III.

THE CONVENTION.

IN the previous chapter we have traced the progress of democratic freedom, from its birth in the separate colonies, through successive but partial unions. It is very noteworthy how instinctively at the approach of danger the colonies turned for safety to the idea of union. And this was something more than a union of States: it was a union of people. When in 1774 its necessity had become pressing, and delegates from twelve States were authorized to consult together for "the common welfare;" and again in 1775, when the revolutionary Congress represented all the States; on both these occasions, the delegates referred their authority, not to the State Legislatures, but to the People in their sovereign capacity. They had been appointed principally by the citizens in Convention; and when not so, by the popular branch of the Legislature only. A fatal de

parture from this mode was adopted in the case of the Confederation, and the delegates were chosen by the State Legislatures.

After the War of Independence had terminated in 1783, that Confederation dragged on through four years of a useless and dishonoured existence. Still, "that Congress should forego the right of originating changes in the system of government; that it should advise the States to confer that power upon another assembly; and that it should sanction a general revision of the Federal Constitution, with the express declaration of its present inadequacy, were all preliminary essentials to a successful reform. Feeble as it had become from the overgrown vitality of State power, and from the lack of numbers and talent upon its roll, it was still the Government of the Union; the Congress of America; the lineal successor of that renowned assembly which had defied the power of England, and brought into existence the thirteen United States. If it stood but the poor shadow of a great name, it was still a name with which to do more than conjure; for it bore a constitutional relation to the

States, still reverenced by the wise and thoughtful, and still necessary to be regarded by all who desired the security of Constitutional Liberty."

It was Hamilton-than whom a purer or wiser patriot never lived-who first saw, that while Congress was practically unable to revise its own "Articles," and was utterly powerless under them as they stood, it was nevertheless desirable to obtain its sanction for a new constitution. He, whose "mature and energetic youth, trained in the school of Washington, had been devoted to the formation and establishment of the Union, knew too well that if its golden cord were once broken, no human agency could again restore it to life. He knew the value of habit, the respect for an established, however enfeebled, authority; and while he felt and insisted on the necessity for a new Constitution, and did all in his power to make the country perceive the defects of the old one, he wisely and honestly admitted that the assent of Congress must be gained to any movement which proposed to remedy the evil.”2

It was therefore resolved, that Congress 2 CURTIS, i. 365.

1 CURTIS, i. 362.

should be called upon for its sanction to a revision, but not for the revision itself.

On 21st February, 1787, a resolution was adopted by Congress, recommending a Convention for the following May.

And here let us observe that Mr. Spence has made an error of no small importance in our discussion. He states that the Convention

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was summoned by an act of Congress, which strictly defined its object and powers in these words- for the purpose of revising the Act of Confederation, and for reporting to the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as should, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the federal compact adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union."" "There is clearly," Mr. Spence adds, "no authority here to frame a new system, or effect organic change, but simply to make alterations and provisions, to effect a vigorous reform;' nor could the Convention desire to exceed their authority, seeing that the next step was to refer the instrument to Congress for its approval, to the very source of their

authority, whose sanction was essential to the success of their labours."1

But Congress was not "the source of their authority," nor did they assemble with the limited powers which Mr. Spence describes. It was only the sanction of Congress that Hamilton had desired, and its "recommendation" for a Convention was all that was given. It was not within the power of Congress to do more than this. One of its acknowledged defects was, that it could only "devise and recommend." Any alterations in its constitution must have been agreed to there, but could only be confirmed by the legislature of every State. Nor did the originating of such alterations necessarily devolve upon that body. It,, therefore, simply "recommended" the separate State legislatures to appoint delegates to the Convention for the purposes described in the resolution. And thus Hamilton's politic idea was realized in perfect accordance with the Articles of Confederation.

It is, indeed, quite true, and so much we concede to Mr. Spence, that so wide a scheme The American Union, by JAMES SPENCE, p. 222.