ment such as the President then proceeded to detail; but that he did not contemplate a removal of funds deposited, unless when wanted for public purposes. The letter closed with this emphatic assurance:

In making to you, my dear sir, this frank and explicit avowal of my opinions and feelings, it is not my intention to interfere with the independent exercise of the discretion committed to you by law over the subject. I have thought it however due to you, under the circumstances, to place before you, with this restriction, my sentiments upon the subject; to the end that you may, on my responsibility, allow them to enter into your decision upon the subject, and into any future exposition of it, so far as you may deem it proper.'

"Prior to the reception of these communications, I had felt embarrassment, not only in relation to the general subject, but as to constitutional and legal questions. I was in doubt, as to the view which the President would take of the 16th section of the law, chartering the United States Bank, which gave the discretion, as to the deposits, to the secretary of the treasury. When, however, I read the above passage in his letter, my anxiety was, in a great measure, if not wholly, removed. If it meant any thing, I concluded that the President now confirmed, what the law had already declared, that the secretary of the treasury had the exclusive right to exercise that discretion independently of the President; and that in thus writing to me, he had pledged himself not to interfere beyond the expression of his own opinions, and the employment of argument to have an influence upon mine. Reflecting, however, upon the means that might be used to induce the President to disregard this pledge, I considered it my duty to comply strictly with his directions, to give him my sentiments frankly and fully."

We cannot be surprised that the sensibility of Mr. Duane was excited "at the low estimate which had been formed of the independance of his character," but we are not a little astonished, that the complacency of the other dissentient members of the cabinet proper, should have been undisturbed, whilst measures most injurious to the country, which they had condemned, were thus prosecuted. In other countries where implicit submission to the behests of the Executive power, to which, time, long descent, and all the impressive circumstances of feudality have given high, though not just, claims to respect, such humble acquiescence would not have been seen, or would have been doomed to ineffable contempt. The elder Pitt, whose energetic mind was ruled by the patriot's heart, threw up the seals when his honest counsel and warning voice were disregarded; and in the past year, we have seen, in France, distinguished ministers resign their offices, even when a legislative body refused to give effect to their measures. Can there be stronger evidence of the corruption of the party, than this sacrifice, which men of fair, and, in private life, of estimable character, make of their judgment and duty upon the altar of ambition or avarice? The secretary of the treasury, though inexperienced in office, was not wanting either in the firmness or intelligence which the occasion and his place required. Believing, as he did, that the President really thought the pros

tration of the United States Bank would be another victory of which he might be proud, and that he was stimulated to consider any means justifiable to attain that end, he resolved to interpose between him and those who were impelling him in his rash career. He was, especially, anxious to disabuse him as to the legislature and the judiciary. He resolutely refused to direct the deposits to be made in the State banks, urging: 1, that the measure was extreme and arbitrary: 2, that it was unauthorized by law: and, 3, that it was inexpedient. I. It was extreme and arbitrary, because,

1. The charter is the law of the land; a contract, that cannot be dissolved or altered, without mutual consent, or forfeited, without inquiry. The public deposits are a benefit to the Bank, for which it has paid a consideration, and their continuance is a part of the contract.

2. The last Congress had acted upon the complaints of the Bank; and the next Congress might follow the example of the last. The House of Representatives, by a vote of 109 to 46, decided that the Bank was a safe place of deposit, and one of the last acts of Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to lend a million of dollars to the Bank without security; and nothing had occurred to warrant him to treat these evidences of confidence with contempt, or to refuse to await the interference of the next Congress. If a body with power to send for persons and papers was unable to come to a decision unfavourable to the Bank, or even to express a disbelief of its safety, the Secretary could not, without such inquiry or power to inquire, first, do what Congress would not do, and then, refer to the reasons of the President as a justification. Any proceeding, now, especially in the absence of adequate reasons, would seem to arise from an apprehension that the representatives of the people are incompetent or corruptible; and that the people, themselves, are incapable of preserving the institutions of their country, in the event of the general depravity of their agents.

II. The measure was unauthorized. If the Secretary were to cease to deposit the public money in the Bank of the United States, it would be his duty to direct its deposit to the credit of the treasurer in some safe place. Did it become the Secretary to judge of the solidity of an institution by hearsay? If he took that responsibility, had he a right to go farther? The plan suggested by the President proposed a contract with divers banks, according to which certain service was to be rendered by one party, for the privilege of trading upon the money of the other. Has the Secretary authority to create a sort of charter? In any way, or for any time, to bind the United States? Have the local banks any right to bind themselves? If they

have, what is the security, and who is to judge of it? Has the Secretary any right to contract that certain banks may contract with other banks, unknown to him? Has he the right, or is it discreet, to leave to any agent the right to decide, in the course of two months, upon the condition of all the banks that may be necessary for the operations of government? If there be no law granting powers needful, in doubtful cases, can the Secretary discreetly take them on his own responsibility? Beside the summary power to take away, has he the legislative power to authorize a disposition of the public money? Could a section of the charter, obviously meant for extreme cases only, authorize the Secretary, in the absence of necessity, to take the public money from a Bank over which there is a controul, and distribute it among institutions over which no controul exists? On the exercise of the power conferred by Congress upon the Secretary, he is enjoined to give reasons immediately to them; obviously showing that Congress considered themselves, alone, competent to judge of the necessity of a removal, from one agent, and the propriety of the substitute. The proposition of the President is avowed to be an experiment. Has the Secretary the right to make experiments upon such important matters? If an experiment must be made, is it not courteous to Congress, of whom the President considers the Secretary, in this case, the agent, to await their instruction? Have not the constitutional holders of the public purse the only means which can be safely used for making such trials?

