evident; for to call up a particular thought, fuppofes it to be already in the mind. As I fhall have frequent occafion, however, to refer to the observation afterwards, I fhall endeavour to obviate the only objection

V.

CHA P. which, I think, can reasonably be urged against it; and which is founded on that operation of the mind which is commonly called recollection or intentional memory.

It is evident, that before we attempt to recollect the particular circumftances of any event, that event in general must have been an object of our attention. We remember the outlines of the ftory, but cannot at firft give a complete account of it. If we wish to recal these circumstances, there are only two ways in which we can proceed. We muft either form different fuppofitions, and then confider which of these tallies best with the other circumftances of the event; or, by revolving in our mind the circumftances we remember, we must endeavour to excite the recollection of the other circumftances affociated with them. The firft of thefe proceffes is, properly fpeaking, an inference of reason, and plainly furnishes no exception to the docrine already delivered. We have an inftance of the other mode of recollection, when we are at a lofs for the beginning of a sentence in reciting a compofition that we do not perfectly remember; in which cafe we naturally repeat ever, two or three times, the concluding words of the preceding fentence, in order to call up the other words which used to be connected with them in the memory. In this inftance, it is evident, that the circumstances we defire to remember, are not recalled to the mind in immediate confequence of an exertion of volition, but are fuggefted by fome other circumftances with which they are connected, independently of our will, by the laws of our conftitution.

NOT

V.

NOTWITHSTANDING, however, the immediate dependence of CHA P. the train of our thoughts on the laws of affociation, it must not be imagined that the will poffeffes no influence over it. This influence, indeed, is not exercifed directly and immediately, as we are apt to fuppofe, on a fuperficial view of the fubject: but it is, nevertheless, very extenfive in its effects; and the different degrees in which it is poffeffed by different individuals, conftitute fome of the moft ftriking inequalities among men, in point of intellectual capacity.

Or the powers which the mind poffeffes over the train of its thoughts, the moft obvious is its power of fingling out any one of them at pleasure; of detaining it; and of making it a particular object of attention. By doing fo, we not only ftop the fucceffion that would otherwife take place; but, in confequence of our bringing to view the lefs obvious relations among our ideas, we frequently divert the current of our thoughts into a new channel. If, for example, when I am indolent and inactive, the name of Sir Ifaac Newton accidentally occur to me,. it will perhaps fuggeft, one after another, the names of fome other eminent mathematicians and aftronomers, or of some of his illuftrious cotemporaries and friends and a number of them may pass in review before me, without engaging my curiosity in any confiderable degree. In a different ftate of mind, the name of Newton will lead my thoughts to the principal incidents of his life, and the more ftriking features of his character: if my mind be ardent and vigorous, will lead my attention to the fublime discoveries he made; and gradually engage me in.

or,

V.

CHA P. fome philofophical investigation. To every object, there are others which bear obvious and, ftriking relations; and others, alfo, whofe relation to it does not readily occur to us, unless we dwell upon it for fome time, and place it before us in different points of view.

BUT the principal power we poffefs over the train of our ideas, is founded on the influence which our habits of thinking have on the laws of Affociation; an influence which is fo great, that we may often form a pretty fhrewd judgment concerning a man's prevailing turn of thought, from the tranfitions he makes in converfation or in writing. It is well known, too, that, by means of habit, a particular affociating principle may be ftrengthened to fuch a degree, as to give us a command of all the different ideas in our mind, which have a certain relation to each other; fo that when any one of the clafs occurs to us, we have almost a certainty that it will fuggeft the reft. What confidence in his own powers, muft a fpeaker poffefs, when he rifes without premeditation, in a popular affembly, to amuse his audience with a lively or an humorous fpeech! Such a confidence, it is evident, can only arife from a long experience of the ftrength of particular affociating principles.

To how great a degree this part of our conftitution may be influenced by habit, appears from facts which are familiar to every one. A man who has an ambition to become a punfter, feldom or never fails in the attainment of his object; that is, he feldom or never fails in acquiring a power which

other