ment: 'I undertake on behalf of Mr. P. (in consideration of Mr. D. having this day given an undertaking to procure Mr. W.'s cheque in favor of Mr. P. for 150l. on account of a debt due from Mr. C. to Mr. P.) that Mr. C. shall have credit for that sum in his accounts with Mr. P. and that Mr. W. shall stand in the place of Mr. P. to that amount; and I further undertake that Mr. P. shall not personally dispute Mr. W.'s right to deduct that sum from the accounts owing by the colliers of the Black Park Colliery to Mr. C.;' Held, that this agreement showed a sufficient consideration moving from P. Peate v. Dicken, 1 C., M. & R. 422.

APPRENTICE.

A.

(What amounts to recision of contract for apprenticeship.) The father of A., a minor, agreed with B. to receive A. into his (B.'s) service on trial, and to take him as an apprentice, if approved. A. went into the service, and worked for B. nearly two years. To several applications made during that time by the father, B. answered that his son should serve out the two years and then be bound, the father paying a fee of 10l. This was agreed to; but shortly after B. quarrelled with A. and told him to go home about his business. went home; and on his father's applying to B. for an explanation, he was told to go and do his worst. The father then caused a letter to be written to B. by an attorney, requiring him either to take A. as his apprentice, or recompense him for his work; to which no satisfactory answer was given. In an action brought by A. (by his next friend) to recover compensation for his service, the judge left it to the jury, on the above facts, to say whether B.'s conduct was such as warranted the father in considering the contract for an apprenticeship as abandoned; and told them, if they thought it was, to give the plaintiff such compensation for his work as they thought proper. The jury found for the plaintiff, with damages by way of compensation for his service: Held, that the direction was proper, and the verdict right. Phillips v. Wiginton, 1. A. & E. 333. ARBITRATION.

(Setting aside award.) An award made by a legal arbitrator cannot be impeached, on the ground of his having decided either contrary to fact or to law. (1 Price, 81.) If the reference is to a non-legal arbitrator, the Court will review his decision as to a point of law, but not upon the facts, unless his award appears so grossly wrong as to induce a suspicion of misconduct. Where a cause was referred to an attorney and another person, the Court granted a rule for setting aside the award on a point of law. Wade v. Malpas, 2 D. P. C. 638; Ashton v. Pointer, ib. 651.

ARREST.

(On return from imprisonment.) A defendant, discharged from lawful custody, is not entitled to any privilege from arrest redeundo. (1 D. P. C. 157.) Goodwin v. Lordon, 1 A. & E. 378 ; 2 D. P. C. 504. ATTORNEY.

1. (Attorney's lien for costs.) Where one judgment is set off against another, the lien of an attorney does not extend beyond his costs in the particular cause. (3 B. & C. 535.) Watson v. Maskell, 1 Bing. N. C. 366.

2. (Attorney and client.) If the plaintiff's attorney receives a sum of money from the defendant, it is primâ facie money received to the plaintiff's use, unless he show that the receipt was without his authority. Vorley v. Garrad, 2 D. P. C. 490.

3. An attorney, entering into an agreement for the settlement of his client's affairs on a Sunday, and thereby rendering himself personally liable, is not a person exercising his ordinary calling within the stat. 22 Car. 2. Peate v. Dicken, 1 C., M. & R. 422; 3 D. P. C. 171.

AUCTIONEER.

(When entitled to set up the jus tertii.) The plaintiff, the elder brother and creditor of an intestate, being in possession of the intestate's goods under a bill of sale, said that he should not insist on his bill of sale, but should divide the goods with the other creditors, and he employed the defendant, an auctioneer, to sell the goods. The auctioneer sold accordingly; after the sale the widow of the deceased gave the defendant notice, through her attorney, not to pay the plaintiff, but to retain the proceeds until all the creditors should come in, that they might be rateably divided amongst them. No letters of administration were taken out: Held, that the defendant was prima facie bound to account to the plaintiff, from whom he had received the goods; and even if he would have been at liberty to set up the jus tertii, and show as a defence against the plaintiff that he was bound to account to a third person, still that he was liable, no title being in fact shown by him in any other person. Crosskey v. Mills, 1 C. M. & R. 298.

BANKRUPTCY.

(Order and disposition.) The assignor of a simple contract debt must be considered in law as having the order and disposition of the debt with the consent of the true owner, until the debtor has notice of the assignment: it will in such case therefore pass to the assignees of the former on his bankruptcy or insolvency. (4 B. & Ad. 546; 1 T. R. 619.) Buck v. Lee, 3 N. & M. 580.

BILL OF EXCHANCE.

1. (Plea of want of consideration.) A plea to an action on a bill by indorsee against acceptor, that the acceptance was without consideration: Held bad on demurrer. (2 B. & Ad. 291.) Lowe v. Chifney, 1 Bing. N. C. 267; 5 Moo. and Sc. 95; French v. Archer, 3 D. P. C. 130.

2. (Pleadings.) Indorsee v. Indorser of a bill. Plea, that the action was commenced before a reasonable time, for the payment of the bill had elapsed after notice of dishonor was given: Held bad. (5 Taunt. 240.) Siggers v. Lewis, 1 C., M. & R. 370; 2 D. P. C. 081. 3. (Property in bill.) A., the payee of a bill, delivered it to B. to get it discounted. B. carried it to C. who refused to discount it, unless B. would indorse it. He did so, and C. discounted it, but paid over a part only of the proceeds; and negotiated the bill for his own benefit. A. being compelled to take up the bill at maturity, sued C. for the balance left unpaid: Held, that he was entitled to recover; and that the proper question for the jury was, whether A. was in fact the owner of the bill, not whether B. represented him to be so in discounting it with C. Bastable v. Poole, 1 C., M. & R. 410.

