sensible, when being desired by the assembly, upon the close of the session in the year 1701, to dissolve them, (being then called by writs) thou told them, thou wouldst not do it, for that thou couldst not answer to the crown to leave the province without a standing assembly.

"That as the exemption from any dissolution or prorogation, seems to be an inseparable consequent of thy grant, as well as our constant practice upon the former charter, which this was by thy promise to exceed, so upon an attempt made by the council, to prorogue us in October last, we have thought it our duty to prepare a bill for ascertaining, explaining, and settling our present constitution; which we having presented to thy deputy for his assent, he finding that the power of dissolution and prorogation is not in express words granted away by charter, as also the inconveniency thereof with his said commission, after several conferences thereupon, had with him and his council, he thought fit to advise us to forbear the farther pressing it, till we should hear from thee; therefore he being unwilling to pass the said bill by us judged so necessary, and the very foundation of our present constitution, we could not think it proper to proceed to perfect any other business, whilst that remained unsettled: nor do we suppose any thing will be done in legislation either by the present or succeeding assemblies, till the difficulties we labour under herein be removed, either by thy speedy order, or by thy deputy without it; seeing to proceed upon other matters, would be to raise a superstructure before the foundation were well laid; nor do we look upon it very advisable for us to proceed far in legislation, until thou repeals those parts of thy lieutenant's commission, relating to prorogation and dissolution of assemblies, for the reasons before given; as also concerning thy final assent to laws, which we conceive to be very unreasonable in itself, and a great abuse and violation of our constitution, that thou should offer to put three negatives upon our acts, whereas by our first charter, we had none but that of the crown; and how thou gained another to thyself, we have before shewed thee, but now to bring us under three, seems a contrivance to provoke us to complain to the

queen, that thou art not effectually represented here, and make that a motive for her to take us under her immediate care and protection, which would make thy surrender in some measure our act, which if thou should do without the consent of the landholders and inhabitants of this province first obtained, would look too much like treachery.

"That it appears, by several petitions now before us, that very great abuses have been and are put upon the inhabitants, and extortions used by thy secretary, surveyors, and other officers, concerned in property as well as courts, which might have been prevented or sooner remedied, had thou been pleased to pass the bill proposed by the assembly in the year 1701 to regulate fees; as also the want of a surveyor-general, which is a great injury and dissatisfaction to the people; as is likewise the want of an established judicature for trials between thee and the people; for if we exhibit our complaints against thee, or those who represent thee in state or property, they must be determined by or before justices of thy own appointment; by which means, thou becomes, in a legal sense, judge in thy own cause, which is against natural equity: therefore, we propose, that a man learned in the laws of England, may be commissioned by the queen, to determine all matters, wherein thy tenants have just cause to complain against thee, thy deputies or commissioners; or else restore the people to the privilege of electing judges, justices, and other officers, according to the direction of the first charter, and intent of the first adventurers, and as the people of New England have by king William's charter: that thy commissioners of property, are very unwilling to make good the deficiencies of those lands thou hast been many years ago paid for (though thou gave them power so to do) and so great is the difficulty and trouble to get satisfaction in this particular, that it is better for one to forego his right, than wait on and attend the coinmissioners about it, unless the quantity wanting be very great.

"We have many other things to represent to thee as griev ances; as thy unheard of abuses to thy purchasers, &c. in

pretending to give them a town, and then by imposing unconscionable quit-rents, makes it worse by ten-fold than a purchase would have been: also the abuse about the bank, and want of common to the town, and not only so, but the very land the town stands on, is not cleared of the Swedes' claims.