III. The measure is inexpedient. If Congress should interrupt the experiment, and it should fail, as the Secretary thinks it would, is he then to make another? Time will be necessary to test the project; and the President desires, that the trial may be made, so as to meet the dissolution of the United States Bank. This rests on the presumption, that Congress will not interfere; whereas the Secretary believes, that the operations will have scarcely been commenced, ere the apparatus will be demolished. With such a probability, will solvent banks engage in the project? Will they guarantee the acts of banks in the remote parts of the Union? Would it be prudent to ally the country with banks willing to make such a common cause? Will not the avarice, the ignorance, or the imprudence of, particularly, remote, local banks, tempt them so to extend their loans, and use the public money, as to disable them from returning it, when required, or compel them to ruin their debtors by recalling it?

Suppose, that in the proposed measure, the faith of the country would not be violated; that contempt to the last and the next Congress would not be evinced; that power to contract with State banks exists; and that it would not be unwise to make the

contract; still the question presents itself, What would be the effect upon society? Would the operations of the Government, or of the commercial world, be facilitated? Would confidence between man and man be promoted? Would the facility to stand a shock, in the event of a war in Europe, for instance, be given to the local banks? Mr. Duane adds:

"These questions were placed by the predecessor of the Secretary in a point of view which he thinks cannot be overlooked by a chief magistrate anxious to protect the mass of the community from embarrassment. From want of experience, or information, the Secretary may not anticipate evil so extensive as that apprehended by his predecessor; but his fears render him unwilling to put the match to a train, the end of which.he has not the sagacity to discern.

"Even if he doubted whether the United States Bank could meet every demand of Government, as made upon it, he would hesitate whether it would not be his duty to forbear, rather than increase the evil, by abridging the power of the Bank to surmount its difficulties. So that, in the absence of all doubt of the kind, he would be at a loss for an excuse, were he to produce, by an act on his part, the very mischief that is apprehended. Credit, like female fame, is of such a peculiar nature, that its blossoms may be blighted even by the breath of inquiry. Much more trivial changes than that proposed by the President, have produced great commercial convulsions."

"The struggle to be made is not to see which can do the other the most harm, the Government or the Bank. The Government has but one duty to execute-to inform the people and their representatives of the apprehended danger. It is not called upon to maim the Bank, lest the Bank should master the country. In any attempt to maim, the agents of the Bank would be those most likely to escape; the wound would be felt in the cottage of the farmer, rather than in the palace of the banker." If the suggestion of the President be sound, that the United States Bank dare not operate oppressively, because the State banks, having Government deposits, might run upon the branches, then, there is a check, at all times, in the hands of the Government; and the Bank, during its legal existence, will be careful not to do or omit what might warrant a total removal of the deposits."

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“...... The United States Bank is represented by some of the local banks as an engine so powerful, as to be an object of universal alarm; and, at the next moment, so utterly feeble, that by the simple operation of a treasury order, the entire branches may be broken up, one after the other, and the paper flung upon them in masses, which they will not be prepared to redeem! Which of these is the true picture? If a treasury order have such talismanic influence, can there be a better pledge for the safety of the public deposites? But, if it has no such power, is it discreet to commence the war? In all such calculations, as those referred to, the flinging back masses of bank paper, and breaking up the branches are items, that seems to have caused no compassion for the ultimate sufferers. It appears to have been forgotten, that a large portion of the good and pure people of the land would be ruined."

It will be seen, by those who have read the letters of the exSecretary, that we have selected from, and condensed his remarks, but have not given all that he said to the President to divert him from the immoral and impolitic war in which he had so franticly engaged. The whole of the Secretary's reasons,

on this head, do honour alike to his principles and his sagacity. We see that the President has not pursued his course, unwarned of its consequences; and that the barbarous system of the war, including the run upon the branches, subsequently attempted at Charleston, was deliberately meditated.

The reasons of the Secretary for refusing to withhold the deposits from the Bank, were communicated to the President of the United States on the 12th July. He displayed, in several interviews, strong marks of dissatisfaction with his "refractory subordinate;" but, at length, asserted, that he wanted inquiry only; and to the observation of the Secretary, that his letter of June 26th indicated the purpose of an actual removal by the 15th September, he replied, certainly not with the honesty and frankness which have so falsely been attributed to him, " that the banks might not agree to the only plan he thought safe, that of mutual guarantee; that information ought to be obtained, even for the use of Congress; that he conceived the Secretary ought to co-operate in collecting it; that he was desirous that Mr. Kendall should make inquiries; and that they might remain uncommitted until after a consideration of the questions that were connected with a change of the depository."

Under these views, the Secretary consented to prepare instructions for the agent; stating, the approaching dissolution of the United States Bank; his power, prior to that period, if there were adequate cause, to withhold the deposits from it, and the desire of the President to ascertain, whether a substitute might not be procured in the state banks; directing the agent to select a designated number of such banks in certain districts, which should be empowered to appoint all the banks, at other points, in which the public money should be deposited, subject to the approbation of the Secretary; who reserved the right to discontinue the deposits in any bank when he should think proper. The terms proposed for an arrangement with the banks were, that they should make monthly or more frequent returns of their condition; report, weekly, the public deposits, and submit their books and transactions to examination by the Secretary or his agent when required: that the contract of the Government should be only with the primary banks, they being responsible for the safety of the deposits wherever made, and for making payments, without charge to the Government, at all places directed by the Secretary, rendering every service lawfully required from the United States Bank, and paying the expense of any agent the secretary should appoint to examine into their affairs. The agent was also instructed;-to inquire, whether the charters of such banks as were disposed to this arrangement would warrant it; whether, if it should be made, prior to the 4th of March, 1836, the Bank of the United States might have power and disposition to embarrass or interrupt it;