4. (Production of, on trial.) It is no ground for a new trial in an action on a bill or note, that it was not produced at the trial, unless it appear that the defendant asked for its production. Henn v. Neck, 3 D. P. C. 163.

BOND.

(Estoppel on obligor.) The obligor of a bond conditioned for payment of rent at the rate of 170l. a year, according to an indenture of lease,'-which lease stated the rent to be 140l. a year-is estopped, in an action on the bond, from saying that the rent received by the lease was other than 170l. a year. (1 Roll. Abr. 872; Cro. Eliz. 362; Willes, 9; 2 B. & P. 299; 6 Mod. 237; 1 Sid. 50, 57.) Lainson v. Tremere, 3 N. & M. 603.

CONSPIRACY.

(To procure marriage between paupers-Indictment for.) A conspiracy to procure a marriage between poor persons of different parishes, for the purpose of relieving the one parish of the woman, and charging the other parish, is not indictable, unless the parties were unwilling to marry, or some forcible or fraudulent means of procuring the marriage were resorted to. The end being lawful, it must appear that the means used were unlawful.

In such an indictment, a statement that the woman was a poor unmarried woman, with child, is not equivalent to a statement that she was actually chargeable. (11 East, 381.) Rex v. Seward, 3 N. & M. 557.

COPYRIGHT.

(In dramatic works.) The assignee of the copyright of a dramatic work printed and published within ten years before the passing of 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 15, (or subsequently to the act, no express reservation of the exclusive right to the representation being made by the author,) and not the author who has assigned such copyright, is entitled under sect. 1 of that act, to the sole right of representing the piece or causing it to be represented. Cumberland v. Planche, 3 N. & M. 537.

CORPORATION. SEE DISTRESS.

COSTS.

1. (Security of costs.) Where security for costs has been once given, the defendant will not be entitled to fresh security if the sureties Jones v. Jacobs, 2 D. P. C. 442.

become insolvent.

2. (Of witnesses) A plaintiff is entitled to the costs of his witnesses from the commencement of the assizes, inasmuch as he is bound to have them in attendance from the commencement. Cosgrave v. Evans, 2 I). P. C. 443.

3. (Of issues on special pleas.) Defendant pleads the general issue and several special pleas; verdict for defendant on the general issue, for plaintiff on the special pleas. The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of the pleadings and witnesses on those pleas, (overruling Other v. Calvert, 1 Bing. 275.) Hart v. Cutbush, 2 D. P. C. 456.

4. (Security for costs. Pauper.) Where it appeared that a plaintiff, suing in forma pauperis, would be absent from England eighteen months, the Court made a rule absolute for a stay of proceedings till his return, unless he gave security for costs. Foss v. Wagner,

2 D. P. C. 499..

5. (Of witnesses.) Where, by an alteration in the pleadings, after notice of trial, certain witnesses become unnecessary, the party who subpœnæd them must use reasonable efforts to prevent their attendance, or their expenses will not be allowed on taxation. Allport v. Baldwin, 2 D. P. C. 599.

6. (The same.) Security for costs cannot be required from a peer, though residing permanently abroad. Earl Ferrers v. Robins, 2 D. P. C. 636.

7. (Security for costs.) A plaintiff, being called upon for his place of residence, gave Peel's Coffee House, Fleet Street: Held not sufficient, and proceedings were stayed till he gave a better place of residence. Hodson v. Gamble, 3 D. P. C. 174.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

If a debtor obtains the benefit of a trust deed executed by his creditors, and in it is contained a consideration that he shall make a full disclosure of his property, but he conceals a portion of it, the creditors signing the deed may still proceed against him. Wenham v. Fowle, 3 D. P. C. 43.

DEVISE.

(Of reversion in fee.) Testator, being seised in tail of lands at C., with remainder to his son in tail, and reversion to himself in fee, and being also seised in fee of other lands at D., devised all his real estates whatsoever over which he had any disposing power to R. and his heirs, in trust for testator's son for life, with several remainders over in tail, subject to terms for the payment of debts, annuities and marriage portions: Held, that by this devise the testator's reversionary interest in the lands at C. passed to the devisee. (2 Burr. 912; 6 East, 494; 15 Ves. 406; 11 East, 322; 1 Taunt. 289.) Mostyn v. Champneys, 1 Bing. N. C. 341. DISTRESS.

(Under authority of corporation.) In trover against a corporation for the value of goods unlawfully taken by way of distress under the direction of their clerk, it is sufficient to give general evidence of his authority to distrain, without showing an appointment under seal. (16 East, 6; 1 Salk. 191; Com. Dig. Franchises, F: 13; 1 Campb. 466; 3 Lev. 107.) Smith v. Birmingham and Staffordshire Gas Light Comp.,, 3 N. & M. 771.

EASEMENT.

1. (Licence to open window.) The defendant, the side of whose house adjoined the plaintiff's lawn, wrote to the plaintiff as follows:-' Before the last coat of paint is put upon the side wall, we wish to place a window in it, and our workmen say it can be finished off more neatly with your permission to place the necessary ladder, &c. The motive for doing this is that I should gain a more cheerful view.' The plaintiff replied, 'You are welcome to place a ladder in my grounds' Held, that this did not amount to a licence to open a window, and therefore that the plaintiff might obstruct the window by an erection on his own land. Bridges v. Blanchard, 3 N. & M., 691.

2. (Verbal licence to use easement.—Revocation.). A verbal licence is not sufficient to confer an easement of having a drain in the land of another to convey water: and such licence may be revoked, though it has been acted on. (5 B. & C. 221; 8 East, 308.) Cocker v. Cowper, 1 C., M. & R. 418.