"These are the chief heads, which we thought fit at this time to lay before thee, earnestly intreating thy serious, consideration of them, and that thou will now at last, after we have thus long endured and groaned under these hardships (which of late seem to be multiplied upon us) endeavour as far as in thee lies, to retrieve thy credit with us thy poor tenants and fellow-subjects, by redressing these aggrievances, especially in getting our law's confirmed, and also to be eased of oaths, and giving positive orders to thy deputy to unite heartily with us, upon our constitution; and that the charters thou granted us for city and country, may be explained, settled, and confirmed by law; and we further intreat, that effectual care be taken for the suppressing of vice, which, to our great trouble we have to acquaint thee, is more rife and common amongst us since the arrival of thy deputy and son, especially of late, than was ever known before: nor are we capable to suppress it, whilst it is connived at, if not encouraged by authority; the mouths of the more sober magistrates being stopped by the said late order about oaths, and the governor's licensing ordinaries not approven by the magistrates of the city of Philadelphia, and the roast chiefly ruled by such as are none of the most exemplary for virtuous conversation: thy positive orders in the premises, will be absolutely necessary to thy deputy, who thinks it unreasonable, and a great hardship on him, to give sanction to laws explanatory of thy grants, or to do any thing by way of enlargement or confirmation of aught, save what is particularly and expressly granted by thee, it being by some of his council urged as an absurdity in us to expect: and we desire that thou would order the licensing of ordinaries and taverns, to be by the justices, according to thy letter dated in September, 1697; and we hope we need not be more ex

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press in-charging thee, as thou tenders thy own honour and honesty, or the obligations thou art under to thy friends, and particularly thy first purchasers and adventurers into this province, that thou do not surrender the government, whatsoever terms thou may by so doing make for thyself and family, which we shall deem no less than a betraying us, and at least will look like first fleecing, then selling: but rather use thy utmost interest with the queen, to ease us in the premises: and if after thy endeavours used to keep the government, it be per force taken from thee, thou will be the clearer in the sight of God, and us the representatives of the people of this thy province, who are thy real friends and well wishers, as we hope is evident in that we have dealt thus plainly with thee.”

It was but natural, that such a paper as this should deeply affect those it was levelled against; and that it should operate differently on persons differently made and differently situated.

Those best acquainted with the necessity of keeping the first principles of government ever before their eyes, and the danger of admitting the least departure from them, could not but be pleased with the plain and firm language of this remonstrance: while those apt to be so dazzled with the outside of things, that they were incapable of looking into their contents, were as much softened with concern for the father and founder of their community, and consequently inclined to think him hardly dealt by in it.

There is something in connexion and dependence which gives a secret bias to all we think and wish, as well as what we say and in all disputes this must be duly allowed for on both sides.

Seven persons, some of them of the council, made their application by petition to the next assembly for a copy of it, but were flatly refused: and even when the governor himself in very high language required it, they were immoveable as before.

Willing as they might be to reclaim the proprietary to a due sense of his first obligations, they might be equally un

willing to expose him: and, agreeable to this, the assembly of 1706-7 in one of their remonstrances to the governor say, "that hoping the bill of courts then in dispute would have put an end to some of the grievances they had several years groaned under, they had hitherto forborn publicly to remonstrate; chusing rather to provide remedies for things amiss than to complain of them." Some concern they might also be under for themselves; their ascendancy was precarious: it depended on the good will of numbers: and the infirmity of nature above touched upon, might happen to operate more powerfully in the people, than the consideration of justice and safety to themselves and their posterity. The province, at this time, had moreover their reasons on account of oaths, a militia, &c. to apprehend some inconveniency if they fell under the immediate government of the crown; and therefore did not care to break with the proprietary entirely.

Nor was it long before, by partial and indirect practices, such as both influencing and awing the electors (facts publicly charged on the instruments of government by the assembly of 1706-7) that the governor obtained both an assembly and a speaker, almost as complaisant as he could wish. Nor ought it to be forgot, that his successor Gookin obtained such another in the year 1710.

In all matters of public concern something personal will interfere. Thus we find during this turbulent period two names frequently occur, as opposites, in principle and purpose, and the oracles of their respective parties, to wit, David Lloyd, speaker of the assembly, and James Logan, secretary to the governor and council.

Logan insults the members of the assembly sent from the house on a message to the governor. The house resent it, complain of it, arraign his conduct in office, and proceed against him as a public delinquent. The governor, on the other hand, conceives an insuperable aversion to the speaker, points him out to the public as an interested, factious, dangerous person, treats him arrogantly at two several confer